Pub Date : 2025-08-08DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448
Alexei Parakhonyak , Sergey V. Popov
In a search and matching model with Nash bargaining, we find infinitely many asymmetric equilibria in which one sex receives a lower payoff than a similarly productive agent of the opposite sex. The mechanism resembles a social norm: if all agents on the opposite side of the marriage market become more demanding, continued searching yields diminished returns. However, if same-sex marriage is legalized and each side of the market includes a positive, arbitrarily small, share of bisexual agents, then only symmetric equilibria survive. This result highlights how restrictions on same-sex marriage reinforce asymmetries in opposite-sex matchings.
{"title":"Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer","authors":"Alexei Parakhonyak , Sergey V. Popov","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102448","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a search and matching model with Nash bargaining, we find infinitely many asymmetric equilibria in which one sex receives a lower payoff than a similarly productive agent of the opposite sex. The mechanism resembles a social norm: if all agents on the opposite side of the marriage market become more demanding, continued searching yields diminished returns. However, if same-sex marriage is legalized and each side of the market includes a positive, arbitrarily small, share of bisexual agents, then only symmetric equilibria survive. This result highlights how restrictions on same-sex marriage reinforce asymmetries in opposite-sex matchings.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102448"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145010895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-08DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450
Martin Černý
In the model of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, certain coalitions are infeasible, meaning they cannot form, which directly influences payoff allocation. We consider a scenario where coalitions are no longer categorized as feasible or infeasible, but rather as known or unknown. In this setting, coalitions with unknown values are still feasible, but their values remain unknown in the allocation process. Classical allocation methods for games with restricted cooperation, such as the R-value, become unsuitable for such scenarios.
We introduce a new allocation rule called the uniform-dividend value (UD-value), designed specifically for cooperative games where some coalition values remain unknown (so-called incomplete cooperative games). The UD-value allocates payoffs by evenly distributing the total surplus within each group of indistinguishable coalitions. We demonstrate that for intersection-closed set systems, the UD-value is uniquely determined and can also be viewed as the expected Shapley value computed over all totally positive (i.e., nonnegative-surplus) extensions of the incomplete cooperative game. We compare the UD-value to two existing allocation rules for intersection-closed games: the R-value, defined as the Shapley value of a game that sets surplus of absent coalition values to zero, and the IC-value, tailored specifically for intersection-closed systems. Specifically, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the UD-value motivated by characterizations of the IC-value and discuss further properties such as fairness and balanced contributions.
{"title":"A new value for cooperative games on intersection-closed systems","authors":"Martin Černý","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102450","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the model of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, certain coalitions are infeasible, meaning they cannot form, which directly influences payoff allocation. We consider a scenario where coalitions are no longer categorized as feasible or infeasible, but rather as known or unknown. In this setting, coalitions with unknown values are still feasible, but their values remain unknown in the allocation process. Classical allocation methods for games with restricted cooperation, such as the R-value, become unsuitable for such scenarios.</div><div>We introduce a new allocation rule called the <em>uniform-dividend value</em> (UD-value), designed specifically for cooperative games where some coalition values remain unknown (so-called <em>incomplete cooperative games</em>). The UD-value allocates payoffs by evenly distributing the total surplus within each group of <em>indistinguishable</em> coalitions. We demonstrate that for <em>intersection-closed</em> set systems, the UD-value is uniquely determined and can also be viewed as the expected Shapley value computed over all totally positive (i.e., nonnegative-surplus) extensions of the incomplete cooperative game. We compare the UD-value to two existing allocation rules for intersection-closed games: the R-value, defined as the Shapley value of a game that sets surplus of absent coalition values to zero, and the IC-value, tailored specifically for intersection-closed systems. Specifically, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the UD-value motivated by characterizations of the IC-value and discuss further properties such as fairness and balanced contributions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102450"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-05DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451
Laurent Gauthier
Extending the sociological study of conformism in naming, we develop a dynamic model of name choice, reflecting conformist or non-conformist behavior. This allows us to account for more degrees of freedom than the statistical physics approaches that have generally been used in name modeling. Testing our model empirically, we find that conformist naming accounts for the unique shape of name distributions in ancient Greece, which differs from contemporary name data.
{"title":"Conformism and name dynamics: A cliometric study of ancient Greek names","authors":"Laurent Gauthier","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102451","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Extending the sociological study of conformism in naming, we develop a dynamic model of name choice, reflecting conformist or non-conformist behavior. This allows us to account for more degrees of freedom than the statistical physics approaches that have generally been used in name modeling. Testing our model empirically, we find that conformist naming accounts for the unique shape of name distributions in ancient Greece, which differs from contemporary name data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-29DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102447
Anindya Bhattacharya
The main contribution of this paper is to provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily with transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded). One novelty of this exercise is that our domain is the entire class of such games: i.e., restrictions like “non-levelness” (a restriction not very appealing in several real-life situations) or “balancedness”, usually imposed in the related literature, are not required.
