Science and Engineering Ethics最新文献

Indications that corruption mitigation in infrastructure systems delivery can be effective are found in the literature. However, there is an untapped opportunity to further enhance the efficacy of existing corruption mitigation strategies by placing them explicitly within the larger context of engineering ethics, and relevant policy statements, guidelines, codes and manuals published by international organizations. An effective matching of these formal statements on ethics to infrastructure systems delivery facilitates the identification of potential corruption hotspots and thus help establish or strengthen institutional mechanisms that address corruption. This paper reviews professional codes of ethics, and relevant literature on corruption mitigation in the context of civil engineering infrastructure development, as a platform for building a structure that connects ethical tenets and the mitigation strategies. The paper assesses corruption mitigation strategies against the background of the fundamental canons of practice in civil engineering ethical codes. As such, the paper's assessment is grounded in the civil engineer's ethical responsibilities (to society, the profession, and peers) and principles (such as safety, health, welfare, respect, and honesty) that are common to professional codes of ethics in engineering practice. Addressing corruption in infrastructure development continues to be imperative for national economic and social development, and such exigency is underscored by the sheer scale of investments in infrastructure development in any country and the billions of dollars lost annually through corruption and fraud.

The rapidly advancing field of brain-computer (BCI) and brain-to-brain interfaces (BBI) is stimulating interest across various sectors including medicine, entertainment, research, and military. The developers of large-scale brain-computer networks, sometimes dubbed 'Mindplexes' or 'Cloudminds', aim to enhance cognitive functions by distributing them across expansive networks. A key technical challenge is the efficient transmission and storage of information. One proposed solution is employing blockchain technology over Web 3.0 to create decentralised cognitive entities. This paper explores the potential of a decentralised web for coordinating large brain-computer constellations, and its associated benefits, focusing in particular on the conceptual and ethical challenges this innovation may pose pertaining to (1) Identity, (2) Sovereignty (encompassing Autonomy, Authenticity, and Ownership), (3) Responsibility and Accountability, and (4) Privacy, Safety, and Security. We suggest that while a decentralised web can address some concerns and mitigate certain risks, underlying ethical issues persist. Fundamental questions about entity definition within these networks, the distinctions between individuals and collectives, and responsibility distribution within and between networks, demand further exploration.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has long been recognised as a challenge to responsibility. Much of this discourse has been framed around robots, such as autonomous weapons or self-driving cars, where we arguably lack control over a machine's behaviour and therefore struggle to identify an agent that can be held accountable. However, most of today's AI is based on machine-learning technology that does not act on its own, but rather serves as a decision-support tool, automatically analysing data to help human agents make better decisions. I argue that decision-support tools pose a challenge to responsibility that goes beyond the familiar problem of finding someone to blame or punish for the behaviour of agent-like systems. Namely, they pose a problem for what we might call "decision ownership": they make it difficult to identify human agents to whom we can attribute value-judgements that are reflected in decisions. Drawing on recent philosophical literature on responsibility and its various facets, I argue that this is primarily a problem of attributability rather than of accountability. This particular responsibility problem comes in different forms and degrees, most obviously when an AI provides direct recommendations for actions, but also, less obviously, when it provides mere descriptive information on the basis of which a decision is made.

The rapid development of computer vision technologies and applications has brought forth a range of social and ethical challenges. Due to the unique characteristics of visual technology in terms of data modalities and application scenarios, computer vision poses specific ethical issues. However, the majority of existing literature either addresses artificial intelligence as a whole or pays particular attention to natural language processing, leaving a gap in specialized research on ethical issues and systematic solutions in the field of computer vision. This paper utilizes bibliometrics and text-mining techniques to quantitatively analyze papers from prominent academic conferences in computer vision over the past decade. It first reveals the developing trends and specific distribution of attention regarding trustworthy aspects in the computer vision field, as well as the inherent connections between ethical dimensions and different stages of visual model development. A life-cycle framework regarding trustworthy computer vision is then presented by making the relevant trustworthy issues, the operation pipeline of AI models, and viable technical solutions interconnected, providing researchers and policymakers with references and guidance for achieving trustworthy CV. Finally, it discusses particular motivations for conducting trustworthy practices and underscores the consistency and ambivalence among various trustworthy principles and technical attributes.

