Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1122
John Biggins
The establishment of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) in 1922 did not occur on a blank canvas. A slew of administrative bodies and agencies with pre-1922 origins now found themselves under a new jurisdiction, still familiar in some respects but alien in others. The Irish State Administration Database indicates that the functions performed by these pre-1922 bodies included the delivery of public services and regulatory oversight. The resilience of pre-1922 bodies arguably ensured a greater degree of day-to-day administrative continuity and stability after 1922 than may otherwise have been the case.This article focuses on a particular subset of these pre-1922 entities – royal chartered bodies – carried into Saorstát Éireann and beyond. Of special interest are the peculiar legal mechanisms through which these bodies were sustained in an altered constitutional landscape. The discontinuation of a pre-1922 royal prerogative to grant and amend royal charters presented legal conundrums for royal chartered bodies and the state. This was mitigated through a mixture of tailored public and private legislation of the Oireachtas. These dynamics are interrogated through the lenses of temporality and legal pluralism.
{"title":"Inheriting the royals: royal chartered bodies in Ireland after 1922","authors":"John Biggins","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1122","url":null,"abstract":"The establishment of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) in 1922 did not occur on a blank canvas. A slew of administrative bodies and agencies with pre-1922 origins now found themselves under a new jurisdiction, still familiar in some respects but alien in others. The Irish State Administration Database indicates that the functions performed by these pre-1922 bodies included the delivery of public services and regulatory oversight. The resilience of pre-1922 bodies arguably ensured a greater degree of day-to-day administrative continuity and stability after 1922 than may otherwise have been the case.This article focuses on a particular subset of these pre-1922 entities – royal chartered bodies – carried into Saorstát Éireann and beyond. Of special interest are the peculiar legal mechanisms through which these bodies were sustained in an altered constitutional landscape. The discontinuation of a pre-1922 royal prerogative to grant and amend royal charters presented legal conundrums for royal chartered bodies and the state. This was mitigated through a mixture of tailored public and private legislation of the Oireachtas. These dynamics are interrogated through the lenses of temporality and legal pluralism.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"30 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141926890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1139
Anurag Deb
The final commentary on the Allister series of cases by this author.
作者对艾利斯特系列案件的最后评论。
{"title":"The Union in court, Part 3: In Re Allister and Peeples’ Applications for Judicial Review [2023] UKSC 5","authors":"Anurag Deb","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1139","url":null,"abstract":"The final commentary on the Allister series of cases by this author.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"29 21","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141926968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1104
Anurag Deb
The Northern Ireland Executive, comprising devolved Northern Ireland ministers and the Executive Committee, has had a long history of being successfully sued in the Northern Ireland courts, both by individual litigants and Executive members themselves. This history demonstrates, at times, a flagrant disregard for legal duties and the rules of proper administration, which, in Northern Ireland, subserve polarised and controversial political interests and priorities of the parties which comprise the Executive. However, when examining the case law, the Northern Ireland courts approach the question of judicial intervention in the same way as they would any other government. This sometimes leads to judicial restraint in granting relief, even in the face of intransigent and arguably bad faith behaviour by ministers or the Executive Committee, as two recent cases demonstrate.In this article I explore the nature and operations of the Northern Ireland Executive, distinguishing it from other governments in the UK. Using this backdrop, I next critically evaluate two recent judgments of the Northern Ireland High Court which exemplify the existing (and limited) judicial approach in the face of Executive lawlessness. I contrast these judgments with two earlier judgments which I argue set out a better approach to remedying Executive lawlessness. Finally, I build on the approach found in these earlier judgments to set out a tentative framework for judicial intervention in and remedy of Executive lawlessness.
