ABSTRACT We analyse the competitive effects of the centralised sale of football media rights in Europe, focusing on the “Big Five” countries (England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain). Contrary to the findings of European competition authorities, we consider that there are arguments in favour of the relevant market for domestic media rights being club- or even match-specific. This raises the question of what competition is restricted by the centralised sale if the rights on offer have limited or no substitutability. We conclude that the centralised sale of media rights is unlikely to be anticompetitive and may have procompetitive effects if the media rights of different clubs are complementary instead of substitutable. In addition, there may be efficiency gains from the bundling of media rights. Under a club or match-specific market definition, a no-single-buyer rule likely reduces the benefits from the centralised sale and may harm consumers.
{"title":"The centralised sale of football media rights in Europe","authors":"C.-Philipp Heller, Slobodan Sudaric, Anne-Christin Winkler","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2023.2205650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2023.2205650","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We analyse the competitive effects of the centralised sale of football media rights in Europe, focusing on the “Big Five” countries (England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain). Contrary to the findings of European competition authorities, we consider that there are arguments in favour of the relevant market for domestic media rights being club- or even match-specific. This raises the question of what competition is restricted by the centralised sale if the rights on offer have limited or no substitutability. We conclude that the centralised sale of media rights is unlikely to be anticompetitive and may have procompetitive effects if the media rights of different clubs are complementary instead of substitutable. In addition, there may be efficiency gains from the bundling of media rights. Under a club or match-specific market definition, a no-single-buyer rule likely reduces the benefits from the centralised sale and may harm consumers.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43728715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1984011
Alexandre Carbonnel
ABSTRACT The recent case in the meal vouchers market in France has put collusion in two-sided markets in the spotlight. This paper discusses the key insights from the recent literature with respect to the consequences of collusion on prices and consumer surplus. I explain why focusing exclusively on prices is misleading in the case of two-sided markets and why a broader assessment also accounting for the impact of collusion on externalities is required. Furthermore, collusion does not necessarily harm all users, which justifies a case-by-case approach. Finally, I provide a concrete example of the assessment of collusion in two-sided markets using the example of the meal vouchers market and show that the insights from the current literature do not apply in this instance. This demonstrates the role that the characteristics of the market under investigation play with respect to the conclusions that may be drawn from collusion in two-sided markets.
{"title":"The two sides of platform collusion","authors":"Alexandre Carbonnel","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1984011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1984011","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The recent case in the meal vouchers market in France has put collusion in two-sided markets in the spotlight. This paper discusses the key insights from the recent literature with respect to the consequences of collusion on prices and consumer surplus. I explain why focusing exclusively on prices is misleading in the case of two-sided markets and why a broader assessment also accounting for the impact of collusion on externalities is required. Furthermore, collusion does not necessarily harm all users, which justifies a case-by-case approach. Finally, I provide a concrete example of the assessment of collusion in two-sided markets using the example of the meal vouchers market and show that the insights from the current literature do not apply in this instance. This demonstrates the role that the characteristics of the market under investigation play with respect to the conclusions that may be drawn from collusion in two-sided markets.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47389754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-21DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1935570
Jesse Kalashyan
ABSTRACT European soccer clubs tend to spend beyond their revenues, causing disruptions in their finances. To minimize these disruptions, UEFA enacted the Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP). FFP achieves its objectives through the “break-even” requirement, which prohibits clubs from spending beyond their revenues. This article argues that FFP violates Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. While there has been scholarly interest in FFP’s incompatibility with competition law, the focus has been on Article 101. In addition to contributing to the scholarship on FFP’s violation of Article 101, this article presents arguments on how FFP violates Article 102. This article then explores UEFA’s interactions with European regulators as a backdrop for explaining why regulators have failed to address FFP’s violation of Articles 101 and 102. This article concludes by arguing that a change to FFP is imminent and suggests a novel method through which UEFA can maintain FFP’s objectives while complying with competition law.
