Pub Date : 2023-06-23DOI: 10.1177/09516298231183640
Benjamin Broman
What is the impact of popular discontent on the transition from indirect to direct rule? The current literature suggests contrasting theories, variously arguing that rulers are more likely to govern directly when facing either a particularly high or particularly low probability of mass resistance. I reconcile these views by arguing that the decision to rule indirectly is subject to competing dilemmas. In a formal model, I show that these twin tensions influence the choice to centralize power in opposing manners. Accordingly, there are two distinct political logics driving direct rule: one resulting from a high likelihood of revolt and the other from a low likelihood, with contrasting comparative statics. The model therefore reconciles contrasting views in the literature. I illustrate the model's logic with reference to key cases and provide heuristics for predicting comparative statics in new empirical settings.
{"title":"Indirect rule and mass threat: Two paths to direct rule","authors":"Benjamin Broman","doi":"10.1177/09516298231183640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298231183640","url":null,"abstract":"What is the impact of popular discontent on the transition from indirect to direct rule? The current literature suggests contrasting theories, variously arguing that rulers are more likely to govern directly when facing either a particularly high or particularly low probability of mass resistance. I reconcile these views by arguing that the decision to rule indirectly is subject to competing dilemmas. In a formal model, I show that these twin tensions influence the choice to centralize power in opposing manners. Accordingly, there are two distinct political logics driving direct rule: one resulting from a high likelihood of revolt and the other from a low likelihood, with contrasting comparative statics. The model therefore reconciles contrasting views in the literature. I illustrate the model's logic with reference to key cases and provide heuristics for predicting comparative statics in new empirical settings.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"35 1","pages":"232 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47122863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-22DOI: 10.1177/09516298231162040
H. Simpson
Legal bias against the poor, and competition from nonstate legal services providers, can both seriously affect state justice provision. But analyses of these factors often fail to incorporate a critical feature of justice systems: states use them for revenue generation. I build a series of formal models to understand how these factors interact. I derive several insights into empirical patterns of bias, competition, access to justice, and legal system viability. First, in poor countries, bias can increase access to justice and legal effectiveness. Second, given competition, poor groups will pay a premium for state-provided justice, while wealthy groups will pay a premium for private dispute resolution. However, losing a poor group to competition is also less costly than losing a wealthy group, and the latter loss can sometimes destroy the viability of the state justice system. These results contribute to our understanding of state capacity and rule of law development.
{"title":"Access to justice in revenue-seeking legal institutions","authors":"H. Simpson","doi":"10.1177/09516298231162040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298231162040","url":null,"abstract":"Legal bias against the poor, and competition from nonstate legal services providers, can both seriously affect state justice provision. But analyses of these factors often fail to incorporate a critical feature of justice systems: states use them for revenue generation. I build a series of formal models to understand how these factors interact. I derive several insights into empirical patterns of bias, competition, access to justice, and legal system viability. First, in poor countries, bias can increase access to justice and legal effectiveness. Second, given competition, poor groups will pay a premium for state-provided justice, while wealthy groups will pay a premium for private dispute resolution. However, losing a poor group to competition is also less costly than losing a wealthy group, and the latter loss can sometimes destroy the viability of the state justice system. These results contribute to our understanding of state capacity and rule of law development.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"35 1","pages":"75 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41667632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-18DOI: 10.1177/09516298221130262
Joshua C. Fjelstul
States create customs unions to accrue consumer welfare gains. Given the incentives to cheat to protect domestic firms from foreign competition, they create regulatory regimes with international courts to manage noncompliance. I develop a formal model that explains how the politics of compliance in regulatory regimes systematically distorts the welfare gains that states accrue from developing customs unions. The model predicts that regulatory regimes are most effective at enforcing compliance (i.e., at reducing trade barriers) in industries with intermediate levels of firm homogeneity in terms of productivity. In highly homogenous industries, regulatory regimes are not effective because noncompliance is minimal enough that litigation is not cost-effective; in highly heterogenous industries, regulatory regimes are not effective because courts, concerned about noncompliance with their rulings, are unlikely to rule against the defendants, deterring the plaintiffs from bringing cases. The model also predicts the downstream consequences for the performance of individual firms and consumer welfare.
