Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.176
A. Zoteeva, M. Kragh
In recent years, leading members of Russia’s Constitutional Court have adapted the concept of constitutional identity to the Russian legal context, to explain and legitimize the country’s authoritarian turn under President Vladimir Putin. This development reflects a broader trend in international politics, where populist and anti-democratic leaders seek to identify “national characteristics” that can be translated into law and legal practices on the domestic as well as international level, in order to deny or restrict certain basic principles such as the rule of law and/or human rights. In Russia, several officials and policy makers, among them Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin (2018), have contributed to this discussion. We argue that a constitutional identity discourse has been used by Russian courts to explain the specific relationship between the Russian state and international law on the one hand, and on the other the relationship between the Russian state and its subjects. We place this debate in its wider legal and political context and highlight how it conforms with the amendments to the Russian constitution introduced in spring 2020.
{"title":"From Constitutional Identity to the Identity of the Constitution","authors":"A. Zoteeva, M. Kragh","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.176","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, leading members of Russia’s Constitutional Court have adapted the concept of constitutional identity to the Russian legal context, to explain and legitimize the country’s authoritarian turn under President Vladimir Putin. This development reflects a broader trend in international politics, where populist and anti-democratic leaders seek to identify “national characteristics” that can be translated into law and legal practices on the domestic as well as international level, in order to deny or restrict certain basic principles such as the rule of law and/or human rights. In Russia, several officials and policy makers, among them Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin (2018), have contributed to this discussion. We argue that a constitutional identity discourse has been used by Russian courts to explain the specific relationship between the Russian state and international law on the one hand, and on the other the relationship between the Russian state and its subjects. We place this debate in its wider legal and political context and highlight how it conforms with the amendments to the Russian constitution introduced in spring 2020.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45716983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.45
J. Dominguez
Communist authoritarian regimes born of revolution claim that their rule is democratic, sponsoring elections that, even if uncompetitive, may supplement their claims to rule if the outcome rewards the most-voted with high posts and sidelines the lower-voted. In 2018, Cuba’s new president argued that the 2018 election shaped the new National Assembly and Council of State democratically: garnering electoral support and better inclusiveness by gender, race, and age. Indeed, across the 2003, 2013, and 2018 elections, the Council became demographically inclusive, matching or exceeding its East Asian communist regime peers. However, in Cuba as in Vietnam, election vote shares had little effect on Council membership; the most-voted were not rewarded, the lower-voted were not sidelined.
{"title":"The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders","authors":"J. Dominguez","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.45","url":null,"abstract":"Communist authoritarian regimes born of revolution claim that their rule is democratic, sponsoring elections that, even if uncompetitive, may supplement their claims to rule if the outcome rewards the most-voted with high posts and sidelines the lower-voted. In 2018, Cuba’s new president argued that the 2018 election shaped the new National Assembly and Council of State democratically: garnering electoral support and better inclusiveness by gender, race, and age. Indeed, across the 2003, 2013, and 2018 elections, the Council became demographically inclusive, matching or exceeding its East Asian communist regime peers. However, in Cuba as in Vietnam, election vote shares had little effect on Council membership; the most-voted were not rewarded, the lower-voted were not sidelined.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46274074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.24
Jiangnan Zhu, N. Mukhin
Extant literature has shown the importance of routinized leadership succession for authoritarian resilience. However, the factors leading to orderly power transitions in autocracies are unclear. This article argues that an orderly succession requires relatively peaceful exit of the incumbent. Through a comparison of the power transition trajectories of the post-Stalin USSR and China in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, this article proposes three conditions that facilitate the voluntary retirement of dictators, including their strong political will to institutionalize successions, adequate capacity to initiate the plan, and reliable retirement packages. Meeting all three conditions, leadership succession in China has resulted in the emergence of the “modern regency” in which the elder leaders can retire relatively voluntarily and continuously influence the politics of a regime after their retirement, especially by proactively supervising future leadership successions. In contrast, without meeting the initial requirements for a dictator’s exit, the case of leadership succession in the USSR is characterized as parallel succession, which includes neither a credible plan on routinization of elite politics nor simultaneous coexistence of the elder leaders and the younger cohort as in the case of China. Moreover, during similar regime crises in the late 1980s, the arrangement of the modern regency helped prolong the authoritarian regime in China, while the USSR collapsed without this safeguard.
