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Basic research and market concentration 基础研究和市场集中

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102472

Khaled Belkadhi , Hend Ghazzai , Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

We introduce a model with the possibility of investing in basic research prior to non-cooperative applied research and quantity competition, comparing two scenarios: Centralized (C) where the State invests in basic research and makes the results available to firms; and Decentralized (D) where firms have to invest in basic research. Total basic research effort acts as a multiplier of firms’ effort in applied research in the reduction of production costs. Interestingly, (i) there is no upper-bound on the number of viable firms under both scenarios, while there is a lower-bound on that number under (D) scenario; (ii) it may be socially optimal under (C) or (D) to have a finite number of firms; (iii) the firms’ expenses in research is either increasing or inverted U-shaped with market concentration, as in a large part of existing empirical literature; (iv) when the basic research cost is low, under (C), it is possible to implement the first best (the optimal number of firms) and a firm’s taxation to fund the optimal basic research expenses in an acceptable way to firms relative to the (D) scenario. When the basic research cost is intermediate, it is possible to implement the second best number of firms defined to be as the one allowing to cover the basic research expenses in an acceptable way to firms relative to the (D) scenario.

我们引入了一个考虑基础研究投资先于非合作应用研究和数量竞争的可能性的模型，并比较了两种情况：集中式(C)，即国家投资基础研究并将成果提供给企业；分散(D)，公司必须投资于基础研究。在降低生产成本方面，基础研究的总投入是企业应用研究投入的乘数。有趣的是，(i)在两种情况下都没有可行公司数量的上限，而在(D)情况下有一个下限；（ii）在(C)或(D)项下，有限数量的企业可能是社会最优的；(3)企业的研究费用与市场集中度呈增加或倒u型关系，大部分实证文献都是如此；（iv）当基础研究成本较低时，在(C)情形下，有可能实施第一最佳（最优企业数量）和企业税收，以相对于(D)情形的企业可接受的方式为最优基础研究费用提供资金。当基本研究成本处于中间水平时，有可能实现次优企业数量，即相对于(D)情景，允许企业以可接受的方式支付基本研究费用的企业数量。

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引用次数: 0

The set of pure-strategy equilibria in max–min two-group contests with a private good prize 具有私有商品奖励的最大最小两组竞争的纯策略均衡集

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-10-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102471

Mario Gilli, Andrea Sorrentino

We characterize the set of pure-strategy equilibria in a deterministic group contest with the weakest-link impact function and a private good prize, complementing the results obtained by Lee (2012) and Chowdhury et al. (2016). We consider a two-stage two-group model, where in the first stage the agents simultaneously choose the sharing rule, while in the second stage they choose efforts. We find that there are continua of subgame perfect equilibria, which means that in equilibrium players’ behavior is indeterminate. By additional restrictions on the effort levels of each class of effort equilibria, we are able to computationally characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

我们用最弱链接影响函数和私人商品奖励来描述确定性群体竞争中的纯策略均衡集，补充了Lee（2012）和Chowdhury等人（2016）的结果。我们考虑一个两阶段的两群体模型，在第一阶段，agent同时选择共享规则，在第二阶段，agent同时选择努力。我们发现了子博弈完全均衡存在连续，这意味着在均衡状态下参与者的行为是不确定的。通过对每一类努力均衡的努力水平的附加限制，我们能够计算表征纯策略下的子博弈完美纳什均衡集。

引用次数: 0

Note on intertemporal preference with loss aversion 关于损失厌恶的跨期偏好的注释

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-10-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102469

Kyoung Jin Choi , Junkee Jeon , Hyeng Keun Koo

We study two models of intertemporal preferences exhibiting loss aversion: one based on utility changes relative to a reference point, and another incorporating mental adjustment costs. Within a multi-period (possibly infinite-horizon) framework, we show that the two formulations are theoretically equivalent. The resulting preferences are neither monotone nor concave in general. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonicity and concavity, and provide a continuous-time extension that preserves the equivalence. Our results offer a tractable and rigorous foundation for modeling intertemporal behavior under reference-dependent preferences.

我们研究了两种表现损失厌恶的跨期偏好模型：一种基于相对于参考点的效用变化，另一种包含心理调整成本。在多周期（可能是无限视界）框架内，我们证明了这两个公式在理论上是等价的。得到的首选项一般既不是单调的，也不是凹的。我们得到了单调性和凹性的充分必要条件，并给出了一个保持等价的连续时间扩展。我们的结果为参考依赖偏好下的跨期行为建模提供了一个易于处理和严格的基础。

引用次数: 0

Strategic behavior in contests with sabotage 与蓄意破坏竞争中的战略行为

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-10-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102470

Doron Klunover

Sabotage is incorporated into Dixit (1987)’s classic model of a two-player probabilistic symmetric contest to show that in contrast to his result and apart from a special case, a player will, if possible, commit to a level of effort different from that in Nash equilibrium. This implies that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential contest differs from the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding simultaneous contest and that a player prefers to be the first mover in the former type of contest rather than participating in the latter type.

