En este artículo se pretende mostrar la coherencia de los enunciados sobre el Dios uno y trino en la teología analítica, a partir de su formulación en el llamado credo atanasiano. Se ofrece un panorama crítico sobre la discusión acerca de la inteligibilidad del misterio de la Trinidad en la teología filosófica analítica reciente, así como las diversas soluciones en algunos de sus más destacados representantes: la del trinitarianismo social (William Hasker), la del trinitarianismo latino (Brian Leftow) y la identidad relativa aplicada a la teoría trinitaria (Peter van Inwagen). Para superar las dificultades que tienen estas posiciones, derivadas, sobre todo, de su problemática noción de persona, se presenta una contribución a esta discusión con un novedoso análisis de la Trinidad, basado en la noción de función de Gottlob Frege. Con este análisis se explica por qué no hay contradicción entre los enunciados trinitarios, y así se justifica la consistencia y, en consecuencia, la coherencia de la doctrina trinitaria. Abstract: This article aims to show the coherence of the statements about the one and triune God in analytic theology, starting from their formulation in the so-called Athanasian Creed. It offers a critical overview of the discussion about the intelligibility of the mystery of the Trinity in recent analytic philosophical theology, as well as the various solutions in some of its most prominent representatives: the social trinitarianism (William Hasker), the Latin trinitarianism (Brian Leftow) and the relative identity applied to trinitarian theory (Peter van Inwagen). In order to overcome the difficulties with these positions, derived, above all, from their problematic notion of personhood, a contribution to this discussion is presented with a novel analysis of the Trinity, based on Gottlob Frege's notion of function. This analysis explains why there is no contradiction between trinitarian statements, and thus justifies the consistency and, consequently, the coherence of trinitarian doctrine.
在这篇文章中，我们试图展示分析神学中关于一神和三位一体的陈述的一致性，从他们在所谓的亚大纳信经中的表述。讨论问题提供了一个关键的谜团的清晰度三位一体的最近分析哲学、神学以及各种解决方案,其中一些最突出:代表trinitarianismo trinitarianismo字母(William Hasker)、社会(Brian Leftow)和身份相对应用理论trinitaria (Peter van Inwagen)。在这篇文章中，我们提出了一个关于三位一体的新分析，这是基于Gottlob Frege的函数概念。这一分析解释了为什么三位一体的陈述之间没有矛盾，从而证明了一致性，从而证明了三位一体教义的连贯性。Abstract:这条区域显示的of the发言about the one and triune God in analytic神学院神学博士,《starting from应建议Athanasian信条。It offers a critical概览讨论about the intelligibility of the奥秘of the Trinity近年analytic philosophical神学院神学,as well as the解决solutions in some of its most prominent代表:the social trinitarianism (William Hasker), the Latin trinitarianism (Brian Leftow) and the: identity applied to trinitarian theory (Peter van Inwagen)。为了克服困难与出任、毁坏,在all from their五天notion of personhood,对这个讨论is with a小说介绍analysis of the Trinity, based on Gottlob Frege’s notion of function。This analysis explains why there is no contradiction between trinitarian高级别,and因此justifies一致性和,consequently, the的trinitarian .。
{"title":"La coherencia de la doctrina trinitaria desde la noción de función de Gottlob Frege","authors":"Vicente Vide-Rodríguez","doi":"10.14428/thl.v5i2.62843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v5i2.62843","url":null,"abstract":"En este artículo se pretende mostrar la coherencia de los enunciados sobre el Dios uno y trino en la teología analítica, a partir de su formulación en el llamado credo atanasiano. Se ofrece un panorama crítico sobre la discusión acerca de la inteligibilidad del misterio de la Trinidad en la teología filosófica analítica reciente, así como las diversas soluciones en algunos de sus más destacados representantes: la del trinitarianismo social (William Hasker), la del trinitarianismo latino (Brian Leftow) y la identidad relativa aplicada a la teoría trinitaria (Peter van Inwagen). Para superar las dificultades que tienen estas posiciones, derivadas, sobre todo, de su problemática noción de persona, se presenta una contribución a esta discusión con un novedoso análisis de la Trinidad, basado en la noción de función de Gottlob Frege. Con este análisis se explica por qué no hay contradicción entre los enunciados trinitarios, y así se justifica la consistencia y, en consecuencia, la coherencia de la doctrina trinitaria. \u0000Abstract: This article aims to show the coherence of the statements about the one and triune God in analytic theology, starting from their formulation in the so-called Athanasian Creed. It offers a critical overview of the discussion about the intelligibility of the mystery of the Trinity in recent analytic philosophical theology, as well as the various solutions in some of its most prominent representatives: the social trinitarianism (William Hasker), the Latin trinitarianism (Brian Leftow) and the relative identity applied to trinitarian theory (Peter van Inwagen). In order to overcome the difficulties with these positions, derived, above all, from their problematic notion of personhood, a contribution to this discussion is presented with a novel analysis of the Trinity, based on Gottlob Frege's notion of function. This analysis explains why there is no contradiction between trinitarian statements, and thus justifies the consistency and, consequently, the coherence of trinitarian doctrine. \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73657892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil.