{"title":"The political economy of noncompliance in customs unions","authors":"Joshua C. Fjelstul","doi":"10.1177/09516298221130262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221130262","url":null,"abstract":"States create customs unions to accrue consumer welfare gains. Given the incentives to cheat to protect domestic firms from foreign competition, they create regulatory regimes with international courts to manage noncompliance. I develop a formal model that explains how the politics of compliance in regulatory regimes systematically distorts the welfare gains that states accrue from developing customs unions. The model predicts that regulatory regimes are most effective at enforcing compliance (i.e., at reducing trade barriers) in industries with intermediate levels of firm homogeneity in terms of productivity. In highly homogenous industries, regulatory regimes are not effective because noncompliance is minimal enough that litigation is not cost-effective; in highly heterogenous industries, regulatory regimes are not effective because courts, concerned about noncompliance with their rulings, are unlikely to rule against the defendants, deterring the plaintiffs from bringing cases. The model also predicts the downstream consequences for the performance of individual firms and consumer welfare.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"35 1","pages":"31 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46700941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-18DOI: 10.1177/09516298221130261
D. Baron
This paper presents a model in which people sort between two districts based on economic and ideological preferences. People are either ideologues who prefer redistribution over a public good or non-ideologues who prefer a public good that benefits everyone equally. Individuals differ in their productivity with the distribution of productivities the same for both ideologues and non-ideologues. Ideologues back their ideology by working harder when there is redistribution even when not recipients, and non-ideologues work harder when the public good is provided. The tax rate in each district is chosen by majority rule with the median voter theorem identifying the winner. In the focal equilibrium, high productivity ideologues and non-ideologues locate together in a low tax district, and low productivity non-ideologues and ideologues locate together in a high tax district to benefit from redistribution. Middle-income individuals separate with non-ideologues locating in the low tax district and ideologues locating in the high tax district. Ideology thus results in a polarization interval in the middle of the income distribution. If ideology leads to partisanship and a strong party government that chooses the tax rate based on the party median, partisanship widens the polarization interval.
{"title":"Ideological sorting","authors":"D. Baron","doi":"10.1177/09516298221130261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221130261","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a model in which people sort between two districts based on economic and ideological preferences. People are either ideologues who prefer redistribution over a public good or non-ideologues who prefer a public good that benefits everyone equally. Individuals differ in their productivity with the distribution of productivities the same for both ideologues and non-ideologues. Ideologues back their ideology by working harder when there is redistribution even when not recipients, and non-ideologues work harder when the public good is provided. The tax rate in each district is chosen by majority rule with the median voter theorem identifying the winner. In the focal equilibrium, high productivity ideologues and non-ideologues locate together in a low tax district, and low productivity non-ideologues and ideologues locate together in a high tax district to benefit from redistribution. Middle-income individuals separate with non-ideologues locating in the low tax district and ideologues locating in the high tax district. Ideology thus results in a polarization interval in the middle of the income distribution. If ideology leads to partisanship and a strong party government that chooses the tax rate based on the party median, partisanship widens the polarization interval.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"35 1","pages":"3 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46881811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-11DOI: 10.1177/09516298221130265
Tasos Kalandrakis
I establish conditions for existence of pure strategy equilibria in K-candidate Downsian electoral competition (K ≥ 2) with valence when the voting rule is monotonic, generalizing existing results to non-proper rules and possibly continuous electorates. The conditions are sufficient when K ≥ 2 and (essentially) necessary in the K = 2 candidate case. They compare the size of one candidate's valence advantage to the radius of a generalized median pivotal ball (P-ball). I flesh out the difference of this generalized median with a recent alternative which, in turn, I characterize both on the basis of a weaker median property and using pivotal hyperplanes.
{"title":"Generalized medians and electoral competition with valence","authors":"Tasos Kalandrakis","doi":"10.1177/09516298221130265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221130265","url":null,"abstract":"I establish conditions for existence of pure strategy equilibria in K-candidate Downsian electoral competition (K ≥ 2) with valence when the voting rule is monotonic, generalizing existing results to non-proper rules and possibly continuous electorates. The conditions are sufficient when K ≥ 2 and (essentially) necessary in the K = 2 candidate case. They compare the size of one candidate's valence advantage to the radius of a generalized median pivotal ball (P-ball). I flesh out the difference of this generalized median with a recent alternative which, in turn, I characterize both on the basis of a weaker median property and using pivotal hyperplanes.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"35 1","pages":"58 - 71"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65666046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1177/09516298221108346
Ishan Joshi
Little is known about how the scope for deliberation can be compared across different branches of government. Two things need to happen for a consensus to emerge in a particular setting. Crucially, parties must coordinate to facilitate such provisions in the first place. Second, the quality of this coordination must be able to override the other biases of the environment in the long run. A parsimonious framework presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for both of these to happen across different settings—legislatures, bureaucracies, and judiciaries. Complicating matters are intra-group factions that have heterogeneous preferences. Interestingly, even if we assume factions that do not want to compromise outnumber those that do, it is the former that take the lead in solving the coordination problem in equilibrium. A related finding suggested by these comparisons is that as institutional environments become more complex—and move away from purely representative functions—the scope for generating this consensus is enhanced.