破坏被纳入到Dixit（1987）的经典的二人概率对称竞争模型中，以表明与他的结果相反，除了特殊情况外，如果可能的话，参与者将投入与纳什均衡不同的努力水平。这意味着顺序竞争的子博弈完美均衡不同于相应的同步竞争的纳什均衡，玩家更愿意在前一种竞争中成为先发者，而不是参与后一种竞争。

引用次数: 0

A simple model on social connections, wages, and welfare 一个关于社会关系、工资和福利的简单模型

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-10-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102468

Ying Wang , Richard T. Woodward

In this paper, we develop a model of social connections to explore how, in the presence of social connections, an increase in an exogenous wage of one of the players does not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement. Players are required to share resources to establish social connections. In this basic model, we show that the non-cooperative equilibrium is not Pareto efficient by introducing a compensation mechanism and showing that a Pareto improving trade could be made. We then show that if a wage increase for one player leads to a reduction in social connections, under some circumstances a mutually beneficial agreement could be reached in which the player foregoes the wage increase in exchange for a cash transfer. The model provides insights into why increases in income do not always translate into greater happiness.

在本文中，我们开发了一个社会关系模型，以探索在存在社会关系的情况下，参与者之一的外生工资增加如何不一定导致帕累托改进。玩家需要分享资源来建立社交关系。在这个基本模型中，我们通过引入补偿机制来证明非合作均衡不是帕累托有效的，并证明可以进行帕累托改善交易。然后我们证明，如果一名球员的工资增加导致社会联系减少，在某些情况下，可以达成互利协议，即球员放弃工资增加以换取现金转移。该模型提供了一些见解，解释了为什么收入的增加并不总是转化为更大的幸福感。

引用次数: 0

On human capital accumulation in times of epidemic 论疫情时期的人力资本积累

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-09-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102466

Stefano Bosi , David Desmarchelier , Cuong Le Van

In the spirit of Goenka and Liu (2020), we study an endogenous growth model à la Lucas (1988) with an infectious disease spreading according to SIS dynamics and slowing human capital accumulation. Our model differs from theirs in some respects. We focus solely on the planner’s solution and cover both bounded and unbounded growth cases, under the assumption of more general preferences. Considering a single capital good allows us to provide a global analysis and in-depth understanding of the transition mechanisms. In the case of decreasing returns, the economy converges towards a stationary stock of human capital which decreases with the severity of the epidemic. In the case of unbounded growth, we recover the main results of Goenka and Liu (2020): the existence of a Balanced Growth Path with a negative impact of disease severity on growth rate. However, in our model, the growth path is only asymptotically balanced and confined within an exponential band during the transition.

在Goenka和Liu（2020）的精神下，我们研究了一个内生增长模型（la Lucas(1988)），其中传染病根据SIS动态传播并减缓人力资本积累。我们的模式在某些方面与他们的不同。我们只关注计划者的解决方案，在更普遍的偏好假设下，涵盖有界和无界增长情况。考虑到单一的资本商品，我们可以提供一个全球的分析和对过渡机制的深入理解。在收益减少的情况下，经济趋向于人力资本的固定存量，这种存量随着疫情的严重程度而减少。在无界生长的情况下，我们恢复了Goenka和Liu（2020）的主要结果：存在一条平衡生长路径，疾病严重程度对生长速度有负向影响。然而，在我们的模型中，在过渡期间，增长路径仅是渐近平衡的，并且被限制在指数带内。

引用次数: 0

Multimarket contact, cartel and product quality 多市场联系，卡特尔和产品质量

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-09-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102467

Neelanjan Sen , Uday Bhanu Sinha

We demonstrate how multimarket contact can negatively impact the quality choices in two different markets, resulting in a reduction in the availability of high-quality products and an increase in the availability of low-quality products. In our model, the firms can collude during the quality choice in different markets and may under-invest in product quality improvement. We also discuss the stability of these types of cartels. Consumer surplus decreases if both firms collude, such that either or both firms switch to the low-quality product in one or both markets. However, in doing so, the firms earn higher profits under collusion.

我们展示了多市场接触如何对两个不同市场的质量选择产生负面影响，导致高质量产品的可用性减少，低质量产品的可用性增加。在我们的模型中，企业在不同市场的质量选择中可能存在串通行为，并且可能在产品质量改进方面投资不足。我们还讨论了这类卡特尔的稳定性。如果两家公司串通，使得其中一家或两家公司在一个或两个市场上转向低质量的产品，消费者剩余就会减少。然而，在这样做的过程中，公司在勾结下获得了更高的利润。

引用次数: 0

Delegation and strategic altruism: A theoretical approach 授权与战略利他主义：一种理论途径

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-09-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102465

Luciano Méndez-Naya

In this paper we introduce two refinements of Nash equilibria for extensive form games: the quasi-stable equilibrium and the stable equilibrium. We then introduce the general strategic game with delegates and study new solutions in that context. We apply the new solution concepts to symmetric

n

-player games in which each player has two strategies. The main conclusion is that, in the prisoner’s dilemma, if the punishment payoff is sufficient, both players obtain the cooperative payoff when they choose strategically altruistic delegates.

