Science and Engineering Ethics最新文献

I defend the claim that life-suspending technologies can constitute a catastrophic and existential security factor for risks structurally similar to those related to climate change. The gist of the argument is that, under certain conditions, life-suspending technologies such as cryonics can provide self-interested actors with incentives to efficiently tackle such risks-in particular, they provide reasons to overcome certain manifestations of generational egoism, a risk factor of several catastrophic and existential risks. Provided we have reasons to decrease catastrophic and existential risks such as climate change, we also have a (defeasible) reason for investing in developing and making life-suspending technologies (more) widespread.

Sharing research data has great potential to benefit science and society. However, data sharing is still not common practice. Since public research funding agencies have a particular impact on research and researchers, the question arises: Are public funding agencies morally obligated to promote data sharing? We argue from a research ethics perspective that public funding agencies have several pro tanto obligations requiring them to promote data sharing. However, there are also pro tanto obligations that speak against promoting data sharing in general as well as with regard to particular instruments of such promotion. We examine and weigh these obligations and conclude that all things considered funders ought to promote the sharing of data. Even the instrument of mandatory data sharing policies can be justified under certain conditions.

Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare.

Concerns about research's environmental impacts have been articulated in the research arena, but questions remain about what types of role responsibilities are appropriate to place on researchers, if any. The research question of this paper is: what are the views of UK health researchers who use data-intensive methods on their responsibilities to consider the environmental impacts of their research? Twenty-six interviews were conducted with UK health researchers using data-intensive methods. Participants expressed a desire to take responsibility for the environmental impacts of their research, however, they were unable to consolidate this because there were often obstacles that prevented them from taking such role responsibilities. They suggested strategies to address this, predominantly related to the need for regulation to monitor their own behaviour. This paper discusses the implications of adopting such a regulatory approach as a mechanism to promote researchers' role responsibilities using a neo-liberal critique.

In this article, I interrogate whether the deployment and development of the Metaverse should take into account African values and modes of knowing to foster the uptake of this hyped technology in Africa. Specifically, I draw on the moral norms arising from the components of communal interactions and humanness in Afro-communitarianism to contend that the deployment of the Metaverse and its development ought to reflect core African moral values to foster its uptake in the region. To adequately align the Metaverse with African core values and thus foster its uptake among Africans, significant technological advancement that makes simulating genuine human experiences possible must occur. Additionally, it would be necessary for the developers and deployers to ensure that higher forms of spiritual activities can be had in the Metaverse to foster its uptake in Africa. Finally, I justify why the preceding points do not necessarily imply that the Metaverse will have a higher moral status than real life on the moral scale that can be grounded in Afro-communitarianism.

Presented here is a systematic literature review of what the academic literature asserts about: (1) the stages of the ethical decision-making process (i.e. awareness, reasoning, motivation, and action) that are claimed to be improved or not improved by RI teaching and whether these claims are supported by evidence; (2) the measurements used to determine the effectiveness of RI teaching; and (3) the stage/s of the ethical decision-making process that are difficult to assess. Regarding (1), awareness was the stage most claimed to be amenable to improvement following RI teaching, and with motivation being the stage that is rarely addressed in the academic literature. While few, some sources claimed RI teaching cannot improve specific stages. With behaviour (action) being the stage referenced most, albeit in only 9% of the total sources, for not being amenable to improvement following RI teaching. Finally, most claims were supported by empirical evidence. Regarding (2), measures most frequently used are custom in-house surveys and some validated measures. Additionally, there is much debate in the literature regarding the adequacy of current assessment measures in RI teaching, and even their absence. Such debate warrants caution when we are considering the empirical evidence supplied to support that RI teaching does or does not improve a specific stage of the decision-making process. Regarding (3), only behaviour was discussed as being difficult to assess, if not impossible. In our discussion section we contextualise these results, and following this we derive some recommendations for relevant stakeholders in RI teaching.

This essay aims to rectify a failure on the part of Western philosophers of technology to attend to the creative philosophical work of Li Bocong at the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. After a brief account of Li Bocong's personal contacts with the West and some remarks on his relationship to Marxism, we take up three aspects of his philosophy that can contribute to enlarging Western philosophical thinking about engineering and technology: (1) Li's analysis of engineering as more than design, (2) his argument for the relevance of the sociology of engineering, and (3) his conceptualization of engineering ethics as more than professional ethics.

Indications that corruption mitigation in infrastructure systems delivery can be effective are found in the literature. However, there is an untapped opportunity to further enhance the efficacy of existing corruption mitigation strategies by placing them explicitly within the larger context of engineering ethics, and relevant policy statements, guidelines, codes and manuals published by international organizations. An effective matching of these formal statements on ethics to infrastructure systems delivery facilitates the identification of potential corruption hotspots and thus help establish or strengthen institutional mechanisms that address corruption. This paper reviews professional codes of ethics, and relevant literature on corruption mitigation in the context of civil engineering infrastructure development, as a platform for building a structure that connects ethical tenets and the mitigation strategies. The paper assesses corruption mitigation strategies against the background of the fundamental canons of practice in civil engineering ethical codes. As such, the paper's assessment is grounded in the civil engineer's ethical responsibilities (to society, the profession, and peers) and principles (such as safety, health, welfare, respect, and honesty) that are common to professional codes of ethics in engineering practice. Addressing corruption in infrastructure development continues to be imperative for national economic and social development, and such exigency is underscored by the sheer scale of investments in infrastructure development in any country and the billions of dollars lost annually through corruption and fraud.

The rapidly advancing field of brain-computer (BCI) and brain-to-brain interfaces (BBI) is stimulating interest across various sectors including medicine, entertainment, research, and military. The developers of large-scale brain-computer networks, sometimes dubbed 'Mindplexes' or 'Cloudminds', aim to enhance cognitive functions by distributing them across expansive networks. A key technical challenge is the efficient transmission and storage of information. One proposed solution is employing blockchain technology over Web 3.0 to create decentralised cognitive entities. This paper explores the potential of a decentralised web for coordinating large brain-computer constellations, and its associated benefits, focusing in particular on the conceptual and ethical challenges this innovation may pose pertaining to (1) Identity, (2) Sovereignty (encompassing Autonomy, Authenticity, and Ownership), (3) Responsibility and Accountability, and (4) Privacy, Safety, and Security. We suggest that while a decentralised web can address some concerns and mitigate certain risks, underlying ethical issues persist. Fundamental questions about entity definition within these networks, the distinctions between individuals and collectives, and responsibility distribution within and between networks, demand further exploration.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has long been recognised as a challenge to responsibility. Much of this discourse has been framed around robots, such as autonomous weapons or self-driving cars, where we arguably lack control over a machine's behaviour and therefore struggle to identify an agent that can be held accountable. However, most of today's AI is based on machine-learning technology that does not act on its own, but rather serves as a decision-support tool, automatically analysing data to help human agents make better decisions. I argue that decision-support tools pose a challenge to responsibility that goes beyond the familiar problem of finding someone to blame or punish for the behaviour of agent-like systems. Namely, they pose a problem for what we might call "decision ownership": they make it difficult to identify human agents to whom we can attribute value-judgements that are reflected in decisions. Drawing on recent philosophical literature on responsibility and its various facets, I argue that this is primarily a problem of attributability rather than of accountability. This particular responsibility problem comes in different forms and degrees, most obviously when an AI provides direct recommendations for actions, but also, less obviously, when it provides mere descriptive information on the basis of which a decision is made.