{"title":"Let's Play GOLF!","authors":"Steven B. Cowan","doi":"10.14428/thl.v5i2.20343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v5i2.20343","url":null,"abstract":"A central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76657419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to recent accounts of so called “liturgical anthropology,” human beings are ritual creatures shaped more by what they feel than what they think. This is because the liturgies that make up our daily lives orient our desires towards certain goals and visions of the good life. We seek to expand this vision of liturgical anthropology by offering a critique of a predominantly affective vision of human development in which liturgy shapes primarily what we love. Drawing insights from developmental psychology, we argue that affect and cognition and intertwined throughout development, each reinforcing the other. Instead of attempting to artificially separate cognition and affect, then, we offer a vision of liturgical anthropology that is holistic, paying attention to the ways in which both our desires and beliefs are shaped by participation in liturgies, whether these be religious or otherwise. Finally, we argue that the psychological concept of “joint attention” can provide a helpful focal point for establishing why liturgy and ritual is so formative for human development.
{"title":"Liturgical Anthropology","authors":"Joshua Cockayne, Gideon Salter","doi":"10.14428/thl.v6i1.61193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v6i1.61193","url":null,"abstract":"According to recent accounts of so called “liturgical anthropology,” human beings are ritual creatures shaped more by what they feel than what they think. This is because the liturgies that make up our daily lives orient our desires towards certain goals and visions of the good life. We seek to expand this vision of liturgical anthropology by offering a critique of a predominantly affective vision of human development in which liturgy shapes primarily what we love. Drawing insights from developmental psychology, we argue that affect and cognition and intertwined throughout development, each reinforcing the other. Instead of attempting to artificially separate cognition and affect, then, we offer a vision of liturgical anthropology that is holistic, paying attention to the ways in which both our desires and beliefs are shaped by participation in liturgies, whether these be religious or otherwise. Finally, we argue that the psychological concept of “joint attention” can provide a helpful focal point for establishing why liturgy and ritual is so formative for human development. \u0000 \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81225946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While the evidential problem of evil has been enormously influential within the contemporary philosophical literature—William Rowe’s 1979 formulation in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” being the most seminal—no academic research has explored what cognitive mechanisms might underwrite the appearance of pointlessness in target examples of suffering. In this exploratory paper, we show that the perception of pointlessness in the target examples of suffering that underwrite Rowe’s seminal formulation of the problem of evil is contingent on the absence of broader context. In other words, we show that when such suffering is presented alongside broader contextual information, the appearance of pointlessness, on average, significantly diminishes. In §1 we briefly elucidate Rowe’s formulation of the problem of evil and the thought experiment that motivates a key premise. In §2 and §3 respectively, we briefly explain our hypothesis regarding Rowe’s case and our methods for testing these hypotheses. In §4, we elucidate our results, and in §5 we explore some of the philosophical implications of our findings and gesture towards some areas for future research. Finally, in §6, we briefly connect our research to some of the established philosophical literature on suffering and narrative before concluding.
