Pub Date : 2024-03-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102867
Melissa K. Spencer
Behavioral adjustments to mitigate increasing risk of STIs can increase or decrease the likelihood of pregnancy. This paper measures the effects of the arrival and spread of AIDS across U.S. cities in the 1980s and 1990s on births and abortions. I show that the AIDS epidemic increased the birth rate by 0.55 percent and the abortion rate by 1.77 percent. I find support for two underlying mechanisms to explain the increase in pregnancies. Some women opted into monogamous partnerships in response to the AIDS epidemic, with a corresponding increase in the marriage rate and improvement in infant health. Others switched from prescription contraceptive methods to condoms. These behavioral changes lowered the incidence of other sexually transmitted infections, but increased both planned and unplanned pregnancies.
{"title":"Safer sex? The effect of AIDS risk on birth rates","authors":"Melissa K. Spencer","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102867","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Behavioral adjustments to mitigate increasing risk of STIs can increase or decrease the likelihood of pregnancy. This paper measures the effects of the arrival and spread of AIDS across U.S. cities in the 1980s and 1990s on births and abortions. I show that the AIDS epidemic increased the birth rate by 0.55 percent and the abortion rate by 1.77 percent. I find support for two underlying mechanisms to explain the increase in pregnancies. Some women opted into monogamous partnerships in response to the AIDS epidemic, with a corresponding increase in the marriage rate and improvement in infant health. Others switched from prescription contraceptive methods to condoms. These behavioral changes lowered the incidence of other sexually transmitted infections, but increased both planned and unplanned pregnancies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102861
Pierre Dubois, Thierry Magnac
We study intertemporal tradeoffs that health authorities face when considering the control of an epidemic using innovative curative medical treatments. We set up a dynamically controlled susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) model for an epidemic in which patients can be asymptomatic, and we analyze the optimality conditions of the sequence of cure expenses decided by health authorities at the onset of the drug innovation process. We show that analytical conclusions are ambiguous because of their dependence on parameter values. As an application, we focus on the case study of hepatitis C, the treatment for which underwent a major upheaval when curative drugs were introduced in 2014. We calibrate our controlled SIR model using French data and simulate optimal policies. We show that the optimal policy entails some front loading of the intertemporal budget. The analysis demonstrates how beneficial intertemporal budgeting can be compared to non-forward-looking constant budget allocation.
我们研究了卫生部门在考虑利用创新性治疗方法控制流行病时面临的时际权衡问题。我们建立了一个动态控制的易感-感染-康复(SIR)流行病模型,在该模型中,患者可能没有症状,我们分析了卫生当局在药物创新过程开始时决定的治愈费用序列的最优性条件。我们表明,由于分析结论依赖于参数值,因此是模棱两可的。作为一项应用,我们将重点放在丙型肝炎的案例研究上,2014 年治疗药物问世后,丙型肝炎的治疗发生了重大变革。我们利用法国数据校准了受控 SIR 模型,并模拟了最优政策。我们的分析表明,最优政策需要对跨期预算进行一些前置加载。分析表明,与非前瞻性的恒定预算分配相比,跨期预算编制是多么有益。
{"title":"Optimal intertemporal curative drug expenses: The case of hepatitis C in France","authors":"Pierre Dubois, Thierry Magnac","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102861","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study intertemporal tradeoffs that health authorities face when considering the control of an epidemic using innovative curative medical treatments. We set up a dynamically controlled susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) model for an epidemic in which patients can be asymptomatic, and we analyze the optimality conditions of the sequence of cure expenses decided by health authorities at the onset of the drug innovation process. We show that analytical conclusions are ambiguous because of their dependence on parameter values. As an application, we focus on the case study of hepatitis C, the treatment for which underwent a major upheaval when curative drugs were introduced in 2014. We calibrate our controlled SIR model using French data and simulate optimal policies. We show that the optimal policy entails some front loading of the intertemporal budget. The analysis demonstrates how beneficial intertemporal budgeting can be compared to non-forward-looking constant budget allocation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139748720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862
Jeannette Brosig-Koch , Heike Hennig-Schmidt , Nadja Kairies-Schwarz , Johanna Kokot , Daniel Wiesen
There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians’ real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians’ attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians’ other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.
{"title":"A new look at physicians’ responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations","authors":"Jeannette Brosig-Koch , Heike Hennig-Schmidt , Nadja Kairies-Schwarz , Johanna Kokot , Daniel Wiesen","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians’ real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians’ attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians’ other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000079/pdfft?md5=d933d7930a44452363910b6bbc41cf32&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000079-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139830941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-10DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102865
Ajin Lee , Boris Vabson
The US government increasingly provides public health insurance coverage through private firms. We examine associated welfare implications for beneficiaries, using a ‘revealed preference’ framework based on beneficiaries’ program attrition rates. Focusing on the Medicaid program in New York State, we exploit quasi-random variation in the initial assignment at birth to public versus private Medicaid based on birth weight. We find that infants assigned to private Medicaid at birth are less likely to subsequently leave Medicaid. We provide suggestive evidence that reduced attrition reflects beneficiary responses to improved program quality, rather than alternative mechanisms such as private Medicaid plans reducing re-enrollment barriers.
