Pub Date : 2024-12-20DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.003
Grégory Ponthière , Nicolas Stevens
Dewatripont and Tirole (2024) defend the morality of markets on the ground of an irrelevance result: the social production of moral actions is independent from competitive pressure on markets. No matter how strong competitive pressure is, markets perform well in diffusing signals about moral values and in coordinating suppliers of moral actions. In this article, we argue, on the contrary, that markets lead to a double crowding out of moral values: first, imperfect transmission of moral values on markets leads to an underproduction of moral actions despite the presence of highly ethical suppliers; second, competitive pressure on markets favors the eviction of highly ethical suppliers by less ethical suppliers. Furthermore, we highlight that this double crowding-out restricts the normative scope of the irrelevance result, and raises the question of what the division of moral labor should be between citizens, firms and States.
{"title":"The morality of markets. A critique","authors":"Grégory Ponthière , Nicolas Stevens","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Dewatripont and Tirole (2024) defend the morality of markets on the ground of an irrelevance result: the social production of moral actions is independent from competitive pressure on markets. No matter how strong competitive pressure is, markets perform well in diffusing signals about moral values and in coordinating suppliers of moral actions. In this article, we argue, on the contrary, that markets lead to a double crowding out of moral values: first, imperfect transmission of moral values on markets leads to an underproduction of moral actions despite the presence of highly ethical suppliers; second, competitive pressure on markets favors the eviction of highly ethical suppliers by less ethical suppliers. Furthermore, we highlight that this double crowding-out restricts the normative scope of the irrelevance result, and raises the question of what the division of moral labor should be between citizens, firms and States.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"134 ","pages":"Pages 14-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143175366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-23DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003
Aditya Vikram
We investigate the stability of internet platform trading mechanisms using the notion of ex-ante incentive compatible core defined by Forges et al. (2002) in the context of an exchange economy. A mechanism can be blocked by a single buyer and seller pair if they can find an interim incentive-compatible trading mechanism that gives them higher ex-ante expected utilities. Standard double auction mechanisms like the trade reduction mechanism and McAfee double auction mechanism may not be single-buyer–single-seller (SBSS) ex-ante stable. We characterize interim incentive-compatible, interim individually-rational, symmetric and revenue-maximizing mechanisms that are SBSS ex-ante stable using methods in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
{"title":"Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market","authors":"Aditya Vikram","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the stability of internet platform trading mechanisms using the notion of ex-ante incentive compatible core defined by Forges et al. (2002) in the context of an exchange economy. A mechanism can be blocked by a single buyer and seller pair if they can find an interim incentive-compatible trading mechanism that gives them higher ex-ante expected utilities. Standard double auction mechanisms like the trade reduction mechanism and McAfee double auction mechanism may not be single-buyer–single-seller (SBSS) ex-ante stable. We characterize interim incentive-compatible, interim individually-rational, symmetric and revenue-maximizing mechanisms that are SBSS ex-ante stable using methods in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"133 ","pages":"Pages 1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142743600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-17DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002
Laura Doval , Pablo Schenone
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent’s conjectures. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition — consistency — for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability.
{"title":"Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets","authors":"Laura Doval , Pablo Schenone","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent’s <em>conjectures</em>. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition — <em>consistency</em> — for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 114-127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142701104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-13DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.001
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Progressive income and commodity tax structures have been examined independently in terms of their ability to reduce income inequality and bipolarization. Rather than focusing on income and commodity taxes in isolation, this paper studies mixed tax systems, which subject both income and consumption to taxation. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of these systems that ensure a reduction in income inequality and bipolarization for both exogenous and endogenous income scenarios. Commodity taxation is “superfluous” in the case of exogenous income, as any post-tax income distribution achievable through a mixed tax system can be replicated by income taxation alone. In contrast, when income is endogenous, there are cases where relying solely on income taxation is ineffective, while mixed tax structures have equalizing and depolarizing potential.
{"title":"Inequality and bipolarization-reducing mixed taxation","authors":"Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Progressive income and commodity tax structures have been examined independently in terms of their ability to reduce income inequality and bipolarization. Rather than focusing on income and commodity taxes in isolation, this paper studies mixed tax systems, which subject both income and consumption to taxation. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of these systems that ensure a reduction in income inequality and bipolarization for both exogenous and endogenous income scenarios. Commodity taxation is “superfluous” in the case of exogenous income, as any post-tax income distribution achievable through a mixed tax system can be replicated by income taxation alone. In contrast, when income is endogenous, there are cases where relying solely on income taxation is ineffective, while mixed tax structures have equalizing and depolarizing potential.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 128-145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142701105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-04DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.003
Sumit Goel , Wade Hann-Caruthers
We study a principal–agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. The principal must choose exactly one of projects, each defined by the utility it provides to the principal and to the agent. The agent knows all the utilities, and the principal can commit to a mechanism (without transfers) that maps the agent’s report about the utilities to a chosen project. Unlike the typical literature, which assumes the agent can lie arbitrarily, we examine the principal’s problem under partial verifiability constraints. We characterize the class of truthful mechanisms under a family of partial verifiability constraints and study the principal’s problem for the specific cases of no-overselling and no-underselling. Our results suggest significant benefits for the principal from identifying or inducing such partial verifiability constraints, while also highlighting the simple mechanisms that perform well.
