Pub Date : 2021-10-14DOI: 10.1017/S0020818321000412
I. Jurado, Sandra León, Stefanie Walter
Abstract How do voters want their governments to respond when another country unilaterally withdraws from an international institution? We distinguish between negotiation approaches that vary in the degree to which they accommodate the withdrawing state's demands and argue that negotiation preferences are shaped by two issues. The first is voters’ exposure to the costs and benefits of accommodation. This exposure varies across issues, and we argue that citizens will generally prefer non-accommodation on zero-sum issues, but support more accommodation on cooperation issues, where non-accommodation puts existing cooperation gains at risk. Second, withdrawal negotiations create precedents, and citizens should therefore be less willing to accommodate the more they are concerned about the ripple effects of accommodation on the institution's stability. These concerns also confront citizens with two types of dilemmas depending on how favorably they view the institution themselves. To test our argument, we use survey evidence and a conjoint experiment conducted in Germany and Spain during the Brexit negotiations. We find that respondents overall are more willing to accommodate the UK on cooperation issues than on zero-sum issues, but also find evidence that Euroskeptics and Europhiles confront different issue-specific dilemmas. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics surrounding the challenges to multilateralism that have proliferated in recent years.
{"title":"Brexit Dilemmas: Shaping Postwithdrawal Relations with a Leaving State","authors":"I. Jurado, Sandra León, Stefanie Walter","doi":"10.1017/S0020818321000412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000412","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do voters want their governments to respond when another country unilaterally withdraws from an international institution? We distinguish between negotiation approaches that vary in the degree to which they accommodate the withdrawing state's demands and argue that negotiation preferences are shaped by two issues. The first is voters’ exposure to the costs and benefits of accommodation. This exposure varies across issues, and we argue that citizens will generally prefer non-accommodation on zero-sum issues, but support more accommodation on cooperation issues, where non-accommodation puts existing cooperation gains at risk. Second, withdrawal negotiations create precedents, and citizens should therefore be less willing to accommodate the more they are concerned about the ripple effects of accommodation on the institution's stability. These concerns also confront citizens with two types of dilemmas depending on how favorably they view the institution themselves. To test our argument, we use survey evidence and a conjoint experiment conducted in Germany and Spain during the Brexit negotiations. We find that respondents overall are more willing to accommodate the UK on cooperation issues than on zero-sum issues, but also find evidence that Euroskeptics and Europhiles confront different issue-specific dilemmas. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics surrounding the challenges to multilateralism that have proliferated in recent years.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45579625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-21DOI: 10.1017/S0020818321000394
D. Tingley, Michael Tomz
Abstract How does naming and shaming affect public support for compliance with international agreements? We investigated this question by conducting survey experiments about the Paris Agreement, which relies on social pressure for enforcement. Our experiments, administered to national samples in the United States, produced three sets of findings. First, shaming by foreign countries shifted domestic public opinion in favor of compliance, increasing the political incentive to honor the Paris Agreement. Second, the effects of shaming varied with the behavior of the target. Shaming was more effective against partial compliers than against targets that took no action or honored their obligations completely. Moreover, even partial compliers managed to reduce the effects of shaming through the strategic use of counter-rhetoric. Third, identity moderated responses to shaming. Shaming by allies was not significantly more effective than shaming by non-allies, but Democrats were more receptive to shaming than Republicans. Overall, our experiments expose both the power and the limits of shaming as a strategy for enforcing the Paris Agreement. At the same time, they advance our understanding of the most significant environmental problem facing the planet.
{"title":"The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement","authors":"D. Tingley, Michael Tomz","doi":"10.1017/S0020818321000394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000394","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does naming and shaming affect public support for compliance with international agreements? We investigated this question by conducting survey experiments about the Paris Agreement, which relies on social pressure for enforcement. Our experiments, administered to national samples in the United States, produced three sets of findings. First, shaming by foreign countries shifted domestic public opinion in favor of compliance, increasing the political incentive to honor the Paris Agreement. Second, the effects of shaming varied with the behavior of the target. Shaming was more effective against partial compliers than against targets that took no action or honored their obligations completely. Moreover, even partial compliers managed to reduce the effects of shaming through the strategic use of counter-rhetoric. Third, identity moderated responses to shaming. Shaming by allies was not significantly more effective than shaming by non-allies, but Democrats were more receptive to shaming than Republicans. Overall, our experiments expose both the power and the limits of shaming as a strategy for enforcing the Paris Agreement. At the same time, they advance our understanding of the most significant environmental problem facing the planet.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41259761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-13DOI: 10.1017/S002081832100031X
R. Gulotty, Dorothy Kronick
Abstract Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-rate subsidy to underwrite hundreds of billions of dollars of imports. Whereas estimates from traditional models would make Chávez look like a welfare maximizer, our results indicate that he implemented distortionary commercial policy to the benefit of special interests. Our analysis underscores the importance of tailoring workhorse models to account for differences in interest group configuration. The politics of trade policy is not reducible to the politics of protectionism.