本文介绍了广泛形式对策的纳什均衡的两种改进：准稳定均衡和稳定均衡。然后，我们与代表们一起介绍一般的战略博弈，并在此背景下研究新的解决方案。我们将新的解概念应用于对称的n人博弈，其中每个玩家有两个策略。主要结论是，在囚徒困境中，如果惩罚收益足够，当双方选择战略利他委托时，双方都获得合作收益。

引用次数: 0

Rational bubbles in portfolios with fundamental value 具有基本价值的投资组合中的理性泡沫

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-09-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102464

Lise Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard , Xavier Raurich , Thomas Seegmuller

In this paper, we provide a framework in which a stationary bubble can exist on a portfolio of dividend-yielding assets. Consistent with standard asset pricing theory, this portfolio bubble is defined as the difference between the portfolio market price and the present value of its future dividend stream. This bubble can coexist with a positive stationary fundamental value, without requiring the collapse of the latter over time. This result is obtained in an exchange overlapping generations economy featuring both newly issued and pre-existing financial assets that depreciate over time, and jointly constitute the asset portfolio. The introduction of new assets in each period decouples the return on bubbles from the effective discount rate applied to dividends. As a result, stationary equilibria can exist with both a positive bubble and a positive fundamental component in the portfolio value. Finally, our framework also allows us to discuss the role of the substitutability between financial assets on the level of bubbles and fundamental values.

在本文中，我们提供了一个框架，其中平稳泡沫可以存在于股息收益资产组合中。与标准资产定价理论一致，这种投资组合泡沫被定义为投资组合市场价格与其未来股息流现值之间的差额。这个泡沫可以与一个正的稳定的基本价值共存，而不需要后者随着时间的推移而崩溃。这一结果是在交换重叠代经济中获得的，其中新发行的金融资产和预先存在的金融资产随着时间的推移而贬值，并共同构成资产组合。每个时期新资产的引入将泡沫回报与股息的有效贴现率脱钩。因此，平稳均衡既可以存在正的泡沫，也可以存在正的基本成分。最后，我们的框架还允许我们讨论泡沫和基本价值水平上金融资产之间可替代性的作用。

引用次数: 0

Connectedness in weighted consensus division of graphical cakes between two agents 两个agent间图形饼加权共识划分的连通性

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pub Date : 2025-09-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102463

Josef Hanke , Ana Rita Pires

Austin’s moving knife procedure was originally introduced to find a consensus division of an interval/circular cake between two agents, each of whom believes that they receive exactly half of the cake.

We generalise this in two ways: we consider cakes modelled by graphs, and let the two agents have unequal, arbitrary entitlements. In this setting, we seek a weighted consensus division – one where each agent believes they received exactly the share they are entitled to – which also minimises the number of connected components that each agent receives.

First, we review the weighted consensus division of a circular cake, which gives exactly one connected piece to each agent. Next, by judiciously mapping a circle to a graph, we produce a weighted consensus division of a star graph cake that gives at most two connected pieces to each agent — and show that this bound on the number of connected pieces is tight. For a tree, each agent receives at most

h + 1

connected pieces, where

h

is the minimal height of the tree. For a connected graphical cake, each agent receives

r + 2

connected pieces, where

r

is the radius of the graph. Finally, for a graphical cake with

s

connected components, the division involves at most

s + 2 r + 4

connected pieces, where

r

is the maximum radius among all connected components.

Austin的动刀程序最初是为了在两个代理之间找到间隔/圆形蛋糕的共识划分，每个代理都认为他们得到了蛋糕的一半。我们用两种方式来概括这一点：我们考虑用图形建模的蛋糕，并让两个代理具有不平等的、任意的权利。在这种情况下，我们寻求一个加权共识划分——每个代理都相信他们得到了他们有权得到的份额——这也最小化了每个代理收到的连接组件的数量。首先，我们回顾了圆形蛋糕的加权共识划分，它给每个agent精确地分配了一个连接块。接下来，通过明智地将一个圆映射到一个图，我们产生了星图饼的加权共识划分，该划分给每个代理最多两个连接块，并表明连接块数量的这个界限是紧密的。对于树，每个代理最多接收到h+1个连接的片段，其中h是树的最小高度。对于连通的图饼，每个agent接收r+2个连通的块，其中r为图的半径。最后，对于具有s个连通分量的图饼，划分最多涉及s+2r+4个连通块，其中r为所有连通分量的最大半径。

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引用次数: 0

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