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Certifying Lemons 柠檬认证
Pub Date : 2024-07-29 DOI: arxiv-2407.19814
Hershdeep Chopra
This paper examines an adverse selection environment where a sender withprivate information (high or low ability) tries to convince a receiver of theirhigh ability. Without commitment or costly signaling, market failure can occur.Certification intermediaries reduce these frictions by enabling signalingthrough hard information. This paper focuses on a monopolistic certifier andits impact on equilibrium welfare and certificate design. Key findings showthat the certifier often provides minimal information, pooling senders ofvarying abilities and leaving low rents for high-type senders, which typicallydisadvantages the receiver. However, when precise information is demanded, thecertifier screens the sender perfectly, benefiting the receiver. Thus, themonopolistic intermediary has an ambiguous effect on market efficiency. Theresults emphasize the importance of high certification standards, which drivelow-ability senders out of the market. Conditions for such equilibria arecharacterized, showing how simple threshold strategies by the receiver inducefirst-best outcomes. Additionally, the relationship between the characteristicsof offered certificates and welfare is identified.
本文研究了一种逆向选择环境,在这种环境中,拥有私人信息(能力高或低)的发送方试图让接收方相信自己的能力很高。认证中介通过硬信息传递信息,减少了这些摩擦。本文重点研究了垄断性认证机构及其对均衡福利和证书设计的影响。主要研究结果表明,认证机构通常只提供最低限度的信息,将不同能力的发送者集中在一起,为高类型发送者留下低租金,这通常对接收者不利。然而,当需要精确信息时,认证者会对发送者进行完美筛选,从而使接收者受益。因此,非垄断性中介对市场效率的影响是模糊的。结果强调了高认证标准的重要性,它能将能力较低的发送方赶出市场。对这种均衡的条件进行了描述,显示了接收方的简单门槛策略是如何诱导出第一最优结果的。此外,还确定了所提供证书的特征与福利之间的关系。
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引用次数: 0
Unimprovable Students and Inequality in School Choice 无法进步的学生与择校中的不平等
Pub Date : 2024-07-29 DOI: arxiv-2407.19831
Josue Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Pablo Arribillaga
The Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) mechanism corrects thePareto-inefficiency of the celebrated Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm,assigning every student to a weakly more preferred school. Nonetheless, it isunclear which and how many students do not improve their DA placement underEADA. We show that, despite all its merits, EADA never benefits pupils who areeither assigned to their worst-ranked schools or unmatched under DA. It alsolimits the placement improvement of marginalized students, preserving schoolsegregation. The placement of the worst-off student under EADA may beunreasonably bad, even though significantly more egalitarian allocations arepossible. Finally, we provide a bound on the expected number of unimprovablestudents using a random market approach. Our results help to understand why EADA fails to reduce the inequalitygenerated by DA in empirical evaluations of school choice mechanisms.
经过效率调整的延迟录取(EADA)机制纠正了著名的延迟录取(DA)算法的帕累托效率低下问题,将每个学生分配到一个较弱的优先学校。尽管如此,目前还不清楚在 EADA 机制下,哪些学生以及有多少学生的 DA 排名没有得到改善。我们的研究表明,尽管 EADA 有很多优点,但它从未使那些被分配到排名最差的学校或未被 DA 匹配的学生受益。它还限制了边缘化学生的派位改善,维持了学校隔离。在 EADA 条件下,最差学生的派位可能是不合理的,即使有可能进行更平等的派位。最后,我们利用随机市场方法给出了未改善学生预期人数的约束。我们的研究结果有助于理解为什么在择校机制的实证评估中,"平等机会与发展 "无法减少 "发展议程 "所产生的不平等。
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引用次数: 0
Order-theoretical fixed point theorems for correspondences and application in game theory 对应关系的有序理论定点定理及其在博弈论中的应用
Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: arxiv-2407.18582
Lu Yu
For an ascending correspondence $F:Xto 2^X$ with chain-complete values on acomplete lattice $X$, we prove that the set of fixed points is a completelattice. This strengthens Zhou's fixed point theorem. For chain-complete posetsthat are not necessarily lattices, we generalize the Abian-Brown and theMarkowsky fixed point theorems from single-valued maps to multivaluedcorrespondences. We provide an application in game theory.
