The problem of the Trinity is often framed as a paradox between some propositions central to the doctrine of the Trinity that seem to be logically in tension with each other. However, a problem of Paradox presupposes that we have a sufficient understanding of the meanings of the propositions (otherwise we wouldn’t even have any appearance of conflict between these meanings). My claim in this paper is that the main problem of the Trinity is more radical than a problem of Paradox: it’s rather a problem of Meaninglessness, in the sense that the difficult challenge is to grasp a meaning for the central propositions of the doctrine (not to render logically compatible some meanings clearly grasped). I show how we can respond to the problem of Meaninglessness and how, once we have solved it, there is no need to try and dissolve the appearance of contradiction which constitutes the problem of Paradox. As far as the problem of Paradox goes, the solution adopted here is therefore a form of Mysterianism.
{"title":"Trinity: Mysterianism and the Problem of Meaninglessness","authors":"Jean-Baptiste Guillon","doi":"10.14428/thl.v6i2.63723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v6i2.63723","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of the Trinity is often framed as a paradox between some propositions central to the doctrine of the Trinity that seem to be logically in tension with each other. However, a problem of Paradox presupposes that we have a sufficient understanding of the meanings of the propositions (otherwise we wouldn’t even have any appearance of conflict between these meanings). My claim in this paper is that the main problem of the Trinity is more radical than a problem of Paradox: it’s rather a problem of Meaninglessness, in the sense that the difficult challenge is to grasp a meaning for the central propositions of the doctrine (not to render logically compatible some meanings clearly grasped). I show how we can respond to the problem of Meaninglessness and how, once we have solved it, there is no need to try and dissolve the appearance of contradiction which constitutes the problem of Paradox. As far as the problem of Paradox goes, the solution adopted here is therefore a form of Mysterianism.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79141186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores and defends an institutional metaphysics for the Trinity as providing us with an inherently interpersonal reality, and provides general and specific methodological arguments in that direction in the first section. The actual argumentation is then first of all directed against Augustine’s rejection of the family as a suitable analogy for the Trinity. It is instead argued that the family does in fact offer an interesting and suitable analogy. Next, several more general and historic precursors to such an institutional analogy are explored and fleshed out, relying on the legal and economic meaning of the term ‘substance’ as an estate, such as the shared inheritance between a father and a son. The main section further develops the outlines and main features of such an institutional metaphysics, relying on both analogies to result in three persons in one numerically identical substance. The final section returns to the methodological issue but now in an explicitly Marian key, culminating in the Holy Family as a key exemplar for the family analogy.
{"title":"institutional metaphysics for the Trinity","authors":"M. Bauwens","doi":"10.14428/thl.v6i2.65613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v6i2.65613","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores and defends an institutional metaphysics for the Trinity as providing us with an inherently interpersonal reality, and provides general and specific methodological arguments in that direction in the first section. The actual argumentation is then first of all directed against Augustine’s rejection of the family as a suitable analogy for the Trinity. It is instead argued that the family does in fact offer an interesting and suitable analogy. Next, several more general and historic precursors to such an institutional analogy are explored and fleshed out, relying on the legal and economic meaning of the term ‘substance’ as an estate, such as the shared inheritance between a father and a son. The main section further develops the outlines and main features of such an institutional metaphysics, relying on both analogies to result in three persons in one numerically identical substance. The final section returns to the methodological issue but now in an explicitly Marian key, culminating in the Holy Family as a key exemplar for the family analogy.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85401059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent findings in neuroscience and psychology indicate that “the body keeps the score” of PTSD. Concurrently, trauma-informed theology to date has deployed pneumatology to explain how God experiences trauma in the Christian narrative of salvation. Yet, in Christian theology the divine person of the Holy Spirit has no assumed human body. This raises an important question as to whether a body is needed for God to keep the score of posttraumatic stress in a manner consistent with neuroscience and how this might shape one’s account of trauma in Christian soteriology. In this article, I take an analytic science-engaged approach to assess the viability of dominant proposals in trauma-informed theology which deploy trauma theory to assert God’s experience of trauma and explain this experience with exclusive reference to pneumatology. After reviewing clinical and scientific research on the neuroscience of PTSD which has been neglected in these approaches, I argue that Christology is a more obviously fitting locus for suggesting God’s experience of trauma within Christian soteriology than the person of the Holy Spirit. I conclude that since the body keeps the score of trauma from a scientific perspective, Christ’s body keeps the score of trauma from a science-engaged theology perspective.
