How do non-experts single out numbers for reference? Linnebo has argued that they do so using a criterion of identity based on the ordinal properties of numerals. Neo-logicists, on the other hand, claim that cardinal properties are the basis of individuation, when they invoke Hume's Principle. I discuss empirical data from cognitive science and linguistics to answer how non-experts individuate numbers better in practice. I use those findings to develop an alternative account that mixes ordinal and cardinal properties to provide a detailed (though not conclusively proven) answer to the question: how do we in fact semantically individuate numbers?
{"title":"How Do We Semantically Individuate Natural Numbers?","authors":"Stefan Buijsman","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab001","DOIUrl":"10.1093/philmat/nkab001","url":null,"abstract":"How do non-experts single out numbers for reference? Linnebo has argued that they do so using a criterion of identity based on the ordinal properties of numerals. Neo-logicists, on the other hand, claim that cardinal properties are the basis of individuation, when they invoke Hume's Principle. I discuss empirical data from cognitive science and linguistics to answer how non-experts individuate numbers better in practice. I use those findings to develop an alternative account that mixes ordinal and cardinal properties to provide a detailed (though not conclusively proven) answer to the question: how do we in fact semantically individuate numbers?","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"214-233"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/philmat/nkab001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49268017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stewart Shapiro and Geoffrey Hellman, eds. The History of Continua: Philosophical and Mathematical Perspectives","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab003","DOIUrl":"10.1093/philmat/nkab003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"294-295"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45161747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kripke observes that the decimal numerals have the buck-stopping property: when a number is given in decimal notation, there is no further question of what number it is. What makes them special in this way? According to Kripke, it is because of structural revelation: each decimal numeral represents the structure of the corresponding number. Though insightful, I argue, this account has some counterintuitive consequences. Then I sketch an alternative account of the buck-stopping property in terms of how we specify the positions of numbers in the progression.
{"title":"On the Buck-Stopping Identification of Numbers","authors":"Dongwoo Kim","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab009","DOIUrl":"10.1093/philmat/nkab009","url":null,"abstract":"Kripke observes that the decimal numerals have the buck-stopping property: when a number is given in decimal notation, there is no further question of what number it is. What makes them special in this way? According to Kripke, it is because of structural revelation: each decimal numeral represents the structure of the corresponding number. Though insightful, I argue, this account has some counterintuitive consequences. Then I sketch an alternative account of the buck-stopping property in terms of how we specify the positions of numbers in the progression.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"234-255"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/philmat/nkab009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44847446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carl Posy and Ofra Rechter, eds. Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics. Volume 1: The Critical Philosophy and its Roots","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkaa037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkaa037","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"298-298"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68176535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I evaluate the claim that the equivalence of multiple intensionally distinct definitions of random sequence provides evidence for the claim that these definitions capture the intuitive conception of randomness, concluding that the former claim is false. I then develop an alternative account of the significance of randomness-theoretic equivalence results, arguing that they are instances of a phenomenon I refer to as schematic equivalence. On my account, this alternative approach has the virtue of providing the plurality of definitions of randomness with conceptual unity and a rationale for certain investigations that are carried out in the field.
{"title":"The Equivalence of Definitions of Algorithmic Randomness","authors":"Christopher Porter","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkaa039","DOIUrl":"10.1093/philmat/nkaa039","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I evaluate the claim that the equivalence of multiple intensionally distinct definitions of random sequence provides evidence for the claim that these definitions capture the intuitive conception of randomness, concluding that the former claim is false. I then develop an alternative account of the significance of randomness-theoretic equivalence results, arguing that they are instances of a phenomenon I refer to as schematic equivalence. On my account, this alternative approach has the virtue of providing the plurality of definitions of randomness with conceptual unity and a rationale for certain investigations that are carried out in the field.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"153-194"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/philmat/nkaa039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49566434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz. Gottlob Freges Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: Ein Kommentar des Vorworts, des Nachworts und der einleitenden Paragraphen. [Gottlob Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic: A Commentary on the Foreword, the Afterword and the Introductory Paragraphs]","authors":"Matthias Wille","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkab011","DOIUrl":"10.1093/philmat/nkab011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"288-291"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/philmat/nkab011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42276960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A probability model is underdetermined when there is no rational reason to assign a particular infinitesimal value as the probability of single events. Pruss claims that hyperreal probabilities are underdetermined. The claim is based upon external hyperreal-valued measures. We show that internal hyperfinite measures are not underdetermined. The importance of internality stems from the fact that Robinson's transfer principle only applies to internal entities. We also evaluate the claim that transferless ordered fields (surreals, Levi-Civita field, Laurent series) may have advantages over hyperreals in probabilistic modeling. We show that probabilities developed over such fields are less expressive than hyperreal probabilities.
{"title":"Internality, transfer, and infinitesimal modeling of infinite processes","authors":"Emanuele Bottazzi;Mikhail G Katz","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkaa033","DOIUrl":"10.1093/philmat/nkaa033","url":null,"abstract":"A probability model is underdetermined when there is no rational reason to assign a particular infinitesimal value as the probability of single events. Pruss claims that hyperreal probabilities are underdetermined. The claim is based upon external hyperreal-valued measures. We show that internal hyperfinite measures are not underdetermined. The importance of internality stems from the fact that Robinson's transfer principle only applies to internal entities. We also evaluate the claim that transferless ordered fields (surreals, Levi-Civita field, Laurent series) may have advantages over hyperreals in probabilistic modeling. We show that probabilities developed over such fields are less expressive than hyperreal probabilities.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"256-277"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/philmat/nkaa033","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46761265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about the Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel's theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.
{"title":"There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences","authors":"Kaave Lajevardi;Saeed Salehi","doi":"10.1093/philmat/nkaa041","DOIUrl":"10.1093/philmat/nkaa041","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about the Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel's theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.","PeriodicalId":49004,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Mathematica","volume":"29 1","pages":"278-287"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/philmat/nkaa041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47318243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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