Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2227639
A. Schwenkenbecher
{"title":"The Meaning of Terrorism","authors":"A. Schwenkenbecher","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2227639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2227639","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47035021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-16DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2225527
James L. D. Brown
Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter . This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic ’ s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal o ff ers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative.
{"title":"On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter","authors":"James L. D. Brown","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2225527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2225527","url":null,"abstract":"Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter . This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic ’ s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal o ff ers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41583762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-16DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2243622
Justin Mendelow
: Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom’s characterisation of the structural/non -structural distinction proposed in his Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism and further work. I argue that from Pereboo m’s characterisation of structural and non-structural properties, one can formulate general metaphysical principles concerning what structural and non-structural properties necessitate. These principles undermine the claim that non-structural properties – either alone or in combination with structural properties – necessitate phenomenal properties. Moreover, these principles are not affected by our supposed inability to conceive of non-structural properties in a manner conducive to the success of conceivability arguments.
{"title":"Russellian Monism and Ignorance of Non-structural Properties","authors":"Justin Mendelow","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2243622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2243622","url":null,"abstract":": Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom’s characterisation of the structural/non -structural distinction proposed in his Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism and further work. I argue that from Pereboo m’s characterisation of structural and non-structural properties, one can formulate general metaphysical principles concerning what structural and non-structural properties necessitate. These principles undermine the claim that non-structural properties – either alone or in combination with structural properties – necessitate phenomenal properties. Moreover, these principles are not affected by our supposed inability to conceive of non-structural properties in a manner conducive to the success of conceivability arguments.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45064200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-23DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2226687
Allison Aitken
There ’ s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, M ā dhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Ś r ī gupta (seventh – eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an unfounded illusion. In this paper, I present an analysis of Ś r ī gupta ’ s ‘ neither-one-nor-many argument ’ against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of uni fi ed consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.
{"title":"A Case Against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology","authors":"Allison Aitken","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2226687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2226687","url":null,"abstract":"There ’ s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, M ā dhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Ś r ī gupta (seventh – eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an unfounded illusion. In this paper, I present an analysis of Ś r ī gupta ’ s ‘ neither-one-nor-many argument ’ against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of uni fi ed consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44584639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-09DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2231953
Christian Alafaci
{"title":"Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics","authors":"Christian Alafaci","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2231953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2231953","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46507723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2243966
Elanor Taylor
Reinhard Brandt and many others, that Kant’s anthropology is in fact ‘integrated’ into his critical philosophy (see 246, 15, 252–53), though she remains silent about the details of this integration. A systematic thinker who uses different disciplines to generate different kinds of knowledge is not necessarily a thinker who integrates pragmatic anthropology into critical philosophy. And Waldow’s own discussion of what she calls ‘Kant’s dual-aspect account of character’ (239) would appear to speak more in favor of segregation rather than integration. Despite Kant’s pronouncement in the Preface to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that pragmatic anthropology deals with what humans as free-acting beings make of themselves, or can and should make of themselves, Waldow claims that ‘methodologically, Kant here [viz., in his Anthropology] remains descriptive,’ and that ‘this makes it difficult to see in which sense we are in fact dealing with humans as freely acting agents’ (245). Overall, Experience Embodied is a nuanced and perceptive account of several important but underappreciated aspects of early modern philosophy, and I particularly hope that other authors will further developWaldow’s emphasis on its moral dimension. Yet another virtue of the book is its extensive list of contemporary references. A great deal of excellent work has been done by younger early modern scholars in recent years, and it is nice to see these different efforts brought together in one accessible list. On the negative side, Waldow’s key points are sometimes made a bit too abstractly. But this is after all a philosophy book.
{"title":"Metaphysical Emergence","authors":"Elanor Taylor","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2243966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2243966","url":null,"abstract":"Reinhard Brandt and many others, that Kant’s anthropology is in fact ‘integrated’ into his critical philosophy (see 246, 15, 252–53), though she remains silent about the details of this integration. A systematic thinker who uses different disciplines to generate different kinds of knowledge is not necessarily a thinker who integrates pragmatic anthropology into critical philosophy. And Waldow’s own discussion of what she calls ‘Kant’s dual-aspect account of character’ (239) would appear to speak more in favor of segregation rather than integration. Despite Kant’s pronouncement in the Preface to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that pragmatic anthropology deals with what humans as free-acting beings make of themselves, or can and should make of themselves, Waldow claims that ‘methodologically, Kant here [viz., in his Anthropology] remains descriptive,’ and that ‘this makes it difficult to see in which sense we are in fact dealing with humans as freely acting agents’ (245). Overall, Experience Embodied is a nuanced and perceptive account of several important but underappreciated aspects of early modern philosophy, and I particularly hope that other authors will further developWaldow’s emphasis on its moral dimension. Yet another virtue of the book is its extensive list of contemporary references. A great deal of excellent work has been done by younger early modern scholars in recent years, and it is nice to see these different efforts brought together in one accessible list. On the negative side, Waldow’s key points are sometimes made a bit too abstractly. But this is after all a philosophy book.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49493208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2227642
Cristian Larroulet Philippi
{"title":"Well-Being Measurements and the Linearity Assumption: A Response to Wodak","authors":"Cristian Larroulet Philippi","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2227642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2227642","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49297130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-19DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2217194
J. Baillie
{"title":"Determinism, Death, and Meaning","authors":"J. Baillie","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2217194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2217194","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48468445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-04DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2217185
B. Reece
{"title":"Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good","authors":"B. Reece","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2217185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2217185","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47697540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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