Global Policy最新文献

The People's Republic of China is central to current debates about power shifts in international organisations, but a systematic and comprehensive assessment of China-related shifts has been missing. As Special Issue introduction, this article contributes to addressing this gap and examines whether, how and to what extent China-related power shifts have unfolded at the United Nations (UN) over the last two decades or so. We define power shifts as changes in the ability of actors to shape others' capacities to act and outline a framework that builds on Barnett and Duvall's four power types of compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. Drawing from Special Issue contributions, our analysis covers empirical insights from the UN's three main pillars – peace and security, development and human rights – and paints an uneven picture. Despite continuing Western dominance, China is mobilising more compulsory power means than two decades ago. Chinese attempts to enact institutional power have also increased but mostly unfold in multilateral niches and remain cautious. While China's structural power position has expanded, China-related effects in productive power have so far remained limited and scattered. We conclude with a combined assessment of changes across power types and discuss research and policy implications.

The People's Republic of China views dispatching Chinese talent to international organisations as a key global governance contribution and a means to shape these institutions from within. International posts are competitive to secure, requiring China's concerted effort to place candidates for entry-level professional staff positions. However, less is known about how China is preparing to compete for these international civil service positions. This article examines United Nations (UN) staffing data, as well as Chinese-language academic, policy and media reports to address this research gap and thereby understand better how China is attempting to facilitate an increase in its staffing levels within UN entities. We find China's efforts emphasise preparation of ‘patriots’ who can bring ‘Chinese wisdom’ into the UN, but that efforts to increase staff numbers are still in development. We also note that deploying patriots in the UN civil service is potentially to the detriment of securing posts: patriotism may not translate into bureaucratic skill or expertise and also attracts the attention of other states willing to counter China's staffing efforts. It remains to be seen whether staffing power shifts will be successful and, if so, the extent to which increased representation will benefit China's interests.

Has the deepening of China's involvement with the United Nations (UN) actually led to significant China-related shifts in power at the UN over the last three decades? This article explores this question in relation to the UN's move in the post Cold War era into a period of greater normative ambition that made the protection of the individual central to its efforts to maintain international peace and security. Conceptually, the article utilizes and adapts the four power types put forward by Barnett and Duvall (2005). Empirically, it draws on some core elements of the UN's expanded liberal normative agenda relating to the security of the individual. The article explores Beijing's attempts to revise or reverse the UN's liberal turn, assessing the extent to which China has been able, in the process, to effect a power shift. It concludes that China has had some, but as yet limited, successes. However, Beijing seems set to continue to be associated with the various types of power discussed here to press its case.

What shifts in the extent and patterns of China's blaming are observable at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? This article employs automated content analysis to measure the frequency of blaming by China and other permanent UNSC member states based on a dataset of all speeches (19,623 overall) in the UNSC from January 1995 to May 2022. Furthermore, it uses qualitative text analysis and network analysis to examine the targets of blaming in three different case studies of UN security governance—UN peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia (1998–2008), the UN sanctions regime against North Korea (2007–2017) and the broader peace and security discourse at the UNSC (2008–2018). The study conceptualizes Chinese blaming as a previously unexamined discursive strategy of compulsory power with potential long-term effects on shifts in productive power. However, the results indicate the absence of blaming-related shifts in the discursive space of the UNSC: China's rhetoric in the UNSC, compared with other UNSC members, has remained restrained over time. Variance in blaming behaviour between actors and across bilateral and multilateral settings seems to depend on strategic considerations that assess how to exert power most effectively.