{"title":"The Northern Ireland Executive: politics, law and a rethink of judicial intervention","authors":"Anurag Deb","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1104","url":null,"abstract":"The Northern Ireland Executive, comprising devolved Northern Ireland ministers and the Executive Committee, has had a long history of being successfully sued in the Northern Ireland courts, both by individual litigants and Executive members themselves. This history demonstrates, at times, a flagrant disregard for legal duties and the rules of proper administration, which, in Northern Ireland, subserve polarised and controversial political interests and priorities of the parties which comprise the Executive. However, when examining the case law, the Northern Ireland courts approach the question of judicial intervention in the same way as they would any other government. This sometimes leads to judicial restraint in granting relief, even in the face of intransigent and arguably bad faith behaviour by ministers or the Executive Committee, as two recent cases demonstrate.In this article I explore the nature and operations of the Northern Ireland Executive, distinguishing it from other governments in the UK. Using this backdrop, I next critically evaluate two recent judgments of the Northern Ireland High Court which exemplify the existing (and limited) judicial approach in the face of Executive lawlessness. I contrast these judgments with two earlier judgments which I argue set out a better approach to remedying Executive lawlessness. Finally, I build on the approach found in these earlier judgments to set out a tentative framework for judicial intervention in and remedy of Executive lawlessness.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"2 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141925687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1102
Francis McManus
In Jalla the Supreme Court was required to decide whether the damage, which had been caused to the claimants’ land by the continued presence of oil on the land, which in turn had been caused by a spill from the defendants’ oil pipeline, constituted a continuing nuisance, the upshot of which was that a continuing cause of action accrued afresh from day to day. The court held that a continuing nuisance was a nuisance which continued day after day, or on another regular basis. In such cases, the cause of action continued afresh on a continuing basis. However, in Jalla the court held that there was no continuing nuisance, on the grounds that there was no repeated activity, or continuing state of affairs, which had been caused by the defendants. Rather, the leak was a one-off event, or isolated escape, which had been caused by the defendants. The cause of action was complete once the claimants’ land was affected by the oil spill. In short, there was no continuing cause of action for as long as the oil remained on the claimants’ land. Whereas the presence of the oil on the claimants’ land may have ranked as a ‘nuisance’ in common parlance, the continuing presence of the oil on the land did not rank as a nuisance in law. The author concludes that Jalla illustrates the confusion which stems from the fact that the concept of nuisance is not clearly defined.
{"title":"A continuing nuisance: Jalla v Shell International Trading and Shipping Company Ltd [2023] UKSC 16","authors":"Francis McManus","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1102","url":null,"abstract":"In Jalla the Supreme Court was required to decide whether the damage, which had been caused to the claimants’ land by the continued presence of oil on the land, which in turn had been caused by a spill from the defendants’ oil pipeline, constituted a continuing nuisance, the upshot of which was that a continuing cause of action accrued afresh from day to day. The court held that a continuing nuisance was a nuisance which continued day after day, or on another regular basis. In such cases, the cause of action continued afresh on a continuing basis. However, in Jalla the court held that there was no continuing nuisance, on the grounds that there was no repeated activity, or continuing state of affairs, which had been caused by the defendants. Rather, the leak was a one-off event, or isolated escape, which had been caused by the defendants. The cause of action was complete once the claimants’ land was affected by the oil spill. In short, there was no continuing cause of action for as long as the oil remained on the claimants’ land. Whereas the presence of the oil on the claimants’ land may have ranked as a ‘nuisance’ in common parlance, the continuing presence of the oil on the land did not rank as a nuisance in law. The author concludes that Jalla illustrates the confusion which stems from the fact that the concept of nuisance is not clearly defined.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"51 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141928293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1077
Keith Syrett
N/A
不适用
{"title":"Why are we waiting? Judicial scrutiny of delays in access to healthcare in Northern Ireland","authors":"Keith Syrett","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1077","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>N/A</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"47 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141929464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1085
Sarah Atkins
This article examines the Supreme Court’s clarification of the law relating to the judicial review of soft law. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on how soft law sits within the legal framework. While much literature to date has attempted to theorise the nature of soft law, or focus on judicial review strategy, this article examines the role that soft law plays in the modern regulatory state. It then examines the treatment of these instruments by the courts, with particular attention paid to the 2021 joined decisions of R(A) and BF. The Supreme Court reversed a more expansive trend evident in preceding Court of Appeal case law and reinforced the primacy of the narrower approach to review seen in the Gillick judgment. Unlike other research on these judgments, this article problematises these decisions by showing how this limits the ability of particularly vulnerable applicants like children to challenge decisions due more to systemically flawed policies than to ad hoc misapplications of soft law by end users. How the Supreme Court could in future occupy a role as a mechanism for legal accountability of discretionary executive powers is also discussed; should the judicial branch of the state avail of the opportunity to make declaratory orders or endorse practice directions that might better regularise the making of soft laws in the future. The article then discusses the wider constitutional problems raised by use of a Gillick-inspired approach, including issues relating to lack of judicial scrutiny of soft law.