{"title":"The value of improving insurance quality: Evidence from long-run Medicaid attrition","authors":"Ajin Lee , Boris Vabson","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102865","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The US government increasingly provides public health insurance coverage through private firms. We examine associated welfare implications for beneficiaries, using a ‘revealed preference’ framework based on beneficiaries’ program attrition rates. Focusing on the Medicaid program in New York State, we exploit quasi-random variation in the initial assignment at birth to public versus private Medicaid based on birth weight. We find that infants assigned to private Medicaid at birth are less likely to subsequently leave Medicaid. We provide suggestive evidence that reduced attrition reflects beneficiary responses to improved program quality, rather than alternative mechanisms such as private Medicaid plans reducing re-enrollment barriers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139737507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102864
Alberto Prati , Charlotte Saucet
The paper estimates the causal effect of a health treatment on patients’ beliefs, preferences and memories about the treatment. It exploits a natural experiment which occurred in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. UK residents could choose to opt into the vaccination program, but not which vaccine they received. The assignment to a vaccine offered little objective information for learning about its qualities, but triggered strong psychological demand for reassuring beliefs. We surveyed a sample of UK residents about their beliefs on the different COVID-19 vaccines before and after receiving their jab. Before vaccination, individuals exhibit similar prior beliefs and stated preferences about the different vaccines. After vaccination, however, they update their beliefs overly optimistically about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine they received, state that they would have chosen it if they could, and have distorted memories about their past beliefs. These results cannot be explained by conventional experience effects. At the aggregated level, they show that random assignment to a health treatment predicts a polarization of opinions about its quality. At the individual level, these findings provide evidence in line with the predictions of motivated beliefs and over-inference from weak signals in a real-world health setting.
{"title":"The causal effect of a health treatment on beliefs, stated preferences and memories","authors":"Alberto Prati , Charlotte Saucet","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102864","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper estimates the causal effect of a health treatment on patients’ beliefs, preferences and memories about the treatment. It exploits a natural experiment which occurred in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. UK residents could choose to opt into the vaccination program, but not which vaccine they received. The assignment to a vaccine offered little objective information for learning about its qualities, but triggered strong psychological demand for reassuring beliefs. We surveyed a sample of UK residents about their beliefs on the different COVID-19 vaccines <em>before</em> and <em>after</em> receiving their jab. <em>Before</em> vaccination, individuals exhibit similar prior beliefs and stated preferences about the different vaccines. <em>After</em> vaccination, however, they update their beliefs overly optimistically about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine they received, state that they would have chosen it if they could, and have distorted memories about their past beliefs. These results cannot be explained by conventional experience effects. At the aggregated level, they show that random assignment to a health treatment predicts a polarization of opinions about its quality. At the individual level, these findings provide evidence in line with the predictions of motivated beliefs and over-inference from weak signals in a real-world health setting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000092/pdfft?md5=c7a46500a516ba9d4c412c5ac72bf185&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000092-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139731609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102863
Nathan Kettlewell , Yuting Zhang
In countries with dual public and private healthcare systems, individuals are often incentivized to purchase private health insurance through subsidies and penalty. We use administrative data from Australia to study how high-income earners respond on both the intensive and extensive margins to the simultaneous withdrawal of a premium subsidy, and the increase of a tax penalty. We estimate regression discontinuity models by exploiting discontinuous changes in the penalty and subsidy rates. Our setting is particularly interesting because means testing creates different incentives at the extensive and intensive margins. Specifically, we could expect to see higher take-up of insurance coupled with downgrading to less expensive plans. We find evidence that the penalty – despite being large in value – only has a modest effect on take-up. Our results show little evidence of downgrading, which is consistent with a low price elasticity for the high-income earners we study.
{"title":"Financial incentives and private health insurance demand on the extensive and intensive margins","authors":"Nathan Kettlewell , Yuting Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102863","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In countries with dual public and private healthcare systems, individuals are often incentivized to purchase private health insurance through subsidies and penalty. We use administrative data from Australia to study how high-income earners respond on both the intensive and extensive margins to the simultaneous withdrawal of a premium subsidy, and the increase of a tax penalty. We estimate regression discontinuity models by exploiting discontinuous changes in the penalty and subsidy rates. Our setting is particularly interesting because means testing creates different incentives at the extensive and intensive margins. Specifically, we could expect to see higher take-up of insurance coupled with downgrading to less expensive plans. We find evidence that the penalty – despite being large in value – only has a modest effect on take-up. Our results show little evidence of downgrading, which is consistent with a low price elasticity for the high-income earners we study.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139727261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102860
Rahi Abouk , Prabal K. De , Michael F. Pesko
We examine the effect of raising the minimum legal sale age of tobacco to 21 (i.e., “T21”). We estimate difference-in-differences models using the Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey data and Nielsen Retail Scanner data from 2012 to 2019. Outcomes include cigarette and e-cigarette use and sales. We find sizable reductions in e-cigarette and cigarette use for 12th graders. T21 also reduced cigarette sales by 12.4 % and e-cigarette sales by 69.3 % in counties with the highest percent quartile of individuals under 21 years of age. In terms of mechanisms, we find that T21 increases ID checking and perceived risks of using both products.