{"title":"A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: Some new axiomatization results","authors":"Anindya Bhattacharya","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102447","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102447","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The main contribution of this paper is to provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily with transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded). One novelty of this exercise is that our domain is the <em>entire</em> class of such games: i.e., restrictions like “non-levelness” (a restriction not very appealing in several real-life situations) or “balancedness”, usually imposed in the related literature, are not required.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102447"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-29DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102449
Koichi Nishimura , Hanna Sumita
We study fair allocation of resources consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations. When only divisible or indivisible goods exist, it is known that an allocation that achieves the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) satisfies the classic fairness notions based on envy. Moreover, the literature shows the structures and characterizations of MNW allocations when valuations are binary and linear (i.e., divisible goods are homogeneous). In this paper, we show that when all agents’ valuations are binary linear, an MNW allocation for mixed goods satisfies the envy-freeness up to any good for mixed goods (EFXM). This notion is stronger than an existing one called envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), and our result generalizes the existing results for the case when only divisible or indivisible goods exist. When all agents’ valuations are binary over indivisible goods and identical over divisible goods (e.g., the divisible good is money), we extend the known characterization of an MNW allocation for indivisible goods to mixed goods, and also show that an MNW allocation satisfies EFXM. For the general additive valuations, we also provide a formal proof that an MNW allocation satisfies a weaker notion than EFM.
{"title":"Envy-freeness and maximum Nash welfare for mixed divisible and indivisible goods","authors":"Koichi Nishimura , Hanna Sumita","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102449","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102449","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study fair allocation of resources consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations. When only divisible or indivisible goods exist, it is known that an allocation that achieves the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) satisfies the classic fairness notions based on envy. Moreover, the literature shows the structures and characterizations of MNW allocations when valuations are binary and linear (i.e., divisible goods are homogeneous). In this paper, we show that when all agents’ valuations are binary linear, an MNW allocation for mixed goods satisfies the envy-freeness up to any good for mixed goods (EFXM). This notion is stronger than an existing one called envy-freeness for mixed goods (EFM), and our result generalizes the existing results for the case when only divisible or indivisible goods exist. When all agents’ valuations are binary over indivisible goods and identical over divisible goods (e.g., the divisible good is money), we extend the known characterization of an MNW allocation for indivisible goods to mixed goods, and also show that an MNW allocation satisfies EFXM. For the general additive valuations, we also provide a formal proof that an MNW allocation satisfies a weaker notion than EFM.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102449"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145010801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-13DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102437
Takeshi Fukasawa
This paper presents a universal representation of symmetric (permutation-invariant) functions with multidimensional variable-size variables. These representations help justify approximation methods that aggregate information from each variable using moments. It further discusses how these findings provide insights into game-theoretic applications, including two-step policy function estimation, Moment-based Markov Equilibrium (MME), and aggregative games.
Regarding policy function estimation, under certain conditions, estimating a common policy function as a function of a firm’s own state and the sum of polynomial terms (moments) of competitors’ states is justified, regardless of the number of firms in a market, provided a sufficient number of moments are included. For MME, this study demonstrates that MME is equivalent to Markov Perfect Equilibrium if the number of moments reaches a certain level and regularity conditions are satisfied.
Regarding aggregative games, the paper establishes that any game satisfying symmetry and continuity conditions in payoff functions can be represented as a multidimensional generalized aggregative game. This extends previous research on generalized (fully) aggregative games by introducing multidimensional aggregates.
{"title":"The use of symmetry for models with variable-size variables","authors":"Takeshi Fukasawa","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102437","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102437","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents a universal representation of symmetric (permutation-invariant) functions with multidimensional variable-size variables. These representations help justify approximation methods that aggregate information from each variable using moments. It further discusses how these findings provide insights into game-theoretic applications, including two-step policy function estimation, Moment-based Markov Equilibrium (MME), and aggregative games.</div><div>Regarding policy function estimation, under certain conditions, estimating a common policy function as a function of a firm’s own state and the sum of polynomial terms (moments) of competitors’ states is justified, regardless of the number of firms in a market, provided a sufficient number of moments are included. For MME, this study demonstrates that MME is equivalent to Markov Perfect Equilibrium if the number of moments reaches a certain level and regularity conditions are satisfied.</div><div>Regarding aggregative games, the paper establishes that any game satisfying symmetry and continuity conditions in payoff functions can be represented as a multidimensional generalized aggregative game. This extends previous research on generalized (fully) aggregative games by introducing multidimensional aggregates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102437"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-11DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102435
Jian Yang
We consider a nonatomic game involving incomplete information. On top of a player’s own action and the joint distribution of other players’ traits and actions, also influencing the player’s return is a state of the world that incorporates uncertain factors external to all players. Non-exact knowledge about the latter is embedded in a player’s signal. When other players adopt strategies that amount to signal-based action distributions, a given player’s action would be guided by her own preference on the vector made up of the distributions on returns that she anticipates to encounter under all potential states allowed by her signal. There can be two equilibrium notions; namely, the action- and distribution-based ones that depend on whether a player controls individual actions or merely their distributions. Besides the existence of equilibria, we also study relationships between the two equilibrium notions for various special cases. Furthermore, the nonatomic game is shown to approximate its finite counterparts.
