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The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems 廉价谈话在集体行动问题中的功效
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-06-12 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819850625
Brenton Kenkel
Incomplete information exacerbates the problems inherent in collective action. Participants cannot efficiently coordinate their actions if they do not know each other’s preferences. I investigate when ordinary communication, or cheap talk, may resolve mutual uncertainty in collective action problems. I find that the efficacy of communication depends critically on the relationship between contributions and the value of the joint project. The incentive barriers to honesty are highest when every contribution increases the project’s value. Participants then have a strict incentive to say whatever would induce others to contribute the most, so cheap talk lacks credibility. By contrast, when contributions may be marginally worthless, such as when the project has no value unless contributions hit a certain threshold, communication may help participants avoid wasted effort. Using these findings, I identify which collective action problems in politics might benefit from communication and which require more expensive solutions to overcome uncertainty.
不完整的信息加剧了集体行动中固有的问题。如果参与者不知道彼此的偏好,他们就无法有效地协调自己的行动。我调查了普通的沟通或廉价的谈话何时可以解决集体行动问题中的相互不确定性。我发现沟通的有效性主要取决于贡献与联合项目价值之间的关系。当每一项贡献都能增加项目价值时,诚实的激励障碍最高。然后,参与者有严格的动机说任何能吸引他人做出最大贡献的话,所以廉价的谈话缺乏可信度。相比之下,当贡献可能微不足道时,例如当项目没有价值时,除非贡献达到一定的阈值,否则沟通可以帮助参与者避免浪费精力。利用这些发现,我确定了政治中哪些集体行动问题可能受益于沟通,哪些需要更昂贵的解决方案来克服不确定性。
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引用次数: 1
A theory of policy sabotage 政策破坏论
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-06-10 DOI: 10.1177/09516298221085974
Alexander V. Hirsch, Jonathan P. Kastellec
We develop a theory of policymaking that examines when policy sabotage—the deliberate choice by an opposition party to interfere with the implementation of a policy—can be an effective electoral strategy, even if rational voters can observe that it is happening. In our model, a potential saboteur chooses whether to sabotage an incumbent’s policy by blocking its successful implementation. A voter then decides whether to retain the incumbent, who is of unknown ability, or to select a challenger. We find that the incentives for sabotage are broadly shaped by the underlying popularity of the incumbent—it is most attractive when an incumbent is somewhat unpopular. If so, sabotage may decrease the probability the incumbent is reelected, even though sabotage is observable to the voter. This is because while the saboteur knows that sabotage will improve the incumbent’s reputation, he fears that absent sabotage a policy success will improve that reputation even more.
我们发展了一种政策制定理论,研究政策破坏——反对党故意选择干预政策的实施——在什么情况下可以成为一种有效的选举策略,即使理性的选民可以观察到它正在发生。在我们的模型中,潜在破坏者选择是否通过阻止现任政策的成功实施来破坏现任政策。然后,选民决定是保留能力未知的现任者,还是选择一位挑战者。我们发现,破坏的动机大体上是由现任者的潜在受欢迎程度决定的——当现任者不太受欢迎时,破坏最具吸引力。如果是这样,破坏可能会降低现任者再次当选的可能性,即使选民可以观察到破坏。这是因为,尽管破坏者知道破坏会提高现任者的声誉,但他担心,如果没有破坏,政策的成功将进一步提高现任者的声誉。
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引用次数: 7
Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy 司法等级制度中的竞争信号
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-06-06 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819850626
Joshua A Strayhorn
Political principals often face information deficits. This is especially true of the US judicial hierarchy; extant theories of ideological monitoring in this setting have therefore explored informational cues such as lower court ideology or dissent. Canonical models of this setting, however, have omitted litigants, implicity assuming they are not an important source of information. This paper develops a formal model that considers whether litigants can credibly signal information about noncompliance, and how litigants’ signals interact with the cues of ideology and dissent. The model shows that litigant signals can be highly informative about doctrinal compliance, sometimes even crowding out the need for other signals. By contrast, litigants face difficulty communicating information about case importance; dissent, however, can be highly informative on this dimension. Accordingly, some informational cues may only influence limited aspects of the high court’s case selection process.