{"title":"The Context of Suffering","authors":"Ian M. Church, Isaac Warchol, J. Barrett","doi":"10.14428/thl.v6i1.61183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v6i1.61183","url":null,"abstract":"While the evidential problem of evil has been enormously influential within the contemporary philosophical literature—William Rowe’s 1979 formulation in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” being the most seminal—no academic research has explored what cognitive mechanisms might underwrite the appearance of pointlessness in target examples of suffering. In this exploratory paper, we show that the perception of pointlessness in the target examples of suffering that underwrite Rowe’s seminal formulation of the problem of evil is contingent on the absence of broader context. In other words, we show that when such suffering is presented alongside broader contextual information, the appearance of pointlessness, on average, significantly diminishes. In §1 we briefly elucidate Rowe’s formulation of the problem of evil and the thought experiment that motivates a key premise. In §2 and §3 respectively, we briefly explain our hypothesis regarding Rowe’s case and our methods for testing these hypotheses. In §4, we elucidate our results, and in §5 we explore some of the philosophical implications of our findings and gesture towards some areas for future research. Finally, in §6, we briefly connect our research to some of the established philosophical literature on suffering and narrative before concluding.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91336422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I aim to discuss E. J. Lowe's view of the synergy between metaphysics and natural science. In doing so, I will extend Lowe’s synergistic model to develop a realist account of theological claims thereby responding to Byrne’s strong form of eliminativism and agnosticism about theological claims. The paper is divided up as follows. In section 1, I will discuss Lowe’s view of metaphysics. In section 2, I will explain how Lowe thinks metaphysics and natural science are related. In section 3, I will respond to objections against Lowe’s conception of metaphysics. In section 4, I will discuss the implications of Lowe’s conception of metaphysics for a realist account of theological claims. In section 5, I will conclude this paper by claiming that there are excellent reasons to extend the synergy between metaphysics and natural science to that of theology as well.
{"title":"Metaphysics, Natural Science and Theological Claims","authors":"Mihretu P. Guta","doi":"10.14428/thl.v5i2.62723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v5i2.62723","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I aim to discuss E. J. Lowe's view of the synergy between metaphysics and natural science. In doing so, I will extend Lowe’s synergistic model to develop a realist account of theological claims thereby responding to Byrne’s strong form of eliminativism and agnosticism about theological claims. The paper is divided up as follows. In section 1, I will discuss Lowe’s view of metaphysics. In section 2, I will explain how Lowe thinks metaphysics and natural science are related. In section 3, I will respond to objections against Lowe’s conception of metaphysics. In section 4, I will discuss the implications of Lowe’s conception of metaphysics for a realist account of theological claims. In section 5, I will conclude this paper by claiming that there are excellent reasons to extend the synergy between metaphysics and natural science to that of theology as well.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90556175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eric Wielenberg’s two alleged contradictions in my view of God, time, and creation are easily resolved. The first is dissolved by appreciating that God’s power to create the universe is a modal property which God may possess but even if He never in fact exercises that power. The second contradiction evaporates once one adopts a relational view of time.
Eric Wielenberg在我对上帝的看法中提出的两个所谓的矛盾，时间和创造，很容易解决。通过认识到上帝创造宇宙的能力是上帝可能拥有的一种模态属性，但即使他实际上从未行使过这种能力，第一种观点就被消解了。一旦人们采用关系时间观，第二个矛盾就消失了。
{"title":"No Trouble","authors":"William Lane Craig","doi":"10.14428/thl.v4i3.58143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v4i3.58143","url":null,"abstract":"Eric Wielenberg’s two alleged contradictions in my view of God, time, and creation are easily resolved. The first is dissolved by appreciating that God’s power to create the universe is a modal property which God may possess but even if He never in fact exercises that power. The second contradiction evaporates once one adopts a relational view of time.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85693042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay, I apply Lowe’s theory of rational agency to God’s causal activity. I argue that Lowe’s account fits well the traditional notions that God acts in the world for reasons. In contrast to Lowe’s analysis of human causal agency, I argue that in the divine case, reasons for acting are not constituted by needs. They are constituted by God’s desires or plans. The fit between Lowe’s account of causal agency and the contours of divine causal agency motivate an argument in favor of Lowe’s theory. Any philosopher who is a theist ought to think Lowe’s account is likely to be true.
{"title":"E. J. Lowe and Divine Causal Agency","authors":"Gregory E. Ganssle","doi":"10.14428/thl.v5i2.58973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v5i2.58973","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I apply Lowe’s theory of rational agency to God’s causal activity. I argue that Lowe’s account fits well the traditional notions that God acts in the world for reasons. In contrast to Lowe’s analysis of human causal agency, I argue that in the divine case, reasons for acting are not constituted by needs. They are constituted by God’s desires or plans. The fit between Lowe’s account of causal agency and the contours of divine causal agency motivate an argument in favor of Lowe’s theory. Any philosopher who is a theist ought to think Lowe’s account is likely to be true.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80070592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience and underestimates dualism. She doesn’t show how neuroscience can explain the mind’s characteristic qualia, unity, privacy, or causality. We argue that Lowe’s dualism can better explain minds, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Murphy’s physicalism thus serves to highlight the value of Lowe’s dualism today.