Six planetary boundaries have already been exceeded, including climate change, loss of biodiversity, chemical pollution, and land-system change. The health research sector contributes to the environmental crisis we are facing, though to a lesser extent than healthcare or agriculture sectors. It could take steps to reduce its environmental impact but generally has not done so, even as the planetary emergency worsens. So far, the normative case for why the health research sector should rectify that failure has not been made. This paper argues strong philosophical grounds, derived from theories of health and social justice, exist to support the claim that the sector has a duty to avoid or minimise causing or contributing to ecological harms that threaten human health or worsen health inequity. The paper next develops ideas about the duty's content, explaining why it should entail more than reducing carbon emissions, and considers what limits might be placed on the duty.

While the technologies that enable Artificial Intelligence (AI) continue to advance rapidly, there are increasing promises regarding AI's beneficial outputs and concerns about the challenges of human-computer interaction in healthcare. To address these concerns, institutions have increasingly resorted to publishing AI guidelines for healthcare, aiming to align AI with ethical practices. However, guidelines as a form of written language can be analyzed to recognize the reciprocal links between its textual communication and underlying societal ideas. From this perspective, we conducted a discourse analysis to understand how these guidelines construct, articulate, and frame ethics for AI in healthcare. We included eight guidelines and identified three prevalent and interwoven discourses: (1) AI is unavoidable and desirable; (2) AI needs to be guided with (some forms of) principles (3) trust in AI is instrumental and primary. These discourses signal an over-spillage of technical ideals to AI ethics, such as over-optimism and resulting hyper-criticism. This research provides insights into the underlying ideas present in AI guidelines and how guidelines influence the practice and alignment of AI with ethical, legal, and societal values expected to shape AI in healthcare.

The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and Engineering Ethical Reasoning Instrument (EERI) are designed to measure ethical reasoning of general (DIT-2) and engineering-student (EERI) populations. These tools-and the DIT-2 especially-have gained wide usage for assessing the ethical reasoning of undergraduate students. This paper reports on a research study in which the ethical reasoning of first-year undergraduate engineering students at multiple universities was assessed with both of these tools. In addition to these two instruments, students were also asked to create personal concept maps of the phrase "ethical decision-making." It was hypothesized that students whose instrument scores reflected more postconventional levels of moral development and more sophisticated ethical reasoning skills would likewise have richer, more detailed concept maps of ethical decision-making, reflecting their deeper levels of understanding of this topic and the complex of related concepts. In fact, there was no significant correlation between the instrument scores and concept map scoring, suggesting that the way first-year students conceptualize ethical decision making does not predict the way they behave when performing scenario-based ethical reasoning (perhaps more situated). This disparity indicates a need to more precisely quantify engineering ethical reasoning and decision making, if we wish to inform assessment outcomes using the results of such quantitative analyses.

Health Recommender Systems are promising Articial-Intelligence-based tools endowing healthy lifestyles and therapy adherence in healthcare and medicine. Among the most supported areas, it is worth mentioning active aging. However, current HRS supporting AA raise ethical challenges that still need to be properly formalized and explored. This study proposes to rethink HRS for AA through an autonomy-based ethical analysis. In particular, a brief overview of the HRS' technical aspects allows us to shed light on the ethical risks and challenges they might raise on individuals' well-being as they age. Moreover, the study proposes a categorization, understanding, and possible preventive/mitigation actions for the elicited risks and challenges through rethinking the AI ethics core principle of autonomy. Finally, elaborating on autonomy-related ethical theories, the paper proposes an autonomy-based ethical framework and how it can foster the development of autonomy-enabling HRS for AA.

In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play when non-experts (dis)trust science.