{"title":"A nonatomic game involving incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes","authors":"Jian Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider a nonatomic game involving incomplete information. On top of a player’s own action and the joint distribution of other players’ traits and actions, also influencing the player’s return is a state of the world that incorporates uncertain factors external to all players. Non-exact knowledge about the latter is embedded in a player’s signal. When other players adopt strategies that amount to signal-based action distributions, a given player’s action would be guided by her own preference on the vector made up of the distributions on returns that she anticipates to encounter under all potential states allowed by her signal. There can be two equilibrium notions; namely, the action- and distribution-based ones that depend on whether a player controls individual actions or merely their distributions. Besides the existence of equilibria, we also study relationships between the two equilibrium notions for various special cases. Furthermore, the nonatomic game is shown to approximate its finite counterparts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"138 ","pages":"Article 102435"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145005423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430
Rajendra P. Kundu, Siddhi Gyan Pandey
We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic interactions amongst players who are linked to each other in an existing signed network of friendships and enmities , which shape the incentive structure faced by players in their pairwise interactions with each other. These interactions take the form of simultaneous move cooperation games of complete information, wherein network effects create incentives to cooperate due to the presence of common friends as well common enemies. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the strategic interactions between players and determine the nature of the tie between them in , which is the new layer of the signed multiplex. We investigate how properties of structural balance in the existing signed social network influence balance in the new signed network , identifying conditions on the existing network that yield a structurally balanced new layer of the multiplex.
{"title":"Cooperation and balance in signed networks: A model of multiplex formation","authors":"Rajendra P. Kundu, Siddhi Gyan Pandey","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102430","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic interactions amongst <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span> players who are linked to each other in an existing signed network of friendships and enmities <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span>, which shape the incentive structure faced by players in their pairwise interactions with each other. These interactions take the form of simultaneous move cooperation games of complete information, wherein network effects create incentives to cooperate due to the presence of common friends as well common enemies. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the strategic interactions between players <span><math><mi>i</mi></math></span> and <span><math><mi>j</mi></math></span> determine the nature of the tie between them in <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, which is the new layer of the signed multiplex. We investigate how properties of structural balance in the existing signed social network <span><math><mi>g</mi></math></span> influence balance in the new signed network <span><math><mrow><mi>G</mi><mrow><mo>(</mo><mi>g</mi><mo>)</mo></mrow></mrow></math></span>, identifying conditions on the existing network that yield a structurally balanced new layer of the multiplex.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102430"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144517767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102432
Wei Bi , Huiyun Ding
This paper studies jump bidding in a war of attrition, where a bidder makes a costly preemptive commitment to deter opponents. We identify a Double-Edged Sword Effect: while jump bidding increases early-stage costs for the jump bidder, it enhances her ability to deter high-valuation opponents in later stages. The bidder jump bids when she believes that her opponent is likely to have a high valuation and not quit soon, such as when the valuation distribution is convex or bounded away from zero. Although jump bidding may result in inefficient allocation, it reduces total attrition costs and can improve overall welfare ex ante.
{"title":"Jump bidding in the war of attrition","authors":"Wei Bi , Huiyun Ding","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies jump bidding in a war of attrition, where a bidder makes a costly preemptive commitment to deter opponents. We identify a Double-Edged Sword Effect: while jump bidding increases early-stage costs for the jump bidder, it enhances her ability to deter high-valuation opponents in later stages. The bidder jump bids when she believes that her opponent is likely to have a high valuation and not quit soon, such as when the valuation distribution is convex or bounded away from zero. Although jump bidding may result in inefficient allocation, it reduces total attrition costs and can improve overall welfare ex ante.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102432"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144562796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-01DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102434
Fernando Barros Jr. , Samuel Cruz , Bruno R. Delalibera , Diego Silva
We study the effect of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) in an economy with multiple isolated banks. Participant banks fund the scheme, which follows a pre-determined insurance payment scheme. An external player transfers insurance benefits to all banks where depositors are running. The total insurance payment depends on resources collected by the external authority and the number of eligible queues to receive the insurance benefit. We discuss the effect of DIS on the optimal payment contract. More specifically, we analyze the existence of bank-run equilibria and whether the optimal payment contract is incentive-compatible. We find that DIS prevents bank-run equilibria at the same time that it may expose the environment to contagion. We also see that the insurance policy relaxes the truth-telling condition for general parameters.
{"title":"Deposit insurance in a sequential-service constrained environment","authors":"Fernando Barros Jr. , Samuel Cruz , Bruno R. Delalibera , Diego Silva","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102434","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102434","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the effect of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) in an economy with multiple isolated banks. Participant banks fund the scheme, which follows a pre-determined insurance payment scheme. An external player transfers insurance benefits to all banks where depositors are running. The total insurance payment depends on resources collected by the external authority and the number of eligible queues to receive the insurance benefit. We discuss the effect of DIS on the optimal payment contract. More specifically, we analyze the existence of bank-run equilibria and whether the optimal payment contract is incentive-compatible. We find that DIS prevents bank-run equilibria at the same time that it may expose the environment to contagion. We also see that the insurance policy relaxes the truth-telling condition for general parameters.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"136 ","pages":"Article 102434"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144557396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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