{"title":"From Murphy’s Christian Physicalism to Lowe’s Dualism","authors":"Mostyn W. Jones, Eric LaRock","doi":"10.14428/thl.v5i2.56273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v5i2.56273","url":null,"abstract":"Nancey Murphy argues that God created us as physical beings without immortal souls. She supports this Christian physicalism by arguing that neuroscience can better explain minds in terms of physical information processing than dualists can in problematic nonphysical terms. We reply that Murphy overestimates neuroscience and underestimates dualism. She doesn’t show how neuroscience can explain the mind’s characteristic qualia, unity, privacy, or causality. We argue that Lowe’s dualism can better explain minds, often with experimental support and in testable ways. Murphy’s physicalism thus serves to highlight the value of Lowe’s dualism today.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83187157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much recent work in analytic theology concerned with Trinitarian doctrine has been limited both by: (1) a narrow focus on the apparent inconsistency of the doctrine and (2) little regard for the historical context in which the doctrine developed. This special issue represents an effort to overcome these limitations in two ways. First, following Timothy Pawl’s definition of “Conciliar Christology,” we define “Conciliar Trinitarianism” as the conjunction of claims about the Trinity in the first seven Ecumenical Councils. Rather than speculative attempts at reconciling, say, sentences taken from the Athanasian Creed, or the common parlance of contemporary, Western Christians, the papers in this issue all address specifically Conciliar Trinitarianism. Second, the special issue brings together both analytic philosophers and patristics scholars in a format in which, in several cases, a scholar from one field responds to a scholar from another. We hope that this will help to jump-start some further conversations between scholars in analytic philosophy and in patristics, as we believe both fields can benefit from a deeper mutual engagement in the study of Conciliar Trinitarianism.
{"title":"Editorial: Conciliar Trinitarianism","authors":"B. Branson, Joseph Jedwab, Scott M. Williams","doi":"10.14428/THL.V4I2.61363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/THL.V4I2.61363","url":null,"abstract":"Much recent work in analytic theology concerned with Trinitarian doctrine has been limited both by: (1) a narrow focus on the apparent inconsistency of the doctrine and (2) little regard for the historical context in which the doctrine developed. This special issue represents an effort to overcome these limitations in two ways. First, following Timothy Pawl’s definition of “Conciliar Christology,” we define “Conciliar Trinitarianism” as the conjunction of claims about the Trinity in the first seven Ecumenical Councils. Rather than speculative attempts at reconciling, say, sentences taken from the Athanasian Creed, or the common parlance of contemporary, Western Christians, the papers in this issue all address specifically Conciliar Trinitarianism. Second, the special issue brings together both analytic philosophers and patristics scholars in a format in which, in several cases, a scholar from one field responds to a scholar from another. We hope that this will help to jump-start some further conversations between scholars in analytic philosophy and in patristics, as we believe both fields can benefit from a deeper mutual engagement in the study of Conciliar Trinitarianism.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81305840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different propositions must always be true at distinct worlds. The Multiactualities Response nevertheless has its own problem, namely that it requires the possibility of multiple actual worlds. This paper argues that if we consider spacetimes with wormholes, we have good cause to think there can be multiple metaphysically privileged present moments; given a suitable analogy between time and modality, it follows that there can be multiple metaphysically privileged (i.e. actual) worlds. This paper includes an in–depth examination of the metaphysics of both the temporal and modal cases.
{"title":"Using Wormholes to Solve the Problem of Evil","authors":"N. Effingham","doi":"10.14428/thl.v4i3.54993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v4i3.54993","url":null,"abstract":"The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different propositions must always be true at distinct worlds. The Multiactualities Response nevertheless has its own problem, namely that it requires the possibility of multiple actual worlds. This paper argues that if we consider spacetimes with wormholes, we have good cause to think there can be multiple metaphysically privileged present moments; given a suitable analogy between time and modality, it follows that there can be multiple metaphysically privileged (i.e. actual) worlds. This paper includes an in–depth examination of the metaphysics of both the temporal and modal cases.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73967253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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