{"title":"The evolution of consensus through coordinated action","authors":"Ishan Joshi","doi":"10.1177/09516298221108346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221108346","url":null,"abstract":"Little is known about how the scope for deliberation can be compared across different branches of government. Two things need to happen for a consensus to emerge in a particular setting. Crucially, parties must coordinate to facilitate such provisions in the first place. Second, the quality of this coordination must be able to override the other biases of the environment in the long run. A parsimonious framework presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for both of these to happen across different settings—legislatures, bureaucracies, and judiciaries. Complicating matters are intra-group factions that have heterogeneous preferences. Interestingly, even if we assume factions that do not want to compromise outnumber those that do, it is the former that take the lead in solving the coordination problem in equilibrium. A related finding suggested by these comparisons is that as institutional environments become more complex—and move away from purely representative functions—the scope for generating this consensus is enhanced.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"552 - 588"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45319960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-25DOI: 10.1177/09516298221122094
Anthony Fowler, Kisoo Kim
Partisan voters tend to seek political news from media sources that match their predispositions. Scholars and pundits often attribute this partisan media sorting to psychological biases, and they typically assume that it leads voters to make worse decisions at the ballot box. To reinterpret this evidence and provide an alternative explanation, we develop two formal models of media choice—one in which voters only want to hear good news about their party and another in which voters only care about making good electoral decisions. Both models predict partisan media sorting, so sorting does not constitute evidence that voters are poorly informed or that they are driven by psychological biases. However, the models do produce competing predictions about when voters will consume more or less news and about whether signals from the news should influence vote choices. Reassessing the empirical literature, we find some support for both explanations.
{"title":"An information-based explanation for partisan media sorting","authors":"Anthony Fowler, Kisoo Kim","doi":"10.1177/09516298221122094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221122094","url":null,"abstract":"Partisan voters tend to seek political news from media sources that match their predispositions. Scholars and pundits often attribute this partisan media sorting to psychological biases, and they typically assume that it leads voters to make worse decisions at the ballot box. To reinterpret this evidence and provide an alternative explanation, we develop two formal models of media choice—one in which voters only want to hear good news about their party and another in which voters only care about making good electoral decisions. Both models predict partisan media sorting, so sorting does not constitute evidence that voters are poorly informed or that they are driven by psychological biases. However, the models do produce competing predictions about when voters will consume more or less news and about whether signals from the news should influence vote choices. Reassessing the empirical literature, we find some support for both explanations.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"499 - 526"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49236260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-22DOI: 10.1177/09516298221123263
Mark C. Wilson, B. Grofman
For a two-party electoral competition in a districted legislature, the change in mean vote share for party A from one election to the next is commonly referred to as swing. A key question, highly relevant to election forecasting and the measurement of partisan gerrymandering, is: “How do we expect the swing to be distributed across the districts as a function of previous vote share?”. The literature gives two main answers: uniform swing and proportional swing. Which is better has been unresolved for decades. Here we (a) provide an axiomatic foundation for desirable properties of a model of swing; (b) show axiomatically that using uniform swing or proportional swing is a bad idea, (c) provide a simple swing model that does satisfy the axioms, and (d) show how to integrate a reversion to the mean effect into models swing. We show that all the above models can be expected to work well when (a) elections are close, or (b) when we restrict to data where swing is low, or (c) when we eliminate the cases where the model is most likely to go wrong. We show on a large US Congressional dataset that in addition to its superior axiomatic properties, our new model provides an overall equal or better fit on five indicators: mistakes about directionality of change, mistakes in winner, estimates that are outside the [0..1] bounds, mean-square error, and correlation between actual and predicted values. We recommend replacing the uniform and proportional swing models with the new model.