我们研究的是一个信息不对称的委托代理项目选择问题。委托人必须从 N 个项目中准确地选择一个，每个项目由它为委托人和代理人提供的效用所决定。代理人知道所有的效用，而委托人可以承诺采用一种机制（无需转让），将代理人关于效用的报告映射到所选项目上。与假定代理人可以任意撒谎的典型文献不同，我们研究的是部分可验证性约束下的委托人问题。我们描述了一系列部分可验证性约束条件下的真实机制，并研究了无过度销售和无遗漏销售等特定情况下的委托人问题。我们的结果表明，识别或诱导这类部分可验证性约束对委托人大有裨益，同时也强调了表现良好的简单机制。
{"title":"Project selection with partially verifiable information","authors":"Sumit Goel , Wade Hann-Caruthers","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a principal–agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. The principal must choose exactly one of <span><math><mi>N</mi></math></span> projects, each defined by the utility it provides to the principal and to the agent. The agent knows all the utilities, and the principal can commit to a mechanism (without transfers) that maps the agent’s report about the utilities to a chosen project. Unlike the typical literature, which assumes the agent can lie arbitrarily, we examine the principal’s problem under partial verifiability constraints. We characterize the class of truthful mechanisms under a family of partial verifiability constraints and study the principal’s problem for the specific cases of no-overselling and no-underselling. Our results suggest significant benefits for the principal from identifying or inducing such partial verifiability constraints, while also highlighting the simple mechanisms that perform well.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 105-113"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142662081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-28DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.002
Shurojit Chatterji , Peng Liu
A common practice in dealing with the allocation of indivisible objects is to treat them as infinitely divisible and specify a fractional allocation, which is then implemented as a lottery on integer allocations that are feasible. The question we study is whether an arbitrary fractional allocation can be decomposed as a lottery on an arbitrary set of feasible integer allocations. The main result is a characterization of decomposable fractional allocations, that is obtained by transforming the decomposability problem into a maximum flow problem. We also provide a separate necessary condition for decomposability.
{"title":"On the decomposability of fractional allocations","authors":"Shurojit Chatterji , Peng Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A common practice in dealing with the allocation of indivisible objects is to treat them as infinitely divisible and specify a fractional allocation, which is then implemented as a lottery on integer allocations that are feasible. The question we study is whether an arbitrary fractional allocation can be decomposed as a lottery on an arbitrary set of feasible integer allocations. The main result is a characterization of decomposable fractional allocations, that is obtained by transforming the decomposability problem into a maximum flow problem. We also provide a separate necessary condition for decomposability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 79-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142571650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a novel family of node centralities in social networks, named family of position centralities, which explicitly takes into account the importance of the links to assess the centrality of the nodes that support them through the Position value (Meessen, 1988). Our proposal shares with the family of Myerson centralities (Gómez et al., 2003) that it is a game-theoretic family of measures that allows to consider the functionality of the network modelled by a symmetric cooperative game. We prove that, like the Myerson centrality measures, every Position centrality measure also satisfies essential properties expected of a centrality measure. We analyse in detail the main differences between the Myerson and the position families of centrality measures. Specifically, we study the differences regarding the connection structures that share dividends and the fairness and stability properties. Along this analysis we consider the case of hub-and-spoke clusters, a prevalent model for studying transportation networks. Finally, a characterisation of the Position Attachment centrality is given, which is the Position centrality obtained when the functionality of the network is modelled by the attachment game. Some comparisons are made with the Attachment centrality introduced by Skibski et al. (2019), which is the analogue member of the family of Myerson centralities.
{"title":"Node centrality based on its edges importance: The Position centrality","authors":"Susana López , Elisenda Molina , Martha Saboyá , Juan Tejada","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a novel family of node centralities in social networks, named <em>family of position centralities</em>, which explicitly takes into account the importance of the links to assess the centrality of the nodes that support them through the Position value (Meessen, 1988). Our proposal shares with the family of Myerson centralities (Gómez et al., 2003) that it is a game-theoretic family of measures that allows to consider the functionality of the network modelled by a symmetric cooperative game. We prove that, like the Myerson centrality measures, every Position centrality measure also satisfies essential properties expected of a centrality measure. We analyse in detail the main differences between the Myerson and the position families of centrality measures. Specifically, we study the differences regarding the connection structures that share dividends and the fairness and stability properties. Along this analysis we consider the case of hub-and-spoke clusters, a prevalent model for studying transportation networks. Finally, a characterisation of the Position Attachment centrality is given, which is the Position centrality obtained when the functionality of the network is modelled by the attachment game. Some comparisons are made with the Attachment centrality introduced by Skibski et al. (2019), which is the analogue member of the family of Myerson centralities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 90-104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142571651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-25DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.006
Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, Isabel Melguizo-López
We investigate an interesting type of equilibrium of a game where a collective decision is reached by aggregating the preferred alternatives of a group of Receivers. A Sender that cares about the collective decision must make efforts (not below a normative-minimum) to gather evidence relevant for the Receivers to gauge their preferred alternatives. Research efforts may be unsuccessful, which allows for strategic concealment. Each Receiver cares only about her preferred alternative so that the goal of the Sender is achieved by affecting the beliefs of a single representative Receiver (e.g., pivotal voter). Disagreement between the players about the best alternative is based solely on heterogeneous priors. The type of equilibrium that we study arises when the Sender and the representative Receiver agree based on their priors but disagree based on some evidence. In such situations, while unfavorable evidence is concealed always, both disclosure and concealment of favorable evidence may happen with positive probability. Interestingly, for sufficiently low normative-minimum efforts, there arises a continuum of equilibria in which the Sender discloses favorable evidence with higher probability.
