Mathematical Social Sciences最新文献

英文中文

Cooperation and balance in signed networks: A model of multiplex formation 签名网络中的合作与平衡：一个多元形成的模型

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430

Rajendra P. Kundu, Siddhi Gyan Pandey

We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic interactions amongst

n

players who are linked to each other in an existing signed network of friendships and enmities

g

, which shape the incentive structure faced by players in their pairwise interactions with each other. These interactions take the form of simultaneous move cooperation games of complete information, wherein network effects create incentives to cooperate due to the presence of common friends as well common enemies. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the strategic interactions between players

i

and

j

determine the nature of the tie between them in

G (g)

, which is the new layer of the signed multiplex. We investigate how properties of structural balance in the existing signed social network

g

influence balance in the new signed network

G (g)

, identifying conditions on the existing network that yield a structurally balanced new layer of the multiplex.

我们提出了签名网络中多重性的博弈论模型，通过在现有的友谊和敌人的签名网络中相互联系的n个参与者之间的战略互动，形成了参与者在彼此配对互动时所面临的激励结构。这些互动以完全信息同步移动合作游戏的形式出现，其中网络效应创造了合作动机，因为存在共同的朋友和敌人。参与者i和j之间的策略交互中的纯策略纳什均衡集决定了他们在G(G)中的联系性质，G(G)是有符号复用的新层。我们研究了现有签名社会网络g中结构平衡的性质如何影响新签名网络g (g)中的平衡，确定了现有网络上产生结构平衡的新多层的条件。

{"title":"Cooperation and balance in signed networks: A model of multiplex formation","authors":"Rajendra P. Kundu, Siddhi Gyan Pandey","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic interactions amongst <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span> players who are linked to each other in an existing signed network of friendships and enmities <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span>, which shape the incentive structure faced by players in their pairwise interactions with each other. These interactions take the form of simultaneous move cooperation games of complete information, wherein network effects create incentives to cooperate due to the presence of common friends as well common enemies. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the strategic interactions between players <span><math><mi>i</mi></math></span> and <span><math><mi>j</mi></math></span> determine the nature of the tie between them in <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, which is the new layer of the signed multiplex. We investigate how properties of structural balance in the existing signed social network <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span> influence balance in the new signed network <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, identifying conditions on the existing network that yield a structurally balanced new layer of the multiplex.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102430"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144517767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Jump bidding in the war of attrition 在消耗战中跳投

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102432

Wei Bi , Huiyun Ding

This paper studies jump bidding in a war of attrition, where a bidder makes a costly preemptive commitment to deter opponents. We identify a Double-Edged Sword Effect: while jump bidding increases early-stage costs for the jump bidder, it enhances her ability to deter high-valuation opponents in later stages. The bidder jump bids when she believes that her opponent is likely to have a high valuation and not quit soon, such as when the valuation distribution is convex or bounded away from zero. Although jump bidding may result in inefficient allocation, it reduces total attrition costs and can improve overall welfare ex ante.

本文研究了消耗战中的跳标问题，在这种情况下，竞标者做出代价高昂的先发制人承诺来威慑对手。我们发现了一种双刃剑效应：虽然跳跃式竞价增加了跳跃式竞价者的早期成本，但它增强了跳跃式竞价者在后期阻止高估值对手的能力。当竞标者认为对手的估值可能很高且不会很快退出时，比如估值分布是凸的或有界远离零时，竞标者就会跳投。跳跃竞价虽然会导致分配效率低下，但降低了总损耗成本，提高了事前的整体福利。

引用次数: 0

Deposit insurance in a sequential-service constrained environment 顺序服务受限环境中的存款保险

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102434

Fernando Barros Jr. , Samuel Cruz , Bruno R. Delalibera , Diego Silva

We study the effect of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) in an economy with multiple isolated banks. Participant banks fund the scheme, which follows a pre-determined insurance payment scheme. An external player transfers insurance benefits to all banks where depositors are running. The total insurance payment depends on resources collected by the external authority and the number of eligible queues to receive the insurance benefit. We discuss the effect of DIS on the optimal payment contract. More specifically, we analyze the existence of bank-run equilibria and whether the optimal payment contract is incentive-compatible. We find that DIS prevents bank-run equilibria at the same time that it may expose the environment to contagion. We also see that the insurance policy relaxes the truth-telling condition for general parameters.

