Pub Date : 2021-06-23DOI: 10.1142/s1013251121500077
Yitao Tao
When Xi Jinping had just come to power in 2012, the world expected that he would continue the development trajectory of economic liberalization and political institutionalization set in motion by Deng Xiaoping. However, when the National People’s Congress abolished the presidential term limit in the Chinese Constitution in March of 2018, it suddenly became clear that Xi had chosen to “roll back” from Deng’s policy line in nearly every aspect of the Chinese Party-state system. How does one explain Xi’s sudden departure from Deng’s policy line? In comparison with the resurgence of other authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America and East Asia, this paper argues that the cause of Xi’s political rollback lies in the exhaustion of the previous development model. More specifically, the exhaustion of export-led growth in the mid-2000s had made the existing distributive coalition unsustainable. The power struggle within the political coalition therefore intensified and finally led to Xi’s monopoly over political power. The argument of this paper will proceed through four parts. It will begin with a literature review of comparative authoritarianism with a particular focus on the impact of a development crisis on the survival of political coalitions. It is followed by an analysis of the contributions of China’s export-led growth to the sustainability of the political coalition during the eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Then, it will explain how the exhaustion of export-led growth led to a power struggle within the political coalition and how through a re-orientation of the development model, Xi has gradually concentrated power into his own hands. Finally, it will discuss the theoretical implications of China’s case.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Xi Jinping’s Political Rollback","authors":"Yitao Tao","doi":"10.1142/s1013251121500077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s1013251121500077","url":null,"abstract":"When Xi Jinping had just come to power in 2012, the world expected that he would continue the development trajectory of economic liberalization and political institutionalization set in motion by Deng Xiaoping. However, when the National People’s Congress abolished the presidential term limit in the Chinese Constitution in March of 2018, it suddenly became clear that Xi had chosen to “roll back” from Deng’s policy line in nearly every aspect of the Chinese Party-state system. How does one explain Xi’s sudden departure from Deng’s policy line? In comparison with the resurgence of other authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America and East Asia, this paper argues that the cause of Xi’s political rollback lies in the exhaustion of the previous development model. More specifically, the exhaustion of export-led growth in the mid-2000s had made the existing distributive coalition unsustainable. The power struggle within the political coalition therefore intensified and finally led to Xi’s monopoly over political power. The argument of this paper will proceed through four parts. It will begin with a literature review of comparative authoritarianism with a particular focus on the impact of a development crisis on the survival of political coalitions. It is followed by an analysis of the contributions of China’s export-led growth to the sustainability of the political coalition during the eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Then, it will explain how the exhaustion of export-led growth led to a power struggle within the political coalition and how through a re-orientation of the development model, Xi has gradually concentrated power into his own hands. Finally, it will discuss the theoretical implications of China’s case.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82065780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-21DOI: 10.1142/s1013251121500053
Michael J. Jensen, Titus C Chen
The regime of censorship in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) extends beyond its borders through the extraterritorial application of its media regulations to popular social media platforms like WeChat. This research investigates the effects of the PRC’s extraterritorial control of online content on the identity narratives and norms communicated by comparing Australia’s Special Broadcast Service (SBS) Mandarin language news and the news targeting Australian audiences published on popular WeChat Official Accounts (OAs). We find significant differences in the news content between these two platforms: SBS provides more political content and a focus on political and cultural integration, while WeChat pages tend to avoid political topics that are not otherwise press releases from the PRC and they encourage strong cultural ties with Mainland China. Finally, SBS tends to both inform and cultivate democratic political identities and identification with the Australian political system, whereas WeChat tends to differentiate the Chinese diaspora from the wider Australian community. We situate these findings within a wider understanding of PRC’s national security strategies and doctrine. Whether by requirement or practice, not only the WeChat OAs in Australia implement PRC’s communication controls, but the content on these pages also challenges the liberal democratic practices and norms and supports foreign influence and espionage in Australia.
