In practice, some well-established service providers sellers offer one-time experiences or product demonstrations for the services that have been introduced to the market for years. Such activities, labeled as seller-induced learning, not only help the consumers learn more about themselves but also exploit the consumers by elaborating on the consumer heterogeneity. When the seller-induced learning completely resolves the consumers' valuation uncertainty, it can facilitate a more sophisticated price discrimination scheme and may give rise to a relatively more efficient allocation. Nevertheless, if there is residual valuation uncertainty, the seller may abandon the seller-induced learning to avoid the exacerbated ex post cannibalization. We show that an exploding offer shall sometimes be offered in conjunction with the seller-induced learning to encourage immediate purchases when uncertainty arises in only some consumers. We identify regimes under which the seller-induced learning is charged at a strictly positive price. Under these regimes, the seller need not sacrifice the ex post efficiency upon inducing consumer learning. Therefore, our result indicates that the seller-induced learning may eliminate the conflict between rent extraction and efficiency initiatives. However, quality distortion prevails when the seller provides an identical menu for all the consumers or the free seller-induced learning. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.
在实践中，一些成熟的服务提供商和销售商为已经进入市场多年的服务提供一次性体验或产品演示。这种被称为卖家诱导学习的活动不仅帮助消费者更多地了解自己，而且还通过阐述消费者的异质性来剥削消费者。当卖方诱导学习完全解决了消费者的估价不确定性时，它可以促进更复杂的价格歧视方案，并可能产生相对更有效的配置。然而，如果存在剩余估值不确定性，卖方可能会放弃卖方诱导学习，以避免加剧事后蚕食。我们表明，当只有部分消费者出现不确定性时，爆炸式报价有时应与卖方诱导学习相结合，以鼓励立即购买。我们确定了卖方诱导学习以严格的正价格收费的制度。在这些制度下，卖方不需要牺牲事后效率，以诱导消费者学习。因此，我们的研究结果表明，卖方诱导学习可以消除租金提取与效率倡议之间的冲突。然而，当卖家为所有消费者提供相同的菜单或卖家诱导的免费学习时，质量扭曲普遍存在。这篇论文被市场营销学的J. Miguel Villas-Boas接受。
{"title":"Product Line Design with Seller-Induced Learning","authors":"Hui Xiong, Ying‐ju Chen","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2013.1789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1789","url":null,"abstract":"In practice, some well-established service providers sellers offer one-time experiences or product demonstrations for the services that have been introduced to the market for years. Such activities, labeled as seller-induced learning, not only help the consumers learn more about themselves but also exploit the consumers by elaborating on the consumer heterogeneity. When the seller-induced learning completely resolves the consumers' valuation uncertainty, it can facilitate a more sophisticated price discrimination scheme and may give rise to a relatively more efficient allocation. Nevertheless, if there is residual valuation uncertainty, the seller may abandon the seller-induced learning to avoid the exacerbated ex post cannibalization. We show that an exploding offer shall sometimes be offered in conjunction with the seller-induced learning to encourage immediate purchases when uncertainty arises in only some consumers. We identify regimes under which the seller-induced learning is charged at a strictly positive price. Under these regimes, the seller need not sacrifice the ex post efficiency upon inducing consumer learning. Therefore, our result indicates that the seller-induced learning may eliminate the conflict between rent extraction and efficiency initiatives. However, quality distortion prevails when the seller provides an identical menu for all the consumers or the free seller-induced learning. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82713818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we present a pharmaceutical supply chain network model with outsourcing under price and quality competition, in both equilibrium and dynamic versions. We consider a pharmaceutical firm that is engaged in determining the optimal pharmaceuti- cal flows associated with its supply chain network activities in the form of manufacturing and distribution. In addition to multimarket demand satisfaction, the pharmaceutical firm seeks to minimize its total cost, with the associated function also capturing the firm's weighted disrepute cost caused by possible quality issues associated with the contractors. Simulta- neously, the contractors, who compete with one another in a noncooperative manner in prices a la Bertrand, and in quality, seek to secure manufacturing and distribution of the pharmaceutical product from the pharmaceutical firm. This game theory model allows for the determination of the optimal pharmaceutical product flows associated with the supply chain in-house and outsourcing network activities and provides the pharmaceutical firm with its optimal make-or-buy decisions and the optimal contractor-selections. We state the gov- erning equilibrium conditions and derive the equivalent variational inequality formulation. We then propose dynamic adjustment processes for the evolution of the product flows, the quality levels, and the prices, along with stability analysis results. The algorithm yields a discretization of the continuous-time adjustment processes. We present convergence results and compute solutions to numerical examples to illustrate the generality and applicability of the framework.