{"title":"The game behind the game: UEFA's Financial Fair Play Regulations and the need to field a substitute","authors":"Jesse Kalashyan","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1935570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1935570","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT European soccer clubs tend to spend beyond their revenues, causing disruptions in their finances. To minimize these disruptions, UEFA enacted the Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP). FFP achieves its objectives through the “break-even” requirement, which prohibits clubs from spending beyond their revenues. This article argues that FFP violates Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. While there has been scholarly interest in FFP’s incompatibility with competition law, the focus has been on Article 101. In addition to contributing to the scholarship on FFP’s violation of Article 101, this article presents arguments on how FFP violates Article 102. This article then explores UEFA’s interactions with European regulators as a backdrop for explaining why regulators have failed to address FFP’s violation of Articles 101 and 102. This article concludes by arguing that a change to FFP is imminent and suggests a novel method through which UEFA can maintain FFP’s objectives while complying with competition law.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1935570","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45437528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-14DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1936400
C. Hutchinson, D. Treščáková
ABSTRACT The development of smart electronic devices are enabling online businesses to collect any data related to the consumer's online activity. Such an extensive trove of consumer personal data can be used for “personalized pricing”. We have evaluated the challenges this form of price discrimination creates for competition and found that in jurisdictions such as the EU which prosecute exploitative abuses, the probability that personalized pricing might be assessed as an abuse of dominant position is high. Another issue raised by the collection and the processing of data for personalized pricing purposes is the growing invasion of privacy. In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation foresees that personal data cannot be used without the consent of the consumer. As for online businesses processing personal data, they’d better stick to the provisions of the GDPR aiming to ensure greater transparency, if they are to avoid any risk of infringement of privacy law.
{"title":"The challenges of personalized pricing to competition and personal data protection law","authors":"C. Hutchinson, D. Treščáková","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1936400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1936400","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The development of smart electronic devices are enabling online businesses to collect any data related to the consumer's online activity. Such an extensive trove of consumer personal data can be used for “personalized pricing”. We have evaluated the challenges this form of price discrimination creates for competition and found that in jurisdictions such as the EU which prosecute exploitative abuses, the probability that personalized pricing might be assessed as an abuse of dominant position is high. Another issue raised by the collection and the processing of data for personalized pricing purposes is the growing invasion of privacy. In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation foresees that personal data cannot be used without the consent of the consumer. As for online businesses processing personal data, they’d better stick to the provisions of the GDPR aiming to ensure greater transparency, if they are to avoid any risk of infringement of privacy law.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1936400","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41397504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-06DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1936398
Bahriye Basaran
ABSTRACT The unanticipated global mass panic that has arisen as a result of the rapid spread of the COVID-19 has had a major impact on the functioning of many markets. Many competition authorities around the world have faced with excessive pricing practices due to the dramatic price hikes of essential items, ranging from personal and medical equipment to basic food products particularly at the onset of the pandemic. The crisis has not been just about pricing, whether the public or the state is willing to pay for certain products or not; at the heart of the problem, there has been a sudden sharp asymmetry between the supply and demand. Based on this asymmetry, this article, by acknowledging that Article 102 (a) fails to deliver a swift and efficient response to this crisis due to conceptual and practical difficulties in its application, addresses other ways that competition authorities and governments use to deal with the virus-profiteers.
{"title":"A closer look on the effectiveness of the EU legal framework for excessive pricing during the COVID-19 crisis","authors":"Bahriye Basaran","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1936398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1936398","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The unanticipated global mass panic that has arisen as a result of the rapid spread of the COVID-19 has had a major impact on the functioning of many markets. Many competition authorities around the world have faced with excessive pricing practices due to the dramatic price hikes of essential items, ranging from personal and medical equipment to basic food products particularly at the onset of the pandemic. The crisis has not been just about pricing, whether the public or the state is willing to pay for certain products or not; at the heart of the problem, there has been a sudden sharp asymmetry between the supply and demand. Based on this asymmetry, this article, by acknowledging that Article 102 (a) fails to deliver a swift and efficient response to this crisis due to conceptual and practical difficulties in its application, addresses other ways that competition authorities and governments use to deal with the virus-profiteers.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1936398","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42573313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1935567
Hanna Stakheyeva
ABSTRACT The paper analyses the legality of online sales bans in selective distribution agreements in the EU, focusing on the “luxury brand image” justification as per the CJEU judgements and the decisions of the EC and national competition authorities. The paper questions the criteria for determining what constitutes a luxury trademark, and whether it is fair to distinguish (or even discriminate) between luxury and non-luxury trademarks, considering that both should have effective control and choice of the distribution of their goods. The paper concludes that the success of the selective distribution system depends on the effective control the trademark owner exercises over it, irrespective of whether or not it is covered by the aura of luxury. The non-luxury brands currently may justify their restrictions on sales on third party platforms under the unfair competition grounds. The selective distribution system should aim at protecting trademark image, which may not necessarily be luxury.