{"title":"Models of inter-election change in partisan vote share","authors":"Mark C. Wilson, B. Grofman","doi":"10.1177/09516298221123263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221123263","url":null,"abstract":"For a two-party electoral competition in a districted legislature, the change in mean vote share for party A from one election to the next is commonly referred to as swing. A key question, highly relevant to election forecasting and the measurement of partisan gerrymandering, is: “How do we expect the swing to be distributed across the districts as a function of previous vote share?”. The literature gives two main answers: uniform swing and proportional swing. Which is better has been unresolved for decades. Here we (a) provide an axiomatic foundation for desirable properties of a model of swing; (b) show axiomatically that using uniform swing or proportional swing is a bad idea, (c) provide a simple swing model that does satisfy the axioms, and (d) show how to integrate a reversion to the mean effect into models swing. We show that all the above models can be expected to work well when (a) elections are close, or (b) when we restrict to data where swing is low, or (c) when we eliminate the cases where the model is most likely to go wrong. We show on a large US Congressional dataset that in addition to its superior axiomatic properties, our new model provides an overall equal or better fit on five indicators: mistakes about directionality of change, mistakes in winner, estimates that are outside the [0..1] bounds, mean-square error, and correlation between actual and predicted values. We recommend replacing the uniform and proportional swing models with the new model.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"481 - 498"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46134773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-21DOI: 10.1177/09516298221122104
F. Brandt, Marie Matthäus, Christian Saile
Voting paradoxes date back to the origin of social choice theory in the 18th century, when the Chevalier de Borda pointed out that plurality—then and now the most common voting rule—may elect a candidate who loses pairwise majority comparisons against every other candidate. Since then, a large number of similar, seemingly paradoxical, phenomena have been observed in the literature. As it turns out, many paradoxes only materialize under some rather contrived circumstances and require a certain number of voters and candidates. In this paper, we leverage computational optimization techniques to identify the minimal numbers of voters and candidates that are required for the most common voting paradoxes to materialize. The resulting compilation of voting paradoxes may serve as a useful reference to social choice theorists as well as an argument for the deployment of certain rules when the numbers of voters or candidates are severely restricted.
{"title":"Minimal voting paradoxes","authors":"F. Brandt, Marie Matthäus, Christian Saile","doi":"10.1177/09516298221122104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221122104","url":null,"abstract":"Voting paradoxes date back to the origin of social choice theory in the 18th century, when the Chevalier de Borda pointed out that plurality—then and now the most common voting rule—may elect a candidate who loses pairwise majority comparisons against every other candidate. Since then, a large number of similar, seemingly paradoxical, phenomena have been observed in the literature. As it turns out, many paradoxes only materialize under some rather contrived circumstances and require a certain number of voters and candidates. In this paper, we leverage computational optimization techniques to identify the minimal numbers of voters and candidates that are required for the most common voting paradoxes to materialize. The resulting compilation of voting paradoxes may serve as a useful reference to social choice theorists as well as an argument for the deployment of certain rules when the numbers of voters or candidates are severely restricted.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"527 - 551"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45513362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552
Perrin Lefebvre, D. Martimort
A substantial literature has been devoted to analyzing how legislators delegate regulatory power to a more knowledgeable agency. Yet, much less attention has been paid to understand how this delegation process is shaped by the environment in which this agency operates, and more specifically by the actions of interest groups. We propose a model of regulatory capture to assess how the distribution of information across interest groups and agencies impacts optimal delegation. Whether an interest group and his agency share information or not determines the scope for capture and how much discretion should be left to this agency in response. Whether asymmetric information reduces or increases discretion depends on the biases of the group and the agency vis-à-vis Congress. Groups that are more aligned with Congress collect politically relevant information, while more extreme groups remain poorly informed. The information structure that endogenously emerges increases discretion under broad circumstances.
{"title":"Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures","authors":"Perrin Lefebvre, D. Martimort","doi":"10.1177/09516298221107552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221107552","url":null,"abstract":"A substantial literature has been devoted to analyzing how legislators delegate regulatory power to a more knowledgeable agency. Yet, much less attention has been paid to understand how this delegation process is shaped by the environment in which this agency operates, and more specifically by the actions of interest groups. We propose a model of regulatory capture to assess how the distribution of information across interest groups and agencies impacts optimal delegation. Whether an interest group and his agency share information or not determines the scope for capture and how much discretion should be left to this agency in response. Whether asymmetric information reduces or increases discretion depends on the biases of the group and the agency vis-à-vis Congress. Groups that are more aligned with Congress collect politically relevant information, while more extreme groups remain poorly informed. The information structure that endogenously emerges increases discretion under broad circumstances.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"357 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47470372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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