Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984851
Carlo de Bassa, E. Grillo, Francesco Passarelli
Often foreign countries levy sanctions in the attempt to foment discontent with a hostile government. But sanctions may provoke costly reactions by the leaders of the target country. This paper presents a model in which sanctions exhaust the target country economically and impair its government’s fiscal capacity. Then, an office-motivated leader may find it convenient to default on foreign debt in order to free resources that she can invest to regain internal political support. The default thus becomes a defensive tool to partially dampen the internal political turmoil sanctions generate.
{"title":"Sanctions and incentives to repudiate external debt","authors":"Carlo de Bassa, E. Grillo, Francesco Passarelli","doi":"10.1177/0951629820984851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984851","url":null,"abstract":"Often foreign countries levy sanctions in the attempt to foment discontent with a hostile government. But sanctions may provoke costly reactions by the leaders of the target country. This paper presents a model in which sanctions exhaust the target country economically and impair its government’s fiscal capacity. Then, an office-motivated leader may find it convenient to default on foreign debt in order to free resources that she can invest to regain internal political support. The default thus becomes a defensive tool to partially dampen the internal political turmoil sanctions generate.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"198 - 224"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820984851","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47068108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984850
Chelsea A. Pardini, Ana Espínola‐Arredondo
Previous game-theoretic analyses of the settlement of the United States assume that Indigenous peoples and settler colonizers either engaged in free exchange or total war for land. We reframe the model to consider that violence, including coercion, was present in most of their interactions; that is, we allow for the settler colonizer to engage in coercion to strategically lower their appropriation costs for Indigenous peoples’ lands. We find that the settler strategically uses violence to pay less in exchanges for Indigenous peoples’ lands. In addition, we examine how uncertainty, about whether an agreement can ensure the avoidance of all-out conflict, affects initial violence and resistance. We find that the likelihood of all-out conflict affects settler violence and it critically depends on whether the Indigenous people can seek compensation.
{"title":"Violence, coercion, and settler colonialism","authors":"Chelsea A. Pardini, Ana Espínola‐Arredondo","doi":"10.1177/0951629820984850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984850","url":null,"abstract":"Previous game-theoretic analyses of the settlement of the United States assume that Indigenous peoples and settler colonizers either engaged in free exchange or total war for land. We reframe the model to consider that violence, including coercion, was present in most of their interactions; that is, we allow for the settler colonizer to engage in coercion to strategically lower their appropriation costs for Indigenous peoples’ lands. We find that the settler strategically uses violence to pay less in exchanges for Indigenous peoples’ lands. In addition, we examine how uncertainty, about whether an agreement can ensure the avoidance of all-out conflict, affects initial violence and resistance. We find that the likelihood of all-out conflict affects settler violence and it critically depends on whether the Indigenous people can seek compensation.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"236 - 273"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820984850","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49510745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984848
Jean Guillaume Forand, Gergely Ujhelyi
Many countries place restrictions on the political rights of government workers. This includes limitations on political activities such as taking an active part in political campaigns. Are such restrictions desirable? We present a formal welfare analysis of this question. Bureaucrats’ political activities affect voter perceptions of the government and this can have informational benefits. However, they can also induce policy mistakes and are susceptible to ‘noise’ from some bureaucrats’ innate desire for political expression. When politicians have limited control over bureaucrats and successfully coordinate with voters, bureaucrats’ political activities can be desirable. In most cases, however, banning political activities is optimal.
{"title":"Don’t hatch the messenger? On the desirability of restricting the political activity of bureaucrats","authors":"Jean Guillaume Forand, Gergely Ujhelyi","doi":"10.1177/0951629820984848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984848","url":null,"abstract":"Many countries place restrictions on the political rights of government workers. This includes limitations on political activities such as taking an active part in political campaigns. Are such restrictions desirable? We present a formal welfare analysis of this question. Bureaucrats’ political activities affect voter perceptions of the government and this can have informational benefits. However, they can also induce policy mistakes and are susceptible to ‘noise’ from some bureaucrats’ innate desire for political expression. When politicians have limited control over bureaucrats and successfully coordinate with voters, bureaucrats’ political activities can be desirable. In most cases, however, banning political activities is optimal.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"95 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820984848","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43342243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-30DOI: 10.1177/09516298221081811
Ingela Alger, J. Laslier
This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.