我们研究了存款保险计划（DIS）在一个有多个孤立银行的经济体中的效果。参与银行为该计划提供资金，该计划遵循预先确定的保险支付计划。外部参与者将保险收益转移到存款人所在的所有银行。保险支付总额取决于外部机构收集的资源和获得保险福利的合格队列的数量。讨论了DIS对最优支付契约的影响。更具体地说，我们分析了银行挤兑均衡的存在性以及最优支付契约是否激励相容。我们发现，DIS在防止银行挤兑均衡的同时，也可能使环境暴露于传染。我们还看到保险单放宽了一般参数的真实条件。

引用次数: 0

Cost structures and innovation incentives 成本结构与创新激励

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102436

Suryaprakash Mishra

In a Cournot oligopoly set up with constant marginal cost and linear demand, innovation is rewarding, i.e., profit enhancing. We show that the same may not be true when marginal costs are increasing. In contrast to the standard results, we show the possibilities of conditional innovation/technological retrogression (henceforth retrogression) by firms: when the number firms

n = 1

or 2 innovation is undertaken by firms unconditionally and with certainty while for

n > 3

there exists an innovation–neutral technology line dividing the regions of innovation and retrogression. We bring forth the unconventional but interesting relationship between the intensity of competition and welfare –

\forall n > 3

competition decreases welfare and thus leads to Pareto deterioration while the lack thereof enhances welfare and results in Pareto improvement. We suggest ‘monitored competition’ as in restricted entry to encourage innovation, as a potential policy instrument.

在边际成本不变、需求线性的古诺寡头垄断中，创新是有益的，即利润增加。我们表明，当边际成本增加时，情况可能并非如此。与标准结果相比，我们展示了企业条件创新/技术倒退（以下简称倒退）的可能性：当企业数量n=1或2时，企业无条件地、确定地进行创新，而当企业数量n= gt；3时，存在一条创新中性的技术线将创新和倒退区域分开。我们提出了竞争强度与福利之间非传统但有趣的关系——∀n>；3竞争会降低福利，从而导致帕累托恶化，而缺乏竞争会提高福利，并导致帕累托改善。我们建议将“监管竞争”作为一种潜在的政策工具，如限制进入以鼓励创新。

引用次数: 0

A stricter canon: General Luce models for arbitrary menu sets 更严格的标准：用于任意菜单集的通用Luce模型

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102431

José A. Rodrigues-Neto , Matthew Ryan , James Taylor

Alós-Ferrer and Mihm (2025, Corollary 1) recently provided a characterisation the classical Luce model (Luce, 1959) when choices are observed for an arbitrarily restricted collection of menus, as is typical in experimental settings or when working with field data. They also characterise the general Luce model (ibid., Theorem 1), which allows choice probabilities to be zero, for the same setting. The latter characterisation involves a single axiom – the general product rule (GPR). An important special case of the general Luce model is obtained when the mapping from menus to the support of choice probabilities can be rationalised by a weak order. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) show that this special case is characterised by Luce’s (1959) choice axiom, provided choice is observed for all possible (finite) menus. The choice axiom is thus a fundamental “canon of probabilistic rationality”. We show that a natural – and surprisingly simple – strengthening of the GPR characterises the model of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) when the menu set is arbitrarily restricted. Our axiom implies the choice axiom, and is therefore a “stricter canon”.

