Journal of Health Economics最新文献

There is evidence that physicians disproportionately suffer from substance use disorder and mental health problems. It is not clear, however, whether these phenomena are causal. We use data on Dutch medical school applicants to examine the effects of becoming a physician on prescription drug use and the receipt of treatment from a mental health facility. Leveraging variation from lottery outcomes that determine admission into medical schools, we find that becoming a physician increases the use of antidepressants, anxiolytics, opioids, and sedatives. Increases in the use of antidepressants, anxiolytics, and sedatives are larger among female physicians than among their male counterparts.

We link data on regional Organized Screening Programs (OSPs) throughout Europe with survey data and population-based cancer registries to estimate effects of OSPs on breast cancer screening (mammography), incidence, and mortality. Identification is from regional variation in the existence and timing of OSPs, and in their age-eligibility criteria. We estimate that OSPs, on average, increase mammography by 25 percentage points, increase breast cancer incidence by 16% five years after the OSPs implementation, and reduce breast cancer mortality by about 10% ten years after.

We describe the healthcare industry as a mixed oligopoly, where a public and two private providers compete, and examine the effects of a merger between the two private healthcare providers on prices, quality, and welfare. When the price and (eventually) quality of the public provider are regulated, the cost synergies required for the merger to increase consumer welfare are less significant than in a setting with only profit-maximizing providers. When, instead, the public provider can adjust its policy to the rivals’ behavior and maximizes a weighted sum of profits and consumer surplus (i.e., it has ‘semi-altruistic’ preferences), the merger is consumer surplus increasing if the public provider is sufficiently altruist, in some cases even absent efficiencies. These results suggest that ignoring the role and objectives of the public sector in the healthcare industry may lead agencies to reject mergers that, while would decrease consumer welfare in fully privatized industries, would increase it in mixed oligopolies.

Resource allocation generally involves a tension between efficiency and equity, particularly in health care. The growth in exclusive physician arrangements using non-linear prices is leading to consumer segmentation with theoretically ambiguous welfare implications. We study concierge medicine, in which physicians only provide care to patients paying a retainer fee. We find limited evidence of selection based on health and stronger evidence of selection based on income. Using a matching strategy that leverages the staggered adoption of concierge medicine, we find large spending increases and no average mortality effects for patients impacted by the switch to concierge medicine.

We estimate the effect of adopting a digital device for performing medical exams at home during telehealth visits. We match visits of adopters and non-adopters who used the same virtual care clinic but without the device and compare healthcare utilization after the matched visits. We find that device adoption, partially offset by decreased use of other primary care modalities, results in a 12% higher utilization rate of primary care and increased use of antibiotics. But – particularly among adults – adoption lowers the use of urgent care, the emergency room, and hospital care, resulting in no increase in total cost.

This study reports the results of the first artefactual field experiment designed to measure the prevalence of aversion toward different components of social risks in a large and demographically representative sample. We identify social risk preferences for health and wealth for losses and gains, and decompose these attitudes into four different dimensions: individual risk, collective risk, ex-post inequality, and ex-ante inequality. The results of a non-parametric analysis suggest that aversion to risk and inequality is the mean preference for outcomes in health and wealth in the domain of gains and losses. A parametric decomposition of aversion to risk and inequality shows that respondents are averse to ex-post and ex-ante inequality in health and wealth for gains and losses. Likewise, respondents are averse to collective risk, but neutral to individual risk, which highlights the importance of considering different components of social risk preferences when managing social health and wealth risks.

We investigate the impact of a large cash transfer on prescription utilization. Our identification strategy leverages the Alaksa Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), which is distributed annually in October and comprises 6% of the average household's annual income. We study the impact of the PFD on the use of prescription medications using a within-Alaska comparison group and difference-in-differences design. Using the IBM MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Prescription Drug Database, we observe prescriptions for 50,866 commercially-insured individuals who filled prescriptions between 2013 and 2019. We find no changes in prescription use overall and are able to rule out changes larger than 0.5% in the week of the PFD and 1.4% the week after. Subgroup analyses find no changes by patient characteristics, degree of cost sharing, or prescription type. We also conduct a synthetic control analysis using a non-Alaska comparison group and find no effects of the PFD on prescriptions. These findings are useful for understanding liquidity sensitivity for prescription medication and the effects of cash distributions among individuals with employer-based health insurance.

This paper investigates the effect of scientific information from randomized controlled clinical trials (RCTs) on the demand for off-label uses of cancer drugs. This is a unique setting where demand for a drug for a specific use is observable both before and after the first RCT results are released. Using variation in the timing of RCTs across off-label uses of drugs, I find that demand responds asymmetrically to the trial results based on the statistical significance of the clinically relevant endpoint. When this endpoint is statistically significant, there is a large and immediate increase in demand. When this end point is not statistically significant, physicians are relatively slow to abandon use of the drug.