{"title":"The Modern Regency","authors":"Jiangnan Zhu, N. Mukhin","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.24","url":null,"abstract":"Extant literature has shown the importance of routinized leadership succession for authoritarian resilience. However, the factors leading to orderly power transitions in autocracies are unclear. This article argues that an orderly succession requires relatively peaceful exit of the incumbent. Through a comparison of the power transition trajectories of the post-Stalin USSR and China in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, this article proposes three conditions that facilitate the voluntary retirement of dictators, including their strong political will to institutionalize successions, adequate capacity to initiate the plan, and reliable retirement packages. Meeting all three conditions, leadership succession in China has resulted in the emergence of the “modern regency” in which the elder leaders can retire relatively voluntarily and continuously influence the politics of a regime after their retirement, especially by proactively supervising future leadership successions. In contrast, without meeting the initial requirements for a dictator’s exit, the case of leadership succession in the USSR is characterized as parallel succession, which includes neither a credible plan on routinization of elite politics nor simultaneous coexistence of the elder leaders and the younger cohort as in the case of China. Moreover, during similar regime crises in the late 1980s, the arrangement of the modern regency helped prolong the authoritarian regime in China, while the USSR collapsed without this safeguard.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44092974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.83
Lucian N. Leustean
In 2015, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church issued an unusual statement declaring that the arrival of refugees represented a “true invasion” in the region. One year later, during debates on Moldova’s presidential elections, the Orthodox Church endorsed the fake news that 30,000 Syrians were about to arrive in the country. Drawing on interviews in Chişinău and Sofia, the article argues that the European refugee crisis has led to an internationally-linked Orthodox conservatism characterized by five components: defending a mythical past; fostering close relations with state authorities; anti-Westernism; building conservative networks at local, national, and geopolitical levels; and presenting Orthodox churches as alternative governance structures. These components shape religion–state relations in predominantly Orthodox countries in the region and have had a direct impact on the ways in which religious and state bodies have responded to populism and geopolitics.
{"title":"Orthodox Conservatism and the Refugee Crisis in Bulgaria and Moldova","authors":"Lucian N. Leustean","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.83","url":null,"abstract":"In 2015, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church issued an unusual statement declaring that the arrival of refugees represented a “true invasion” in the region. One year later, during debates on Moldova’s presidential elections, the Orthodox Church endorsed the fake news that 30,000 Syrians were about to arrive in the country. Drawing on interviews in Chişinău and Sofia, the article argues that the European refugee crisis has led to an internationally-linked Orthodox conservatism characterized by five components: defending a mythical past; fostering close relations with state authorities; anti-Westernism; building conservative networks at local, national, and geopolitical levels; and presenting Orthodox churches as alternative governance structures. These components shape religion–state relations in predominantly Orthodox countries in the region and have had a direct impact on the ways in which religious and state bodies have responded to populism and geopolitics.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46031992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.102
Iveta Ķešāne
Drawing on Norbert Elias’s writing and sociology of emotion literature, this study proposes viewing neoliberalization as a “civilizing process,” which is enabled by politics of shaming. By tracing two streams of protests triggered by neoliberal transformations—by farmers and schoolteachers—in the 1990s and how they were handled by the ruling elite publicly in the mass media, this article finds that, in post-Soviet and neoliberal Latvia, in moments of tension between the state and society, rule occurred through a politics of shaming that utilized three instruments: the neoliberal ideology of a good citizen, essentializing language, and dividing language. This article contributes to the post-Soviet studies’ scholarship, the growing body of scholarship that explores relationships between neoliberalization and emotions, as well as social movements literature.