对于在完整点阵 $X$ 上具有链完全值的升序对应关系 $F:X(X)到 2^X(X),我们证明了定点集合是一个完整点阵。这加强了周的定点定理。对于不一定是网格的链式完全正集,我们将阿比恩-布朗和马科夫斯基定点定理从单值映射推广到多值对应。我们提供了在博弈论中的应用。
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引用次数: 0
Getting the Agent to Wait 让代理等待
Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: arxiv-2407.19127
Maryam Saeedi, Yikang Shen, Ali Shourideh
We examine the strategic interaction between an expert (principal) maximizingengagement and an agent seeking swift information. Our analysis reveals: Whenpriors align, relative patience determines optimal disclosure -- impatientagents induce gradual revelation, while impatient principals cause delayed,abrupt revelation. When priors disagree, catering to the bias often emerges,with the principal initially providing signals aligned with the agent's bias.With private agent beliefs, we observe two phases: one engaging both agents,followed by catering to one type. Comparing personalized and non-personalizedstrategies, we find faster information revelation in the non-personalized case,but higher quality information in the personalized case.
我们研究了最大化参与的专家(委托人)与寻求迅速信息的代理人之间的战略互动。我们的分析表明当优先权一致时,相对耐心决定了最优披露--没有耐心的代理人会诱导渐进式披露,而没有耐心的委托人则会导致延迟、突然的披露。当先验不一致时,往往会出现迎合偏差的情况,委托人最初会提供与代理人的偏差一致的信号。在代理人有私人信念的情况下,我们观察到两个阶段:一个阶段是两个代理人都参与,然后是迎合一种类型。比较个性化策略和非个性化策略,我们发现非个性化策略的信息揭示速度更快,而个性化策略的信息质量更高。
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引用次数: 0
Generalization of Zhou fixed point theorem 周定点定理的推广
Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: arxiv-2407.17884
Lu Yu
We give two generalizations of the Zhou fixed point theorem. They weaken thesubcompleteness condition of values, and relax the ascending condition of thecorrespondence. As an application, we derive a generalization of Topkis'stheorem on the existence and order structure of the set of Nash equilibria ofsupermodular games.
我们给出了周定点定理的两个概括。它们削弱了值的次完备性条件,并放宽了对应关系的上升条件。作为应用,我们推导了托普基斯定理关于超模博弈纳什均衡集的存在性和阶结构的广义。
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引用次数: 0
Quantity Limits on Addictive Goods 成瘾物品的数量限制
Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: arxiv-2407.16987
Eric Gao
Addiction is a major societal issue leading to billions in healthcare lossesper year. Policy makers often introduce ad hoc quantity limits-limits on theconsumption or possession of a substance-something which current economicmodels of addiction have failed to address. This paper enriches Bernheim andRangel (2004)'s model of addiction driven by cue-triggered decisions byincorporating endogenous choice of how much of the addictive good to consume,instead of just whether or not consumption happens. Stricter quality limitsimprove welfare as long as they do not preclude the myopically optimal level ofconsumption.
成瘾是一个重大的社会问题,每年造成数十亿美元的医疗损失。政策制定者通常会引入特别的数量限制--对某种物质的消费或拥有量进行限制--而目前的成瘾经济模型却未能解决这一问题。本文丰富了 Bernheim 和 Rangel(2004)由线索触发决策驱动的成瘾模型,将消费多少成瘾物品的内生选择纳入其中,而不仅仅是消费与否。只要不排除近视最佳消费水平,更严格的质量限制就能改善福利。
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引用次数: 0
Robust Comparative Statics with Misspecified Bayesian Learning 使用失范贝叶斯学习的稳健比较静力学
Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: arxiv-2407.17037
Aniruddha Ghosh
We present novel monotone comparative statics results for steady statebehavior in a dynamic optimization environment with misspecified Bayesianlearning. We consider a generalized framework, based on Esponda and Pouzo(2021), wherein a Bayesian learner facing a dynamic optimization problem has aprior on a set of parameterized transition probability functions (models) butis misspecified in the sense that the true process is not within this set. Inthe steady state, the learner infers the model that best-fits the datagenerated by their actions, and in turn, their actions are optimally chosengiven their inferred model. We characterize conditions on the primitives of theenvironment, and in particular, over the set of models under which the steadystate distribution over states and actions and inferred models exhibitmonotonic behavior. Further, we offer a new theorem on the existence of asteady state on the basis of a monotonicity argument. Lastly, we provide anupper bound on the cost of misspecification, again in terms of the primitivesof the environment. We demonstrate the utility of our results for severalenvironments of general interest, including forecasting models, dynamiceffort-task, and optimal consumption-savings problems.
