Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04364-3
Lieke Joske Franci Asma
Abstract In this paper, I argue that instead of primarily paying attention to the nature of implicit attitudes that are taken to cause implicit discrimination, we should investigate how discrimination can be implicit in itself. I propose to characterize implicit discrimination as unintentional discrimination: the person responds to facts unintentionally and often unconsciously which are, given their end, irrelevant and imply unfair treatment. The result is a unified account of implicit bias that allows for the different ways in which it can display itself and can be explained. Furthermore, the view can account for the central characteristics of implicit bias: (1) that it is, for a variety of reasons, difficult to control, (2) that we are not necessarily unconscious of implicit bias but not properly conscious either, and (3) that we can unintentionally discriminate regardless of whether we claim to care about fairness.
{"title":"Implicit bias as unintentional discrimination","authors":"Lieke Joske Franci Asma","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04364-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04364-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue that instead of primarily paying attention to the nature of implicit attitudes that are taken to cause implicit discrimination, we should investigate how discrimination can be implicit in itself. I propose to characterize implicit discrimination as unintentional discrimination: the person responds to facts unintentionally and often unconsciously which are, given their end, irrelevant and imply unfair treatment. The result is a unified account of implicit bias that allows for the different ways in which it can display itself and can be explained. Furthermore, the view can account for the central characteristics of implicit bias: (1) that it is, for a variety of reasons, difficult to control, (2) that we are not necessarily unconscious of implicit bias but not properly conscious either, and (3) that we can unintentionally discriminate regardless of whether we claim to care about fairness.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4
Clint Hurshman
{"title":"Artifacts and intervention: a persistence theory of artifact functions","authors":"Clint Hurshman","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04347-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135995742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04360-7
Laura Caponetto, Luca San Mauro, Giorgio Venturi
Abstract It is prima facie uncontroversial that the justification of an assertion amounts to a collection of other (inferentially related) assertions. In this paper, we point at a class of assertions, i.e. mathematical assertions, that appear to systematically flout this principle. To justify a mathematical assertion (e.g. a theorem) is to provide a proof—and proofs are sequences of directives. The claim is backed up by linguistic data on the use of imperatives in proofs, and by a pragmatic analysis of theorems and their proofs. Proofs, we argue, are sequences of instructions whose performance inevitably gets one to truth. It follows that a felicitous theorem, i.e. a theorem that has been correctly proven, is a persuasive theorem. When it comes to mathematical assertions, there is no sharp distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary success.
{"title":"How to make (mathematical) assertions with directives","authors":"Laura Caponetto, Luca San Mauro, Giorgio Venturi","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04360-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04360-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is prima facie uncontroversial that the justification of an assertion amounts to a collection of other (inferentially related) assertions. In this paper, we point at a class of assertions, i.e. mathematical assertions, that appear to systematically flout this principle. To justify a mathematical assertion (e.g. a theorem) is to provide a proof—and proofs are sequences of directives. The claim is backed up by linguistic data on the use of imperatives in proofs, and by a pragmatic analysis of theorems and their proofs. Proofs, we argue, are sequences of instructions whose performance inevitably gets one to truth. It follows that a felicitous theorem, i.e. a theorem that has been correctly proven, is a persuasive theorem. When it comes to mathematical assertions, there is no sharp distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary success.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-14DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04344-7
Julien Tricard
{"title":"Symmetries as grounds for induction: the case of the Ω− baryon","authors":"Julien Tricard","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04344-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04344-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135804370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04341-w
Hsiang-Ke Chao
{"title":"Three kinds of the Lotka–Volterra model transfer from biology to economics","authors":"Hsiang-Ke Chao","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04341-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04341-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135853921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04356-3
Stella S. Moon
{"title":"Demarcating Descartes’s geometry with clarity and distinctness","authors":"Stella S. Moon","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04356-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04356-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135968962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-08DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04352-7
Caspar Jacobs
Abstract It is often claimed that one can avoid the kind of underdetermination that is a typical consequence of symmetries in physics by stipulating that symmetry-related models represent the same state of affairs (Leibniz Equivalence). But recent commentators (Dasgupta in Philos Perspect 25:115–160, 2011; Pooley in: Knox and Wilson (eds) The Routledge companion to the philosophy of physics, Routledge, Milton Park, 2021; Pooley and Read in Br J Philos Sci, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1086/718274 ; Teitel in J Philos 119:233–278, 2021) have responded that claims about the representational capacities of models are irrelevant to the issue of underdetermination, which concerns possible worlds themselves. In this paper I distinguish two versions of this objection: (1) that a theory’s formalism does not (fully) determine the space of physical possibilities, and (2) that the relevant notion of possibility is not physical possibility. I offer a refutation of each.
人们经常声称，通过规定与对称相关的模型代表相同的事物状态(莱布尼茨等价)，可以避免物理学中对称性的典型后果——不确定性。但是最近的评论者(Dasgupta在Philos perspective 25:15 - 160, 2011;Pooley in: Knox and Wilson(编)The Routledge companion to physics, Routledge, Milton Park, 2021;《哲学科学学报》，2021,https://doi.org/10.1086/718274;Teitel在J Philos 119:233-278, 2021)中回应说，关于模型表征能力的主张与不确定问题无关，不确定问题涉及可能世界本身。在本文中，我区分了这一反对意见的两个版本:(1)理论的形式主义并不(完全)决定物理可能性的空间，(2)可能性的相关概念不是物理可能性。我对每一个都提出反驳。
{"title":"Are models our tools not our masters?","authors":"Caspar Jacobs","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04352-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04352-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is often claimed that one can avoid the kind of underdetermination that is a typical consequence of symmetries in physics by stipulating that symmetry-related models represent the same state of affairs (Leibniz Equivalence). But recent commentators (Dasgupta in Philos Perspect 25:115–160, 2011; Pooley in: Knox and Wilson (eds) The Routledge companion to the philosophy of physics, Routledge, Milton Park, 2021; Pooley and Read in Br J Philos Sci, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1086/718274 ; Teitel in J Philos 119:233–278, 2021) have responded that claims about the representational capacities of models are irrelevant to the issue of underdetermination, which concerns possible worlds themselves. In this paper I distinguish two versions of this objection: (1) that a theory’s formalism does not (fully) determine the space of physical possibilities, and (2) that the relevant notion of possibility is not physical possibility. I offer a refutation of each.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135197644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-08DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04350-9
Ilho Park
{"title":"Evidence and the epistemic betterness","authors":"Ilho Park","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04350-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04350-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135198621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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