Pub Date : 2024-02-13DOI: 10.1177/00323217241229316
Davide Angelucci, Luca Carrieri, Marco Improta
Previous studies have extensively demonstrated that young people vote less than older ones. However, the magnitude of this age-related gap varies across different contexts: While in some countries, the gap is remarkable and increasing over time, in others, it is quite modest, and it has remained constant. This article investigates some of the factors that might explain this variability. In particular, it examines the impact of different types of representation (descriptive and substantive) on the age-related gap in turnout. It does so by relying on a dataset that combines individual-level data with information concerning the age composition of national parliaments and party system emphasis on specific issues. Overall, the dataset covers 57 elections and 19 West European countries. Results show that when young people are descriptively represented, the age-related gap in turnout is significantly reduced. The same effect occurs when party systems place relatively more emphasis on postmaterialist issues.
{"title":"‘No Participation Without Representation’: The Impact of Descriptive and Substantive Representation on the Age-Related Turnout Gap","authors":"Davide Angelucci, Luca Carrieri, Marco Improta","doi":"10.1177/00323217241229316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241229316","url":null,"abstract":"Previous studies have extensively demonstrated that young people vote less than older ones. However, the magnitude of this age-related gap varies across different contexts: While in some countries, the gap is remarkable and increasing over time, in others, it is quite modest, and it has remained constant. This article investigates some of the factors that might explain this variability. In particular, it examines the impact of different types of representation (descriptive and substantive) on the age-related gap in turnout. It does so by relying on a dataset that combines individual-level data with information concerning the age composition of national parliaments and party system emphasis on specific issues. Overall, the dataset covers 57 elections and 19 West European countries. Results show that when young people are descriptively represented, the age-related gap in turnout is significantly reduced. The same effect occurs when party systems place relatively more emphasis on postmaterialist issues.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139781703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-13DOI: 10.1177/00323217241229316
Davide Angelucci, Luca Carrieri, Marco Improta
Previous studies have extensively demonstrated that young people vote less than older ones. However, the magnitude of this age-related gap varies across different contexts: While in some countries, the gap is remarkable and increasing over time, in others, it is quite modest, and it has remained constant. This article investigates some of the factors that might explain this variability. In particular, it examines the impact of different types of representation (descriptive and substantive) on the age-related gap in turnout. It does so by relying on a dataset that combines individual-level data with information concerning the age composition of national parliaments and party system emphasis on specific issues. Overall, the dataset covers 57 elections and 19 West European countries. Results show that when young people are descriptively represented, the age-related gap in turnout is significantly reduced. The same effect occurs when party systems place relatively more emphasis on postmaterialist issues.
{"title":"‘No Participation Without Representation’: The Impact of Descriptive and Substantive Representation on the Age-Related Turnout Gap","authors":"Davide Angelucci, Luca Carrieri, Marco Improta","doi":"10.1177/00323217241229316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241229316","url":null,"abstract":"Previous studies have extensively demonstrated that young people vote less than older ones. However, the magnitude of this age-related gap varies across different contexts: While in some countries, the gap is remarkable and increasing over time, in others, it is quite modest, and it has remained constant. This article investigates some of the factors that might explain this variability. In particular, it examines the impact of different types of representation (descriptive and substantive) on the age-related gap in turnout. It does so by relying on a dataset that combines individual-level data with information concerning the age composition of national parliaments and party system emphasis on specific issues. Overall, the dataset covers 57 elections and 19 West European countries. Results show that when young people are descriptively represented, the age-related gap in turnout is significantly reduced. The same effect occurs when party systems place relatively more emphasis on postmaterialist issues.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139841633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-12DOI: 10.1177/00323217241228456
C. Knotz, Alyssa M Taylor, Mia K. Gandenberger, Juliana Chueri
Why do people oppose granting social rights to immigrants? Previous research indicates that psychological predispositions such as authoritarianism or ethnocentrism are strong drivers, but our understanding of their roles is still incomplete. This is in part because studies have not yet systematically tested different psychological variables against other, but also in part because some other potentially important predispositions such as implicit bias and social dominance orientation have so far been overlooked. We address this gap using original data from survey experiments conducted in six countries (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). We find consistent effects of ethnocentrism and social dominance orientation, a less robust effect of authoritarianism and no effect of implicit bias. In substantive terms, we find that a belief in ethnocentric stereotypes and a desire for dominance are the central factors driving opposition to immigrants’ social rights.
