The Chalcedonian Definition states that the incarnate Christ is both fully human and fully divine. But spelling out what the Chalcedonian Definition entails continues to be a subject of intense controversy among philosophers and theologians alike. One of these controversies concerns what I call the problem of the bearer question. At the heart of this question lies whether or not the two natures of Christ require two distinct bearers. In section I, I will explain the problem of the bearer question and how it arises directly due to the Chalcedonian Definition. In section II, I will propose a solution to the problem of the bearer question within the framework of what I call, a ‘Multi–Track Disposition Model of the Incarnation’. At the heart of this model lies the notion that the manifestation of properties is multi–directional in the sense that there is a reciprocal partnership among property manifestations. In section III, I will contrast the solution proposed to the bearer question by the Multi–Track Model to that of a ‘Kenotic Model of the Incarnation’. I will argue that the Multi–Track Model provides us with better conceptual resources to make sense of the bearer question. Finally, in section IV, I will briefly point out why ultimately a conclusive answer to the bearer question may still prove to be elusive because the bearer question gives rise to a host of other unresolved questions.
{"title":"The Two Natures of the Incarnate Christ and the Bearer Question","authors":"Mihretu P. Guta","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I3.17663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I3.17663","url":null,"abstract":"The Chalcedonian Definition states that the incarnate Christ is both fully human and fully divine. But spelling out what the Chalcedonian Definition entails continues to be a subject of intense controversy among philosophers and theologians alike. One of these controversies concerns what I call the problem of the bearer question. At the heart of this question lies whether or not the two natures of Christ require two distinct bearers. In section I, I will explain the problem of the bearer question and how it arises directly due to the Chalcedonian Definition. In section II, I will propose a solution to the problem of the bearer question within the framework of what I call, a ‘Multi–Track Disposition Model of the Incarnation’. At the heart of this model lies the notion that the manifestation of properties is multi–directional in the sense that there is a reciprocal partnership among property manifestations. In section III, I will contrast the solution proposed to the bearer question by the Multi–Track Model to that of a ‘Kenotic Model of the Incarnation’. I will argue that the Multi–Track Model provides us with better conceptual resources to make sense of the bearer question. Finally, in section IV, I will briefly point out why ultimately a conclusive answer to the bearer question may still prove to be elusive because the bearer question gives rise to a host of other unresolved questions.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84258881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved.
{"title":"Incarnation, Divine Timelessness, and Modality","authors":"Emily Paul","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I3.2283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I3.2283","url":null,"abstract":"A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved. ","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88685070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Even thirty years after Thomas Morris wrote The Logic of God Incarnate, there are some claims that Morris makes that require examination in analytic Christology. One of those claims is a concession that Morris gives to modalists near the end of the book, where he says that the two–minds view he has defended can be used to provide a consistent modalistic understanding of Jesus’s prayer life. This view, he says, blocks the inference from the fact that Jesus prays to the Father to the additional claim that Jesus and the Father are numerically distinct. I argue that Oneness Pentecostals can appropriate central concepts from The Logic of God Incarnate as Morris suggests, and further that this means Oneness Pentecostals should abandon the claim that Jesus believes he just is the Father. Once Oneness Pentecostals abandon this claim, they can give a possible explanation of how it is that Jesus relates to the Father in prayer even though he just is the Father.