{"title":"Estimating the effects of tobacco-21 on youth tobacco use and sales","authors":"Rahi Abouk , Prabal K. De , Michael F. Pesko","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102860","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102860","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the effect of raising the minimum legal sale age of tobacco to 21 (i.e., “T21”). We estimate difference-in-differences models using the Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey data and Nielsen Retail Scanner data from 2012 to 2019. Outcomes include cigarette and e-cigarette use and sales. We find sizable reductions in e-cigarette and cigarette use for 12th graders. T21 also reduced cigarette sales by 12.4 % and e-cigarette sales by 69.3 % in counties with the highest percent quartile of individuals under 21 years of age. In terms of mechanisms, we find that T21 increases ID checking and perceived risks of using both products.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139679430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862
Jeannette E. Brosig-Koch, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Nadja Kairies-Schwarz, Johanna Kokot, Daniel Wiesen
{"title":"A new look at physicians’ responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations","authors":"Jeannette E. Brosig-Koch, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Nadja Kairies-Schwarz, Johanna Kokot, Daniel Wiesen","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139890711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-23DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102856
Matthew Robson , Owen O’Donnell , Tom Van Ourti
We design a novel experiment to identify aversion to pure (univariate) health inequality separately from aversion to income-related and income-caused health inequality. Participants allocate resources to determine health of individuals. Identification comes from random variation in resource productivity and information on income and its causal effect. We gather data (26,286 observations) from a sample of UK adults (n = 337) and estimate pooled and participant-specific social preferences while accounting for noise. The median person has strong aversion to pure health inequality, challenging the health maximisation objective of economic evaluation. Aversion to health inequality is even stronger when it is related to income. However, the median person prioritises health of poorer individuals less than is assumed in the standard measure of income-related health inequality. On average, aversion to that inequality does not become stronger when low income is known to cause ill-health. There is substantial heterogeneity in all three types of inequality aversion.
{"title":"Aversion to health inequality — Pure, income-related and income-caused","authors":"Matthew Robson , Owen O’Donnell , Tom Van Ourti","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102856","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102856","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We design a novel experiment to identify aversion to pure (univariate) health inequality separately from aversion to income-related and income-caused health inequality. Participants allocate resources to determine health of individuals. Identification comes from random variation in resource productivity and information on income and its causal effect. We gather data (26,286 observations) from a sample of UK adults (n = 337) and estimate pooled and participant-specific social preferences while accounting for noise. The median person has strong aversion to pure health inequality, challenging the health maximisation objective of economic evaluation. Aversion to health inequality is even stronger when it is related to income. However, the median person prioritises health of poorer individuals less than is assumed in the standard measure of income-related health inequality. On average, aversion to that inequality does not become stronger when low income is known to cause ill-health. There is substantial heterogeneity in all three types of inequality aversion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000018/pdfft?md5=c739abc03c78906b4e2e9ecad8d513dd&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000018-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139545788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the relationship between immigration enforcement and institutionalization rates of the elderly. Exploiting the staggered implementation of the Secure Communities (SC) immigration enforcement program across U.S. counties from 2008 through 2014, we show that SC led to a 0.26 percentage points (6.8 percent) increase in the likelihood that Americans aged 65 and above live in an institution. Supportive of supply shocks in the household services market as a central mechanism, we find that the elderly who are most likely to purchase domestic worker services are also the most likely to move into nursing homes following the implementation of SC. Additionally, we find suggestive evidence of significant reductions in the work hours of housekeepers, personal care aides, and home health workers hinting at the critical role of negative supply shocks in occupations that facilitate aging in community.
{"title":"Immigration enforcement and the institutionalization of elderly Americans","authors":"Abdulmohsen Almuhaisen , Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes , Delia Furtado","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102859","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102859","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the relationship between immigration enforcement and institutionalization rates of the elderly. Exploiting the staggered implementation of the Secure Communities (SC) immigration enforcement program across U.S. counties from 2008 through 2014, we show that SC led to a 0.26 percentage points (6.8 percent) increase in the likelihood that Americans aged 65 and above live in an institution. Supportive of supply shocks in the household services market as a central mechanism, we find that the elderly who are most likely to purchase domestic worker services are also the most likely to move into nursing homes following the implementation of SC. Additionally, we find suggestive evidence of significant reductions in the work hours of housekeepers, personal care aides, and home health workers hinting at the critical role of negative supply shocks in occupations that facilitate aging in community.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000043/pdfft?md5=070c3a5705923f29f31d8cf296c789b2&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000043-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139517109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}