This paper examines, for a two-period signalling game played by a revenue-raising government and a monopolistic firm in an asymmetric information context, how the government behaves when it taxes the firm’s production. Information regarding the firm’s efficiency (or its potential to pay taxes) is private; therefore, only the firm knows its ‘type’. To prevent opportunism and lead the firm to disclose information through its period-1 output, the period-1 per-unit tax needs to be lower than it would if information were perfect (and tax revenue is consequently lower). As a result, expected taxes increase with time. This behaviour generally (but not always) reduces social welfare. In contrast, when the government prefers the firm’s information is not disclosed by the period-1 signal, the expected per-unit tax in such period is the same as it would be if information were perfect. Moreover, if the firm reveals no information, then welfare is generally (but not always) greater than it would be if information were perfect. The government would generally prefer information not to be revealed, because disclose would greatly reduce its period-1 tax income. From a social standpoint, information non-disclosure increases welfare, except when both the probability of the firm being efficient and its efficiency level relative to that of the inefficient firm are sufficiently high. Clasificacion JEL: H21, D82.
{"title":"A Revenue-raising Government Taxing a Firm with Private Information","authors":"M. Antelo","doi":"10.7866/HPE-RPE.12.4.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7866/HPE-RPE.12.4.3","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines, for a two-period signalling game played by a revenue-raising government and a monopolistic firm in an asymmetric information context, how the government behaves when it taxes the firm’s production. Information regarding the firm’s efficiency (or its potential to pay taxes) is private; therefore, only the firm knows its ‘type’. To prevent opportunism and lead the firm to disclose information through its period-1 output, the period-1 per-unit tax needs to be lower than it would if information were perfect (and tax revenue is consequently lower). As a result, expected taxes increase with time. This behaviour generally (but not always) reduces social welfare. In contrast, when the government prefers the firm’s information is not disclosed by the period-1 signal, the expected per-unit tax in such period is the same as it would be if information were perfect. Moreover, if the firm reveals no information, then welfare is generally (but not always) greater than it would be if information were perfect. The government would generally prefer information not to be revealed, because disclose would greatly reduce its period-1 tax income. From a social standpoint, information non-disclosure increases welfare, except when both the probability of the firm being efficient and its efficiency level relative to that of the inefficient firm are sufficiently high. Clasificacion JEL: H21, D82.","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":"57-86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71305796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En las ultimas decadas diversas lineas de reforma del Impuesto sobre Sociedades, como ACE y CbIT, han sido propuestas para eliminar el tratamiento fiscal preferente a la financiacion mediante deuda. Este trabajo estima los efectos que tendria en Espana la aplicacion de reformas de este tipo, mediante tecnicas de microsimulacion aplicadas sobre la base de datos contable sAbI. Los resultados muestran las fortalezas y debilidades de cada una de las reformas, y sugieren la aplicacion de formulas mixtas y/o la puesta en marcha gradual de las reformas como transicion hacia bases imponibles neutrales.
{"title":"La neutralidad financiera en el Impuesto sobre Sociedades: Microsimulación de las opciones de reforma para España","authors":"Lourdes María Jerez Barroso, F. Sánchez","doi":"10.7866/HPE-RPE.12.4.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7866/HPE-RPE.12.4.2","url":null,"abstract":"En las ultimas decadas diversas lineas de reforma del Impuesto sobre Sociedades, como ACE y CbIT, han sido propuestas para eliminar el tratamiento fiscal preferente a la financiacion mediante deuda. Este trabajo estima los efectos que tendria en Espana la aplicacion de reformas de este tipo, mediante tecnicas de microsimulacion aplicadas sobre la base de datos contable sAbI. Los resultados muestran las fortalezas y debilidades de cada una de las reformas, y sugieren la aplicacion de formulas mixtas y/o la puesta en marcha gradual de las reformas como transicion hacia bases imponibles neutrales.","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"203 1","pages":"23-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71305752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Las interrelaciones entre el gasto militar y el civil y sus consecuencias economicas y sociales durante el siglo XX han sido objeto de numerosas investigaciones desde hace varias decadas. En las publicadas hasta mediados del decenio de 1970 se defiende que el gasto social y la economia sufragaron la defensa, mientras que en la mayoria de las editadas despues se sostiene que los canones no se fabricaron a costa de la mantequilla o no se hallan pruebas consistentes de lo contrario. Esta diversidad de resultados se debe a las diferentes teorias, metodologias y tecnicas estadisticas utilizadas en la investigacion de un asunto que seria de gran interes iniciar en Espana.