{"title":"Oneness Pentecostalism, the Two-Minds View, and the Problem of Jesus's Prayers","authors":"Skylar D. McManus","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I3.2313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I3.2313","url":null,"abstract":"Even thirty years after Thomas Morris wrote The Logic of God Incarnate, there are some claims that Morris makes that require examination in analytic Christology. One of those claims is a concession that Morris gives to modalists near the end of the book, where he says that the two–minds view he has defended can be used to provide a consistent modalistic understanding of Jesus’s prayer life. This view, he says, blocks the inference from the fact that Jesus prays to the Father to the additional claim that Jesus and the Father are numerically distinct. I argue that Oneness Pentecostals can appropriate central concepts from The Logic of God Incarnate as Morris suggests, and further that this means Oneness Pentecostals should abandon the claim that Jesus believes he just is the Father. Once Oneness Pentecostals abandon this claim, they can give a possible explanation of how it is that Jesus relates to the Father in prayer even though he just is the Father.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85506467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“Dynamic” views of heaven are currently popular, in which the blessed spend eternity progressing and developing, as opposed to “static” views, in which they do not. This is, in part, because dynamic views supposedly offer a plausible solution to the “Boredom Problem”, i.e. the claim that, given an infinite amount of time, existence would necessarily become so tedious as to be unbearable. I argue that static views actually deal with this problem more successfully than dynamic views do. I argue that the Boredom Problem itself rests on the assumption that, without activity to keep us interested, we slip into boredom by default. I examine the phenomenon of boredom itself to evaluate that assumption, and argue that it is false. It follows that a person in a state of “serenity” – who desires only to continue as they are – cannot become bored. I relate this to the Christian tradition of conceiving of heaven in terms of rest and inactivity, argue that it is consistent with the claim that the blessed in heaven are embodied, communal, and virtuous (in some sense), and conclude that boredom poses no more problem to this conception of heaven than exhaustion does to the dynamic conception.
{"title":"In Defence of Inactivity: Boredom, Serenity, and Rest in Heaven","authors":"Jonathan R. Hill","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I2.2103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I2.2103","url":null,"abstract":"“Dynamic” views of heaven are currently popular, in which the blessed spend eternity progressing and developing, as opposed to “static” views, in which they do not. This is, in part, because dynamic views supposedly offer a plausible solution to the “Boredom Problem”, i.e. the claim that, given an infinite amount of time, existence would necessarily become so tedious as to be unbearable. I argue that static views actually deal with this problem more successfully than dynamic views do. I argue that the Boredom Problem itself rests on the assumption that, without activity to keep us interested, we slip into boredom by default. I examine the phenomenon of boredom itself to evaluate that assumption, and argue that it is false. It follows that a person in a state of “serenity” – who desires only to continue as they are – cannot become bored. I relate this to the Christian tradition of conceiving of heaven in terms of rest and inactivity, argue that it is consistent with the claim that the blessed in heaven are embodied, communal, and virtuous (in some sense), and conclude that boredom poses no more problem to this conception of heaven than exhaustion does to the dynamic conception.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82329002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The doctrine of the Father’s begetting the Son in his divine nature, despite its credal affirmation, enjoys no clear scriptural support and threatens to introduce an objectionable ontological subordinationism into the doctrine of the Trinity. We should therefore think of Christ’s sonship as a function of his incarnation, even if that role is assumed beginninglessly.
{"title":"Is God the Son Begotten in His Divine Nature?","authors":"W. Craig","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I3.16583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I3.16583","url":null,"abstract":"The doctrine of the Father’s begetting the Son in his divine nature, despite its credal affirmation, enjoys no clear scriptural support and threatens to introduce an objectionable ontological subordinationism into the doctrine of the Trinity. We should therefore think of Christ’s sonship as a function of his incarnation, even if that role is assumed beginninglessly.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76280678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article I examine the modal theism of St. Anselm of Canterbury, arguing that the person of the divine Son plays an important role in how Anselm thinks about God’s power and possibilities. Beginning with his first major theological work, the Monologion, I show how Anselm’s characterizes God’s knowledge of creation, not in the traditional, Augustinian terms of an intellectual divine “idea,” but in the comparatively more linguistic terms of a divine “locutio” or “utterance.” I go on to argue that this sets Anselm up for a somewhat unique modal theology, one in which God is best understood as acting and creating, not against the backdrop of an already defined and existing domain of possibilities, but in a way that makes him the inventor and creator of his own possibilities. In the second part of the article, I turn to Anselm’s influential work of Christology, Cur Deus Homo, to examine how his “theistic actualism” is paralleled in select aspects of his account of the divine Son’s Incarnation in the person and work of Jesus Christ.
