Journal of Applied Social Psychology最新文献

People have conflicting opinions on coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), from disagreements about the vaccine's effectiveness to competing claims about the need for restrictions. The present two studies (Ns = 262 and 250) examined whether COVID-19 beliefs had a confirmatory impact on how belief-relevant scientific research is evaluated and whether the use of corrective strategies (counter explanation and consider the opposite) reduces this bias. While biased assimilation (belief-consistent studies were evaluated more positively than belief-inconsistent studies) and perceived attitude polarization (participants reported that their beliefs became more extreme) effects were strong and consistent, evidence for overcoming these biases was mixed. Whereas considering the opposite had a corrective effect on biased assimilation and perceived attitude polarization, counter explanation depolarized actual attitude change.

In recent years, anti-immigration movements have emerged and aim to gain the attention and support of the public. In two studies (Study 1, N = 775, student sample; Study 2, N = 500, non student sample) we investigated the role of positive and negative intergroup contact to predict support for anti-immigration movements from native Germans in a context of a recent intergroup conflict. Using path analysis, we analyzed the mediating processes of threat perceptions for the intentions to engage in collective action against immigration policies and the justification of the protests. Extending previous research on collective action, intergroup contact and threat, we further tested the moderating role of the identification with Germany. Findings from both studies supported the predictive power of intergroup contact as well as the mediating role of threat for collective action intentions and the justification of protests. Our results suggest that behavioral support was predicted by a strong identification with the threatened ingroup, whereass passive support was not. These findings highlighting the role importance of identification for movement support.

Previous research has demonstrated that conservative individuals (relative to liberal individuals) were less likely to adhere to COVID-19 guidelines (e.g., social distancing). We argue that because adherence to COVID-19 guidelines was largely characterized as “politically correct” behavior, individuals opposed to political correctness (PC) norms would follow COVID-19 guidelines less, controlling for political conservatism and other relevant demographic variables. In two correlational studies and one preregistered experiment, we tested whether opposition to political correctness (OPC) predicts less adherence to COVID-19 guidelines. Study 1 showed that OPC correlates negatively with mask-wearing and social distancing, controlling for conservatism, gender, age, and religious identity. Study 2 replicated and extended these effects, demonstrating that seeing mask-wearing as a common good (i.e., as a beneficial COVID-19 mitigation strategy) mediated the relationship between OPC and mask-wearing, social distancing, handwashing, and vaccination intentions. Study 3 experimentally manipulated feelings toward PC. Inconsistent with our preregistered hypothesis but consistent with previous research, participants induced to have positive feelings toward PC adhered to COVID-19 guidelines the most and had the most positive feelings toward wearing masks. We discuss how moralization of health guidelines can predict individuals' likelihood of adhering to these guidelines. We also discuss how best to persuade individuals who see adherence to health guidelines as “politically correct,” as well as future research directions to address this concern.

This research investigated the effects of a single exposure to media content of a distinct valence and mass-mediated contact with a distant minority outgroup on feelings/attitudes toward a local outgroup. Experimental Study 1 was conducted among 314 Israeli Jews. The findings of Study 1 showed the effects of a single exposure to positive and negative media items about asylum seekers in Europe on perceived threats posed by them. In this study we did not find a carry-over effect of single-exposure to a media item about asylum seekers in Europe on feelings toward the local outgroup—asylum seekers in Israel. Study 2 was conducted through an online survey among 1039 Israeli Jews. It showed the effect of recurring mass-mediated contact with asylum seekers in Europe on perceived threats posed by them. Both Study 1 and Study 2 found carry-over effects of realistic and symbolic threats from asylum seekers in Europe on feelings/attitudes toward asylum seekers in Israel. The findings of Study 2 also showed a carry-over effect of positive mass-mediated contact with a distant outgroup on attitudes toward a local outgroup. Based on the findings, we conclude that the positive media framing of distant outgroups may promote tolerance and acceptance of local outgroups.

Intergroup status relations are in a constant flux, and groups monitor and pay attention to not only their own status as active and distinctive entities to ensure survival but also monitor the status and vitality of rival outgroups that are viewed as a threat to ingroup status. This study, set within the context of Indian religious intergroup relations, examines whether perceived outgroup vitality and status are associated with uncertainty about the ingroup's future and whether heightened uncertainty is associated with greater preference for leadership rhetoric that highlights ingroup collective victimhood and suffering. Indian Hindu (N = 163) participants recruited through MTurk completed measures of religious identification, outgroup vitality, and future uncertainty and were randomly assigned to read either a victimhood message or a pro-diversity message by a prospective leader. Uncertainty about the ingroup's future mediated the relationship between outgroup vitality and leader support; leader speech moderated the relationship between uncertainty and leader support, such that under high uncertainty a leader who used victimhood speech was preferred. Implications for the ways in which leaders can gain influence by emphasizing subgroup suffering given the context of existential ingroup uncertainty is discussed.