{"title":"¿Se financió la defensa a costa del gasto social y la economía en el siglo XX? El dilema cañones versus mantequilla","authors":"José Jurado Sánchez","doi":"10.7866/HPE-RPE.12.4.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7866/HPE-RPE.12.4.4","url":null,"abstract":"Las interrelaciones entre el gasto militar y el civil y sus consecuencias economicas y sociales durante el siglo XX han sido objeto de numerosas investigaciones desde hace varias decadas. En las publicadas hasta mediados del decenio de 1970 se defiende que el gasto social y la economia sufragaron la defensa, mientras que en la mayoria de las editadas despues se sostiene que los canones no se fabricaron a costa de la mantequilla o no se hallan pruebas consistentes de lo contrario. Esta diversidad de resultados se debe a las diferentes teorias, metodologias y tecnicas estadisticas utilizadas en la investigacion de un asunto que seria de gran interes iniciar en Espana.","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"203 1","pages":"89-117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71306044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we measure the degree of income related inequality in mental health as measured by the GHQ instrument and general health as measured by the EQOL-5D instrument for the Catalan population. We find that income is the main contributor to inequality, although the share of inequality in mental health that can be explained by income is much greater than the corresponding share of inequality in general health. We also find that the variation in demographic structure reduces income related inequality in mental health but increases income related inequality in general health. The regional variations in both instruments for health are striking, with the Barcelona districts faring relatively bad with respect to the rest of geographical areas and Lleida being the health region where, all else held equal, the population reports the greatest level of health. A big share of inequality in the two health measures, but specially mental health, is due to the favourable position in both health and income of those who enjoy an indefinite contract with respect to the rest of individuals. We also find that risky working conditions affect both health measures and are able to explain an important share of socio-economic inequality.
{"title":"Socio-Economic Inequalities in Health in Catalonia","authors":"Pilar García-Gómez, �?ngel López Nicolás","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.563848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.563848","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we measure the degree of income related inequality in mental health as measured by the GHQ instrument and general health as measured by the EQOL-5D instrument for the Catalan population. We find that income is the main contributor to inequality, although the share of inequality in mental health that can be explained by income is much greater than the corresponding share of inequality in general health. We also find that the variation in demographic structure reduces income related inequality in mental health but increases income related inequality in general health. The regional variations in both instruments for health are striking, with the Barcelona districts faring relatively bad with respect to the rest of geographical areas and Lleida being the health region where, all else held equal, the population reports the greatest level of health. A big share of inequality in the two health measures, but specially mental health, is due to the favourable position in both health and income of those who enjoy an indefinite contract with respect to the rest of individuals. We also find that risky working conditions affect both health measures and are able to explain an important share of socio-economic inequality.","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2004-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.563848","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67764531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reviews the U.S. welfare reform efforts over the 1990s and the effects of these reforms to date. Seven "lessons" of potential interest to European observers are discussed, with particular attention to the conclusions of more recent research. Such research indicates, for example, that more effective programs contain both positive and negative incentives, utilize work-first as well as job training programs, and provide some important supports beyond just job and work skills. The paper ends with some speculations about why European policy-makers are becoming more interested in U.S. welfare reform experiments than they have been in the past.
{"title":"U.S. Welfare Reform: what's Relevant for Europe?","authors":"Rebecca M. Blank","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/49.1.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/49.1.49","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the U.S. welfare reform efforts over the 1990s and the effects of these reforms to date. Seven \"lessons\" of potential interest to European observers are discussed, with particular attention to the conclusions of more recent research. Such research indicates, for example, that more effective programs contain both positive and negative incentives, utilize work-first as well as job training programs, and provide some important supports beyond just job and work skills. The paper ends with some speculations about why European policy-makers are becoming more interested in U.S. welfare reform experiments than they have been in the past.","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"15-36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/49.1.49","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60704690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by "roving bandits" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little to be gamed by either the population or the bandits. Both would be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator -a "stationary bandit" who monopolizes and rationalizes that theft in the form of taxes-. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. The incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies rarely perform well economically for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same that are needed for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.
{"title":"Dictadura, democracia y desarrollo","authors":"Mancur Olson","doi":"10.21678/APUNTES.35.400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21678/APUNTES.35.400","url":null,"abstract":"Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by \"roving bandits\" destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little to be gamed by either the population or the bandits. Both would be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator -a \"stationary bandit\" who monopolizes and rationalizes that theft in the form of taxes-. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. The incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies rarely perform well economically for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same that are needed for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"85-94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"1994-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68218494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comercio y desarrollo","authors":"Miguel Carmona Alonso","doi":"10.30875/2e928beb-es","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30875/2e928beb-es","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"125-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69731137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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