{"title":"Christ's Body Keeps the Score","authors":"Preston Hill","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i1.64223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i1.64223","url":null,"abstract":"Recent findings in neuroscience and psychology indicate that “the body keeps the score” of PTSD. Concurrently, trauma-informed theology to date has deployed pneumatology to explain how God experiences trauma in the Christian narrative of salvation. Yet, in Christian theology the divine person of the Holy Spirit has no assumed human body. This raises an important question as to whether a body is needed for God to keep the score of posttraumatic stress in a manner consistent with neuroscience and how this might shape one’s account of trauma in Christian soteriology. In this article, I take an analytic science-engaged approach to assess the viability of dominant proposals in trauma-informed theology which deploy trauma theory to assert God’s experience of trauma and explain this experience with exclusive reference to pneumatology. After reviewing clinical and scientific research on the neuroscience of PTSD which has been neglected in these approaches, I argue that Christology is a more obviously fitting locus for suggesting God’s experience of trauma within Christian soteriology than the person of the Holy Spirit. I conclude that since the body keeps the score of trauma from a scientific perspective, Christ’s body keeps the score of trauma from a science-engaged theology perspective.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79639486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article seeks to show that death prevents one’s life from being meaningful on balance. Proponents of what has come to be known as the ‘imperfection thesis’ about life’s meaning claim that it is sufficient for one’s life to be meaningful that one relates to only a non-maximal conceivable value. In many, if not all, contexts, holding the imperfection thesis appears to be the sole reason for supposing that death need not prevent one’s life from being meaningful. Counter to this, it is argued that there is good reason to believe that the imperfection thesis is false, that arguments in favour of the imperfection thesis fail, and that attempts to show that the imperfection thesis can counter the arguments against it in a principled way are unsuccessful. Given this, it can be concluded that the imperfection thesis is false, and so there is no reason for supposing that death need not prevent one’s life from being meaningful.
{"title":"Death Prevents Our Lives From Being Meaningful","authors":"Nicholas Waghorn","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.63193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.63193","url":null,"abstract":"This article seeks to show that death prevents one’s life from being meaningful on balance. Proponents of what has come to be known as the ‘imperfection thesis’ about life’s meaning claim that it is sufficient for one’s life to be meaningful that one relates to only a non-maximal conceivable value. In many, if not all, contexts, holding the imperfection thesis appears to be the sole reason for supposing that death need not prevent one’s life from being meaningful. Counter to this, it is argued that there is good reason to believe that the imperfection thesis is false, that arguments in favour of the imperfection thesis fail, and that attempts to show that the imperfection thesis can counter the arguments against it in a principled way are unsuccessful. Given this, it can be concluded that the imperfection thesis is false, and so there is no reason for supposing that death need not prevent one’s life from being meaningful.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86416960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Meaning-making plays a central role in how we deal with experiences of suffering, including those due to mental disorder. And for many, religious beliefs, experiences, and practices (hereafter, religious engagement) play a central role in informing this meaning-making. However, a crucial facet of the relationship between experiences of mental disorder and religious engagement remains underexplored—namely the potentially positive effects of mental disorder on religious engagement (e.g. experiences of bipolar disorder increasing sense of God’s presence). In what follows, I will present empirical findings from two recent studies of mine which shed light on the extent to which participants experienced these positive effects, specific components of these effects, and how they fit into their understanding of their mental disorder and its relationship to their religious identity. In doing so, I will draw on and expand Tasia Scrutton’s Potentially Transformative view (2015a, 2015b, 2020) according to which mental disorders may provide opportunities for spiritual growth. My empirical results align with and help deepen an account according to which mental disorders are potentially spiritually transformative by providing further insight into such instances: specifically, which symptoms and internal and external factors are often involved, as well as which religious beliefs, experiences, and/or practices are often affected. After presenting these results and articulating their relevance for a potentially transformative view of mental disorder, I will then address some potential objections to the theoretical account as well as some limitations of the empirical work, before sketching possible promising directions for future research.