{"title":"Illiberal Media in a Liberal Democracy: Examining Identity in Australia’s Mandarin Language News","authors":"Michael J. Jensen, Titus C Chen","doi":"10.1142/s1013251121500053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s1013251121500053","url":null,"abstract":"The regime of censorship in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) extends beyond its borders through the extraterritorial application of its media regulations to popular social media platforms like WeChat. This research investigates the effects of the PRC’s extraterritorial control of online content on the identity narratives and norms communicated by comparing Australia’s Special Broadcast Service (SBS) Mandarin language news and the news targeting Australian audiences published on popular WeChat Official Accounts (OAs). We find significant differences in the news content between these two platforms: SBS provides more political content and a focus on political and cultural integration, while WeChat pages tend to avoid political topics that are not otherwise press releases from the PRC and they encourage strong cultural ties with Mainland China. Finally, SBS tends to both inform and cultivate democratic political identities and identification with the Australian political system, whereas WeChat tends to differentiate the Chinese diaspora from the wider Australian community. We situate these findings within a wider understanding of PRC’s national security strategies and doctrine. Whether by requirement or practice, not only the WeChat OAs in Australia implement PRC’s communication controls, but the content on these pages also challenges the liberal democratic practices and norms and supports foreign influence and espionage in Australia.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77579777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-12DOI: 10.1142/S1013251121500065
Ben Hillman
In his first term (2012–2017), Xi Jinping’s signature domestic policy was an anti-corruption campaign that targeted political enemies and venality in public office. The anti-corruption work has continued in his second term while being superseded in domestic political importance by a campaign to “Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil (2018–2020).” On the surface, the campaign to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil is an anti-crime campaign that focuses on the “black and evil forces” of organized crime and their official protectors, but its scope extends well beyond the ganglands to target a wide range of social and political threats to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Drawing on interviews with government officials, police and citizens as well as analysis of policy documents, this paper argues that the campaign is a populist initiative designed to bolster CCP legitimacy and serve as a mechanism of social control. Like the Chongqing prototype that inspired it, however, the campaign harbors a dark side that could undermine the contemporary Chinese social contract in which people are willing to sacrifice personal freedoms in exchange for security and material benefits.
{"title":"Law, Order and Social Control in Xi’s China","authors":"Ben Hillman","doi":"10.1142/S1013251121500065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251121500065","url":null,"abstract":"In his first term (2012–2017), Xi Jinping’s signature domestic policy was an anti-corruption campaign that targeted political enemies and venality in public office. The anti-corruption work has continued in his second term while being superseded in domestic political importance by a campaign to “Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil (2018–2020).” On the surface, the campaign to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil is an anti-crime campaign that focuses on the “black and evil forces” of organized crime and their official protectors, but its scope extends well beyond the ganglands to target a wide range of social and political threats to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Drawing on interviews with government officials, police and citizens as well as analysis of policy documents, this paper argues that the campaign is a populist initiative designed to bolster CCP legitimacy and serve as a mechanism of social control. Like the Chongqing prototype that inspired it, however, the campaign harbors a dark side that could undermine the contemporary Chinese social contract in which people are willing to sacrifice personal freedoms in exchange for security and material benefits.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"41 1","pages":"2150006"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90249512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-12DOI: 10.1142/S1013251121500089
F. W. Yang
After President Xi Jinping came to office, the Chinese government tightened its ideological control over establishment intellectuals and particularly the university teachers. This project aims to answer the question of why and when an authoritarian state chooses to do so. It focuses on the CCP’s policy toward establishment intellectuals under Xi and explores the most applicable explanation for this policy shift. Based on the existing literature on the cyclical model of state-intellectual relations in China, we propose a new model of “Dual Methods in State-Intellectual Relations.” The model demonstrates that the CCP has employed dual methods of repression and co-optation on intellectuals adopting different roles. Leaders choose repression when they perceive that the legitimacy of their rule is challenged externally or internally by criticism and collective actions led by intellectuals. In this case, the goal of repression is to either set up a new “red line” or warn intellectuals that they have crossed it.