在这篇文章中，我考察了坎特伯雷圣安瑟伦的模态有神论，认为圣子的人在安瑟伦如何思考上帝的力量和可能性方面起着重要作用。从他的第一部主要神学著作《神论》开始，我将展示安瑟伦是如何描述上帝对创造的知识的，他不是用传统的奥古斯丁式的智慧的神圣“观念”，而是用相对更语言学的方式，用神圣的“话语”或“话语”。我接着认为，这为安瑟姆建立了一种独特的模态神学，在这种神学中，上帝最好被理解为行动和创造，而不是在一个已经定义和存在的可能性领域的背景下，而是在某种程度上使他成为自己可能性的发明者和创造者。在文章的第二部分，我转向安瑟伦的影响深远的基督论著作《你是人》(Cur Deus Homo)，来研究他的“有神论的现实主义”如何与他对圣子化身为耶稣基督的个人和工作的描述的某些方面相对应。
{"title":"Christ, the Power and Possibility of God in St. Anselm of Canterbury","authors":"J. Mcintosh","doi":"10.14428/THL.V3I1.2323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V3I1.2323","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I examine the modal theism of St. Anselm of Canterbury, arguing that the person of the divine Son plays an important role in how Anselm thinks about God’s power and possibilities. Beginning with his first major theological work, the Monologion, I show how Anselm’s characterizes God’s knowledge of creation, not in the traditional, Augustinian terms of an intellectual divine “idea,” but in the comparatively more linguistic terms of a divine “locutio” or “utterance.” I go on to argue that this sets Anselm up for a somewhat unique modal theology, one in which God is best understood as acting and creating, not against the backdrop of an already defined and existing domain of possibilities, but in a way that makes him the inventor and creator of his own possibilities. In the second part of the article, I turn to Anselm’s influential work of Christology, Cur Deus Homo, to examine how his “theistic actualism” is paralleled in select aspects of his account of the divine Son’s Incarnation in the person and work of Jesus Christ.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87658894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues Aquinas’s doctrine of the beatific vision suffers from a twofold christological deficit: (1) Aquinas rarely alludes to an eternally continuing link (whether as cause or as means) between Christ’s beatific vision and ours; and (2) for Aquinas the beatific vision is not theophanic, that is to say, for Aquinas, Christ is not the object of the beatific vision; instead, he maintains the divine essence constitutes the object. Even if Aquinas were to have followed his “principle of the maximum” in the unfinished third part of the Summa and so had discussed Christ’s own beatific vision as the cause of the saints’ beatific vision, he would still have ended up with a christological deficit, inasmuch as Christ would still not be the means and the object of the saints’ beatific vision. For a more christologically robust way forward, I draw on John Owen and several other Puritan theologians, who treat the beatific vision as the climactic theophany.
{"title":"Thomas Aquinas on the Beatific Vision: A Christological Deficit","authors":"Hans Boersma","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I2.14733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I2.14733","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues Aquinas’s doctrine of the beatific vision suffers from a twofold christological deficit: (1) Aquinas rarely alludes to an eternally continuing link (whether as cause or as means) between Christ’s beatific vision and ours; and (2) for Aquinas the beatific vision is not theophanic, that is to say, for Aquinas, Christ is not the object of the beatific vision; instead, he maintains the divine essence constitutes the object. Even if Aquinas were to have followed his “principle of the maximum” in the unfinished third part of the Summa and so had discussed Christ’s own beatific vision as the cause of the saints’ beatific vision, he would still have ended up with a christological deficit, inasmuch as Christ would still not be the means and the object of the saints’ beatific vision. For a more christologically robust way forward, I draw on John Owen and several other Puritan theologians, who treat the beatific vision as the climactic theophany.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83439979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that Thomas Aquinas is to be interpreted as holding that the beatific vision of the saints is causally dependent on the glorified humanity of Christ. It opposes the view that, for Aquinas, Christ’s humanity has causal significance only for those who are being brought to the beatific vision by grace, and not for those who have attained this vision, such that there is a Christological deficit in Aquinas’s eschatology. The argument proceeds somewhat in the manner of an article of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. Having briefly outlined the recent debate, especially the contribution of Hans Boersma, two objections are put against my position. A sed contra is formulated on the basis of quotations from the Summa. The responsio is based on Aquinas’s extensive use of a philosophical ‘principle of the maximum’ and its particular application by Aquinas to grace. After replies to the objections, based on the method and structure of the Summa, I locate Aquinas’s position in the debate on Christ’s heavenly mediation between that of John Calvin and that of John Owen and Jonathan Edwards.