政治负责人经常面临信息不足的问题。美国的司法等级制度尤其如此;因此,在这种背景下,现存的意识形态监督理论探索了诸如下级法院意识形态或异议等信息线索。然而,这种情况下的典型模型忽略了诉讼当事人,隐含地假设他们不是重要的信息来源。本文开发了一个形式模型,考虑诉讼当事人是否能够可信地发出关于不遵守的信息,以及诉讼当事人的信号如何与意识形态和异议的线索相互作用。该模型表明,诉讼信号可以提供关于理论合规性的高度信息,有时甚至会排除对其他信号的需求。相比之下,诉讼当事人在沟通案件重要性信息方面面临困难;然而,不同意见在这一方面可能会提供大量信息。因此,一些信息线索可能只会影响高等法院案件选择过程的有限方面。
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引用次数: 1
The stability of multi-level governments 多层次政府的稳定性
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-05-24 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984852
Enriqueta Aragonès, C. Ponsati
This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity.
本文研究了多层次政府的稳定性问题。我们分析了领导两级政府的两位政治家之间的广泛形式游戏。我们描述了使这种政府结构稳定的条件。我们还表明,如果领导人关心选举租金,而不同级别选民的偏好不一致,那么分散的政府结构可能是不可持续的。这一结果令人困惑,因为从规范的角度来看,当不同的地区选区表现出偏好异质性时,通过多级政府结构进行分散决策的最优性才是相关的。
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引用次数: 0
Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 31.2 JTP第31.2期编辑简介
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-04-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819843372
Torun Dewan, John W. Patty
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引用次数: 0
A dynamic model of party membership and ideologies 党员和意识形态的动态模型
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-03-19 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819833185
Bilge Ozturk Goktuna
We analyze the one-dimensional electoral competition between two parties when the ideology of each party is endogenously determined. The parties are composed of two factions: the ‘opportunists’ and the ‘militants’. The ideology of each party is determined by the preferences of the median citizen supporting the party. Under the proportional system, where parties are represented proportionally to the share of their votes, we first study the short-term political equilibria. We then introduce a dynamic setup that endogenizes the composition of the parties, in order to analyze the stability of these equilibria. We make explicit the stability conditions for the two equilibria where all the opportunists belong to the same party and for the unique equilibrium where they are distributed between both parties. The conditions involve the rates of party switching and of ideological adjustment. This coupled adjustment process makes it possible for party competition to sustain proportional representation, fluctuation in party positioning, and some degree of policy divergence.
我们分析了当两党意识形态内生决定时,两党之间的一维选举竞争。政党由两个派别组成:“机会主义者”和“激进分子”。每个政党的意识形态是由支持该党的中间公民的偏好决定的。在比例制度下,政党的代表权与其选票份额成比例,我们首先研究短期政治平衡。然后,我们引入了一个内生各方组成的动态设置,以分析这些均衡的稳定性。我们明确了两个均衡的稳定性条件,其中所有机会主义者都属于同一方,而唯一均衡则分布在双方之间。条件包括政党更替率和意识形态调整率。这种耦合的调整过程使政党竞争有可能维持比例代表制、政党定位的波动和一定程度的政策分歧。
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引用次数: 7
A spatial valence model of political participation in China 中国政治参与的空间价态模型
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-03-18 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819833190
Jason Y. Wu
In spatial models of political competition in democracies, citizens vote for the party or candidate that is the closest to their own ideological position, while in valence models, voters decide on the basis of non-policy factors, such as competence. What remains unclear, however, is whether citizens in authoritarian regimes use spatial or valence considerations to guide their decisions to participate in politics. This study uses data from the 2015 Chinese Urban Governance Survey to measure the ideology of Chinese citizens, and estimates an empirical stochastic model to explore how Chinese citizens use ideological distance and valence to determine how they want to participate in politics. The results show that valence issues, such as perceived government competence, play a larger role in political participation than ideology.
