The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of strategy implementation and control as independent variable in enhancing firm’s sustainable competitive advantage through innovation as the dependent variable in the Nigeria’s manufacturing sector. Data were collected through personal questionnaire from 166 manufacturing firms in Nigeria who are members of manufacturing association of Nigeria within North West and North central zones with 70% response rate. The results indicate that there is positive and significant relationship between strategic management elements; implementation and control with sustainable competitive advantage; innovation. According to the result manufacturers in Nigeria fully agree that strategy control is essential when a unique strategy has been implemented so as to successfully enhance sustainable competitive advantage. This study adds Knowledge to the theory and practice of sustainable competitive advantage particularly in Nigeria’s manufacturing firms. Its theoretical and empirical significance adds more insight on the previous empirical studies in the field that is to say it gives guidelines to manufacturers in Nigeria on the impact of strategic management approaches on sustainable competitive advantage. For government and firms, the study provides avenue of enhancing sustainable competitive advantage in Nigeria and Africa as a whole since the phenomena is general.
{"title":"Impact of Strategic Management Element in Enhancing Firm's Sustainable Competitive Advantage. An Empirical Study of Nigeria's Manufacturing Sector","authors":"Y. Sani, Abdel-Hafiez Ali Hassaballah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2463031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2463031","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of strategy implementation and control as independent variable in enhancing firm’s sustainable competitive advantage through innovation as the dependent variable in the Nigeria’s manufacturing sector. Data were collected through personal questionnaire from 166 manufacturing firms in Nigeria who are members of manufacturing association of Nigeria within North West and North central zones with 70% response rate. The results indicate that there is positive and significant relationship between strategic management elements; implementation and control with sustainable competitive advantage; innovation. According to the result manufacturers in Nigeria fully agree that strategy control is essential when a unique strategy has been implemented so as to successfully enhance sustainable competitive advantage. This study adds Knowledge to the theory and practice of sustainable competitive advantage particularly in Nigeria’s manufacturing firms. Its theoretical and empirical significance adds more insight on the previous empirical studies in the field that is to say it gives guidelines to manufacturers in Nigeria on the impact of strategic management approaches on sustainable competitive advantage. For government and firms, the study provides avenue of enhancing sustainable competitive advantage in Nigeria and Africa as a whole since the phenomena is general.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"299 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82869049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a distribution-free entropy-based methodology to calculate the expected value of an uncertainty reduction effort and present our results within the context of reducing demand uncertainty. In contrast to existing techniques, the methodology requires neither sampled observations of demand nor a priori assumptions regarding the underlying demand distribution. Rather, leveraging the maximum entropy principle to assign a probability density over all possible demand distributions enables modeling of both one's present state of uncertainty and one's potential future states of uncertainty. We demonstrate that this probability assignment is intuitively satisfying, theoretically justified, and done in a manner that is completely consistent with a decision maker's current information (or lack thereof). Theoretical and numerical results for valuing uncertainty reductions without knowing an underlying demand distribution are explored and contribute to the existing distribution free literature. We leverage these results to answer an often overlooked question in demand management: "Is there value in further reducing my demand uncertainty or do I act on my currently available information?''
{"title":"An Entropy Based Methodology for Valuation of Demand Uncertainty Reduction","authors":"Adam J. Fleischhacker, P. Fok","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2428870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2428870","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a distribution-free entropy-based methodology to calculate the expected value of an uncertainty reduction effort and present our results within the context of reducing demand uncertainty. In contrast to existing techniques, the methodology requires neither sampled observations of demand nor a priori assumptions regarding the underlying demand distribution. Rather, leveraging the maximum entropy principle to assign a probability density over all possible demand distributions enables modeling of both one's present state of uncertainty and one's potential future states of uncertainty. We demonstrate that this probability assignment is intuitively satisfying, theoretically justified, and done in a manner that is completely consistent with a decision maker's current information (or lack thereof). Theoretical and numerical results for valuing uncertainty reductions without knowing an underlying demand distribution are explored and contribute to the existing distribution free literature. We leverage these results to answer an often overlooked question in demand management: \"Is there value in further reducing my demand uncertainty or do I act on my currently available information?''","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90666118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a novel empirical approach to analyze workforce productivity in service systems via timing studies – detailed time-stamped data recording relevant activities performed by the employees processing service requests. Our econometric approach, which is based on models from survival analysis, takes advantage of the detailed information provided by timing study data to capture the time-varying factors that affect productivity, such as the workload level, switching among different tasks and temporary work-relief from breaks during the working shift. We apply our framework in an information technology service delivery system and use the estimated results to evaluate alternative designs of the service system in terms of workforce productivity. Specifically, our methodology can inform decisions regarding workload allocation, routing, prioritization, and working schedule design in a service system.