{"title":"Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Networks with Outsourcing Under Price and Quality Competition","authors":"A. Nagurney, Dong Li, L. Nagurney","doi":"10.1111/itor.12031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12031","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a pharmaceutical supply chain network model with outsourcing under price and quality competition, in both equilibrium and dynamic versions. We consider a pharmaceutical firm that is engaged in determining the optimal pharmaceuti- cal flows associated with its supply chain network activities in the form of manufacturing and distribution. In addition to multimarket demand satisfaction, the pharmaceutical firm seeks to minimize its total cost, with the associated function also capturing the firm's weighted disrepute cost caused by possible quality issues associated with the contractors. Simulta- neously, the contractors, who compete with one another in a noncooperative manner in prices a la Bertrand, and in quality, seek to secure manufacturing and distribution of the pharmaceutical product from the pharmaceutical firm. This game theory model allows for the determination of the optimal pharmaceutical product flows associated with the supply chain in-house and outsourcing network activities and provides the pharmaceutical firm with its optimal make-or-buy decisions and the optimal contractor-selections. We state the gov- erning equilibrium conditions and derive the equivalent variational inequality formulation. We then propose dynamic adjustment processes for the evolution of the product flows, the quality levels, and the prices, along with stability analysis results. The algorithm yields a discretization of the continuous-time adjustment processes. We present convergence results and compute solutions to numerical examples to illustrate the generality and applicability of the framework.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88901664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The assumption that unsold goods can be liquidated at a constant salvage value is widespread in inventory theory. We show that, under general mathematical conditions, this modeling assumption will cause companies to underestimate both the value of lead-time reduction and the cost of lead time increases. Our result does not require that companies actively consider the possibility of non-constant salvage values. Rather we show that, in an environment where salvage values are allowed to depend on the amount of overage, a firm that cuts lead times according to a strategy that assumes a constant salvage value will earn more money than predicted from its lead-time reduction.
{"title":"Constant Salvage Value Models: A Source of Systematic Bias in Predicting the Value of Lead-Time Reduction","authors":"Stefan Wager, Suzanne de Treville","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2202422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2202422","url":null,"abstract":"The assumption that unsold goods can be liquidated at a constant salvage value is widespread in inventory theory. We show that, under general mathematical conditions, this modeling assumption will cause companies to underestimate both the value of lead-time reduction and the cost of lead time increases. Our result does not require that companies actively consider the possibility of non-constant salvage values. Rather we show that, in an environment where salvage values are allowed to depend on the amount of overage, a firm that cuts lead times according to a strategy that assumes a constant salvage value will earn more money than predicted from its lead-time reduction.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79173308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Product quality is one of the key competitive factors that will enable firms to survive and succeed in the global market place. Product quality is an important dimension of operational performance in supply chain management that has not received sufficient attention from the research community. Previous researches in this field have neglected to consider the relationship between supply chain integration and dimensions of product quality. Hence, the effect of supply chain integration on quality performance has received less attention. Therefore consideration must be given to the development of collaborative activities between manufacturer, supplier and costumer which enables firms to work together and improve product quality. Accordingly, the primary focus of this study is to investigate the relationship between dimensions of product quality and supply chain integration. The dimensions considered for product quality are design quality and conformance quality, whereas the dimensions for supply chain integration are customer integration, supplier integration, and internal integration. The relationships between these dimensions are then embodied in a framework which will be validated. This research adopts both a qualitative conceptual approach and a quantitative approach in the development of the framework. The literature is consulted in identifying the dimensions of supply chain integration and product quality. These dimensions are then modeled into a questionnaire survey, and are administered to identify manufacturing companies. Validity and reliability of the scales for the construct of interest were assessed through a factor analysis and Cronbach-alpha test. The results provide considerable support for our product quality-supply chain integration framework that can be used in the manufacturing sector.