{"title":"Mental Disorder, Meaning-making, and Religious Cognition","authors":"Kate Finley","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i1.64203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i1.64203","url":null,"abstract":"Meaning-making plays a central role in how we deal with experiences of suffering, including those due to mental disorder. And for many, religious beliefs, experiences, and practices (hereafter, religious engagement) play a central role in informing this meaning-making. However, a crucial facet of the relationship between experiences of mental disorder and religious engagement remains underexplored—namely the potentially positive effects of mental disorder on religious engagement (e.g. experiences of bipolar disorder increasing sense of God’s presence). In what follows, I will present empirical findings from two recent studies of mine which shed light on the extent to which participants experienced these positive effects, specific components of these effects, and how they fit into their understanding of their mental disorder and its relationship to their religious identity. In doing so, I will draw on and expand Tasia Scrutton’s Potentially Transformative view (2015a, 2015b, 2020) according to which mental disorders may provide opportunities for spiritual growth. My empirical results align with and help deepen an account according to which mental disorders are potentially spiritually transformative by providing further insight into such instances: specifically, which symptoms and internal and external factors are often involved, as well as which religious beliefs, experiences, and/or practices are often affected. After presenting these results and articulating their relevance for a potentially transformative view of mental disorder, I will then address some potential objections to the theoretical account as well as some limitations of the empirical work, before sketching possible promising directions for future research.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89600918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I argue for an extension of relational accounts of the imago Dei which includes a kind of priestly relation to the created order. In this relation, humanity is intended to ensure the independent flourishing of creation in a way reflective of the kind of communion we ought to have with one another. Through an analysis of the brokenness of these relationships, I argue human oppression of other humans and ravaging of creation are born of the same brokenness in such a way that they contribute to one another as distortions of human teleological communion. By drawing on Social Identity Approach in group psychology, I can offer an account of shared human identity out of which humanity acts in distorted ways as a group. By describing oppression and ravaging in terms of broken communal telos and group action, I offer a way forward for relating humanity to the created order in a way that neither instrumentalizes creation, nor flattens the distinctiveness of human creation in the image of God.
{"title":"Communion and Creation","authors":"D. T. Everhart","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i1.63363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i1.63363","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue for an extension of relational accounts of the imago Dei which includes a kind of priestly relation to the created order. In this relation, humanity is intended to ensure the independent flourishing of creation in a way reflective of the kind of communion we ought to have with one another. Through an analysis of the brokenness of these relationships, I argue human oppression of other humans and ravaging of creation are born of the same brokenness in such a way that they contribute to one another as distortions of human teleological communion. By drawing on Social Identity Approach in group psychology, I can offer an account of shared human identity out of which humanity acts in distorted ways as a group. By describing oppression and ravaging in terms of broken communal telos and group action, I offer a way forward for relating humanity to the created order in a way that neither instrumentalizes creation, nor flattens the distinctiveness of human creation in the image of God.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81349899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I provide an overview of the Christian moral wisdom with respect to virtue formation and character cultivation. I focus in particular on some warnings issued by the great teachers on these topics with respect to the motivations one ought to have in the Christian life. I then discuss some findings of contemporary psychology on habit formation which seem to be at odds with the warnings in Christian moral wisdom. I argue that while there is surface discord between the contemporary psychology of habit formation and Christian moral wisdom, there is in fact a deep concord between them.
{"title":"The Psychology of Habit Formation and Christian Moral Wisdom on Virtue Formation","authors":"Timothy Pawl","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i1.64333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i1.64333","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I provide an overview of the Christian moral wisdom with respect to virtue formation and character cultivation. I focus in particular on some warnings issued by the great teachers on these topics with respect to the motivations one ought to have in the Christian life. I then discuss some findings of contemporary psychology on habit formation which seem to be at odds with the warnings in Christian moral wisdom. I argue that while there is surface discord between the contemporary psychology of habit formation and Christian moral wisdom, there is in fact a deep concord between them.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82698172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding the pervasiveness of sin is central to Christian theology. The question of why humans are so sinful given an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God presents a challenge and a puzzle. Here, we investigate Friedrich Schleiermacher’s biocultural evolutionary account of sin. We look at empirical evidence to support it and use the cultural Price equation to provide a naturalistic model of the transmission of sin. This model can help us understand how sin can be ubiquitous and unavoidable, even though it is not biologically transmitted, and even if there is no historical Fall that precipitated the tendency to sin.