{"title":"Productivity Analysis in Services Using Timing Studies","authors":"Yina Lu, A. Heching, M. Olivares","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2403336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2403336","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a novel empirical approach to analyze workforce productivity in service systems via timing studies – detailed time-stamped data recording relevant activities performed by the employees processing service requests. Our econometric approach, which is based on models from survival analysis, takes advantage of the detailed information provided by timing study data to capture the time-varying factors that affect productivity, such as the workload level, switching among different tasks and temporary work-relief from breaks during the working shift. We apply our framework in an information technology service delivery system and use the estimated results to evaluate alternative designs of the service system in terms of workforce productivity. Specifically, our methodology can inform decisions regarding workload allocation, routing, prioritization, and working schedule design in a service system.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"167 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73918534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In an infinite horizon inventory and sales model, we show that the seller’s unique strategy exhibits increasing prices under general conditions on the revenue function. An increasing discount rate leads to an increase of the time interval between order times, but an increase in batch size has an ambiguous effect.
{"title":"The Economic Order Decision with Continuous Dynamic Pricing and Batch Supply","authors":"A. van den Berg, P. Herings, H. Peters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2382587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382587","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In an infinite horizon inventory and sales model, we show that the seller’s unique strategy exhibits increasing prices under general conditions on the revenue function. An increasing discount rate leads to an increase of the time interval between order times, but an increase in batch size has an ambiguous effect.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75638934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We model a supply chain scenario in which the genuine manufacturer is uncertain whether a retailer sells counterfeits alongside authentic products. We evaluate the optimal strategies for players under wholesale price contracts and two-part tariff contracts and analyse the impact of the uncertainty of retailer counterfeiting on the manufacturer’s pricing and expected profits. Furthermore, we investigate whether the two-part tariff is more effective compared with the wholesale price contract.
{"title":"Supply Chain Contracts Under Uncertainty of Retailer Counterfeiting","authors":"N. Sundaresan, Janat Shah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2378226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378226","url":null,"abstract":"We model a supply chain scenario in which the genuine manufacturer is uncertain whether a retailer sells counterfeits alongside authentic products. We evaluate the optimal strategies for players under wholesale price contracts and two-part tariff contracts and analyse the impact of the uncertainty of retailer counterfeiting on the manufacturer’s pricing and expected profits. Furthermore, we investigate whether the two-part tariff is more effective compared with the wholesale price contract.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2014-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81103941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While digital goods industries such as entertainment, software, and publishing are growing at a rapid pace, traditional supply chain contract models have failed to evolve with the new digital economy. To illustrate, the agency model utilized by the e-book publishing industry has recently received much negative attention brought by the U.S. Department of Justice's lawsuit against Apple, Inc. The emerging agency model in the e-book industry works as follows: the publisher sets the price of the digital goods and the retailers who serve as agents retain a percentage of the revenue associated with a consumer purchase. The regulators claim that the agency model is hurting this industry as well as the consumer's welfare because e-book prices have increased after the introduction of the agency model. We investigate the strategic impact of the agency model by examining a digital goods supply chain with one supplier and two competing retailers. In comparison to the benchmark wholesale model, we find that the agency model can coordinate the competing retailers by dividing the coordinated profits into a prenegotiated revenue sharing proportion. Further, we also identify the Pareto improving region whereby both the supplier and the retailers prefer the agency model to the wholesale model. Our main qualitative insight regarding the agency model still holds even when we consider the presence of the printed books in the marketplace. Thus, contrary to current press presaging the negative impact of the agency model on the e-books industry, we find the agency model to be superior to the traditional wholesale contracts for publishers, retailers and consumers in this digital goods industry.