Alós-Ferrer和Mihm （2025, Corollary 1）最近提供了经典Luce模型（Luce, 1959）的特征，当在任意限制的菜单集合中观察选择时，这是典型的实验设置或使用现场数据时。它们还描述了一般的Luce模型（同上，定理1），该模型允许在相同的设置下选择概率为零。后一种描述涉及到一个公理——一般乘积法则（GPR）。得到了一般Luce模型的一个重要特例，即从菜单到选择概率支持的映射可以通过弱顺序进行合理化。Cerreia-Vioglio等人（2021）表明，这种特殊情况的特征是Luce（1959）的选择公理，前提是所有可能的（有限的）菜单都有选择。因此，选择公理是一个基本的“概率理性的经典”。我们表明，当菜单集被任意限制时，Cerreia-Vioglio等人（2021）的GPR模型具有自然且令人惊讶的简单强化特征。我们的公理包含了选择公理，因此是一个“更严格的准则”。

{"title":"A stricter canon: General Luce models for arbitrary menu sets","authors":"José A. Rodrigues-Neto , Matthew Ryan , James Taylor","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102431","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102431","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Alós-Ferrer and Mihm (2025, Corollary 1) recently provided a characterisation the classical Luce model (Luce, 1959) when choices are observed for an arbitrarily restricted collection of menus, as is typical in experimental settings or when working with field data. They also characterise the general Luce model (<em>ibid.</em>, Theorem 1), which allows choice probabilities to be zero, for the same setting. The latter characterisation involves a single axiom – the <em>general product rule (GPR)</em>. An important special case of the general Luce model is obtained when the mapping from menus to the support of choice probabilities can be rationalised by a weak order. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) show that this special case is characterised by Luce’s (1959) <em>choice axiom</em>, provided choice is observed for all possible (finite) menus. The choice axiom is thus a fundamental “canon of probabilistic rationality”. We show that a natural – and surprisingly simple – strengthening of the GPR characterises the model of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2021) when the menu set is arbitrarily restricted. Our axiom implies the choice axiom, and is therefore a “stricter canon”.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102431"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144366077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The rates of learning with public and private signals 公共信号和私人信号的学习率

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-06-18 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102433

Dengwei Qi

This paper presents a dynamic market-based learning model, in which agents trade a risky asset repeatedly while observing public and private endogenous signals about market prices and demands. We explicitly characterize the changes in precisions of agents’ beliefs about the market, and demonstrate that complete learning is achieved in the limit. Moreover, we show that the asymptotic learning rates of both public and private signals attain the highest possible rate in the model, which is linear, thereby establishing the asymptotic learning efficiency. Factors that influence the learning speed and asymptotic rates are also identified. We also prove that the asymptotic learning efficiency applies to other learning situations.

本文提出了一个动态的基于市场的学习模型，在该模型中，代理人在观察关于市场价格和需求的公共和私人内生信号的同时重复交易风险资产。我们明确地描述了智能体对市场信念精度的变化，并证明了在极限下可以实现完全学习。此外，我们还证明了公共信号和私有信号的渐近学习率在模型中都达到了最高的可能率，这是线性的，从而建立了渐近学习效率。本文还确定了影响学习速度和渐近率的因素。我们还证明了渐近学习效率适用于其他学习情况。

引用次数: 0

Aggregating incomplete rankings 汇总不完全排名

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-06-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102423

Yasunori Okumura

This study considers a method for deriving a ranking of alternatives by aggregating the rankings submitted by multiple individuals, each of whom need not evaluate all of the alternatives. We call the collection of subsets of alternatives that individuals can evaluate an evaluability profile. For a given evaluability profile, we define an aggregating ranking function whose inputs are the rankings provided by individuals on the alternatives that they evaluate. We investigate the properties of such functions, focusing on modified versions of the properties originally introduced by Arrow and his followers. Whether there exists an aggregating ranking function that satisfies a given combination of the properties depends on the evaluability profile. Accordingly, we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions on evaluability profiles to ensure the existence of functions that satisfy four different combinations of the properties. Finally, we discuss whether these properties are satisfied in a real-world scenario.

本研究考虑了一种方法，该方法通过汇总多个个体提交的排名来得出备选方案的排名，每个个体都不需要评估所有的备选方案。我们把个人可以评估的备选方案子集的集合称为可评估性概要。对于给定的可评估性配置文件，我们定义了一个聚合排名函数，其输入是个人对其评估的备选方案提供的排名。我们研究了这些函数的性质，重点研究了阿罗及其追随者最初引入的性质的修改版本。是否存在满足给定属性组合的聚合排序函数取决于可评估性配置文件。因此，我们确定了可求性轮廓上的充要条件，以保证满足四种不同性质组合的函数的存在性。最后，我们将讨论在现实场景中是否满足这些属性。

引用次数: 0

Existence of Berge equilibrium in finite games 有限对策中Berge均衡的存在性

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-05-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102419

Hans Haller

This investigation is focused primarily on the existence of Berge equilibrium in finite games. A secondary concern is the comparison of Berge equilibrium existence and Nash equilibrium existence.