{"title":"The Arbitrage Lobby: Theory and Evidence on Dual Exchange Rates","authors":"R. Gulotty, Dorothy Kronick","doi":"10.1017/S002081832100031X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081832100031X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-rate subsidy to underwrite hundreds of billions of dollars of imports. Whereas estimates from traditional models would make Chávez look like a welfare maximizer, our results indicate that he implemented distortionary commercial policy to the benefit of special interests. Our analysis underscores the importance of tailoring workhorse models to account for differences in interest group configuration. The politics of trade policy is not reducible to the politics of protectionism.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44342920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-05DOI: 10.1017/S0020818321000308
R. Stone, Yu Wang, Shu Yu
Abstract China has become a leading source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), and the Chinese state exercises a unique degree of influence over its firms. We explore the patterns of political influence over FDI using a comprehensive firm-level data set on Chinese outward FDI from 2000 to 2013. Using six country-level measures of affinity for China, we find that state-owned and globally diversified firms appear to conform most closely to official guidance. Official investment directives and state visits link investments to state policies; Taiwan recognition and Dalai Lama meetings anchor our political interpretations; and UN General Assembly voting and temporary UN Security Council membership suggest that this intervention may be systematic. The results are robust to country, year, and sector fixed effects, and most do not hold for private or small firms. The results suggest that China uses FDI by prominent state-owned enterprises as an instrument to promote its foreign policy.
{"title":"Chinese Power and the State-Owned Enterprise","authors":"R. Stone, Yu Wang, Shu Yu","doi":"10.1017/S0020818321000308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000308","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China has become a leading source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), and the Chinese state exercises a unique degree of influence over its firms. We explore the patterns of political influence over FDI using a comprehensive firm-level data set on Chinese outward FDI from 2000 to 2013. Using six country-level measures of affinity for China, we find that state-owned and globally diversified firms appear to conform most closely to official guidance. Official investment directives and state visits link investments to state policies; Taiwan recognition and Dalai Lama meetings anchor our political interpretations; and UN General Assembly voting and temporary UN Security Council membership suggest that this intervention may be systematic. The results are robust to country, year, and sector fixed effects, and most do not hold for private or small firms. The results suggest that China uses FDI by prominent state-owned enterprises as an instrument to promote its foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0020818321000308","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46347270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.1017/s002081830002470x
H. Hertig
An important item of discussion during the Autumn months of 1960 among the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was reported to be the question of association with the European Economic Community (EEC), but the press announced in October a “lack of progress” in resolving the problems encountered. The question was said to have been included in the issues taken up at the second ministerial meeting of the Council, held in Berne, Switzerland, on October 11 and 12, 1960. Mr. Max Petitpierre, president of the Swiss Confederation, reportedly stated in an address to the Council that, even if there was little prospect of an agreement between EEC and EFTA in the immediate future, it was imperative that the two organizations work together, not only for commercial and economic reasons, but also because of the mission that Europe was called on to discharge toward the newly independent countries. Since, however, an acceptable settlement with EEC seemed impossible in the near future, the Council determined that EFTA should proceed with its own plans. In pursuance of this decision, the Ministers decided to establish a consultative committee, representative of all aspects of economic activity, including labor, to advise on all facets of the activity of the Association. Also considered at the meeting was the possibility of an additional 10 percent tariff reduction to take effect as of January 1, 1961, to keep pace with the EEC cut scheduled for that date, but the Council concluded that too little time had elapsed since the first 20 percent tariff reductions on July 1, 1960, to make any modification of the timetable feasible at this time; it resolved, nevertheless, to re-examine the question early in 1961. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that the original tariff cuts had gone into operation without difficulty, and reasserted that the object of EFTA was not the creation of an inward-looking preferential bloc—for example, no restrictions on trade with third countries had been introduced with the creation of the group. EFTA offered to all trading nations, whether producers of industrial or agricultural products, stated the Council, the opportunities of an expanding market.