我们提出了新的单调比较静态结果,用于解释在动态优化环境中的稳态行为,以及失范贝叶斯学习(misspecified Bayesianlearning)。我们考虑了一个基于 Esponda 和 Pouzo(2021 年)的广义框架,在这个框架中,面临动态优化问题的贝叶斯学习者有一组参数化过渡概率函数(模型)的先验,但由于真实过程不在这组参数化过渡概率函数(模型)的范围内而被错误地指定。在稳定状态下,学习者会推断出最适合其行动产生的数据的模型,反过来,他们的行动也会根据推断出的模型做出最优选择。我们描述了环境基元的条件,特别是模型集的条件,在这些条件下,状态和行动的稳态分布以及推断模型都表现出单调行为。此外,我们还在单调性论证的基础上提出了一个关于稳态存在的新定理。最后,我们再次从环境基元的角度,提供了错误规范代价的上界。我们证明了我们的结果在几个普遍感兴趣的环境中的实用性,包括预测模型、动态努力任务和最优消费节省问题。
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引用次数: 0
Diversity in Choice as Majorization 作为专业选择的多样性
Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: arxiv-2407.17589
Federico Echenique, Teddy Mekonnen, M. Bumin Yenmez
We use majorization to model comparative diversity in school choice. Apopulation of agents is more diverse than another population of agents if itsdistribution over groups is less concentrated: being less concentrated takes aspecific mathematical meaning borrowed from the theory of majorization. Weadapt the standard notion of majorization in order to favor arbitrarydistributional objectives, such as population-level distributions overrace/ethnicity or socioeconomic status. With school admissions in mind, weaxiomatically characterize choice rules that are consistent with modifiedmajorization, and constitute a principled method for admitting a diversepopulation of students into a school. Two important advantages of our approachis that majorization provides a natural notion of diversity, and that ouraxioms are independent of any exogenous priority ordering. We compare ourchoice rule to the leading proposal in the literature, ``reserves and quotas,''and find ours to be more flexible.
我们用 "专业化 "来模拟择校中的比较多样性。如果一个群体在不同群体间的分布集中程度较低,那么这个群体就比另一个群体更多样化:集中程度较低的数学含义借鉴了 "主要化 "理论。我们对标准的 "主要化 "概念进行了调整,以适应任意的分布目标,如种族/族裔或社会经济地位的人口分布。考虑到学校的录取问题,我们对与修正的专业化相一致的选择规则进行了标准化描述,并构成了一种将多样化的学生群体录取到学校的原则性方法。我们的方法有两个重要优势:专业化提供了一个自然的多样性概念;我们的公理与任何外生的优先排序无关。我们将我们的选择规则与文献中的主要建议 "保留和配额 "进行了比较,发现我们的规则更加灵活。
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引用次数: 0
Capital as Artificial Intelligence 作为人工智能的资本
Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: arxiv-2407.16314
Cesare Carissimo, Marcin Korecki
We gather many perspectives on Capital and synthesize their commonalities. Weprovide a characterization of Capital as a historical agential system andpropose a model of Capital using tools from computer science. Our modelconsists of propositions which, if satisfied by a specific grounding,constitute a valid model of Capital. We clarify the manners in which Capitalcan evolve. We claim that, when its evolution is driven by quantitativeoptimization processes, Capital can possess qualities of ArtificialIntelligence. We find that Capital may not uniquely represent meaning, in thesame way that optimization is not intentionally meaningful. We find thatArtificial Intelligences like modern day Large Language Models are a part ofCapital. We link our readers to a web-interface where they can interact with apart of Capital.
我们收集了许多关于《资本论》的观点,并综合了它们的共性。我们将《资本论》描述为一个历史性的行动系统,并使用计算机科学的工具提出了一个《资本论》模型。我们的模型由一些命题组成,如果这些命题符合特定的基础,就构成了一个有效的《资本论》模型。我们阐明了资本演变的方式。我们认为,当资本的进化由定量优化过程驱动时,资本可以具备人工智能的特质。我们发现,"资本 "可能并不唯一地代表意义,就像优化并非有意为之一样。我们发现,像现代大型语言模型这样的人工智能也是资本的一部分。我们将读者链接到一个网络界面,在那里他们可以与《资本论》的一部分进行互动。
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引用次数: 0
Dynamic Signals 动态信号
Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: arxiv-2407.16648
Mark Whitmeyer, Cole Williams
In this paper, we reveal that the signal representation of informationintroduced by Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) can be applied profitably to dynamicdecision problems. We use this to characterize when one dynamic informationstructure is more valuable to an agent than another, irrespective of what otherdynamic sources of information the agent may possess. Notably, this robustdominance is equivalent to an intuitive dynamic version of Brooks, Frankel, andKamenica (2022)'s reveal-or-refine condition.
在本文中,我们揭示了 Gentzkow 和 Kamenica(2017 年)提出的信息信号表示法可以有效地应用于动态决策问题。我们用它来描述当一种动态信息结构对一个代理来说比另一种更有价值时的特征,而不管该代理可能拥有哪些其他动态信息源。值得注意的是,这种稳健优势等同于布鲁克斯、弗兰克尔和卡梅尼卡(Brooks, Frankel, andKamenica, 2022)的 "揭示或改进 "条件的直观动态版本。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics
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