Slavery, in the form of 'debt-bondage', is rife in Indian brick kilns, where the enforcement of labour laws is poor. Working equids support brick-kiln workers by transporting raw bricks into the kilns, but the situation of equids and their owners within the brick kilns is relatively unknown. We describe the welfare of donkeys (Equus asinus) owned under conditions of debt-bondage, examine the links between owner and donkey behaviour, and outline the living conditions of both donkeys and humans working in the brick kilns of Gujarat, India. We then explore the unique experience of debt-bondage by donkey owners, compare migration trends to those of non-donkey-owning workers and assess impacts on their children's education. The physical and behavioural conditions of donkeys reflected that of their owners, creating negative feedback loops and potentially reducing productivity. All donkey owners experienced debt-bondage and were particularly vulnerable to unexpected financial loss. Donkey owners, unlike non-owners, migrated within their home state, enabling their children to attend school. Our work highlights the need for policy reform within the brick-kiln industry to acknowledge the pivotal role of working donkeys in supporting human livelihoods.

Decisions to give and receive help are often influenced by group memberships, social identities, and intergroup relations. Two studies were conducted to test how perceived political relations between countries are related to willingness to accept offers of intergroup help. Respondents in two low-income countries, the Philippines (N = 289) and Pakistan (N = 275), indicated their willingness to accept (or not) Covid-19 vaccine donations from two higher-status countries (China and the United States) during the Covid pandemic. Results showed that the perceived motivation of the outgroup nation for providing help was associated with rejection or acceptance of help, mediated by emotional reactions to the help. A perception that outgroup nations donate vaccines to demonstrate and assert their superiority and power, that they donate vaccines to keep the outgroup dependent on the ingroup, and a perception that they donate vaccines out of self-interest, were all associated with rejection of vaccine donations. A perception that donations by the outgroup are motivated by genuine concern for the ingroup was associated with acceptance of help. Findings confirm that political intergroup relations are related to attitudes about whether the ingroup nation should accept intergroup help or not. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.

Not everyone engages in COVID-19 related preventative health behaviors (PHB; e.g., mask wearing, social distancing) despite their demonstrated effectiveness for mitigating the spread of COVID-19. In the United States, for instance, PHBs emerged as (and remain) a partisan issue. The current work examines partisan gaps in PHB by considering both informational and perceptual factors related to COVID-19. Specifically, we focus on politically motivated belief in COVID-19 (mis)information and simultaneously consider the roles of physical threat and disgust perception. We find that poor performance in misinformation accuracy judgments and subsequently lower COVID-19 threat perceptions sequentially predict less PHB engagement. In Study 1 (N = 87 US undergraduate students), higher conservatism predicted lower COVID-19 threat perceptions but not COVID-19 disgust perceptions. Study 2 (N = 168 US undergraduate students) replicated this effect, while demonstrating that the relationship between stronger conservatism and lower engagement in PHB was mediated by higher accuracy judgments of COVID-19 misinformation and, in turn, lower perceptions of COVID-19 threat but not disgust. This suggests that considering threat perception is essential to understanding how politically motivated endorsement of COVID-19 misinformation shapes PHB.

The innovator's bias is defined as the tendency for innovators to focus mainly on the positive potential impact of their inventions and to neglect, ignore, or downplay any potential negative impact. Such bias may help sustain the motivation needed for business success but may create problems by failing to acknowledge and prepare for problematic outcomes. We report three studies (total n = 1608) designed to demonstrate this bias—and to show how to overcome it (while ideally preserving the innovators' enthusiastic affection for their product). Three studies used hypothetical innovations, all with potential downsides. Feelings of ownership were manipulated by having some participants role-play being marketing manager, including naming the product, devising advertising slogans, and identifying target demographics for potential purchasers. Owners then rated their product, while nonowner controls rated a different product. Study 1 (n = 495) demonstrated the innovator's bias by showing that owners rated the likely consequences of their product more favorably than nonowners did. Owners also displayed more enthusiastic zeal for their product. Study 2 (n = 553) tested interventions aimed at reducing the bias while preserving the zeal. Of six interventions, the most successful was having owners imagine the worst-case scenario involving the most negative outcome that the invention could cause. Study 3 (n = 560) was a preregistered replication of the main findings from Study 2 (osf.io/ew9cq).

Online fake news can have noxious consequences. Social media platforms are experimenting with different interventions to curb fake news' spread, often employing them simultaneously. However, research investigating the interaction of these interventions is limited. Here, we use the heuristic-systematic model of information processing (HSM) as a theoretical framework to jointly test two interventions against fake news that are implemented at scale by social media platforms: (1) adding warning labels from fact checkers to initiate systematic processing and (2) removing social endorsement cues (e.g., engagement counts) to reduce the influence of this heuristic cue. Moreover, we accounted for dispositions previously found to affect a person's response to fake news through motivated reasoning or cognitive style. An online experiment in Germany (N = 571) confirmed that warning labels reduced the perceived credibility of a fake news post exaggerating the consequences of climate change. Warning labels also lowered the (self-reported) likelihood to amplify fake news. Removing social endorsement cues did not have an effect. In line with research on motivated reasoning, left-leaning individuals perceived the climate fake news to be more credible and reported a higher likelihood to amplify it. Supporting research on cognitive style, participants with lower educational levels and a less analytic thinking style also reported a higher likelihood of amplification. Elaboration likelihood was associated only with age, involvement, and political leaning, but not affected by warning labels. Our findings contribute to the mounting evidence for the effectiveness of warning labels while questioning their relevance for systematic processing.