Pub Date : 2024-09-10DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003
Xieji Zhang
In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders’ truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions.
{"title":"The ascending auction with flexible reporting","authors":"Xieji Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders’ truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 28-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142169360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-05DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001
Nadja Stroh-Maraun
There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight.
{"title":"Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism","authors":"Nadja Stroh-Maraun","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 49-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000817/pdfft?md5=20c6d6ce7944d3dcfc320f58184efcf4&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000817-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142243137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-05DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.002
Ratul Lahkar
We consider rent-seeking contests where the impact function, which measures how much impact effort has, takes an exponential form. The resulting contest success function (CSF) is a difference-form CSF and the contest is a difference-form contest. Rent dissipation measures the rent lost due to rent-seeking. Cost functions in our difference-form contest are also exponential. We establish the equivalence between such difference-form contests and Tullock contests. We then solve finite-player symmetric difference-form contests in closed form. But if there are asymmetries, the contest cannot be solved. We, therefore, approximate an asymmetric difference-form contest with a large population contest, which can be solved. Rent dissipation in the large population contest is the ratio of the elasticity of the impact function to that of the cost function. Hence, this ratio also approximates rent dissipation in a finite-player contest.
{"title":"Rent dissipation in difference-form contests","authors":"Ratul Lahkar","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We consider rent-seeking contests where the impact function, which measures how much impact effort has, takes an exponential form. The resulting contest success function (CSF) is a difference-form CSF and the contest is a difference-form contest. Rent dissipation measures the rent lost due to rent-seeking. Cost functions in our difference-form contest are also exponential. We establish the equivalence between such difference-form contests and Tullock contests. We then solve finite-player symmetric difference-form contests in closed form. But if there are asymmetries, the contest cannot be solved. We, therefore, approximate an asymmetric difference-form contest with a large population contest, which can be solved. Rent dissipation in the large population contest is the ratio of the elasticity of the impact function to that of the cost function. Hence, this ratio also approximates rent dissipation in a finite-player contest.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 40-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142229465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-16DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.005
Madhuparna Karmokar , Dipjyoti Majumdar , Souvik Roy
We study the structure of probabilistic voting rules that are ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) with respect to independently distributed prior beliefs that can be considered generic (Majumdar and Sen (2004)). We first identify a class of priors, such that for each prior in that class there exists a probabilistic voting rule that puts a positive probability weight on “compromise” candidates. The class of priors include generic priors. Next, we consider a class of randomized voting rules that have a “finite range”. For this class of rules, we identify an appropriate generic condition on priors such that, any rule in this class is OBIC with respect to a prior satisfying the generic condition if and only if the rule is a random dictatorship.
我们研究了概率投票规则的结构,这些规则在独立分布的先验信念方面是顺序贝叶斯激励兼容(OBIC)的,可被视为通用规则(Majumdar 和 Sen (2004))。我们首先确定一类先验,对于该类先验中的每个先验,都存在一种概率投票规则,该规则对 "折中 "候选人赋予正概率权重。该类先验包括一般先验。接下来,我们考虑一类具有 "有限范围 "的随机投票规则。对于这一类规则,我们确定了一个关于先验的适当的通用条件,这样,当且仅当该规则是一个随机独裁规则时,这一类规则中的任何规则对于满足通用条件的先验都是 OBIC 的。
{"title":"Some further results on random OBIC rules","authors":"Madhuparna Karmokar , Dipjyoti Majumdar , Souvik Roy","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the structure of probabilistic voting rules that are ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) with respect to independently distributed prior beliefs that can be considered <em>generic</em> (Majumdar and Sen (2004)). We first identify a class of priors, such that for each prior in that class there exists a probabilistic voting rule that puts a positive probability weight on “compromise” candidates. The class of priors include generic priors. Next, we consider a class of randomized voting rules that have a “finite range”. For this class of rules, we identify an appropriate generic condition on priors such that, any rule in this class is OBIC with respect to a prior satisfying the generic condition if and only if the rule is a random dictatorship.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 102-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142083493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-16DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.004
Hiromasa Ogawa
Serious information asymmetry exists between consumers and expert sellers in the credit-goods market. This study develops a generic model to investigate the relationship between consumer information and expert fraud in the credence goods market. The unique features of the model are that (i) the state of the consumer is multidimensional, (ii) the expert seller has concerns about their reputation, and (iii) information asymmetry exists between the consumer and the expert seller regarding the necessity of the provided treatment ex-ante and ex-post. On average, the equilibrium amount of the recommended treatment is greater than the necessary level. The contingent effect of any consumer information on expert overtreatment can be evaluated by analyzing the posterior variance of the number of problems updated by the information. Consumer information on only part of the problem hardly reduces expert overtreatment in certain situations. The unconditional effect of consumer information on expert seller fraud varies considerably with state distribution.