{"title":"The Agency Model for Digital Goods","authors":"Y. Tan, J. Carrillo, Hsing Kenny Cheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2297484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2297484","url":null,"abstract":"While digital goods industries such as entertainment, software, and publishing are growing at a rapid pace, traditional supply chain contract models have failed to evolve with the new digital economy. To illustrate, the agency model utilized by the e-book publishing industry has recently received much negative attention brought by the U.S. Department of Justice's lawsuit against Apple, Inc. The emerging agency model in the e-book industry works as follows: the publisher sets the price of the digital goods and the retailers who serve as agents retain a percentage of the revenue associated with a consumer purchase. The regulators claim that the agency model is hurting this industry as well as the consumer's welfare because e-book prices have increased after the introduction of the agency model. We investigate the strategic impact of the agency model by examining a digital goods supply chain with one supplier and two competing retailers. In comparison to the benchmark wholesale model, we find that the agency model can coordinate the competing retailers by dividing the coordinated profits into a prenegotiated revenue sharing proportion. Further, we also identify the Pareto improving region whereby both the supplier and the retailers prefer the agency model to the wholesale model. Our main qualitative insight regarding the agency model still holds even when we consider the presence of the printed books in the marketplace. Thus, contrary to current press presaging the negative impact of the agency model on the e-books industry, we find the agency model to be superior to the traditional wholesale contracts for publishers, retailers and consumers in this digital goods industry.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84654743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jérémie Gallien, A. Mersereau, Andres Garro, Alberte Dapena Mora, M. N. Vidal
Given uncertain popularity of new products by location, fast fashion retailer Zara faces a trade-off. Large initial shipments to stores reduce lost sales in the critical first days of the product life cycle, but maintaining stock at the warehouse allows restocking flexibility once initial sales are observed. In collaboration with Zara, we develop and test a decision support system featuring a data-driven model of forecast updating and a dynamic optimization formulation for allocating limited stock by location over time. A controlled field experiment run worldwide with 34 articles during the 2012 season showed an increase in total average season sales by approximately 2% and a reduction in the number of unsold units at the end of the regular selling season by approximately 4%.
{"title":"Initial Shipment Decisions for New Products at Zara","authors":"Jérémie Gallien, A. Mersereau, Andres Garro, Alberte Dapena Mora, M. N. Vidal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2378859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378859","url":null,"abstract":"Given uncertain popularity of new products by location, fast fashion retailer Zara faces a trade-off. Large initial shipments to stores reduce lost sales in the critical first days of the product life cycle, but maintaining stock at the warehouse allows restocking flexibility once initial sales are observed. In collaboration with Zara, we develop and test a decision support system featuring a data-driven model of forecast updating and a dynamic optimization formulation for allocating limited stock by location over time. A controlled field experiment run worldwide with 34 articles during the 2012 season showed an increase in total average season sales by approximately 2% and a reduction in the number of unsold units at the end of the regular selling season by approximately 4%.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81210166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The manufacturing complexity of many high-tech products results in a substantial variation in the quality of the units produced. Post manufacturing, the units are classified into vertically differentiated products. These products are typically obtained in uncontrollable fractions, leading to mismatches between their demand and supply. We focus on product stock-outs due to the supply-demand mismatches. Existing literature suggests that when faced with product stock-outs, firms should satisfy all unmet demand of a low-end product by downgrading excess units of a high-end product (downward substitution). However, this policy may be sub-optimal if it is likely that low-end customers will substitute with a higher quality product and pay the higher price (upward substitution). In this paper, we investigate whether and how much downward substitution firms should perform. We also investigate whether and how much low-end inventory firms should withhold to strategically divert some low-end demand to the high-end product. We first establish the existence of regions of co-production technology and willingness of customers to substitute upwards where firms adopt different substitution/withholding strategies. Then, we develop a managerial framework to determine the optimal selling strategy during the life cycle of technology products as profit margins shrink, manufacturing technology improves, and more capacity becomes available. Consistent trends exist for exogenous and endogenous prices.
{"title":"Managing Supply Risk for Vertically Differentiated Co-Products","authors":"S. Bansal, S. Transchel","doi":"10.1111/POMS.12173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/POMS.12173","url":null,"abstract":"The manufacturing complexity of many high-tech products results in a substantial variation in the quality of the units produced. Post manufacturing, the units are classified into vertically differentiated products. These products are typically obtained in uncontrollable fractions, leading to mismatches between their demand and supply. We focus on product stock-outs due to the supply-demand mismatches. Existing literature suggests that when faced with product stock-outs, firms should satisfy all unmet demand of a low-end product by downgrading excess units of a high-end product (downward substitution). However, this policy may be sub-optimal if it is likely that low-end customers will substitute with a higher quality product and pay the higher price (upward substitution). In this paper, we investigate whether and how much downward substitution firms should perform. We also investigate whether and how much low-end inventory firms should withhold to strategically divert some low-end demand to the high-end product. We first establish the existence of regions of co-production technology and willingness of customers to substitute upwards where firms adopt different substitution/withholding strategies. Then, we develop a managerial framework to determine the optimal selling strategy during the life cycle of technology products as profit margins shrink, manufacturing technology improves, and more capacity becomes available. Consistent trends exist for exogenous and endogenous prices.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89588920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the ability of competing retailers to form a cartel by sharing information with their mutual manufacturer. In a market characterized by demand uncertainty, colluding retailers wish to share information about the potential market demand to coordinate on the optimal collusive retail price. However, in light of potential exposure to antitrust investigations and possible sanctions, the retailers search for mechanisms to exchange information while avoiding the risks of scrutiny by the antitrust authorities. This paper examines such a mechanism: each retailer shares his private information with the mutual manufacturer; the wholesale price set by the latter is thereafter used by the retailers to infer the market condition and coordinate on the cartel’s price. Although a cartel at the retail level limits the manufacturer’s sold quantity, under certain conditions the manufacturer is better off accepting the retailers’ private information, thereby assisting the cartel formation. Moreover, vertical information sharing between the retailers and their mutual manufacturer can result in lower consumer surplus than that would have occurred had the retailers been permitted to collude directly.
