Science and Engineering Ethics最新文献

The ethical decision making of researchers has historically been studied from an individualistic perspective. However, researchers rarely work alone, and they typically experience ethical dilemmas in a team context. In this mixed-methods study, 67 scientists and engineers working at a public R1 (very high research activity) university in the United States responded to a survey that asked whether they had experienced or observed an ethical dilemma while working in a research team. Among these, 30 respondents agreed to be interviewed about their experiences using a think-aloud protocol. A total of 40 unique ethical incidents were collected across these interviews. Qualitative data from interview transcripts were then systematically content-analyzed by multiple independent judges to quantify the overall ethicality of team decisions as well as several team characteristics, decision processes, and situational factors. The results demonstrated that team formalistic orientation, ethical championing, and the use of ethical decision strategies were all positively related to the overall ethicality of team decisions. Additionally, the relationship between ethical championing and overall team decision ethicality was moderated by psychological safety and moral intensity. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.

This paper investigates the ethical implications of applying open science (OS) practices on disruptive technologies, such as generative AIs. Disruptive technologies, characterized by their scalability and paradigm-shifting nature, have the potential to generate significant global impact, and carry a risk of dual use. The tension arises between the moral duty of OS to promote societal benefit by democratizing knowledge and the risks associated with open dissemination of disruptive technologies. Van Rennselaer Potter's 'third bioethics' serves as the founding horizon for an ethical framework to govern these tensions. Through theoretical analysis and concrete examples, this paper explores how OS can contribute to a better future or pose threats. Finally, we provide an ethical framework for the intersection between OS and disruptive technologies that tries to go beyond the simple 'as open as possible' tenet, considering openness as an instrumental value for the pursuit of other ethical values rather than as a principle with prima facie moral significance.

This paper is the introduction to a topical collection on "Changing Values and Energy Systems" that consists of six contributions that examine instances of value change regarding the design, use and operation of energy systems. This introduction discusses the need to consider values in the energy transition. It examines conceptions of value and value change and how values can be addressed in the design of energy systems. Value change in the context of energy and energy systems is a topic that has recently gained traction. Current, and past, energy transitions often focus on a limited range of values, such as sustainability, while leaving other salient values, such as energy democracy, or energy justice, out of the picture. Furthermore, these values become entrenched in the design of these systems: it is hard for stakeholders to address new concerns and values in the use and operation of these systems, leading to further costly transitions and systems' overhaul. To remedy this issue, value change in the context of energy systems needs to be better understood. We also need to think about further requirements for the governance, institutional and engineering design of energy systems to accommodate future value change. Openness, transparency, adaptiveness, flexibility and modularity emerge as new requirements within the current energy transition that need further exploration and scrutiny.

I defend the claim that life-suspending technologies can constitute a catastrophic and existential security factor for risks structurally similar to those related to climate change. The gist of the argument is that, under certain conditions, life-suspending technologies such as cryonics can provide self-interested actors with incentives to efficiently tackle such risks-in particular, they provide reasons to overcome certain manifestations of generational egoism, a risk factor of several catastrophic and existential risks. Provided we have reasons to decrease catastrophic and existential risks such as climate change, we also have a (defeasible) reason for investing in developing and making life-suspending technologies (more) widespread.

Sharing research data has great potential to benefit science and society. However, data sharing is still not common practice. Since public research funding agencies have a particular impact on research and researchers, the question arises: Are public funding agencies morally obligated to promote data sharing? We argue from a research ethics perspective that public funding agencies have several pro tanto obligations requiring them to promote data sharing. However, there are also pro tanto obligations that speak against promoting data sharing in general as well as with regard to particular instruments of such promotion. We examine and weigh these obligations and conclude that all things considered funders ought to promote the sharing of data. Even the instrument of mandatory data sharing policies can be justified under certain conditions.

Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare.

Concerns about research's environmental impacts have been articulated in the research arena, but questions remain about what types of role responsibilities are appropriate to place on researchers, if any. The research question of this paper is: what are the views of UK health researchers who use data-intensive methods on their responsibilities to consider the environmental impacts of their research? Twenty-six interviews were conducted with UK health researchers using data-intensive methods. Participants expressed a desire to take responsibility for the environmental impacts of their research, however, they were unable to consolidate this because there were often obstacles that prevented them from taking such role responsibilities. They suggested strategies to address this, predominantly related to the need for regulation to monitor their own behaviour. This paper discusses the implications of adopting such a regulatory approach as a mechanism to promote researchers' role responsibilities using a neo-liberal critique.

In this article, I interrogate whether the deployment and development of the Metaverse should take into account African values and modes of knowing to foster the uptake of this hyped technology in Africa. Specifically, I draw on the moral norms arising from the components of communal interactions and humanness in Afro-communitarianism to contend that the deployment of the Metaverse and its development ought to reflect core African moral values to foster its uptake in the region. To adequately align the Metaverse with African core values and thus foster its uptake among Africans, significant technological advancement that makes simulating genuine human experiences possible must occur. Additionally, it would be necessary for the developers and deployers to ensure that higher forms of spiritual activities can be had in the Metaverse to foster its uptake in Africa. Finally, I justify why the preceding points do not necessarily imply that the Metaverse will have a higher moral status than real life on the moral scale that can be grounded in Afro-communitarianism.

Presented here is a systematic literature review of what the academic literature asserts about: (1) the stages of the ethical decision-making process (i.e. awareness, reasoning, motivation, and action) that are claimed to be improved or not improved by RI teaching and whether these claims are supported by evidence; (2) the measurements used to determine the effectiveness of RI teaching; and (3) the stage/s of the ethical decision-making process that are difficult to assess. Regarding (1), awareness was the stage most claimed to be amenable to improvement following RI teaching, and with motivation being the stage that is rarely addressed in the academic literature. While few, some sources claimed RI teaching cannot improve specific stages. With behaviour (action) being the stage referenced most, albeit in only 9% of the total sources, for not being amenable to improvement following RI teaching. Finally, most claims were supported by empirical evidence. Regarding (2), measures most frequently used are custom in-house surveys and some validated measures. Additionally, there is much debate in the literature regarding the adequacy of current assessment measures in RI teaching, and even their absence. Such debate warrants caution when we are considering the empirical evidence supplied to support that RI teaching does or does not improve a specific stage of the decision-making process. Regarding (3), only behaviour was discussed as being difficult to assess, if not impossible. In our discussion section we contextualise these results, and following this we derive some recommendations for relevant stakeholders in RI teaching.

This essay aims to rectify a failure on the part of Western philosophers of technology to attend to the creative philosophical work of Li Bocong at the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. After a brief account of Li Bocong's personal contacts with the West and some remarks on his relationship to Marxism, we take up three aspects of his philosophy that can contribute to enlarging Western philosophical thinking about engineering and technology: (1) Li's analysis of engineering as more than design, (2) his argument for the relevance of the sociology of engineering, and (3) his conceptualization of engineering ethics as more than professional ethics.