{"title":"Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: Coordination and information aggregation","authors":"Ingela Alger, J. Laslier","doi":"10.1177/09516298221081811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221081811","url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"280 - 312"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47207135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-28DOI: 10.1177/09516298231162047
Nicolas Boccard
Ideally, a representative democracy awards a genuine vote to each adult. We study this issue in competitive democracies with an election model combining district apportionment and proportional representation. Four classic seat allocation rules, including d’Hondt, are reframed as Dutch auctions, allowing important properties to be easily derived. The pros and cons of these methods are stated in terms of economic inequality; Sainte Laguë’s is shown to best carry the genuine vote ideal, both for elections and for apportionment. We next expound the interplay between these two components in generating an inequitable treatment of voters and develop the scale-free index of inequity best fitted to their concern. We apply it to 40 countries for the apportionment of electoral districts. Lastly, we compute the same inequity index for recent parliamentary elections in 80 countries, finding that the majority system mistreats electors, thus putting a ‘price’ on government stability.
{"title":"Electoral inequity","authors":"Nicolas Boccard","doi":"10.1177/09516298231162047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298231162047","url":null,"abstract":"Ideally, a representative democracy awards a genuine vote to each adult. We study this issue in competitive democracies with an election model combining district apportionment and proportional representation. Four classic seat allocation rules, including d’Hondt, are reframed as Dutch auctions, allowing important properties to be easily derived. The pros and cons of these methods are stated in terms of economic inequality; Sainte Laguë’s is shown to best carry the genuine vote ideal, both for elections and for apportionment. We next expound the interplay between these two components in generating an inequitable treatment of voters and develop the scale-free index of inequity best fitted to their concern. We apply it to 40 countries for the apportionment of electoral districts. Lastly, we compute the same inequity index for recent parliamentary elections in 80 countries, finding that the majority system mistreats electors, thus putting a ‘price’ on government stability.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"35 1","pages":"100 - 125"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48473824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-30DOI: 10.1177/0951629820963192
Esther Hauk, Javier Ortega
We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a nation state. Industrialization requires the elites to finance schooling. The implementation of statewide education generates a common national identity, which enables cross-regional production, while regional education does not. We show that statewide education is chosen when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the same elite holds power at both geographical levels. By contrast, a dominant regional elite might prefer regional schooling, even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it is statewide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for five European countries in 1860–1920.
{"title":"Schooling, nation building and industrialization","authors":"Esther Hauk, Javier Ortega","doi":"10.1177/0951629820963192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820963192","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a nation state. Industrialization requires the elites to finance schooling. The implementation of statewide education generates a common national identity, which enables cross-regional production, while regional education does not. We show that statewide education is chosen when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the same elite holds power at both geographical levels. By contrast, a dominant regional elite might prefer regional schooling, even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it is statewide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for five European countries in 1860–1920.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"56 - 94"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820963192","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49655424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-20DOI: 10.1177/0951629820963177
Guillaume Cheikbossian
In this paper, I study the ability of a group of citizens to cooperate against a hegemon in a repeated contest game and where group members and the hegemon have different valuations of the prize. I first consider that group members use grim trigger strategies (GTSs) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a stationary subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size or the heterogeneity in the valuation of the prize increases. In turn, I show that full cooperation within the group can also be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE). However, an increase in group size makes it more difficult to sustain within-group cooperation, but an increase in the relative valuation of the prize by group members still facilitates group cooperation.