{"title":"What Drives Opposition to Social Rights for Immigrants? Clarifying the Role of Psychological Predispositions","authors":"C. Knotz, Alyssa M Taylor, Mia K. Gandenberger, Juliana Chueri","doi":"10.1177/00323217241228456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241228456","url":null,"abstract":"Why do people oppose granting social rights to immigrants? Previous research indicates that psychological predispositions such as authoritarianism or ethnocentrism are strong drivers, but our understanding of their roles is still incomplete. This is in part because studies have not yet systematically tested different psychological variables against other, but also in part because some other potentially important predispositions such as implicit bias and social dominance orientation have so far been overlooked. We address this gap using original data from survey experiments conducted in six countries (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). We find consistent effects of ethnocentrism and social dominance orientation, a less robust effect of authoritarianism and no effect of implicit bias. In substantive terms, we find that a belief in ethnocentric stereotypes and a desire for dominance are the central factors driving opposition to immigrants’ social rights.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139783597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-12DOI: 10.1177/00323217241228456
C. Knotz, Alyssa M Taylor, Mia K. Gandenberger, Juliana Chueri
Why do people oppose granting social rights to immigrants? Previous research indicates that psychological predispositions such as authoritarianism or ethnocentrism are strong drivers, but our understanding of their roles is still incomplete. This is in part because studies have not yet systematically tested different psychological variables against other, but also in part because some other potentially important predispositions such as implicit bias and social dominance orientation have so far been overlooked. We address this gap using original data from survey experiments conducted in six countries (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). We find consistent effects of ethnocentrism and social dominance orientation, a less robust effect of authoritarianism and no effect of implicit bias. In substantive terms, we find that a belief in ethnocentric stereotypes and a desire for dominance are the central factors driving opposition to immigrants’ social rights.
{"title":"What Drives Opposition to Social Rights for Immigrants? Clarifying the Role of Psychological Predispositions","authors":"C. Knotz, Alyssa M Taylor, Mia K. Gandenberger, Juliana Chueri","doi":"10.1177/00323217241228456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241228456","url":null,"abstract":"Why do people oppose granting social rights to immigrants? Previous research indicates that psychological predispositions such as authoritarianism or ethnocentrism are strong drivers, but our understanding of their roles is still incomplete. This is in part because studies have not yet systematically tested different psychological variables against other, but also in part because some other potentially important predispositions such as implicit bias and social dominance orientation have so far been overlooked. We address this gap using original data from survey experiments conducted in six countries (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). We find consistent effects of ethnocentrism and social dominance orientation, a less robust effect of authoritarianism and no effect of implicit bias. In substantive terms, we find that a belief in ethnocentric stereotypes and a desire for dominance are the central factors driving opposition to immigrants’ social rights.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139843412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-05DOI: 10.1177/00323217231224971
Michael Kumove
Is generalised trust stable or changeable? The ‘cultural’ theory argues that trust is a relatively fixed personality trait, while the ‘experiential’ theory contends that life experiences can alter trust during adulthood. But these two theories have been tested using a variety of different criteria whose differences have seemingly never been acknowledged explicitly. In this article, I map out these five different criteria, formulating specific hypotheses for each one and test them on a large and representative longitudinal data set from Australia. As expected, both the cultural and experiential theories appear broadly correct: trust is affected by both early-life factors and adult experiences, but the impact of adult experiences is usually transitory. A broad range of adult experiences seem to affect trust, and trust exhibits high rank-order but low mean-level stability. I conclude by suggesting some new directions for the study of generalised trust.
{"title":"Take Five? Testing the Cultural and Experiential Theories of Generalised Trust Against Five Criteria","authors":"Michael Kumove","doi":"10.1177/00323217231224971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231224971","url":null,"abstract":"Is generalised trust stable or changeable? The ‘cultural’ theory argues that trust is a relatively fixed personality trait, while the ‘experiential’ theory contends that life experiences can alter trust during adulthood. But these two theories have been tested using a variety of different criteria whose differences have seemingly never been acknowledged explicitly. In this article, I map out these five different criteria, formulating specific hypotheses for each one and test them on a large and representative longitudinal data set from Australia. As expected, both the cultural and experiential theories appear broadly correct: trust is affected by both early-life factors and adult experiences, but the impact of adult experiences is usually transitory. A broad range of adult experiences seem to affect trust, and trust exhibits high rank-order but low mean-level stability. I conclude by suggesting some new directions for the study of generalised trust.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139864781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-05DOI: 10.1177/00323217231224971
Michael Kumove
Is generalised trust stable or changeable? The ‘cultural’ theory argues that trust is a relatively fixed personality trait, while the ‘experiential’ theory contends that life experiences can alter trust during adulthood. But these two theories have been tested using a variety of different criteria whose differences have seemingly never been acknowledged explicitly. In this article, I map out these five different criteria, formulating specific hypotheses for each one and test them on a large and representative longitudinal data set from Australia. As expected, both the cultural and experiential theories appear broadly correct: trust is affected by both early-life factors and adult experiences, but the impact of adult experiences is usually transitory. A broad range of adult experiences seem to affect trust, and trust exhibits high rank-order but low mean-level stability. I conclude by suggesting some new directions for the study of generalised trust.