本文主要研究有限对策中Berge均衡的存在性。第二个问题是贝尔热均衡存在和纳什均衡存在的比较。

引用次数: 0

Dynamics of ideal efforts and consensus in a multi-layer network game 多层网络博弈中理想努力与共识的动态

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102421

Ana Mauleon , Mariam Nanumyan , Vincent Vannetelbosch

We study a network game on a fixed multi-layer network of two types of relationships. The social interactions in the first layer carry a pressure to conform with the social norm within the layer. The second layer provides additional strategic complementarities from players’ interaction. Players are endowed with personal ideal efforts and are heterogeneous in their ideal efforts and productivity. Each player repeatedly chooses her effort level in the network game and updates her ideal effort based on the new effort choice. Each player suffers disutility when her effort differs from her neighbors’ efforts or is inconsistent with her ideal effort. We find the pure Nash equilibrium of the game in each period and provide conditions for the convergence of efforts and ideals to a steady state. Furthermore, we find that the sensitivity to cognitive dissonance and the taste for conformity have opposing effects on the speed of convergence to a consensus and the steady state.

研究了两种关系的固定多层网络上的网络博弈问题。第一层的社会互动带来了一种压力，迫使人们遵从该层内的社会规范。第二层提供了来自玩家互动的额外战略补充。参与者被赋予了个人理想努力，并且在理想努力和生产力上存在异质性。每个参与者在网络游戏中反复选择自己的努力水平，并根据新的努力选择更新自己的理想努力。当每个参与者的努力与邻居的努力不同或与自己的理想努力不一致时，他们就会遭受负效用。我们找到了博弈在每个时期的纯纳什均衡，并为努力和理想趋同于稳态提供了条件。此外，我们发现对认知失调的敏感性和对一致性的品味对趋同到共识和稳定状态的速度有相反的影响。

引用次数: 0

Condorcet efficiency: Weighted Bucklin vs. weighted scoring and Borda 孔多塞效率：加权巴克林vs加权得分和博尔达

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102420

D. Marc Kilgour , Jean-Charles Grégoire , Angèle M. Foley

We ask how good Bucklin-related procedures can be at identifying Condorcet winners in ranked-ballot, single-winner elections. Bucklin procedures can have a wide range of weighting vectors and thresholds; one, for example, applies Borda weights, analogous to the Borda Count in weighted scoring elections. Using simulation, we estimate the maximum Condorcet efficiency of both weighted Bucklin and weighted scoring elections as the number of voters becomes very large; these measures depend of course on the underlying distribution of ballots. For the impartial anonymous culture distribution, weighted Bucklin exhibits higher Condorcet efficiency than weighted scoring when there are 3 candidates, but is not as good when there are 4 candidates, and about equal when there are 5 or 6. We also compare them under the impartial culture distribution (equally good), and under a one-dimensional spatial model (weighted Bucklin is usually better, sometimes much better).

我们想知道，在排序投票、单赢家选举中，与巴克林相关的程序能在多大程度上识别孔多塞的获胜者。巴克林程序可以有广泛的加权向量和阈值；例如，一种方法应用Borda权重，类似于加权计分选举中的Borda Count。通过模拟，我们估计了加权巴克林选举和加权得分选举在选民数量变得非常大时的最大孔多塞效率；这些措施当然取决于选票的基本分配情况。对于公正的匿名文化分布，当有3个候选人时，加权Bucklin比加权得分表现出更高的孔多塞效率，但当有4个候选人时则不如加权得分，当有5个或6个候选人时基本相等。我们还比较了他们在公正的文化分布下（同样好）和一维空间模型下（加权的Bucklin通常更好，有时好得多）。

引用次数: 0

首页上一页

下一页尾页

类型

全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

数据库

全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences

全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.

﹀