{"title":"Neoliberalization and Politics of Shaming","authors":"Iveta Ķešāne","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.102","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on Norbert Elias’s writing and sociology of emotion literature, this study proposes viewing neoliberalization as a “civilizing process,” which is enabled by politics of shaming. By tracing two streams of protests triggered by neoliberal transformations—by farmers and schoolteachers—in the 1990s and how they were handled by the ruling elite publicly in the mass media, this article finds that, in post-Soviet and neoliberal Latvia, in moments of tension between the state and society, rule occurred through a politics of shaming that utilized three instruments: the neoliberal ideology of a good citizen, essentializing language, and dividing language. This article contributes to the post-Soviet studies’ scholarship, the growing body of scholarship that explores relationships between neoliberalization and emotions, as well as social movements literature.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43980579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.1
Filip Ilkowski
The aim of this article is to show with the example of contemporary Poland the ideological function of anti-communism. It explains how “communism” has been constructed and utilized mainly in order to legitimize the political/economic power in the decades of Transition after 1989. The question is not only why anti-communism has been relatively successful in functioning as the hegemonic ideology, but also what its limits are. This article examines the roots of anti-communism with an attempt to find its universal and particular features. The Polish example is helpful to distinguish major, contradictory, ideological explanations operating within its framework: apologetic and contesting.
{"title":"Anti-Communism as Ideology","authors":"Filip Ilkowski","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.1","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to show with the example of contemporary Poland the ideological function of anti-communism. It explains how “communism” has been constructed and utilized mainly in order to legitimize the political/economic power in the decades of Transition after 1989. The question is not only why anti-communism has been relatively successful in functioning as the hegemonic ideology, but also what its limits are. This article examines the roots of anti-communism with an attempt to find its universal and particular features. The Polish example is helpful to distinguish major, contradictory, ideological explanations operating within its framework: apologetic and contesting.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47019838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.66
G. Golosov, M. Turchenko
One of the well-known properties of multimember plurality systems is their propensity toward producing the so-called “sweep effect,” manifesting itself in that the strongest party in a majority of districts sees its full slate of candidates elected even if the margin of plurality is small. Despite this property, and mostly for technical reasons, this system remains rather widely employed for conducting local elections both in democracies and in electoral authoritarian regimes. This article employs the evidence from the 2019 municipal elections in St. Petersburg to examine how increased strategic coordination of opposition voters became instrumental in countering the sweep effect and thus reducing the scope of political monopoly in an overtly authoritarian context. The analysis shows that this goal was achieved primarily by enabling opposition-minded voters to cast a greater number of votes than it otherwise would have been.
{"title":"Countering the “Sweep Effect”","authors":"G. Golosov, M. Turchenko","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.66","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.66","url":null,"abstract":"One of the well-known properties of multimember plurality systems is their propensity toward producing the so-called “sweep effect,” manifesting itself in that the strongest party in a majority of districts sees its full slate of candidates elected even if the margin of plurality is small. Despite this property, and mostly for technical reasons, this system remains rather widely employed for conducting local elections both in democracies and in electoral authoritarian regimes. This article employs the evidence from the 2019 municipal elections in St. Petersburg to examine how increased strategic coordination of opposition voters became instrumental in countering the sweep effect and thus reducing the scope of political monopoly in an overtly authoritarian context. The analysis shows that this goal was achieved primarily by enabling opposition-minded voters to cast a greater number of votes than it otherwise would have been.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43204116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.156
R. Mohr, K. Brown
This study examines memory of the Soviet Union and political opinions in modern Russia through qualitative, semi-structured interviews across generations in two Russian cities. The study aims to explore the differences in memory and meaning of the Soviet Union across generation and geography, and to connect those differences to political dispositions in modern Russia. Respondents were asked about their impressions of the Soviet Union and modern-day Russia, and responses were coded for emergent themes and trends. The research finds that youth bifurcate along geographic lines; respondents in St. Petersburg were more likely to reject Soviet ideals than their counterparts in Yoshkar-Ola. The former also tended to prefer liberalism and globalization, while the latter expressed greater nationalism. Older respondents showed no distinct geographic trend, but gave more nuanced assessments of the Soviet Union due to the power of personal memory over cultural reconstruction. In younger respondents, these findings indicate that living in a cosmopolitan metropolis may condition interpretations of the Soviet past and influence contemporary political identity toward globalization. Youths living in smaller cities have less interaction with other global cities and therefore may have more conservative perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia.