{"title":"Take Five? Testing the Cultural and Experiential Theories of Generalised Trust Against Five Criteria","authors":"Michael Kumove","doi":"10.1177/00323217231224971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231224971","url":null,"abstract":"Is generalised trust stable or changeable? The ‘cultural’ theory argues that trust is a relatively fixed personality trait, while the ‘experiential’ theory contends that life experiences can alter trust during adulthood. But these two theories have been tested using a variety of different criteria whose differences have seemingly never been acknowledged explicitly. In this article, I map out these five different criteria, formulating specific hypotheses for each one and test them on a large and representative longitudinal data set from Australia. As expected, both the cultural and experiential theories appear broadly correct: trust is affected by both early-life factors and adult experiences, but the impact of adult experiences is usually transitory. A broad range of adult experiences seem to affect trust, and trust exhibits high rank-order but low mean-level stability. I conclude by suggesting some new directions for the study of generalised trust.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139804684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-03DOI: 10.1177/00323217231224579
Juan Pérez-Rajó
Populism and affective polarization speak of a bisected society, and scholars have linked them at the party level. While the relationship between populism and affective polarization can be reciprocal, this article leverages panel data to delve into the causal relationship between populism and affective polarization. First, I posit individuals who become identified with populist parties will hold higher levels of affective polarization. Second, I expect increases in levels of populist attitudes to heighten affective polarization, and this is explained by both the increase of affect towards the ingroup and the decrease of affect towards the outgroup. Using nine waves of a panel survey, results show the importance of differentiating between measures of populism at the individual level, as the increase in populist attitudes appears to fuel affective polarization, symmetrically increasing affect towards the ingroup and decreasing affect towards the outgroup, while the effect of becoming a populist party supporter is more nuanced, as it is different for populist left and right parties.
{"title":"Does Populism Fuel Affective Polarization? An Individual-Level Panel Data Analysis","authors":"Juan Pérez-Rajó","doi":"10.1177/00323217231224579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231224579","url":null,"abstract":"Populism and affective polarization speak of a bisected society, and scholars have linked them at the party level. While the relationship between populism and affective polarization can be reciprocal, this article leverages panel data to delve into the causal relationship between populism and affective polarization. First, I posit individuals who become identified with populist parties will hold higher levels of affective polarization. Second, I expect increases in levels of populist attitudes to heighten affective polarization, and this is explained by both the increase of affect towards the ingroup and the decrease of affect towards the outgroup. Using nine waves of a panel survey, results show the importance of differentiating between measures of populism at the individual level, as the increase in populist attitudes appears to fuel affective polarization, symmetrically increasing affect towards the ingroup and decreasing affect towards the outgroup, while the effect of becoming a populist party supporter is more nuanced, as it is different for populist left and right parties.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139867531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-03DOI: 10.1177/00323217231224579
Juan Pérez-Rajó
Populism and affective polarization speak of a bisected society, and scholars have linked them at the party level. While the relationship between populism and affective polarization can be reciprocal, this article leverages panel data to delve into the causal relationship between populism and affective polarization. First, I posit individuals who become identified with populist parties will hold higher levels of affective polarization. Second, I expect increases in levels of populist attitudes to heighten affective polarization, and this is explained by both the increase of affect towards the ingroup and the decrease of affect towards the outgroup. Using nine waves of a panel survey, results show the importance of differentiating between measures of populism at the individual level, as the increase in populist attitudes appears to fuel affective polarization, symmetrically increasing affect towards the ingroup and decreasing affect towards the outgroup, while the effect of becoming a populist party supporter is more nuanced, as it is different for populist left and right parties.
