Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes最新文献

Systemic bias and discrimination have resulted in some groups benefitting from centuries of advantages and other groups being harmed by centuries of disadvantages in our society. As an institution within our imperfect society, Academe is subject to the same systems of privilege and oppression that differentially drive advancement rates among scholars. In this editorial, we focus attention on the microaggressions and discrimination scholars of color experience in Academe in the United States. Specifically, we take a personal narrative approach to explore several common challenges scholars of color face and provide affirmations to these scholars to counteract the negative effects of these challenges. Finally, we call in allies by providing insights about their critical role in dismantling systemic bias and being a reliable source of support to scholars of color.

We investigate perceptions of emotional deception and introduce a novel distinction between the Up-display of emotion (the fabricated and the exaggerated expression of emotions) and the Down-display of emotion (the suppression of felt emotions). Observers judge Down-displays of anger, sadness, and happiness as more ethical (less deceptive, less intentional, and less harmful) than commensurate Up-displays. We integrate these findings to build a unifying framework of perceptions of deception, the Deception Perception Model, to assert that perceptions of deception are influenced by Perceived Deception Intention, Deception Magnitude, Consequences of Deception, Contextual Norms of Deception, and Deception Discovery.

Drawing on people’s motivation to whet their curiosity, we tested a previously unexplored solution to reconciling want/should conflicts. Past work has shown that people are motivated to satisfy their curiosity and find enjoyment in doing so. Our work shows that piquing people’s curiosity can be leveraged to influence their choices, by steering them away from tempting “want” options (e.g., choosing unhealthy foods, watching lowbrow films, taking the elevator), and toward less-than-tempting, though normatively desirable “should” options. In two lab and two field studies, we created curiosity lures—incentives that pique people’s curiosity and deliver its closure on the condition people choose the “should” option over the “want” option. In all, our nudges were successful and highlight the external validity of our research. Notably, we observed a 9.8% increase in stairwell-use, and a 10% increase in fruit-and-vegetable purchases when we tested curiosity lures in large-scale field experiments totaling over 100,000 observations.

We explore why teams with the same level of cultural diversity can differ in their level of creativity. To this end, we introduce the concept of paradox mindsets to research on multicultural teams. We argue that team members with a high multicultural paradox mindset are accepting of and energized by intercultural tensions, both emphasizing cultural differences and finding common ground. Their presence thus enables multicultural teams to embrace these tensions and leverage their cultural diversity toward team creativity. Specifically, we hypothesize that teams with members that have a high multicultural paradox mindset are more creative because these members promote information elaboration at the team level, which in turn fosters creativity. We test our hypotheses in a study of 217 individuals randomly assigned to 63 culturally diverse teams. Results provide support for our overarching theory.

We challenge the predominant viewpoint in the literature that employee silence is inherently harmful. We theorize that employees can engage in strategic silence, or the intentional withholding of untimely ideas or concerns, in order to raise issues that resonate better with managers when they do speak up. More specifically, we propose that employees’ voice is deemed higher quality by managers, and as a result, earns them higher performance evaluations and rewards, when those employees also engage in strategic silence. In a qualitative study (Study 1), we document the dimensions and real-life examples of strategic silence. In two multi-source survey-based field studies (Study 2a and Study 2b) and a pre-registered online experiment (Study 3), we demonstrate support for our theoretical model. Through our findings, we highlight that strategic silence is a functional and useful type of silence that employees use to gain more positive appraisal of their voice from managers.

Based on role congruity theory, this preregistered meta-analysis examines whether women negotiate less unethically than men. We predicted that moderators related to the person (negotiation experience) and the negotiation context (e.g., advocacy, cultural gender-role inequality) influence the proposed gender difference. We conducted a Bayesian three-level meta-analysis to test our predictions on a sample of 116 effect sizes from 70 samples (overall N = 14,028, including employees, MBA students, undergraduate students). As predicted, women negotiated less unethically than men (Hedges’ g = 0.25). The gender difference held for unethical judgements (Hedges’ g = 0.29), unethical intentions (Hedges’ g = 0.21), and unethical behaviors (Hedges’ g = 0.17). The gender difference decreased when parties negotiated for others as compared to for themselves, when parties strategically used positive affect, and tended to decrease when parties were experienced as compared to inexperienced negotiators. We discuss implications for theory and research.

In this paper, we study the effects of non-monetary symbolic awards on winners, losers, and their peers. Using a regression discontinuity design, we examine post-award performance differences between those who barely won a symbolic performance award and those who came just short of winning the award in a large insurance company (Study 1). Our findings show that awarded workers performed worse than their non-awarded counterparts, and worse performance was more severe in more competitive teams. Building on these findings, we explore potential mechanisms using an incentivized real-effort experiment (Study 2). The experiment reveals that award winners’ worse post-award performance relative to unawarded workers was driven by social undermining in the form of deliberate sabotage by coworkers, rather than award winners’ own behavioral changes due to negative motivational effects.

Managers and policymakers regularly rely on incentives to encourage valued behaviors. While incentives are often successful, there are also notable and surprising examples of their ineffectiveness. Why? We propose a contributing factor may be that they are not sufficiently conspicuous. In a large-scale field experiment (Experiment 1) and three online experiments (Experiments 2–4), we show that even when incentives are transparently provided, failing to make them conspicuous vastly undermines their ability to shift behavior. Online experiments indicate that conspicuous incentives work by increasing people’s extrinsic motivation to earn an incentive (Experiment 2) and do not merely serve as reminders to act (Experiment 3). We also assess whether people intuit that incentive conspicuousness matters (Experiment 4); nearly half of participants reject a costless opportunity to make their own incentives conspicuous, which leads them to earn less than they otherwise would. Yet, our results also hint at some degree of sophistication: those who benefit most from making incentives conspicuous are particularly likely to choose to make their incentives conspicuous.

We develop and test a theory of how managerial endorsement is influenced by how employees voice their ideas – whether they engage in promotive voice, prohibitive voice, or a mix of these two types together. Drawing on research on cognitive fluency resulting from consistency in information, we argue and show that managers are less likely to endorse voice that mixes both promotive and prohibitive elements within the same instance of speaking up, compared to voice that is uniformly promotive or prohibitive. Extending these arguments about cognitive fluency, we further show that endorsement is contingent on whether each uniform type is consistent with managerial regulatory focus. Our findings, based on five studies – a survey study of managers from a wide range of organizations, a field study in a hospital, and three experiments – enrich our theoretical understanding of the cognitive paths through which the type(s) of voice, and whether voice mixes these types, shapes which ideas are endorsed for implementation. They also reveal important implications for managers about why they may systematically gravitate toward (and miss out on) certain ideas when they evaluate employee voice, and for employees about the tactical choices they should use in voicing ideas to their managers.