{"title":"European Free Trade Association","authors":"H. Hertig","doi":"10.1017/s002081830002470x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s002081830002470x","url":null,"abstract":"An important item of discussion during the Autumn months of 1960 among the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was reported to be the question of association with the European Economic Community (EEC), but the press announced in October a “lack of progress” in resolving the problems encountered. The question was said to have been included in the issues taken up at the second ministerial meeting of the Council, held in Berne, Switzerland, on October 11 and 12, 1960. Mr. Max Petitpierre, president of the Swiss Confederation, reportedly stated in an address to the Council that, even if there was little prospect of an agreement between EEC and EFTA in the immediate future, it was imperative that the two organizations work together, not only for commercial and economic reasons, but also because of the mission that Europe was called on to discharge toward the newly independent countries. Since, however, an acceptable settlement with EEC seemed impossible in the near future, the Council determined that EFTA should proceed with its own plans. In pursuance of this decision, the Ministers decided to establish a consultative committee, representative of all aspects of economic activity, including labor, to advise on all facets of the activity of the Association. Also considered at the meeting was the possibility of an additional 10 percent tariff reduction to take effect as of January 1, 1961, to keep pace with the EEC cut scheduled for that date, but the Council concluded that too little time had elapsed since the first 20 percent tariff reductions on July 1, 1960, to make any modification of the timetable feasible at this time; it resolved, nevertheless, to re-examine the question early in 1961. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that the original tariff cuts had gone into operation without difficulty, and reasserted that the object of EFTA was not the creation of an inward-looking preferential bloc—for example, no restrictions on trade with third countries had been introduced with the creation of the group. EFTA offered to all trading nations, whether producers of industrial or agricultural products, stated the Council, the opportunities of an expanding market.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s002081830002470x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44865358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.1017/S0020818321000357
Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Layna Mosley, R. Wellhausen
Abstract Governments interact strategically with sovereign bond market creditors: they make choices not only about how often and how much to borrow, but also under what terms. The denomination of debt, in domestic or foreign currency, is a critical part of these terms. The “original sin” logic has long predicted that creditors have little appetite for developing-country government debt issued in domestic currency. Our novel data, including bond issues by 131 countries in 240,000 primary market transactions between 1990 and 2016, suggest otherwise. Domestic-denominated bonds have come to dominate the market, although domestic-currency issuance often is accompanied by shorter bond maturities. We argue that ideologically rooted policy preferences play an important role in this unexpected trend in denomination. All else equal, right governments choose foreign denomination as a means of mitigating currency risk and thus minimizing borrowing costs. In contrast, left governments opt for the flexibility of domestic denomination, and they are better able to act on their preferences in the presence of risk-mitigating monetary institutions and macroeconomic stability. We find support for our argument that partisanship has a robust and enduring relationship with denomination outcomes, even in a marketplace in which domestic-denominated developing-country sovereign bonds have become the norm.
{"title":"Coming to Terms: The Politics of Sovereign Bond Denomination","authors":"Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Layna Mosley, R. Wellhausen","doi":"10.1017/S0020818321000357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000357","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Governments interact strategically with sovereign bond market creditors: they make choices not only about how often and how much to borrow, but also under what terms. The denomination of debt, in domestic or foreign currency, is a critical part of these terms. The “original sin” logic has long predicted that creditors have little appetite for developing-country government debt issued in domestic currency. Our novel data, including bond issues by 131 countries in 240,000 primary market transactions between 1990 and 2016, suggest otherwise. Domestic-denominated bonds have come to dominate the market, although domestic-currency issuance often is accompanied by shorter bond maturities. We argue that ideologically rooted policy preferences play an important role in this unexpected trend in denomination. All else equal, right governments choose foreign denomination as a means of mitigating currency risk and thus minimizing borrowing costs. In contrast, left governments opt for the flexibility of domestic denomination, and they are better able to act on their preferences in the presence of risk-mitigating monetary institutions and macroeconomic stability. We find support for our argument that partisanship has a robust and enduring relationship with denomination outcomes, even in a marketplace in which domestic-denominated developing-country sovereign bonds have become the norm.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43136821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-23DOI: 10.1017/S0020818321000333
D. Cohen, S. Karim
Abstract Recent world events, such as the rise of hypermasculine authoritarian leaders, have shown the importance of both sex and gender for understanding international politics. However, quantitative researchers of conflict have long relegated the study of sex and gender inequality as a cause of war to a specialized group of scholars, despite overwhelming evidence that the connections are profound and consequential. In this review essay, we demonstrate the tremendous progress made in this field by analyzing a wave of research that examines the relationships between sex and gender inequality and war. We divide this work into theories that emphasize strategy versus those that analyze structures. In addition, we focus on two aspects of this research agenda—specifying mechanisms that link sex and gender inequality to war, and leveraging data at multiple levels of analysis—to outline fruitful pathways forward for the broader international security research agenda. Ultimately, we argue that the study of the nexus of sex and gender inequality and war will enliven theoretical debates, illuminate new hypotheses, and enrich the policy discourse with robust evidence.