{"title":"Expert’s reputation concern and consumer information","authors":"Hiromasa Ogawa","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Serious information asymmetry exists between consumers and expert sellers in the credit-goods market. This study develops a generic model to investigate the relationship between consumer information and expert fraud in the credence goods market. The unique features of the model are that (i) the state of the consumer is multidimensional, (ii) the expert seller has concerns about their reputation, and (iii) information asymmetry exists between the consumer and the expert seller regarding the necessity of the provided treatment ex-ante and ex-post. On average, the equilibrium amount of the recommended treatment is greater than the necessary level. The contingent effect of any consumer information on expert overtreatment can be evaluated by analyzing the posterior variance of the number of problems updated by the information. Consumer information on only part of the problem hardly reduces expert overtreatment in certain situations. The unconditional effect of consumer information on expert seller fraud varies considerably with state distribution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 80-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142002331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.003
Donald C. Keenan , Arthur Snow
It is shown that well-behaved notions of greater or less downside risk aversion, via utility transformations, lead not to just one, but two, dual, notions of absolute aversion to downside risk: one, the more evident but weaker condition, requires that the prudence measure be positive, given a positive Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion, whereas the other, stronger, but less obvious, condition requires that the prudence measure be greater than three times the corresponding Arrow–Pratt measure. The reason for the appearance of these two extreme conditions, bounding the spectrum of reasonable alternative notions of downside risk aversion, or equivalently of downside risk loving, are explained, and consequences of this divergence in the possible meanings of downside risk aversion are explored.
{"title":"Full downside risk aversion","authors":"Donald C. Keenan , Arthur Snow","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is shown that well-behaved notions of greater or less downside risk aversion, via utility transformations, lead not to just one, but two, dual, notions of absolute aversion to downside risk: one, the more evident but weaker condition, requires that the prudence measure be positive, given a positive Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion, whereas the other, stronger, but less obvious, condition requires that the prudence measure be greater than three times the corresponding Arrow–Pratt measure. The reason for the appearance of these two extreme conditions, bounding the spectrum of reasonable alternative notions of downside risk aversion, or equivalently of downside risk loving, are explained, and consequences of this divergence in the possible meanings of downside risk aversion are explored.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 93-101"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142049919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.004
Daniela Bubboloni, Francesco Nardi
We introduce the anonymity group, the neutrality group and the symmetry group of a social preference function. Inspired by an unsolved problem posed by Kelly in 1991, we investigate the problem of recognizing which permutation groups may arise as anonymity, neutrality and symmetry groups of a social preference function. A complete description is provided for neutrality groups. In the case of anonymity groups, we derive a sufficient condition, which largely captures the desired class of objects. Our approach also is of relevance for the notion of representability by Boolean functions and, therefore, the results of this paper also shed some light on this field of study.
{"title":"Symmetry groups for social preference functions","authors":"Daniela Bubboloni, Francesco Nardi","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We introduce the anonymity group, the neutrality group and the symmetry group of a social preference function. Inspired by an unsolved problem posed by Kelly in 1991, we investigate the problem of recognizing which permutation groups may arise as anonymity, neutrality and symmetry groups of a social preference function. A complete description is provided for neutrality groups. In the case of anonymity groups, we derive a sufficient condition, which largely captures the desired class of objects. Our approach also is of relevance for the notion of representability by Boolean functions and, therefore, the results of this paper also shed some light on this field of study.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 1-14"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000696/pdfft?md5=1a8881f9212a224d472328303d2dd0e9&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000696-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142096187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-12DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.002
Jonas Hedlund
This paper examines the conditions under which separating outcomes occur in informed persuasion, that is, in Bayesian persuasion settings in which the sender is privately informed about the payoff-relevant state prior to committing to an experiment. We consider a setting with finite payoff-relevant states and sender payoffs that are continuous and monotonic in the receiver’s posterior beliefs. The paper finds that if full disclosure of the payoff-relevant state reduces the sender’s expected payoff under any common prior (i.e., if the sender’s payoff function is outer concave), then single-crossing properties arise such that the high sender type can separate from the low type by choosing more informative experiments. This single-crossing condition leads to the selection of “least costly” separating equilibria by the D1 criterion, i.e., the sender’s choice of experiment signals his type. Further, separating equilibria are characterized by simple constrained maximization problems.