{"title":"A Product Quality — Supply Chain Integration Framework","authors":"Zahra Lotfi, S. Sahran, M. Mukhtar","doi":"10.3923/JAS.2013.36.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3923/JAS.2013.36.48","url":null,"abstract":"Product quality is one of the key competitive factors that will enable firms to survive and succeed in the global market place. Product quality is an important dimension of operational performance in supply chain management that has not received sufficient attention from the research community. Previous researches in this field have neglected to consider the relationship between supply chain integration and dimensions of product quality. Hence, the effect of supply chain integration on quality performance has received less attention. Therefore consideration must be given to the development of collaborative activities between manufacturer, supplier and costumer which enables firms to work together and improve product quality. Accordingly, the primary focus of this study is to investigate the relationship between dimensions of product quality and supply chain integration. The dimensions considered for product quality are design quality and conformance quality, whereas the dimensions for supply chain integration are customer integration, supplier integration, and internal integration. The relationships between these dimensions are then embodied in a framework which will be validated. This research adopts both a qualitative conceptual approach and a quantitative approach in the development of the framework. The literature is consulted in identifying the dimensions of supply chain integration and product quality. These dimensions are then modeled into a questionnaire survey, and are administered to identify manufacturing companies. Validity and reliability of the scales for the construct of interest were assessed through a factor analysis and Cronbach-alpha test. The results provide considerable support for our product quality-supply chain integration framework that can be used in the manufacturing sector.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75527519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.5465/AMBPP.2013.15308ABSTRACT
J. Roehrich, Johanne Grosvold, Stefan Hoejmose
This paper applies the logic of bounded rationality and explores the extent to which companies implement responsible supply chain management (RSCM) as a result of their reputational risk exposure, and how bounded rationality impacts on the decision to implement RSCM. This study draws on primary and secondary data from twelve UK-based companies. We conducted 19 semi- structured interviews and analysed our data through an inductive methodology. We find that reputational risk exposure is a central driver in a company’s decision to implement RSCM practices. However, managers face bounded rationality, in particular: (i) conflicting priorities; (ii) capabilities and resources; (iii) commitment; and iv) contextual environment, which in turn, means that companies do what they can to safeguard their reputation, but balance the extent to which they implement RSCM and the cost of doing so against the likelihood of exposure. By engaging in collaborative relationships with their supply chain partners, focal firms who ...