在民主政治竞争的空间模型中,公民投票给最接近自己意识形态立场的政党或候选人,而在价态模型中,选民根据能力等非政策因素进行决定。然而,尚不清楚的是,专制政权下的公民是利用空间考虑还是价值考虑来指导他们参与政治的决定。本研究使用2015年中国城市治理调查的数据来衡量中国公民的意识形态,并估计一个经验随机模型来探讨中国公民如何使用意识形态距离和价来决定他们想要如何参与政治。结果显示,效价问题,如对政府能力的感知,在政治参与中比意识形态发挥更大的作用。
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引用次数: 4
Neurocognition and Subjective Experience Following Acute Doses of the Synthetic Cannabinoid JWH-018: Responders Versus Nonresponders. 急性服用合成大麻素 JWH-018 后的神经认知和主观体验:反应者与非反应者。
IF 3.1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-03-13 eCollection Date: 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.1089/can.2018.0047
Eef L Theunissen, Nadia R P W Hutten, Natasha L Mason, Stefan W Toennes, Kim P C Kuypers, Johannes G Ramaekers

Introduction: Synthetic cannabinoid mixtures have been easily accessible for years, leading to the belief that these products were natural and harmless, which contributed to their popularity. Nevertheless, there are many reports of users ending up in hospital due to severe side effects such as tachycardia, aggression, and psychosis. Controlled studies on the effects of synthetic cannabinoids on human performance are lacking. In the present study, we assessed the safety pharmacology of the synthetic cannabinoid JWH-018 after acute administration. Methods: Seventeen healthy cannabis-experienced participants took part in this placebo-controlled, crossover study. Participants inhaled the vapor of JWH-018 (doses ranged between 2 and 6.2 mg) and were subsequently monitored for 12 h, during which vital signs, cognitive performance, and subjective experience were measured. Subjective high scores showed that there is a large variability in the subjective experience of participants. Therefore, a mixed analysis of variance, with "Responder" (i.e., subjective high score >2) as a between-subjects factor and "Drug" as a within-subjects factor (placebo and JWH-018), was used. Results: Serum concentrations of JWH-018 were significantly higher in the responders. Overall, JWH-018 increased heart rate within the first hour and significantly impaired critical tracking and memory performance. Responders to JWH-018 performed more poorly in tests measuring reaction time and showed increased levels of confusion, amnesia, dissociation, derealization, and depersonalization and increased drug liking after JWH-018. Conclusion: JWH-018 administration produced large variability in drug concentrations and subjective experience. Fluctuations in drug delivery probably contributed to the variation in response. JWH-018's impairing effects on cognition and subjective measures were mainly demonstrated in participants who experienced a subjective intoxication of the drug. Lack of control over drug delivery may increase the risk of overdosing in synthetic cannabinoid users.

导言:多年来,合成大麻素混合物一直很容易获得,因此人们相信这些产品是天然无害的,这也是它们大受欢迎的原因之一。然而,有许多报告称,使用者因心动过速、攻击性和精神错乱等严重副作用而最终入院。关于合成大麻素对人体表现的影响,目前还缺乏对照研究。在本研究中,我们评估了合成大麻素 JWH-018 急性给药后的安全药理学。研究方法17 名有大麻经验的健康参与者参加了这项安慰剂对照交叉研究。参与者吸入 JWH-018 的蒸汽(剂量介于 2 至 6.2 毫克之间),随后接受 12 小时的监测,在此期间测量生命体征、认知能力和主观感受。主观高分显示,参与者的主观体验存在很大差异。因此,我们采用了混合方差分析,将 "应答者"(即主观高分>2)作为受试者之间的因子,将 "药物 "作为受试者内部的因子(安慰剂和 JWH-018)。研究结果应答者血清中的 JWH-018 浓度明显更高。总体而言,JWH-018 会在第一小时内增加心率,并严重影响关键追踪和记忆能力。JWH-018反应者在反应时间测试中的表现更差,在服用JWH-018后表现出更高程度的混乱、健忘、分离、去个性化和人格解体,以及更高的药物喜好。结论服用 JWH-018 后,药物浓度和主观感受的变化很大。给药量的波动可能是导致反应变化的原因之一。JWH-018对认知和主观测量的损害作用主要体现在那些主观感受到药物中毒的参与者身上。对给药缺乏控制可能会增加合成大麻素使用者用药过量的风险。
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引用次数: 0
Organizing evaluation: Assessing combat leadership quality 组织评价:评价作战领导素质
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-03-13 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819833177