{"title":"Does More Equality for Women Mean Less War? Rethinking Sex and Gender Inequality and Political Violence","authors":"D. Cohen, S. Karim","doi":"10.1017/S0020818321000333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000333","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent world events, such as the rise of hypermasculine authoritarian leaders, have shown the importance of both sex and gender for understanding international politics. However, quantitative researchers of conflict have long relegated the study of sex and gender inequality as a cause of war to a specialized group of scholars, despite overwhelming evidence that the connections are profound and consequential. In this review essay, we demonstrate the tremendous progress made in this field by analyzing a wave of research that examines the relationships between sex and gender inequality and war. We divide this work into theories that emphasize strategy versus those that analyze structures. In addition, we focus on two aspects of this research agenda—specifying mechanisms that link sex and gender inequality to war, and leveraging data at multiple levels of analysis—to outline fruitful pathways forward for the broader international security research agenda. Ultimately, we argue that the study of the nexus of sex and gender inequality and war will enliven theoretical debates, illuminate new hypotheses, and enrich the policy discourse with robust evidence.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0020818321000333","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42836791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-12DOI: 10.1017/S0020818321000345
N. Miller
Abstract How effective are states at assessing and predicting the nuclear intentions of foreign countries? Drawing on close to 200 US assessments of foreign countries’ proliferation intentions between 1957 and 1966, this research note finds that close to 80 percent of testable US assessments were correct and that they shifted from highly inaccurate in the late 1950s to highly accurate in the 1960s. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, I conclude that learning from early failures led the intelligence community to achieve higher accuracy.
{"title":"Learning to Predict Proliferation","authors":"N. Miller","doi":"10.1017/S0020818321000345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000345","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How effective are states at assessing and predicting the nuclear intentions of foreign countries? Drawing on close to 200 US assessments of foreign countries’ proliferation intentions between 1957 and 1966, this research note finds that close to 80 percent of testable US assessments were correct and that they shifted from highly inaccurate in the late 1950s to highly accurate in the 1960s. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, I conclude that learning from early failures led the intelligence community to achieve higher accuracy.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0020818321000345","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44006831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300008675
H. Canton
The second part of the ninth ordinary session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was held from October 16 to 29, 1957, under the presidency of Mr. Fernand Dehousse.
{"title":"Council of Europe","authors":"H. Canton","doi":"10.1017/S0020818300008675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300008675","url":null,"abstract":"The second part of the ninth ordinary session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was held from October 16 to 29, 1957, under the presidency of Mr. Fernand Dehousse.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0020818300008675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49130598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-06DOI: 10.1017/S0020818321000321
Colin Chia
Abstract Identities and ideas can lead to international order contestation through the efforts of international actors to socially position themselves and perform their identities. International actors try to shape the world to suit who they want to be. To substantiate this argument, I examine the contestation of international orders in early modern Southeast Asia. The prevailing view portrays a Confucian international order which formed a consensual and stable hierarchy in East Asia. However, instead of acquiescing to hegemonic leadership, both Siam and Vietnam frequently sought to assert their equality and even superiority to the Chinese dynasties. I argue that both polities engaged in political contention to define their places in relation to other polities and the broader social context in which they interacted. I examine how international order contestation emerged from efforts to define and redefine background knowledge about social positioning, social categorization, and the political ontologies and beliefs about collective purpose on which they are based. I claim that agents seek to interact with others in ways that reify their sense of self, and challenge the background knowledge embedded in performances of other actors that threaten their ability to perform their identity. I also argue against theories that attribute international order contestation to hegemonic decline or the breakdown of a tacit bargain, which assume that orders are held together by a dominant power. One implication is that hegemony and hierarchy are based on dominant ideas, not dominant states.
{"title":"Social Positioning and International Order Contestation in Early Modern Southeast Asia","authors":"Colin Chia","doi":"10.1017/S0020818321000321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000321","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Identities and ideas can lead to international order contestation through the efforts of international actors to socially position themselves and perform their identities. International actors try to shape the world to suit who they want to be. To substantiate this argument, I examine the contestation of international orders in early modern Southeast Asia. The prevailing view portrays a Confucian international order which formed a consensual and stable hierarchy in East Asia. However, instead of acquiescing to hegemonic leadership, both Siam and Vietnam frequently sought to assert their equality and even superiority to the Chinese dynasties. I argue that both polities engaged in political contention to define their places in relation to other polities and the broader social context in which they interacted. I examine how international order contestation emerged from efforts to define and redefine background knowledge about social positioning, social categorization, and the political ontologies and beliefs about collective purpose on which they are based. I claim that agents seek to interact with others in ways that reify their sense of self, and challenge the background knowledge embedded in performances of other actors that threaten their ability to perform their identity. I also argue against theories that attribute international order contestation to hegemonic decline or the breakdown of a tacit bargain, which assume that orders are held together by a dominant power. One implication is that hegemony and hierarchy are based on dominant ideas, not dominant states.","PeriodicalId":48388,"journal":{"name":"International Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0020818321000321","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41505249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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