Global Policy最新文献

The paper analyses a contradiction in the liberal approach to post-war statebuilding. The form of the state is seen to aim for the establishment of a centralised maximalist administration when the state's de jure economic policy makes its revenue dependant on market-generated private sector taxes that are either inadequate or its institutions are part of the reconstruction process. This conflation de facto leads to dependency on official development assistance (ODA), mainly administered through exogenous-to-state agencies that undermine the nascent state's bureaucratic development. The paper introduces the concept of deferred revenue regime and argues that dependency on ODA is one empirical symptom of the contradiction in the liberal approach to statebuilding. Using a high-profile recent example in an instrumental case study, Afghanistan, from 2002 to 2021, the paper develops a diachronic sequencing of significant policy decisions to suggest temporal causality between economic management and ODA dependency, relying on primary data and stylised statistics. The findings contribute to post-war statebuilding, institutionalism and the political economy of aid.

International organizations (IOs) are often criticized for insulated decision-making processes that do not react to the preferences of key stakeholders that are directly affected by them. However, empirical studies probing the degree to which IOs’ policies are aligned with the preferences of such key constituencies are scarce. This paper tackles the gap by studying the case of the World Bank. We argue that congruence with stakeholder preferences increases when recipients have institutional means of participation and decreases when donors restrict the purposes of their funds. We utilize survey data from 269 stakeholder surveys conducted in 114 countries between 2012 and 2022 for our empirical analysis. Our findings carry important implications for the responsiveness of IOs to stakeholders in low- and middle-income countries.

The accountability of market-driven sustainability governance has long been controversial, reflecting the deeply political processes through which accountability contests shape governance transformations. Drawing on illustrative examples from internationally traded agro-commodity sectors in the critical case of Indonesia, this paper examines the contested processes of accountability that have accompanied a recent period of institutional change in sustainability governance. Amidst rising critiques of global certification, there has been a parallel expansion of governance approaches that prioritise capability development over regulatory enforcement and engage more intensively with governments in commodity-producing countries. As alternative governance models gain influence, tensions between competing governance stakeholders and agendas are mirrored and amplified through parallel accountability contests, in which distributional conflicts between global and local stakeholders are intensified by pressures to adopt contentious systems of compliance verification. While accountability gaps associated with contrasting institutional models produce strong pressures for partial institutional convergence, such convergence coexists with new forms of institutional fragmentation, as competition between global and national certification expands to encompass competition with localised capacity-building and jurisdictional approaches. Analysis highlights the often-neglected role of accountability politics in shaping institutional change, while raising pressing questions about the distributional implications of contemporary shifts away from global certification governance models.

This article examines the narratives surrounding Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and beyond. Since the start of the war, Western characterizations of Russia's foreign policy as revanchist and imperialist have been overshadowed by the more successful framing by Russia that its actions were driven by the need to push back on American unipolarity and Western imperialist tendencies. This article examines how the Kremlin's narrative on the war has been embraced by leaders in core BRICS countries, shaping their position vis-à-vis Russia and the war. Drawing on theories of strategic narratives, this article highlights how leaders in China, India, Brazil, and South Africa understand the war and create conditions in which Russia can prosecute its war against a neighbor with their support or acquiescence. The paper concludes with policy recommendations and a brief discussion of why theories of strategic narratives have been underappreciated relative to more standard power-based and materialist explanations of the war's outbreak, scope, and trajectory by scholars of international relations.

Against the backdrop of the polarization created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and growing competition between the US and China, a “battle for the hearts and minds” of the Global South is taking place, with the digital realm serving as a major theater for such a battle. Based on a review of the literature, an analysis of official documents as well as data collected via expert interviews with EU officials, this study delves into the state of the art of EU digital diplomacy toward the Global South, problematizing key concepts and categories; exploring the role of actors, audiences, and messages; and providing some policy recommendations.

Climate migration will be one of the most important challenges in the coming decades, and although many international institutions are beginning to recognise this challenge, there is no coordinator for these efforts. The EU, because of the resources at its disposal and the fact that it is a world leader in the fight against climate change, can play this role. It can also be one of the elements of building and strengthening the EU's partnerships in the international arena, and it could strengthen the flagship political project of recent years, i.e. strategic autonomy. The aim of this article is to analyse the EU agenda and the actions taken so far to prepare the EU and the international community to manage climate migration on a global scale.

This paper analyzes what the geoeconomic tools of the European Union (EU) and China are and examines their nature from a comparative perspective. To this end, a literature review is conducted, accounting for the tools known as geoeconomic, and this is complemented by a content analysis of official documents, which include lesser-known geoeconomic tools. The results indicate that although a similar number of geoeconomic tools have been identified, their salience and nature vary. While the EU's usage of these tools has lately been reactive to external developments and is not very often researched by academics, the Chinese usage takes a proactive stance. The paper concludes by pointing out that the development and relevance of these tools mirrors the systemic rivalry between the EU and China and indicates the geoeconomic shift that is taking place in international relations. Similarly, it also shows that the literature does not address all the geoeconomic tools there are and therefore this paper contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive list of the instruments mentioned.

In this paper, we discuss the literature and consider the historical relationship between growth and a set of poverty-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically extreme monetary poverty, undernutrition, stunting, child mortality, maternal mortality and access to clean water. We then make projections for 2030. We find that it is very likely that global poverty-related SDGs will not be met and by a considerable distance. The implication of this, we argue, is that more emphasis is needed on both policies to raise growth rates (i.e., build productive capacities) and distributive policy measures such as the introduction or expansion of income transfers, and ensuring investments in public goods are sufficient.

The boundaries of knowledge within science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) domains are continuously advancing resulting in dynamic diplomatic applications. These shifting and expanding boundaries have direct implications in foreign policy. However, frontline diplomats have demanding day-to-day priorities that make it difficult to acquire, retain, and employ cutting edge STEM knowledge to advance national interests to their full potential. To aid in this objective, diplomatic institutions utilize STEM domain experts and traditional dissemination routes to support diplomatic personnel in STEM diplomacy issues. Routes commonly used include reports, briefings, trainings, and consultations. However, these routes may not always align with the timelines, workflows, and information systems used by frontline diplomats serving overseas. While many organizations focus on innovation within science diplomacy topics, opportunity also exists in innovation around linking experts with diplomats. Here we examine current linking approaches used to connect STEM experts and information with frontline diplomats to advance national interests. We utilize the US diplomatic network as an example to categorize current information flows and linking approaches. We then provide examples of common, underutilized, and alternative approaches. Our aim is to provide a clearer understanding of common linkages between STEM expert knowledge and frontline diplomats while highlighting potential alternatives.

Euroization is considered as a solution for transition economies or as a step toward later integration into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This article seeks to challenge this conventional trajectory by arguing that a country already participating in the EMU could opt for euroization. Instead of adopting a binary analysis of pros and cons, a moderate perspective is employed, taking into account the specific institutional setup of Eurozone member countries. The aim of this article is to underscore the potential advantages of euroization, positioning it as a strategy that, though limited, can provide greater fiscal policy space.