{"title":"More Stick than Carrot?: Xi’s Policy toward Establishment Intellectuals","authors":"F. W. Yang","doi":"10.1142/S1013251121500089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251121500089","url":null,"abstract":"After President Xi Jinping came to office, the Chinese government tightened its ideological control over establishment intellectuals and particularly the university teachers. This project aims to answer the question of why and when an authoritarian state chooses to do so. It focuses on the CCP’s policy toward establishment intellectuals under Xi and explores the most applicable explanation for this policy shift. Based on the existing literature on the cyclical model of state-intellectual relations in China, we propose a new model of “Dual Methods in State-Intellectual Relations.” The model demonstrates that the CCP has employed dual methods of repression and co-optation on intellectuals adopting different roles. Leaders choose repression when they perceive that the legitimacy of their rule is challenged externally or internally by criticism and collective actions led by intellectuals. In this case, the goal of repression is to either set up a new “red line” or warn intellectuals that they have crossed it.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"10 1","pages":"2150008"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74353172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.1142/S1013251121500028
Hsin-Hsien Wang, Wei-Feng Tzeng
Having been a stable authoritarian regime for more than seven decades, China is an excellent example of how authoritarian regimes can resist pressure from a rapidly transforming society. Its capaci...
{"title":"Building a Hyper-Stability Structure: The Mechanisms of Social Stability Maintenance in Xi’s China","authors":"Hsin-Hsien Wang, Wei-Feng Tzeng","doi":"10.1142/S1013251121500028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251121500028","url":null,"abstract":"Having been a stable authoritarian regime for more than seven decades, China is an excellent example of how authoritarian regimes can resist pressure from a rapidly transforming society. Its capaci...","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"17 1","pages":"2150002"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74262710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-19DOI: 10.1142/S101325112150003X
Ji-Whan Yun
Since Japan’s imposition of export controls against Korea in July 2019 and its following countermoves, including the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, the gover...
{"title":"Post-Democracy and Historicism: The Hidden Origin of the Korea-Japan Trade War","authors":"Ji-Whan Yun","doi":"10.1142/S101325112150003X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S101325112150003X","url":null,"abstract":"Since Japan’s imposition of export controls against Korea in July 2019 and its following countermoves, including the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, the gover...","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"33 1","pages":"2150003"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87982425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S1013251121500041
V. Ng
This study focuses on increasing support for radical means among the Hong Kong youth. Previous studies have suggested the incompatibility between two components of a dual identity as a cause of radicalization, yet few have explored the mechanics of this process in detail. This study employs qualitative methods to investigate how the growing incompatibility between the identity of Hong Kong citizens as Hongkongers and as Chinese may contribute to radicalization among tertiary students. This study first conducted quantitative analyses to confirm the positive relationship between identity incompatibility and support for radical means. Past research has argued that nested identities should not be perceived as mutually exclusive. However, qualitative interviews revealed that some respondents did perceive the two identities in zero-sum terms and saw mainland China as a “cultural other.” Our study distinguished these two types of identity incompatibilities as either an “ambiguous incompatibility” or a “manifest incompatibility.” We propose that a “manifest incompatibility” has contributed to radicalization through three pathways: (1) pathways defined by the need for an identity, (2) emotional pathways, and (3) ideological pathways. Support for radical means is likely driven by a variety of factors that include perceived threats to a local identity, the negative emotions that accompany identity incompatibility, and the adoption of a new ideology that involves the rejection of previously accepted moral principles. By illuminating the possible mechanisms that explain how identity incompatibility may lead to a rise in support for the use of radical means, this study not only contributes to the theoretical discussion on radicalization but also sheds light on the widespread participation in recent protests in Hong Kong.