{"title":"Schleiermacher and the transmission of sin","authors":"Helen De Cruz, J. De Smedt","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i2.65763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i2.65763","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the pervasiveness of sin is central to Christian theology. The question of why humans are so sinful given an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God presents a challenge and a puzzle. Here, we investigate Friedrich Schleiermacher’s biocultural evolutionary account of sin. We look at empirical evidence to support it and use the cultural Price equation to provide a naturalistic model of the transmission of sin. This model can help us understand how sin can be ubiquitous and unavoidable, even though it is not biologically transmitted, and even if there is no historical Fall that precipitated the tendency to sin.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87312157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses an amazingly close analogy between models of generalised trinitarin logics on the one hand side and class hierarchies in the field of object-oriented programming on the other, thus linking philosophy of religion and computer science. In order to bring out this analogy as clear and precise as possible, we utilise a metaobject protocol for the actual implementation of the theological models. These formal implementations lead to the insight that the analogy can be pushed even further, and we lay bare and analyse the close relation between the theological notion of subordination of divine persons and precedence in structures of multiple inheritance. The implementation of theoretical godheads finally leads to new metaobject programming techniques, thus underlining the cross-fertilisation between theology and computer science.
{"title":"Computational Theology","authors":"Tim Lethen","doi":"10.14428/thl.v6i2.65223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v6i2.65223","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses an amazingly close analogy between models of generalised trinitarin logics on the one hand side and class hierarchies in the field of object-oriented programming on the other, thus linking philosophy of religion and computer science. In order to bring out this analogy as clear and precise as possible, we utilise a metaobject protocol for the actual implementation of the theological models. These formal implementations lead to the insight that the analogy can be pushed even further, and we lay bare and analyse the close relation between the theological notion of subordination of divine persons and precedence in structures of multiple inheritance. The implementation of theoretical godheads finally leads to new metaobject programming techniques, thus underlining the cross-fertilisation between theology and computer science.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80343803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The doctrine of “the Monarchy of the Father” is affirmed by nearly all patristic authors at the source of the doctrine of the Trinity and its canonical, creedal formulation(s). Yet, while still discussed by theologians, the doctrine has been (almost) completely ignored in analytic theology. I argue that the doctrine, though ancient, suggests a fresh approach within the contemporary debate, and reveals a fatal flaw in one of the strongest contemporary arguments against Trinitarianism. Briefly, whereas Social Trinitarianism identifies God with all of the divine persons (taken together) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism identifies God with each of the divine persons (taken individually), what I will call “Monarchical Trinitarianism” identifies God with one of the divine persons (the Father), without rejecting the full divinity of the Son and Spirit. According to Dale Tuggy, all orthodox formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity, by definition, identify God with the Trinity, rather than the Father, whereas the New Testament does the reverse. I argue Tuggy's argument counts equally in favor of Monarchical Trinitarianism, but siphons off that support, counting it as support only for Unitarianism via his definitions, which are undermined by a close reading of both patristic and modern Trinitarian theologians.
{"title":"One God, the Father","authors":"B. Branson","doi":"10.14428/thl.v6i2.67603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v6i2.67603","url":null,"abstract":"The doctrine of “the Monarchy of the Father” is affirmed by nearly all patristic authors at the source of the doctrine of the Trinity and its canonical, creedal formulation(s). Yet, while still discussed by theologians, the doctrine has been (almost) completely ignored in analytic theology. I argue that the doctrine, though ancient, suggests a fresh approach within the contemporary debate, and reveals a fatal flaw in one of the strongest contemporary arguments against Trinitarianism. Briefly, whereas Social Trinitarianism identifies God with all of the divine persons (taken together) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism identifies God with each of the divine persons (taken individually), what I will call “Monarchical Trinitarianism” identifies God with one of the divine persons (the Father), without rejecting the full divinity of the Son and Spirit. According to Dale Tuggy, all orthodox formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity, by definition, identify God with the Trinity, rather than the Father, whereas the New Testament does the reverse. I argue Tuggy's argument counts equally in favor of Monarchical Trinitarianism, but siphons off that support, counting it as support only for Unitarianism via his definitions, which are undermined by a close reading of both patristic and modern Trinitarian theologians.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83048130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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