{"title":"Does Populism Fuel Affective Polarization? An Individual-Level Panel Data Analysis","authors":"Juan Pérez-Rajó","doi":"10.1177/00323217231224579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231224579","url":null,"abstract":"Populism and affective polarization speak of a bisected society, and scholars have linked them at the party level. While the relationship between populism and affective polarization can be reciprocal, this article leverages panel data to delve into the causal relationship between populism and affective polarization. First, I posit individuals who become identified with populist parties will hold higher levels of affective polarization. Second, I expect increases in levels of populist attitudes to heighten affective polarization, and this is explained by both the increase of affect towards the ingroup and the decrease of affect towards the outgroup. Using nine waves of a panel survey, results show the importance of differentiating between measures of populism at the individual level, as the increase in populist attitudes appears to fuel affective polarization, symmetrically increasing affect towards the ingroup and decreasing affect towards the outgroup, while the effect of becoming a populist party supporter is more nuanced, as it is different for populist left and right parties.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139807919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-02DOI: 10.1177/00323217231224964
Hannah Salamon
Numerous studies suggest a relationship between women’s political representation and improved environmental outcomes. Yet, the contexts in which this holds and the mechanisms through which it comes to be remain understudied. This study proposes that women’s impact on political commitments to environmentalism and policy outcomes are moderated by states’ corruption levels. Although women tend to be more environmental, left-leaning, and risk-averse than men, environments of high-corruption restrain, tokenize, and marginalize women representatives, thereby limiting the impact they may have on environmental governance. Time-series cross-sectional analyses of 58 democracies across 15 years show women’s representation is correlated with better environmental outputs and outcomes, but only when corruption levels are low. These findings help broaden our understanding of the relationship between representation and environmental politics and suggest that the interaction of both integrity and inclusivity in governments holds a key to fighting climate change.
{"title":"The “Women’s Representation-Corruption Link” and Environmentalism: A Cross-National Study","authors":"Hannah Salamon","doi":"10.1177/00323217231224964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231224964","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous studies suggest a relationship between women’s political representation and improved environmental outcomes. Yet, the contexts in which this holds and the mechanisms through which it comes to be remain understudied. This study proposes that women’s impact on political commitments to environmentalism and policy outcomes are moderated by states’ corruption levels. Although women tend to be more environmental, left-leaning, and risk-averse than men, environments of high-corruption restrain, tokenize, and marginalize women representatives, thereby limiting the impact they may have on environmental governance. Time-series cross-sectional analyses of 58 democracies across 15 years show women’s representation is correlated with better environmental outputs and outcomes, but only when corruption levels are low. These findings help broaden our understanding of the relationship between representation and environmental politics and suggest that the interaction of both integrity and inclusivity in governments holds a key to fighting climate change.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139809859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-02DOI: 10.1177/00323217231224964
Hannah Salamon
Numerous studies suggest a relationship between women’s political representation and improved environmental outcomes. Yet, the contexts in which this holds and the mechanisms through which it comes to be remain understudied. This study proposes that women’s impact on political commitments to environmentalism and policy outcomes are moderated by states’ corruption levels. Although women tend to be more environmental, left-leaning, and risk-averse than men, environments of high-corruption restrain, tokenize, and marginalize women representatives, thereby limiting the impact they may have on environmental governance. Time-series cross-sectional analyses of 58 democracies across 15 years show women’s representation is correlated with better environmental outputs and outcomes, but only when corruption levels are low. These findings help broaden our understanding of the relationship between representation and environmental politics and suggest that the interaction of both integrity and inclusivity in governments holds a key to fighting climate change.
{"title":"The “Women’s Representation-Corruption Link” and Environmentalism: A Cross-National Study","authors":"Hannah Salamon","doi":"10.1177/00323217231224964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231224964","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous studies suggest a relationship between women’s political representation and improved environmental outcomes. Yet, the contexts in which this holds and the mechanisms through which it comes to be remain understudied. This study proposes that women’s impact on political commitments to environmentalism and policy outcomes are moderated by states’ corruption levels. Although women tend to be more environmental, left-leaning, and risk-averse than men, environments of high-corruption restrain, tokenize, and marginalize women representatives, thereby limiting the impact they may have on environmental governance. Time-series cross-sectional analyses of 58 democracies across 15 years show women’s representation is correlated with better environmental outputs and outcomes, but only when corruption levels are low. These findings help broaden our understanding of the relationship between representation and environmental politics and suggest that the interaction of both integrity and inclusivity in governments holds a key to fighting climate change.","PeriodicalId":51379,"journal":{"name":"Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139869843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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