{"title":"Dual-Identity Incompatibility as a Cause of Radicalization: A Case Study of Hong Kong","authors":"V. Ng","doi":"10.1142/S1013251121500041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251121500041","url":null,"abstract":"This study focuses on increasing support for radical means among the Hong Kong youth. Previous studies have suggested the incompatibility between two components of a dual identity as a cause of radicalization, yet few have explored the mechanics of this process in detail. This study employs qualitative methods to investigate how the growing incompatibility between the identity of Hong Kong citizens as Hongkongers and as Chinese may contribute to radicalization among tertiary students. This study first conducted quantitative analyses to confirm the positive relationship between identity incompatibility and support for radical means. Past research has argued that nested identities should not be perceived as mutually exclusive. However, qualitative interviews revealed that some respondents did perceive the two identities in zero-sum terms and saw mainland China as a “cultural other.” Our study distinguished these two types of identity incompatibilities as either an “ambiguous incompatibility” or a “manifest incompatibility.” We propose that a “manifest incompatibility” has contributed to radicalization through three pathways: (1) pathways defined by the need for an identity, (2) emotional pathways, and (3) ideological pathways. Support for radical means is likely driven by a variety of factors that include perceived threats to a local identity, the negative emotions that accompany identity incompatibility, and the adoption of a new ideology that involves the rejection of previously accepted moral principles. By illuminating the possible mechanisms that explain how identity incompatibility may lead to a rise in support for the use of radical means, this study not only contributes to the theoretical discussion on radicalization but also sheds light on the widespread participation in recent protests in Hong Kong.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"139 1","pages":"2150004"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80745165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-10DOI: 10.1142/S1013251121500016
Xiaojun Li
On March 15, 2019, the National People’s Congress passed a long-anticipated Foreign Investment Law (FIL) after a short deliberation period of only three months. This expedited legislative process s...
{"title":"The Durability of China’s Lawmaking Process under Xi Jinping: A Tale of Two Foreign Investment Laws","authors":"Xiaojun Li","doi":"10.1142/S1013251121500016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251121500016","url":null,"abstract":"On March 15, 2019, the National People’s Congress passed a long-anticipated Foreign Investment Law (FIL) after a short deliberation period of only three months. This expedited legislative process s...","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"1 1","pages":"2150001"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88822262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-21DOI: 10.1142/s1013251120500034
E. Choi
Developed countries are becoming concerned with an increase in temporary workers, as it has undermined both their job security and the effects of collective action. China has experienced a surge of temporary work during the last three decades. Employing a cost and benefit analysis, this study identifies labor shortages and the weakness of job protection against arbitrary dismissal, both preconditions that have affected the collective-action preferences of temporary and permanent workers in China since 2010. Although the former has lowered the cost of collective action for temporary workers in China, the latter has increased the opportunity cost for permanent workers. Analyzing the Chinese General Social Survey in 2013, this study finds that temporary workers are twice as likely as permanent workers to actively join in collective action, suggesting that the prevalence of precarious work in China does not necessarily disempower Chinese workers.
{"title":"Temporary Workers and Collective-Action Preferences in China","authors":"E. Choi","doi":"10.1142/s1013251120500034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s1013251120500034","url":null,"abstract":"Developed countries are becoming concerned with an increase in temporary workers, as it has undermined both their job security and the effects of collective action. China has experienced a surge of temporary work during the last three decades. Employing a cost and benefit analysis, this study identifies labor shortages and the weakness of job protection against arbitrary dismissal, both preconditions that have affected the collective-action preferences of temporary and permanent workers in China since 2010. Although the former has lowered the cost of collective action for temporary workers in China, the latter has increased the opportunity cost for permanent workers. Analyzing the Chinese General Social Survey in 2013, this study finds that temporary workers are twice as likely as permanent workers to actively join in collective action, suggesting that the prevalence of precarious work in China does not necessarily disempower Chinese workers.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":"2050003"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89893783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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