{"title":"Reputational Risks and Responsible Supply Chain Management: Decision Making Under Bounded Rationality","authors":"J. Roehrich, Johanne Grosvold, Stefan Hoejmose","doi":"10.5465/AMBPP.2013.15308ABSTRACT","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2013.15308ABSTRACT","url":null,"abstract":"This paper applies the logic of bounded rationality and explores the extent to which companies implement responsible supply chain management (RSCM) as a result of their reputational risk exposure, and how bounded rationality impacts on the decision to implement RSCM. This study draws on primary and secondary data from twelve UK-based companies. We conducted 19 semi- structured interviews and analysed our data through an inductive methodology. We find that reputational risk exposure is a central driver in a company’s decision to implement RSCM practices. However, managers face bounded rationality, in particular: (i) conflicting priorities; (ii) capabilities and resources; (iii) commitment; and iv) contextual environment, which in turn, means that companies do what they can to safeguard their reputation, but balance the extent to which they implement RSCM and the cost of doing so against the likelihood of exposure. By engaging in collaborative relationships with their supply chain partners, focal firms who ...","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86292362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To understand whether retailers should consider consumer returns when merchandising, we study how the optimal assortment of a price-taking retailer is influenced by its return policy. The retailer selects its assortment from an exogenous set of horizontally differentiated products. Consumers make purchase and keep/return decisions in nested multinomial logit fashion. Our main finding is that the optimal assortment has a counterintuitive structure for relatively strict return policies: It is optimal to offer a mix of the most popular and most eccentric products when the refund amount is sufficiently low, which can be viewed as a form of risk sharing between the retailer and consumers. In contrast, if the refund is sufficiently high, or when returns are disallowed, optimal assortment is composed of only the most popular products (a common finding in the literature). We provide preliminary empirical evidence for one of the key drivers of our results: more eccentric products have higher probability of return – conditional on purchase. In light of our analytical findings and managerial insights, we conclude that retailers should take their return policies into account when merchandising.
{"title":"When to Carry Eccentric Products? Optimal Retail Assortment under Consumer Returns","authors":"Aydın Alptekinoğlu, A. Grasas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1809198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1809198","url":null,"abstract":"To understand whether retailers should consider consumer returns when merchandising, we study how the optimal assortment of a price-taking retailer is influenced by its return policy. The retailer selects its assortment from an exogenous set of horizontally differentiated products. Consumers make purchase and keep/return decisions in nested multinomial logit fashion. Our main finding is that the optimal assortment has a counterintuitive structure for relatively strict return policies: It is optimal to offer a mix of the most popular and most eccentric products when the refund amount is sufficiently low, which can be viewed as a form of risk sharing between the retailer and consumers. In contrast, if the refund is sufficiently high, or when returns are disallowed, optimal assortment is composed of only the most popular products (a common finding in the literature). We provide preliminary empirical evidence for one of the key drivers of our results: more eccentric products have higher probability of return – conditional on purchase. In light of our analytical findings and managerial insights, we conclude that retailers should take their return policies into account when merchandising.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75292738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study two-echelon distribution systems (also known as one-warehouse, multiple-retailer (OWMR) systems) subject to supply disruptions. We propose algorithms to find the optimal or near-optimal stocking levels of all the locations in the system by assuming periodic review base-stock policies, deterministic demands at the retailers and non-overlapping disruptions at the supply processes of the warehouse and the retailer. This is the first paper to consider OWMR systems with all locations keeping inventory and all locations subject to supply disruptions. We show how supply disruptions at different parts of the network affect inventory decisions and we quantify the effects of ignoring the disruptions at different parts of the supply chain. Our results suggest that companies should work on reducing the duration of supply disruptions instead of trying to prevent them. In addition, if they choose to do nothing to prevent the consequences of some of the disruptions, these should not be the ones happening close to the customers.
{"title":"Disruptions in One-Warehouse Multiple-Retailer Systems","authors":"Z. Atan, L. Snyder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2171214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2171214","url":null,"abstract":"We study two-echelon distribution systems (also known as one-warehouse, multiple-retailer (OWMR) systems) subject to supply disruptions. We propose algorithms to find the optimal or near-optimal stocking levels of all the locations in the system by assuming periodic review base-stock policies, deterministic demands at the retailers and non-overlapping disruptions at the supply processes of the warehouse and the retailer. This is the first paper to consider OWMR systems with all locations keeping inventory and all locations subject to supply disruptions. We show how supply disruptions at different parts of the network affect inventory decisions and we quantify the effects of ignoring the disruptions at different parts of the supply chain. Our results suggest that companies should work on reducing the duration of supply disruptions instead of trying to prevent them. In addition, if they choose to do nothing to prevent the consequences of some of the disruptions, these should not be the ones happening close to the customers.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83799143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: Рассмотрена задача программного управления параметрами поточной линии с использованием сверхурочных работ.