{"title":"The Beatific Vision and the Heavenly Mediation of Christ","authors":"S. Gaine","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I2.7623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I2.7623","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that Thomas Aquinas is to be interpreted as holding that the beatific vision of the saints is causally dependent on the glorified humanity of Christ. It opposes the view that, for Aquinas, Christ’s humanity has causal significance only for those who are being brought to the beatific vision by grace, and not for those who have attained this vision, such that there is a Christological deficit in Aquinas’s eschatology. The argument proceeds somewhat in the manner of an article of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. Having briefly outlined the recent debate, especially the contribution of Hans Boersma, two objections are put against my position. A sed contra is formulated on the basis of quotations from the Summa. The responsio is based on Aquinas’s extensive use of a philosophical ‘principle of the maximum’ and its particular application by Aquinas to grace. After replies to the objections, based on the method and structure of the Summa, I locate Aquinas’s position in the debate on Christ’s heavenly mediation between that of John Calvin and that of John Owen and Jonathan Edwards.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90616280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God’ (Matthew 5.8; NRSV), so says Christ at the beginning of his greatest sermon, the Sermon on the Mount. But just what it is to be pure in heart and what it is to see God, he never explains. Following this beatitude, Christian writers in Scripture, and in the subsequent Christian tradition, have developed the doctrine of the beatific vision, according to which a person who is completely sanctified (is pure in heart) has immediate knowledge of God (sees him). While this doctrine has exerted considerable influence on the Christian tradition, it has received scant philosophical attention. In this issue, we begin to sketch what a philosophy of the beatific vision would look like.
{"title":"Editorial: Beatific Vision","authors":"David Efird, David Worsley","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I2.16603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I2.16603","url":null,"abstract":"‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God’ (Matthew 5.8; NRSV), so says Christ at the beginning of his greatest sermon, the Sermon on the Mount. But just what it is to be pure in heart and what it is to see God, he never explains. Following this beatitude, Christian writers in Scripture, and in the subsequent Christian tradition, have developed the doctrine of the beatific vision, according to which a person who is completely sanctified (is pure in heart) has immediate knowledge of God (sees him). While this doctrine has exerted considerable influence on the Christian tradition, it has received scant philosophical attention. In this issue, we begin to sketch what a philosophy of the beatific vision would look like.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75051499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay I identify four different problems of heavenly freedom; i.e., problems that arise for those who hold that the redeemed in heaven have free will. They are: the problem arising from God's own freedom, the problem of needing to praise the redeemed for not sinning in heaven, the problem of needing to affirm that the redeemed freely refrain from sinning, and the problem arising from a commitment to the free will defence. I explore how some of these problems vary depending on the notion of free will which is endorsed. And I suggest that because these differing problems arise from distinct theological and/or philosophical commitments, there is little reason to think that one and the same feature or property of an account of heavenly freedom will address them all.
{"title":"Some Problems of Heavenly Freedom","authors":"S. Kittle","doi":"10.14428/THL.V2I2.2273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V2I2.2273","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay I identify four different problems of heavenly freedom; i.e., problems that arise for those who hold that the redeemed in heaven have free will. They are: the problem arising from God's own freedom, the problem of needing to praise the redeemed for not sinning in heaven, the problem of needing to affirm that the redeemed freely refrain from sinning, and the problem arising from a commitment to the free will defence. I explore how some of these problems vary depending on the notion of free will which is endorsed. And I suggest that because these differing problems arise from distinct theological and/or philosophical commitments, there is little reason to think that one and the same feature or property of an account of heavenly freedom will address them all.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91149456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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