{"title":"Fettering scrutiny on executive discretionary powers? Developments in the judicial reviewability of ministerial non-statutory guidance","authors":"Sarah Atkins","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1085","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the Supreme Court’s clarification of the law relating to the judicial review of soft law. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on how soft law sits within the legal framework. While much literature to date has attempted to theorise the nature of soft law, or focus on judicial review strategy, this article examines the role that soft law plays in the modern regulatory state. It then examines the treatment of these instruments by the courts, with particular attention paid to the 2021 joined decisions of R(A) and BF. The Supreme Court reversed a more expansive trend evident in preceding Court of Appeal case law and reinforced the primacy of the narrower approach to review seen in the Gillick judgment. Unlike other research on these judgments, this article problematises these decisions by showing how this limits the ability of particularly vulnerable applicants like children to challenge decisions due more to systemically flawed policies than to ad hoc misapplications of soft law by end users. How the Supreme Court could in future occupy a role as a mechanism for legal accountability of discretionary executive powers is also discussed; should the judicial branch of the state avail of the opportunity to make declaratory orders or endorse practice directions that might better regularise the making of soft laws in the future. The article then discusses the wider constitutional problems raised by use of a Gillick-inspired approach, including issues relating to lack of judicial scrutiny of soft law.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141925880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-04DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1111
Kathryn O'Sullivan
The issue of cohabitants’ rights in Ireland has received limited attention in either public or academic discourse since the enactment of Part 15 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 more than a decade ago. However, questions pertaining to the rights and entitlements of de facto families under Irish law are once again coming under the spotlight. This note considers one discrete feature of the Irish cohabitation scheme: namely, the requirement to prove intimacy to demonstrate the existence of a cohabiting relationship for the purposes of the 2010 Act. It investigates the importance of intimacy within the definition of ‘cohabitant’ and drawing on the most up-to-date case law highlights the deeply (in)sensitive investigations which are often undertaken to establish its existence.
{"title":"(To) intimacy and beyond: rethinking the definition of ‘cohabitant’ in Ireland","authors":"Kathryn O'Sullivan","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i2.1111","url":null,"abstract":"The issue of cohabitants’ rights in Ireland has received limited attention in either public or academic discourse since the enactment of Part 15 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 more than a decade ago. However, questions pertaining to the rights and entitlements of de facto families under Irish law are once again coming under the spotlight. This note considers one discrete feature of the Irish cohabitation scheme: namely, the requirement to prove intimacy to demonstrate the existence of a cohabiting relationship for the purposes of the 2010 Act. It investigates the importance of intimacy within the definition of ‘cohabitant’ and drawing on the most up-to-date case law highlights the deeply (in)sensitive investigations which are often undertaken to establish its existence.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":" 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141678303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-10DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75iad1.1147
Christopher McCrudden
This article traces the origins of the declaration of rights in the human rights and equality section of the 1998 Belfast-Good Friday Agreement, which secured a fragile peace in Northern Ireland. It sets out in detail for the first time the drafting history of the declaration, set against the complex negotiating history of the Agreement as a whole, describing the multiple actors involved in the evolution of the declaration and their motivations, including republican and loyalist paramilitary groups, feminists and civil rights organisations, Irish and British civil servants and political advisors, as well as the political parties. It thus provides a detailed account of the evolution of human rights thinking at a critical stage of the Northern Ireland peace process. The article argues that it is now more important than ever to understand this history. Although originally conceived as merely declaratory, this declaration has, since the European Union–United Kingdom (EU–UK) Withdrawal Agreement following Brexit, taken on a new lease of life due to the Ireland–Northern Ireland Protocol to the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement, which accorded the declaration of rights a legal status in domestic and international law that it did not have previously. The article concludes with a reflection on the implications of the history recounted in this article for the future interpretation and application of the Protocol (now, the Windsor Framework), and for the study of the historiography of human rights more broadly, emphasising in particular the extent to which the declaration exemplifies a syncretic rather than an eclectic human rights instrument.