{"title":"Competition law in attempt to understand (Luxury) trademarks","authors":"Hanna Stakheyeva","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1935567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1935567","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper analyses the legality of online sales bans in selective distribution agreements in the EU, focusing on the “luxury brand image” justification as per the CJEU judgements and the decisions of the EC and national competition authorities. The paper questions the criteria for determining what constitutes a luxury trademark, and whether it is fair to distinguish (or even discriminate) between luxury and non-luxury trademarks, considering that both should have effective control and choice of the distribution of their goods. The paper concludes that the success of the selective distribution system depends on the effective control the trademark owner exercises over it, irrespective of whether or not it is covered by the aura of luxury. The non-luxury brands currently may justify their restrictions on sales on third party platforms under the unfair competition grounds. The selective distribution system should aim at protecting trademark image, which may not necessarily be luxury.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1935567","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48877951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-26DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1930450
D. Geradin, Dimitrios Katsifis, Theano Karanikioti
ABSTRACT Now a multi-billion-dollar industry, online advertising is what funds free online content. At the core of this industry lies the ability to track users through various technical means, such as cookies, which has sparked privacy concerns, and is thus subject to a growing body of regulation. But the most important rules around tracking seem to come from a handful of large platforms who have assumed the role of a de facto privacy regulator. In this paper we explore in detail Google’s decision to phase out support for third-party cookies on Chrome, accompanied by a set of proposals known as the Privacy Sandbox proposals. We query whether this decision raises any antitrust concerns – and if so, how they can be reconciled with the objective of privacy. At a conceptual level, we use this opportunity to reflect on the relationship between competition law and privacy and the trade-offs regulators may have to make.
{"title":"Google as a de facto privacy regulator: analysing the Privacy Sandbox from an antitrust perspective","authors":"D. Geradin, Dimitrios Katsifis, Theano Karanikioti","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1930450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1930450","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Now a multi-billion-dollar industry, online advertising is what funds free online content. At the core of this industry lies the ability to track users through various technical means, such as cookies, which has sparked privacy concerns, and is thus subject to a growing body of regulation. But the most important rules around tracking seem to come from a handful of large platforms who have assumed the role of a de facto privacy regulator. In this paper we explore in detail Google’s decision to phase out support for third-party cookies on Chrome, accompanied by a set of proposals known as the Privacy Sandbox proposals. We query whether this decision raises any antitrust concerns – and if so, how they can be reconciled with the objective of privacy. At a conceptual level, we use this opportunity to reflect on the relationship between competition law and privacy and the trade-offs regulators may have to make.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1930450","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45921620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-21DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1936401
Tom Smith, D. Geradin
ABSTRACT Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon (the “GAFAs”) have been slow to disrupt the financial services sector, but they are likely to do so in the coming years by using their control of important customer access points such as mobile operating systems, search engines, app stores, and marketplaces. This paper discusses these issues in the context of competition law enforcement and the emerging UK and EU regulatory regimes aiming to curb the GAFAs’ market power. The new rules can ensure that consumers will benefit from the innovations of the GAFAs and others without suffering the long-run effects of their further accumulation of market power. The new rules can ensure that the GAFAs do not benefit from an asymmetry of regulatory obligations compared to their financial services competitors, and that the GAFAs cannot leverage their market power from core activities into financial services whereby their financial services competitors are hindered in reacting.