{"title":"Cartel Formation through Strategic Information Leakage in a Distribution Channel","authors":"Noam Shamir","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2292410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2292410","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the ability of competing retailers to form a cartel by sharing information with their mutual manufacturer. In a market characterized by demand uncertainty, colluding retailers wish to share information about the potential market demand to coordinate on the optimal collusive retail price. However, in light of potential exposure to antitrust investigations and possible sanctions, the retailers search for mechanisms to exchange information while avoiding the risks of scrutiny by the antitrust authorities. This paper examines such a mechanism: each retailer shares his private information with the mutual manufacturer; the wholesale price set by the latter is thereafter used by the retailers to infer the market condition and coordinate on the cartel’s price. Although a cartel at the retail level limits the manufacturer’s sold quantity, under certain conditions the manufacturer is better off accepting the retailers’ private information, thereby assisting the cartel formation. Moreover, vertical information sharing between the retailers and their mutual manufacturer can result in lower consumer surplus than that would have occurred had the retailers been permitted to collude directly.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81018971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article studies the impact of modular assembly on supply chain efficiency. In the modular assembly approach, a manufacturer acquires pre-assembled modules from its suppliers, rather than the individual components, as in the traditional assembly approach. We analyze the competitive behavior of a two-stage modular assembly system consisting of a manufacturer, and a supplier who pre-assembles two components into a module. The firms can choose their own inventory policies and we show the existence of Nash equilibrium in the inventory game. Moving from the traditional to the modular approach has a twofold effect on the supply chain. First, we investigate the effect of centralizing the component suppliers. It can be shown that when there is no production time shift, the module supplier always holds more component inventories than suppliers do in the traditional approach, which yields a lower cost for the manufacturer. However, the suppliers, and therefore the supply chain may incur a higher cost in the modular approach. Second, we study the effect of a shift in production time from the manufacturing stage to the supplier stage. From numerical studies, it has been found that such a lead time shift always benefits a centralized supply chain, but not necessarily so for a decentralized system. Combining the two effects, we find that the modular approach generally reduces the cost to the manufacturer and the supply chain, which explains the prevalence of modular assembly from the perspective of inventory management. These results also provide some insight into how firms can improve supply chain efficiency by choosing the right decision structure and lead time configuration.
{"title":"The Impact of Modular Assembly on Supply Chain Efficiency","authors":"Tianjun Feng, Fuqiang Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2284390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2284390","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies the impact of modular assembly on supply chain efficiency. In the modular assembly approach, a manufacturer acquires pre-assembled modules from its suppliers, rather than the individual components, as in the traditional assembly approach. We analyze the competitive behavior of a two-stage modular assembly system consisting of a manufacturer, and a supplier who pre-assembles two components into a module. The firms can choose their own inventory policies and we show the existence of Nash equilibrium in the inventory game. Moving from the traditional to the modular approach has a twofold effect on the supply chain. First, we investigate the effect of centralizing the component suppliers. It can be shown that when there is no production time shift, the module supplier always holds more component inventories than suppliers do in the traditional approach, which yields a lower cost for the manufacturer. However, the suppliers, and therefore the supply chain may incur a higher cost in the modular approach. Second, we study the effect of a shift in production time from the manufacturing stage to the supplier stage. From numerical studies, it has been found that such a lead time shift always benefits a centralized supply chain, but not necessarily so for a decentralized system. Combining the two effects, we find that the modular approach generally reduces the cost to the manufacturer and the supply chain, which explains the prevalence of modular assembly from the perspective of inventory management. These results also provide some insight into how firms can improve supply chain efficiency by choosing the right decision structure and lead time configuration.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74624494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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