William A. Wagstaff
What determines military effectiveness? Previous literature has examined factors such as military doctrine, culture, and capabilities, as well as regime type and civil–military relations, but has largely ignored military leadership quality. Competent military leaders positively influence battle outcomes by ensuring proper implementation of battleplans and quick reaction to an increasingly dynamic battlefield. This paper formally models the relationship between high-ranking military commanders and their immediate subordinates to examine the commander’s ability to evaluate her personnel. I vary the ability of the subordinates to signal their commander to determine how different signaling structures influence what commanders may learn. This analysis reveals that commanders opt for less informative signals from subordinates as the military professionalizes, potentially impeding their ability to identify and remove incompetent subordinates. Leaving incompetent subordinates in command reduces the ability of the military to improve. Evidence from the US Army’s leadership decisions after the Battle of Kasserine Pass and Operation Avalanche illustrates these results.
什么决定了军事效能?先前的文献研究了军事学说、文化和能力,以及政权类型和军民关系等因素,但在很大程度上忽视了军事领导素质。有能力的军事领导人通过确保作战计划的正确实施和对日益充满活力的战场的快速反应,积极影响战斗结果。本文对高级军事指挥官及其直属下属之间的关系进行了形式化建模,以检验指挥官评估其人员的能力。我改变下属向指挥官发出信号的能力,以确定不同的信号结构如何影响指挥官可能学到的东西。这项分析表明,随着军队的专业化,指挥官会选择从下属那里获得信息较少的信号,这可能会阻碍他们识别和罢免不称职下属的能力。让不称职的下属担任指挥会降低军队的改进能力。卡塞林山口战役和雪崩行动后,美国陆军领导层的决定证明了这些结果。
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引用次数: 0
What is opposition good for? 反对有什么好处?
IF 1 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Pub Date : 2019-03-11 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819833192
B. Demirkaya
Governments in representative democracies may have incentives to pursue policies that do not align with voters’ preferences. When voters lack information about the policy bias of the government and the consequences of policy alternatives, they will have difficulty holding the government accountable. I propose a formal model that explores whether an opposition party can help solve this problem by providing information about policy alternatives. The model acknowledges that opposition parties may have incentives to mislead voters because of their own policy biases or election concerns. Despite this challenge, the model shows that the presence of an opposition party may induce a biased government to adjust its policies. For this disciplining equilibrium to work, the reputations of the opposition and the government should be close to each other, or the voter should believe that one policy alternative is much more likely to be good for her than another alternative. In addition, the government should be sufficiently concerned about winning the elections, and the opposition should be sufficiently concerned about policy. Under the same conditions, however, misleading information on the opposition may cause an unbiased government to implement policies that are detrimental to voter welfare.
代议制民主国家的政府可能有动机推行与选民偏好不一致的政策。当选民缺乏有关政府政策偏见和政策替代方案后果的信息时,他们将很难追究政府的责任。我提出了一个正式的模型,探讨反对党是否可以通过提供有关政策替代方案的信息来帮助解决这个问题。该模型承认,反对党可能会因为自己的政策偏见或选举担忧而误导选民。尽管存在这一挑战,但该模型表明,反对党的存在可能会导致有偏见的政府调整其政策。为了使这种纪律平衡发挥作用,反对派和政府的声誉应该相互接近,或者选民应该相信一种政策选择比另一种选择更有可能对她有利。此外,政府应该充分关注赢得选举,反对派应该充分关注政策。然而,在同样的条件下,关于反对派的误导性信息可能会导致一个公正的政府实施有损选民福利的政策。
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引用次数: 10
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Journal of Theoretical Politics
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