Journal of Applied Social Psychology最新文献

Mentorship plays a significant role in shaping an individual's career in the workplace. Agency and communion are key dimensions that reflect personal values and workplace norms, both of which strongly influence the mentoring experience. Across four studies, we examined the type of mentoring that potential mentees want depending on their own values, workplace norms, and the interplay between the two. In each study, we investigated if potential mentees prefer mentors similar to themselves on agency and communion and who fit agentic and communal workplace norms. We analyzed perceived workplace norms in Study 1, manipulated prescriptive workplace norms in Study 2, and descriptive workplace norms in Study 3. Finally, Study 4 experimentally investigated if the similarity with the mentor and the perceived workplace requirements affects the preference for a potential mentor. Across all studies, we investigated if women preferred more communion (i.e., communal values in the mentor, psychosocial support) in their ideal mentors than men. The results indicated that people prefer mentors who share the same values and that women prefer more communion than men. Workplace norms did not influence mentoring preferences and did not interact with individuals' values.

As hostility toward immigrants grows, it is essential to explore the psychological factors that contribute to anti-immigrant attitudes. Although the impact of economic hardship, societal anomie, and conspiracy belief on anti-immigration attitudes have all been individually studied, their combined impact remains underexamined. Across six studies (n = 3,643), we investigated how economic hardship and perceptions of societal decline (anomie) predict anti-immigrant attitudes about Non-European immigrants, with anti-immigrant conspiracy beliefs as a potential serial mediator. Study 1a (n = 491, UK participants) found that both perceived and actual economic hardship predicted anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g., support for violence against Non-European immigrants) through anomie and conspiracy beliefs, an effect replicated in Study 1b (n = 493, Irish participants). Study 2 (n = 760) used a quasi-experimental design and found that participants from UK postcode areas with higher income deprivation reported greater anomie, which was linked to belief in Non-European immigrant conspiracy theories and anti-immigrant sentiment. Study 3a (n = 790, UK participants) confirmed these associations with experimentally simulated economic hardship in a virtual society; Study 3b (n = 321, participants from Ireland) replicated this effect. Study 4 (n = 788, UK) demonstrated that individuals experiencing economic hardship, when exposed to conspiracy content, reported significantly higher violent intentions toward immigrants and marginally higher non-violent intentions. Together, these studies, using diverse research designs, provide evidence that economic hardship and anomie may contribute to anti-immigrant sentiment, with conspiracy beliefs potentially mediating these relationships.

One explanation for the link between political conservatism and rejection of the science and solutions of climate change is based on perceived threats. Yet, until recently, this claim has not been studied by simultaneously considering the different levels at which individuals may experience a sense of threat (i.e., threat of climate change or climate policy, at personal or collective level, on economic or cultural domains). A recent theoretical advance integrated the existing threat-based explanations for conservatives' lower acceptance of climate change and support for pro-climate policy. We aimed to subject aspects of this integrated threat model of climate change attitudes to empirical testing through a series of three studies (Study 1 N = 5110, Study 2 N = 299, Study 3 N = 552). We found the hypothesized threat asymmetry in risk assessments of climate change and its solutions, whereby conservative ideologies predict greater perceived threat from climate policy, and lower perceived threat from climate change itself. Also consistent with the model, we found evidence that cross-sectionally, threat partially mediated associations between ideology and policy support. However, we also report on an unsuccessful experimental test of the model. Prompting people to think about the economic or cultural consequences of climate policy did not heighten conservatives' perceptions of policy threat (i.e., a manipulation failure), and thus did not have the expected exacerbating effect on their climate policy concern. Findings suggest conservatives' threat-based concerns about climate policy may be difficult to shift experimentally and provide only a partial explanation for their lower policy support.

Research has shown that experiencing sexual objectification may lead to a variety of psychological responses. These responses include people evaluating themselves based on their appearance (self-objectification), having concerns that they may not be safe (personal safety concerns) and loneliness. We developed the current literature by assessing whether the different emotions that are felt following instances of sexual objectification predict the extent to which people engage in self-objectification, have personal safety concerns or feel lonely. Study 1 (N = 144) demonstrated that generally feeling fear following sexual objectification positively predicted personal safety concerns, whilst generally feeling rejection positively predicted loneliness. Studies 2 (N = 139) and 3 (N = 140) assessed the emotions and psychological consequences that stem from a single instance of sexual objectification. Importantly, in line with Study 1, Study 2 found that fear positively predicted personal safety concerns and that rejection positively predicted loneliness. Similarly, in Study 3, a combined rejection and fear construct positively predicted personal safety concerns and loneliness. The self-objectification findings were less consistent between studies. Self-objectification was positively predicted by pride in Study 1, shame in Study 2, and inferiority as well as the combined rejection and fear construct in Study 3. These studies demonstrate the importance of emotions in predicting the different psychological consequences of sexual objectification. Adapting the emotions that are felt may reduce the harmful psychological consequences of sexual objectification.

Historical collective threats, such as national disaster or pathogen pandemics, have been highlighted as a key factor driving the evolution of cultural differences. However, little research has investigated how these culture-threat links are reflected in specific psychological and behavioral tendencies. Additionally, although it is commonly argued that behavioral regulation strategies generally differ between cultures – with East Asians generally preferring to adjust themselves to fit situations and European Americans generally preferring to influence situations to fit themselves – they have scarcely been examined beyond the context of daily life. We tested whether these general findings on behavioral tendencies could be extended to the collective threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. We conducted two online surveys between August and December 2020 (n = 1240 and 823, respectively) in Japan and the United States, and found that, compared to European Americans, Japanese participants perceived higher levels of both normative and actual adjustment for both themselves and others. Furthermore, European Americans reported that actors in their daily lives (friends, subordinates, superiors, and local governments) other than the national government had influenced people's behavior significantly more than Japanese did. Finally, European Americans reported that they were more likely than Japanese participants to use influence strategies in response to encountering someone not wearing a mask on the train.

We report two preregistered studies examining how individuals view life to be unfolding over time for themselves, people in their community, country, and all of humanity. We evaluated the link between such beliefs and “well-doing,” that is, the motivation to engage in actions geared toward an improved future. In Study 1 (N = 963; M age = 40.83 years; 48.2% female), individuals reported their beliefs about how life is unfolding over time for people in one of four target conditions: self, community, country, or all of humanity. In Study 2 (N = 947; M age = 39.52; 51.4% female), individuals were randomly assigned to one of three narrative direction conditions (better, stable, worse) for one of the four target conditions. In Study 1, participants viewed life as getting better over time for the self, on average, but getting worse for the other targets. In both studies, perceiving life as improving (vs. worsening) was associated with stronger well-doing intentions, particularly in the self condition in Study 1 and with respect to participants' general motivation in Study 2 regardless of target condition. Thus, viewing life as getting better and better (vs. worse and worse) over time may play an important role in motivating individuals to strive toward making life better, not only for oneself but also for people in one's community, country, and all of humanity.