{"title":"Generational and Geographic Effects on Collective Memory of the USSR","authors":"R. Mohr, K. Brown","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.156","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines memory of the Soviet Union and political opinions in modern Russia through qualitative, semi-structured interviews across generations in two Russian cities. The study aims to explore the differences in memory and meaning of the Soviet Union across generation and geography, and to connect those differences to political dispositions in modern Russia. Respondents were asked about their impressions of the Soviet Union and modern-day Russia, and responses were coded for emergent themes and trends. The research finds that youth bifurcate along geographic lines; respondents in St. Petersburg were more likely to reject Soviet ideals than their counterparts in Yoshkar-Ola. The former also tended to prefer liberalism and globalization, while the latter expressed greater nationalism. Older respondents showed no distinct geographic trend, but gave more nuanced assessments of the Soviet Union due to the power of personal memory over cultural reconstruction. In younger respondents, these findings indicate that living in a cosmopolitan metropolis may condition interpretations of the Soviet past and influence contemporary political identity toward globalization. Youths living in smaller cities have less interaction with other global cities and therefore may have more conservative perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41431906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.128
Salome Minesashvili
Georgia’s European identity, often regarded as the basis of its pro-Western foreign policy, has been contested in the domestic arena by alternative agendas. While government changes are usually deemed instigators of change in this contestation, no systematic analysis has been conducted on the effect of external developments. Considering that Georgia’s relations with the West and Russia have been evolving and that the debates on European identity inherently relate to foreign policy, this article asks to what extent and how contestation within the European identity discourse changes in response to different external events. To elucidate these questions, the study unpacks European identity discourse in Georgia between 2012 and 2017 in the context of various ongoing foreign policy developments. These include developments in Georgia–European Union (EU) and Georgia–Russia relations, the war in Ukraine, and internal issues of the EU. Moreover, instead of common pro- and anti-European binary positions, identity discourse is analyzed as a combination of three identity categories via media in which each category constructs different degrees of difference with Europe. This article finds that advocates of each category interpret different foreign policy developments to reinforce, rather than challenge, their positions; thus, contestation and division in the discourse persist over time.
{"title":"Europe in Georgia’s Identity Discourse","authors":"Salome Minesashvili","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.128","url":null,"abstract":"Georgia’s European identity, often regarded as the basis of its pro-Western foreign policy, has been contested in the domestic arena by alternative agendas. While government changes are usually deemed instigators of change in this contestation, no systematic analysis has been conducted on the effect of external developments. Considering that Georgia’s relations with the West and Russia have been evolving and that the debates on European identity inherently relate to foreign policy, this article asks to what extent and how contestation within the European identity discourse changes in response to different external events. To elucidate these questions, the study unpacks European identity discourse in Georgia between 2012 and 2017 in the context of various ongoing foreign policy developments. These include developments in Georgia–European Union (EU) and Georgia–Russia relations, the war in Ukraine, and internal issues of the EU. Moreover, instead of common pro- and anti-European binary positions, identity discourse is analyzed as a combination of three identity categories via media in which each category constructs different degrees of difference with Europe. This article finds that advocates of each category interpret different foreign policy developments to reinforce, rather than challenge, their positions; thus, contestation and division in the discourse persist over time.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46417743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.196
M. Štefek
This article deals with the thus far unnoticed “intellectual origin” of the so-called Prague Spring. It summarizes tenets of behavioral revolution in the field of social sciences and documents its considerable influence on Czechoslovak scholars. From the mid-1960s, behavioral reasoning coexisted with other (mutually conflicting) perspectives. Literature on Czechoslovak reform has given evidence of the impact of Marxian revisionism, the Frankfurt school, and theories of industrial societies. This article stresses the significance of behavioral meta-theory not only in academia but also in the political arena. However, the process of normalization after 1968/1969 signified the inevitable end for this paradigm.
{"title":"Czechoslovakia’s Discreet Behavioral Revolution in the 1960s","authors":"M. Štefek","doi":"10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1525/J.POSTCOMSTUD.2021.54.1-2.196","url":null,"abstract":"This article deals with the thus far unnoticed “intellectual origin” of the so-called Prague Spring. It summarizes tenets of behavioral revolution in the field of social sciences and documents its considerable influence on Czechoslovak scholars. From the mid-1960s, behavioral reasoning coexisted with other (mutually conflicting) perspectives. Literature on Czechoslovak reform has given evidence of the impact of Marxian revisionism, the Frankfurt school, and theories of industrial societies. This article stresses the significance of behavioral meta-theory not only in academia but also in the political arena. However, the process of normalization after 1968/1969 signified the inevitable end for this paradigm.","PeriodicalId":51623,"journal":{"name":"Communist and Post-Communist Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41699245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：