{"title":"Group cooperation against a hegemon","authors":"Guillaume Cheikbossian","doi":"10.1177/0951629820963177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820963177","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I study the ability of a group of citizens to cooperate against a hegemon in a repeated contest game and where group members and the hegemon have different valuations of the prize. I first consider that group members use grim trigger strategies (GTSs) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a stationary subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size or the heterogeneity in the valuation of the prize increases. In turn, I show that full cooperation within the group can also be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE). However, an increase in group size makes it more difficult to sustain within-group cooperation, but an increase in the relative valuation of the prize by group members still facilitates group cooperation.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"25 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820963177","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45405168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-15DOI: 10.1177/0951629820963182
M. Griebeler, Roberta Carnelos Resende
Highly fragmented party systems are composed of a large number of political groups, many of which have negligible bargaining power when it comes to negotiations of electoral alliances. Inspired by the Brazilian system—one of the most fragmented in the world—we provide a stylized model of electoral alliances in which there is a competition for the support of the small parties. Two leading parties try to entice a small one by simultaneously offering transfers (e.g. government positions, support in other elections, prestige). Through a first-price sealed-bid auction approach, we can analyze the role of two particular factors in alliance formation, namely pragmatism and ideology. Our findings show that, in equilibrium, the favorite party tends to offer lower transfers than the underdog. Furthermore, the closer the leading and the small parties are in terms of ideology, the smaller the transferred amount. When the ideological closeness between the small party and the underdog is sufficiently large—relative to the favorite—the effect may be strong enough to overcome the electoral advantage of the favorite.
{"title":"A model of electoral alliances in highly fragmented party systems","authors":"M. Griebeler, Roberta Carnelos Resende","doi":"10.1177/0951629820963182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820963182","url":null,"abstract":"Highly fragmented party systems are composed of a large number of political groups, many of which have negligible bargaining power when it comes to negotiations of electoral alliances. Inspired by the Brazilian system—one of the most fragmented in the world—we provide a stylized model of electoral alliances in which there is a competition for the support of the small parties. Two leading parties try to entice a small one by simultaneously offering transfers (e.g. government positions, support in other elections, prestige). Through a first-price sealed-bid auction approach, we can analyze the role of two particular factors in alliance formation, namely pragmatism and ideology. Our findings show that, in equilibrium, the favorite party tends to offer lower transfers than the underdog. Furthermore, the closer the leading and the small parties are in terms of ideology, the smaller the transferred amount. When the ideological closeness between the small party and the underdog is sufficiently large—relative to the favorite—the effect may be strong enough to overcome the electoral advantage of the favorite.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"3 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820963182","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45562220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-16DOI: 10.1177/0951629820956279
C. Stefanadis
I examine some political economy aspects of the capital–labor split. In a game-theoretic general equilibrium model, rent-seekers attempt to appropriate the output of manufacturing firms on the offensive end, while such firms safeguard their income on the defensive end. Then the presence of imperfect property rights is a breeding ground for social conflict and has two indirect consequences. First, it evens out changes in the gross (before-social-conflict) labor and capital shares of total output that are caused by changes in the aggregate factor endowments, leading to more rigid equilibrium factor shares. Second, if social conflict is more labor-intensive than manufacturing, weaker property rights lead to a larger equilibrium labor share.
{"title":"Social conflict, property rights, and the capital–labor split","authors":"C. Stefanadis","doi":"10.1177/0951629820956279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820956279","url":null,"abstract":"I examine some political economy aspects of the capital–labor split. In a game-theoretic general equilibrium model, rent-seekers attempt to appropriate the output of manufacturing firms on the offensive end, while such firms safeguard their income on the defensive end. Then the presence of imperfect property rights is a breeding ground for social conflict and has two indirect consequences. First, it evens out changes in the gross (before-social-conflict) labor and capital shares of total output that are caused by changes in the aggregate factor endowments, leading to more rigid equilibrium factor shares. Second, if social conflict is more labor-intensive than manufacturing, weaker property rights lead to a larger equilibrium labor share.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"582 - 604"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820956279","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42846445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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