{"title":"Signaling through Bayesian persuasion","authors":"Jonas Hedlund","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the conditions under which separating outcomes occur in informed persuasion, that is, in Bayesian persuasion settings in which the sender is privately informed about the payoff-relevant state prior to committing to an experiment. We consider a setting with finite payoff-relevant states and sender payoffs that are continuous and monotonic in the receiver’s posterior beliefs. The paper finds that if full disclosure of the payoff-relevant state reduces the sender’s expected payoff under any common prior (i.e., if the sender’s payoff function is outer concave), then single-crossing properties arise such that the high sender type can separate from the low type by choosing more informative experiments. This single-crossing condition leads to the selection of “least costly” separating equilibria by the D1 criterion, i.e., the sender’s choice of experiment signals his type. Further, separating equilibria are characterized by simple constrained maximization problems.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 15-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142158053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.001
Mauro Maria Baldi, Raffaella Coppier, Elisabetta Michetti
We develop an overlapping generations model to explore the role of grandparents in grandchildren’s education and its impact on human capital growth. We examine the quantity–quality (Q–Q) trade-off faced by parents in choosing the number and education of children, incorporating an active role for grandparents. Findings underscore the significance of the elderly in human capital accumulation, fertility, and economic growth. When grandparents invest more time, resources are freed, fostering greater human capital growth and mitigating the effects of the Q–Q trade-off.
{"title":"The role of grandparents in grandchildren’s education for human capital accumulation in an overlapping generations model","authors":"Mauro Maria Baldi, Raffaella Coppier, Elisabetta Michetti","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.08.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We develop an overlapping generations model to explore the role of grandparents in grandchildren’s education and its impact on human capital growth. We examine the quantity–quality (Q–Q) trade-off faced by parents in choosing the number and education of children, incorporating an active role for grandparents. Findings underscore the significance of the elderly in human capital accumulation, fertility, and economic growth. When grandparents invest more time, resources are freed, fostering greater human capital growth and mitigating the effects of the Q–Q trade-off.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 67-79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141979452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-25DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.002
Anuj S. Vora , Ankur A. Kulkarni
We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of symbols known to a strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We allow the receiver the possibility of selecting the alternatives presented in the questionnaire, and thereby linking decisions across the components of the sequence. We show that, despite the strategic sender and the noise in the channel, the receiver can recover exponentially many sequences, but also that exponentially many sequences are unrecoverable even by the best strategy. We define the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences as the information extraction capacity. A generalization of the Shannon capacity, it characterizes the optimal amount of communication resources required while communicating with a strategic sender. We derive bounds leading to an exact evaluation of the information extraction capacity in many cases. Our results form the building blocks of a novel, non-cooperative regime of communication involving a strategic sender.
{"title":"Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender","authors":"Anuj S. Vora , Ankur A. Kulkarni","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of symbols known to a strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We allow the receiver the possibility of selecting the alternatives presented in the questionnaire, and thereby linking decisions across the components of the sequence. We show that, despite the strategic sender and the noise in the channel, the receiver can recover exponentially many sequences, but also that exponentially many sequences are unrecoverable even by the best strategy. We define the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences as the information extraction capacity. A generalization of the Shannon capacity, it characterizes the optimal amount of communication resources required while communicating with a strategic sender. We derive bounds leading to an exact evaluation of the information extraction capacity in many cases. Our results form the building blocks of a novel, non-cooperative regime of communication involving a strategic sender.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"131 ","pages":"Pages 48-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141961295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}