It is an open question whether compositional truth with the principle of propositional soundness: “All arithmetical sentences which are propositional tautologies are true” is conservative over Peano Arithmetic. In this article, we show that the principle of propositional soundness imposes some saturation-like properties on the truth predicate, thus showing significant limitations to the possible conservativity proof.
We develop a framework for nonstandard analysis that gives foundations to the interplay between external and internal iterations of the star map, and we present a few examples to show the strength and flexibility of such a nonstandard technique for applications in combinatorial number theory.
Feferman [9] defines an impredicative system of explicit mathematics, which is proof-theoretically equivalent to the subsystem of second-order arithmetic. In this paper, we propose several systems of Frege structure with the same proof-theoretic strength as . To be precise, we first consider the Kripke–Feferman theory, which is one of the most famous truth theories, and we extend it by two kinds of induction principles inspired by [22]. In addition, we give similar results for the system based on Aczel's original Frege structure [1]. Finally, we equip Cantini's supervaluation-style theory with the notion of universes, the strength of which was an open problem in [24].
We provide a general and syntactically defined family of sequent calculi, called semi-analytic, to formalize the informal notion of a “nice” sequent calculus. We show that any sufficiently strong (multimodal) substructural logic with a semi-analytic sequent calculus enjoys the Craig Interpolation Property, CIP. As a positive application, our theorem provides a uniform and modular method to prove the CIP for several multimodal substructural logics, including many fragments and variants of linear logic. More interestingly, on the negative side, it employs the lack of the CIP in almost all substructural, superintuitionistic and modal logics to provide a formal proof for the well-known intuition that almost all logics do not have a “nice” sequent calculus. More precisely, we show that many substructural logics including , , , Łn (for ), Gn (for ), and almost all extensions of , , , , , , and (except for at most 1, 1, 3, 8, 7, 37, and 6 of them, respectively) do not have a semi-analytic calculus.