{"title":"Evidence disclosure with heterogeneous priors","authors":"Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, Isabel Melguizo-López","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate an interesting type of equilibrium of a game where a collective decision is reached by aggregating the preferred alternatives of a group of Receivers. A Sender that cares about the collective decision must make efforts (not below a normative-minimum) to gather evidence relevant for the Receivers to gauge their preferred alternatives. Research efforts may be unsuccessful, which allows for strategic concealment. Each Receiver cares only about her preferred alternative so that the goal of the Sender is achieved by affecting the beliefs of a single representative Receiver (e.g., pivotal voter). Disagreement between the players about the best alternative is based solely on heterogeneous priors. The type of equilibrium that we study arises when the Sender and the representative Receiver agree based on their priors but disagree based on some evidence. In such situations, while unfavorable evidence is concealed always, both disclosure and concealment of favorable evidence may happen with positive probability. Interestingly, for sufficiently low normative-minimum efforts, there arises a continuum of equilibria in which the Sender discloses favorable evidence with higher probability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 69-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142357876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-18DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005
Benjamin Bachi, Shiran Rachmilevitch
We introduce a new solution concept for -person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.
我们为 n 人策略博弈引入了一个新的解概念--极弱优势，它比普通的弱优势弱，但比纳什均衡强。这个概念的一个吸引人的特点是，它可以为存在弱支配策略的博弈提供直观的预测，但这些策略似乎并不吸引人。
{"title":"Very weakly dominant strategies","authors":"Benjamin Bachi, Shiran Rachmilevitch","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a new solution concept for <span><math><mi>n</mi></math></span>-person strategic games — <em>very weak dominance</em> — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 75-78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142526127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-17DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.004
Abhimanyu Khan , Ronald Peeters
We develop a framework to analyse stable cartelisation when firms can form multiple cartels. This contrasts with the existing literature which generally assumes, without further justification, that at most one cartel may form. We define cartelisation to be stable in the multiple cartels framework if: (i) a firm in a cartel does not find it more profitable to leave the cartel and operate independently, (ii) a firm that operates independently does not find it more profitable to join an existing cartel, (iii) a firm in a cartel does not find it more profitable to join another existing cartel or form a new cartel with an independent firm, and (iv) two independent firms do not find it more profitable to form a new cartel. In the context of quantity competition in differentiated markets, we show that a single cartel is never stable whenever multiple cartels may be formed. We completely characterise the stable cartelisation structure — there is at most one firm that is not a part of any cartel while each of the remaining firms is part of a two-firm cartel. The implication for competition policy is that efforts towards the detection of cartels should also be directed at smaller cartels that may operate in less concentrated markets rather than only on large dominant cartels in concentrated markets.
{"title":"Stable cartel configurations and product differentiation: The case of multiple cartels","authors":"Abhimanyu Khan , Ronald Peeters","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a framework to analyse stable cartelisation when firms can form multiple cartels. This contrasts with the existing literature which generally assumes, without further justification, that at most one cartel may form. We define cartelisation to be stable in the multiple cartels framework if: (i) a firm in a cartel does not find it more profitable to leave the cartel and operate independently, (ii) a firm that operates independently does not find it more profitable to join an existing cartel, (iii) a firm in a cartel does not find it more profitable to join another existing cartel or form a new cartel with an independent firm, and (iv) two independent firms do not find it more profitable to form a new cartel. In the context of quantity competition in differentiated markets, we show that a single cartel is never stable whenever multiple cartels may be formed. We completely characterise the stable cartelisation structure — there is at most one firm that is not a part of any cartel while each of the remaining firms is part of a two-firm cartel. The implication for competition policy is that efforts towards the detection of cartels should also be directed at smaller cartels that may operate in less concentrated markets rather than only on large dominant cartels in concentrated markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 57-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000866/pdfft?md5=b025962ed7c1720027752a67cfc7b0f2&pid=1-s2.0-S0165489624000866-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142312918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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