{"title":"The origins of ‘civil rights and religious liberties’ in the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement","authors":"Christopher McCrudden","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75iad1.1147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75iad1.1147","url":null,"abstract":"This article traces the origins of the declaration of rights in the human rights and equality section of the 1998 Belfast-Good Friday Agreement, which secured a fragile peace in Northern Ireland. It sets out in detail for the first time the drafting history of the declaration, set against the complex negotiating history of the Agreement as a whole, describing the multiple actors involved in the evolution of the declaration and their motivations, including republican and loyalist paramilitary groups, feminists and civil rights organisations, Irish and British civil servants and political advisors, as well as the political parties. It thus provides a detailed account of the evolution of human rights thinking at a critical stage of the Northern Ireland peace process. The article argues that it is now more important than ever to understand this history. Although originally conceived as merely declaratory, this declaration has, since the European Union–United Kingdom (EU–UK) Withdrawal Agreement following Brexit, taken on a new lease of life due to the Ireland–Northern Ireland Protocol to the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement, which accorded the declaration of rights a legal status in domestic and international law that it did not have previously. The article concludes with a reflection on the implications of the history recounted in this article for the future interpretation and application of the Protocol (now, the Windsor Framework), and for the study of the historiography of human rights more broadly, emphasising in particular the extent to which the declaration exemplifies a syncretic rather than an eclectic human rights instrument.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"117 39","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141361706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-25DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i1.1108
Lisa Whitten
Post-Brexit Northern Ireland occupies a unique position in the internal market of the United Kingdom due, primarily, to the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, or Windsor Framework. Agreed as part of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement, the Protocol/Windsor Framework provides that EU Single Market rules concerning the free movement of goods, customs, VAT, state aid and energy markets, continue to apply in Northern Ireland, despite it having formally left the EU along with the rest of the UK. To allow for the domestic implementation of the novel arrangements for post-Brexit Northern Ireland, set out in the Protocol/Windsor Framework, the UK Internal Market (UKIM) Act 2020 includes a series of specific provisions that except goods entering and leaving Northern Ireland from the ‘market access principles’ established by the UKIM Act 2020 in certain circumstances. This commentary introduces the UKIM Act 2020 then presents a review of its provisions that are specifically dedicated to post-Brexit Northern Ireland. Written in September 2023 the analysis then provides an assessment of the implications of measures agreed between the UK and EU laid down in the Windsor Framework texts which were published in February of this year. Based on the analysis of the UKIM Act 2020 set against the backdrop of the Protocol, then Windsor Framework, the commentary argues that the position of Northern Ireland post-Brexit is not only newly unique but also newly consequential for those both inside and outside its borders.
{"title":"Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom Internal Market","authors":"Lisa Whitten","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i1.1108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i1.1108","url":null,"abstract":"Post-Brexit Northern Ireland occupies a unique position in the internal market of the United Kingdom due, primarily, to the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, or Windsor Framework. \u0000Agreed as part of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement, the Protocol/Windsor Framework provides that EU Single Market rules concerning the free movement of goods, customs, VAT, state aid and energy markets, continue to apply in Northern Ireland, despite it having formally left the EU along with the rest of the UK. To allow for the domestic implementation of the novel arrangements for post-Brexit Northern Ireland, set out in the Protocol/Windsor Framework, the UK Internal Market (UKIM) Act 2020 includes a series of specific provisions that except goods entering and leaving Northern Ireland from the ‘market access principles’ established by the UKIM Act 2020 in certain circumstances. \u0000This commentary introduces the UKIM Act 2020 then presents a review of its provisions that are specifically dedicated to post-Brexit Northern Ireland. Written in September 2023 the analysis then provides an assessment of the implications of measures agreed between the UK and EU laid down in the Windsor Framework texts which were published in February of this year. \u0000Based on the analysis of the UKIM Act 2020 set against the backdrop of the Protocol, then Windsor Framework, the commentary argues that the position of Northern Ireland post-Brexit is not only newly unique but also newly consequential for those both inside and outside its borders.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"4 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140654563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-25DOI: 10.53386/nilq.v75i1.1082
Gareth Evans
This commentary will focus on the Counsel General’s legal challenge to the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 (UKIMA). While the application for an advisory declaration in this case was refused by both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal, this commentary argues that the substance of the application, and accompanying decision of the court, offer three points of constitutional significance regarding the Welsh devolution settlement: (i) the decision clarifies the position on the use of declaratory judgments in reference to premature questions on legislative competence; (ii) the application sets out the substance of the Welsh Government’s ongoing concern regarding the content and operation of UKIMA, and its potential impact upon the Senedd’s legislative competence; (iii) the application by a devolved government for judicial review of UK Parliamentary legislation marks a significant moment in the relationship between the Welsh and UK Governments.
{"title":"Devolution and declaratory judgments: the Counsel General’s legal challenge to the UK Internal Market Act 2020","authors":"Gareth Evans","doi":"10.53386/nilq.v75i1.1082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v75i1.1082","url":null,"abstract":"This commentary will focus on the Counsel General’s legal challenge to the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 (UKIMA). While the application for an advisory declaration in this case was refused by both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal, this commentary argues that the substance of the application, and accompanying decision of the court, offer three points of constitutional significance regarding the Welsh devolution settlement: (i) the decision clarifies the position on the use of declaratory judgments in reference to premature questions on legislative competence; (ii) the application sets out the substance of the Welsh Government’s ongoing concern regarding the content and operation of UKIMA, and its potential impact upon the Senedd’s legislative competence; (iii) the application by a devolved government for judicial review of UK Parliamentary legislation marks a significant moment in the relationship between the Welsh and UK Governments.","PeriodicalId":509896,"journal":{"name":"Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly","volume":"10 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140654101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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