China's financial contributions to the United Nations have increased in tandem with its growing economic might. However, their composition differs from that of other large (Western) contributors, being predominantly made up of mandatory fees and to a much lesser degree of voluntary core and earmarked contributions. What types of power does China seek and exercise through these different funding modalities? This article uses the conceptual power framework developed by Barnett and Duvall to answer this question. We argue that China's UN funding strategy reflects a careful balance between its commitments as a ‘responsible great power’ contributing to multilateralism and its desire to expand its influence within the UN system. We suggest that China exercises compulsory and structural power through assessed contributions and acquires some limited institutional and structural power via voluntary core contributions, while its voluntary earmarked contributions relate, to varying degrees, to all four power types — compulsory, structural, institutional, and productive. We also discuss key reasons behind the limited nature of China's voluntary funding. Based on our analysis, we suggest that the overall increase in China's funding contributes to changes in China's favor but, so far, has not led to more substantive power shifts at the UN.

China's growing human rights abuses have attracted the attention of the United Nations (UN) Special Procedures, a central mechanism of the UN's international human rights monitoring system. In response to this growing scrutiny, Beijing has deployed compulsory power through criticism of particular individuals serving as Special Procedure mandate holders and directed funding toward select mandates that align with China's interests; institutional power with repeated efforts to change the rules governing the work of the Special Procedures; and productive power by, for example, introducing the idea that there is a lack of diversity among those serving in the Special Procedures system. China's forceful language had some impact on particular actors, especially UN staff who sought to avoid Beijing's ire. At the same time, China's overall impact on this part of the UN remains modest as the Special Procedures continue to be able to act independently, have spoken out about China's abuses and the selection process has not been captured by Beijing. While there are other parts of the human rights regime where Beijing is able to shape norms, ideas, and procedures, thus far, the Special Procedures have been able to withstand the PRC's projection of power.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) presents itself as a global laboratory of ideas. In 2022, China became the largest financial contributor to UNESCO at a time when the United States had been absent from the organisation for 4 years. Against this backdrop, a focus on whether or not China has become a more powerful actor within UNESCO is timely and capable of adding a new dimension to the existing body of literature on China's participation in global governance. This paper draws on UNESCO reports and data, as well as interviews with UNESCO officials and Chinese diplomats. Building on Barnett and Duvall's power typology, the article concludes that China's power within UNESCO has increased, yet unevenly. China is regarded as a moderate contributor rather than a challenger to existing power constellations in terms of compulsory power, structural power and productive power. However, China has shaped new industry norms and rules in the professional domain of UNESCO, reflecting institutional power shifts. Moreover, China's mechanisms of indirect influence within UNESCO have shifted towards a strategy referred to as ‘homeland diplomacy’, expanding the range of stakeholders to include experts, private sector entities and universities.

How does Indonesia's positioning in relation to the Russia-Ukraine war shape the country's view on global order? President Joko Widodo or Jokowi visited both Russia and Ukraine in June 2022 in the pretext of brokering peace between the two countries. Indonesia though refrained from taking sides in the Russo-Ukraine war. During his visit, Jokowi stressed the necessity for the war to end. Equally important but of greater significance was his emphasis on the importance of re-establishing the global supply chains of food, fertiliser, and energy. The resumption of these global supply chains would safeguard Indonesia's economic stability. We argue that domestic determinants were influential in moulding Indonesia's policy position which aimed at shaping Global South solidarity into one privileging Indonesia's transactional stance. The country's economic interests were a key driver shaping its response to the Russia-Ukraine war. Furthermore, Indonesia's approach towards the war reflected ‘varied consequentialism’ as cost–benefit analysis plays a significant role.

When international agencies make claims of an “existential threat” to humanity and advocate for urgent action from countries, it should be a safe assumption that they are consistent with their own data. However, a review of the data and evidentiary citations underlying the claims of the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, and the Group of Twenty (G20) reveals a troubling picture in which the stated urgency and burden of infectious disease outbreaks, namely those of pandemic threat, is grossly misrepresented. These discrepancies in key documents and subsequent recitations in pandemic preparedness proposals have significant policy and financial implications. Disproportionate pandemic preparedness based on these false premises risks a significant opportunity cost through unnecessary diversion of financial and political resources away from global health priorities of higher burden. As WHO Member States plan to transform the way international health emergencies are managed at the World Health Assembly in May 2024, there is a crucial need to pause, rethink, and ensure future policy reflects evidence of need.