{"title":"Maintaining a level playing field when Big Tech disrupts the financial services sector","authors":"Tom Smith, D. Geradin","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1936401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1936401","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon (the “GAFAs”) have been slow to disrupt the financial services sector, but they are likely to do so in the coming years by using their control of important customer access points such as mobile operating systems, search engines, app stores, and marketplaces. This paper discusses these issues in the context of competition law enforcement and the emerging UK and EU regulatory regimes aiming to curb the GAFAs’ market power. The new rules can ensure that consumers will benefit from the innovations of the GAFAs and others without suffering the long-run effects of their further accumulation of market power. The new rules can ensure that the GAFAs do not benefit from an asymmetry of regulatory obligations compared to their financial services competitors, and that the GAFAs cannot leverage their market power from core activities into financial services whereby their financial services competitors are hindered in reacting.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1936401","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42397831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-19DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1930452
G. Monti
ABSTRACT The European Commission has recently begun to reflect on whether competition law is a barrier to the formation of collective labour agreements between industry and atypical workers. The policy focus to date has been on whether and how to extend the antitrust labour exemptions to certain classes of atypical worker. This paper shows how efforts in this direction in the Netherlands and Ireland have revealed that this is a tricky path to pursue. As a result, the paper proposes four additional approaches: three of these indicate that even if atypical workers are treated as undertakings and collective bargains between them and employers fall to be assessed under competition law, many agreements will unlikely have anticompetitive effects and for those that may do so, exemptions are possible. A fifth approach is that active antitrust enforcement against employers imposing unfair terms on atypical workers may function to solve some of the concerns that collective bargaining seeks to address.
{"title":"Collective labour agreements and EU competition law: five reconfigurations","authors":"G. Monti","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1930452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1930452","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The European Commission has recently begun to reflect on whether competition law is a barrier to the formation of collective labour agreements between industry and atypical workers. The policy focus to date has been on whether and how to extend the antitrust labour exemptions to certain classes of atypical worker. This paper shows how efforts in this direction in the Netherlands and Ireland have revealed that this is a tricky path to pursue. As a result, the paper proposes four additional approaches: three of these indicate that even if atypical workers are treated as undertakings and collective bargains between them and employers fall to be assessed under competition law, many agreements will unlikely have anticompetitive effects and for those that may do so, exemptions are possible. A fifth approach is that active antitrust enforcement against employers imposing unfair terms on atypical workers may function to solve some of the concerns that collective bargaining seeks to address.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1930452","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42960305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-16DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1911730
S. Majumdar
ABSTRACT This paper reports an assessment of horizontal ownership concentration, contingent on congeneric acquisitions, on firm-level strategic behaviour in the telecommunications sector. Consequent to deals, the change in the concentration index was over one and half times the value of the original ratio. An asset control Herfindahl Hirschman Index (AHHI) shot up from 1056 to 2747. Firms' strategic behaviour examined has been debt level in capital structure. Companies associated with a high value of the structural capital variable have had significantly lower debt, around 24% less than average, while companies associated with a low value of the structural capital variable have had significantly higher debt, of around 11% more than average. Companies identified as owned by horizontal ownership controllers with high market power have had significantly lower debt, of around 19% less than average. The behaviour of companies have been competitively aggressive, as an outcome of horizontal ownership concentration.
{"title":"Structural capital and capital structure: assessing horizontal ownership concentration","authors":"S. Majumdar","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1911730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1911730","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper reports an assessment of horizontal ownership concentration, contingent on congeneric acquisitions, on firm-level strategic behaviour in the telecommunications sector. Consequent to deals, the change in the concentration index was over one and half times the value of the original ratio. An asset control Herfindahl Hirschman Index (AHHI) shot up from 1056 to 2747. Firms' strategic behaviour examined has been debt level in capital structure. Companies associated with a high value of the structural capital variable have had significantly lower debt, around 24% less than average, while companies associated with a low value of the structural capital variable have had significantly higher debt, of around 11% more than average. Companies identified as owned by horizontal ownership controllers with high market power have had significantly lower debt, of around 19% less than average. The behaviour of companies have been competitively aggressive, as an outcome of horizontal ownership concentration.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1911730","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43678667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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