English Abstract: The problem of software control of the production line parameters using overtime is showed.
{"title":"Техническое Содержание и Постановка Задачи Программного Управления Параметрами Поточной Линии С Использованием Сверхурочных Работ (Technical Content and Statement of the Problem Control of Production Line Parameters Using Overtime Work)","authors":"O. Pihnastyi, Viktor Zaruba","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3427518","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3427518","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Рассмотрена задача программного управления параметрами поточной линии с использованием сверхурочных работ.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The problem of software control of the production line parameters using overtime is showed.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88552722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The supply chain contracting literature has focused on incentive contracts designed to align supply chain members' individual interests. A key finding of this literature is that members' preferences for contractual forms are at odds: the upstream supplier prefers more complex contracts that can coordinate the supply chain, with the simple 'wholesale price only' contracts eliminated by market force; however, the downstream retailer prefers the wholesale price only contract because it leaves more surplus (than a coordinating contract) that the retailer can get. This paper addresses the question: Under what circumstances do suppliers and retailers prefer the same contractual form? Our analysis suggests that both sides of the supply chain may prefer the same 'quantity discount' contract, thereby eliminating the conflicts of interests that otherwise typify contracting situations. More interesting still is that both sides may also prefer the wholesale price only contract, a result that is new to the literature.
{"title":"Harmony in Competition: On Preferences for Contractual Forms in Supply Chains","authors":"Lijian Lu, Yaozhong Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2157820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2157820","url":null,"abstract":"The supply chain contracting literature has focused on incentive contracts designed to align supply chain members' individual interests. A key finding of this literature is that members' preferences for contractual forms are at odds: the upstream supplier prefers more complex contracts that can coordinate the supply chain, with the simple 'wholesale price only' contracts eliminated by market force; however, the downstream retailer prefers the wholesale price only contract because it leaves more surplus (than a coordinating contract) that the retailer can get. This paper addresses the question: Under what circumstances do suppliers and retailers prefer the same contractual form? Our analysis suggests that both sides of the supply chain may prefer the same 'quantity discount' contract, thereby eliminating the conflicts of interests that otherwise typify contracting situations. More interesting still is that both sides may also prefer the wholesale price only contract, a result that is new to the literature.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91201774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
La industria de alimentación y bebidas es uno de los sectores en mejor situación actualmente en España. Un sector estratégico para afrontar la situación de crisis generalizada que estamos viviendo. En el presente artículo se repasa la situación actual del sector así cómo varios aspectos clave que las empresas deben afrontar en los próximos años para alcanzar el desarrollo que necesitan. Food and beverage industry is one of the sectors in best situation currently in Spain. This sector is a strategic sector to face the situation of crisis that we are experiencing. This article reviewed the current situation in the sector as well as several key aspects that the sector must face in the coming years to meet the development needs.
{"title":"La Industria Alimentaria Española: situación y previsiones futuras (The Spanish Food Industry: Actual Situation and Future Forecasts)","authors":"J. Francisco Carbonell Ureña","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2136876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2136876","url":null,"abstract":"La industria de alimentación y bebidas es uno de los sectores en mejor situación actualmente en España. Un sector estratégico para afrontar la situación de crisis generalizada que estamos viviendo. En el presente artículo se repasa la situación actual del sector así cómo varios aspectos clave que las empresas deben afrontar en los próximos años para alcanzar el desarrollo que necesitan. Food and beverage industry is one of the sectors in best situation currently in Spain. This sector is a strategic sector to face the situation of crisis that we are experiencing. This article reviewed the current situation in the sector as well as several key aspects that the sector must face in the coming years to meet the development needs.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"193 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85934251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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