Pub Date : 2019-08-05DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119020016
G. Naidu, Mumin Chen
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue — China’s Engagement with South Asia and Responses from the Region","authors":"G. Naidu, Mumin Chen","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119020016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119020016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83463972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-05DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119400034
Smruti S. Pattanaik
Bangladesh has engaged both India and China as they fulfill its aspirations for development without raising the apprehensions of either. High-level visits between Bangladesh and India and the resolution of some of the long pending issues have removed some earlier distrust, greatly institutionalizing the relationship between the two. India opposes the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while Bangladesh is a participant. China shares a robust relationship with the military of Bangladesh, while security cooperation between India and Bangladesh is nascent, involving capacity building and cooperation to meet non-traditional security challenges. Bangladesh has kept the sensitivities of the two countries in mind as it engages with both. Therefore, it has built its energy and infrastructure with the largest credit line ever offered by India while also engaging with China to invest massively in infrastructure projects. Bangladesh is the only country in South Asia to have profited from relations with both India and China in such a way. In this study, four sectors have been selected in which Bangladesh has engaged both countries and benefitted immeasurably.
{"title":"Engaging the Asian Giants: India, China and Bangladesh’s Crucial Balancing Act","authors":"Smruti S. Pattanaik","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119400034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119400034","url":null,"abstract":"Bangladesh has engaged both India and China as they fulfill its aspirations for development without raising the apprehensions of either. High-level visits between Bangladesh and India and the resolution of some of the long pending issues have removed some earlier distrust, greatly institutionalizing the relationship between the two. India opposes the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while Bangladesh is a participant. China shares a robust relationship with the military of Bangladesh, while security cooperation between India and Bangladesh is nascent, involving capacity building and cooperation to meet non-traditional security challenges. Bangladesh has kept the sensitivities of the two countries in mind as it engages with both. Therefore, it has built its energy and infrastructure with the largest credit line ever offered by India while also engaging with China to invest massively in infrastructure projects. Bangladesh is the only country in South Asia to have profited from relations with both India and China in such a way. In this study, four sectors have been selected in which Bangladesh has engaged both countries and benefitted immeasurably.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74962539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-05DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119400022
Jingdong Yuan
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious project aiming to transform the economic landscape along its route in the areas of trade, investment, and energy supplies. It makes as its focal point the connectivity between China and Eurasia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. South Asia’s location presents China with significant strategic opportunities as Beijing seeks to expand its economic presence in the subcontinent by providing resources in infrastructural development, particularly the construction of seaports. With growing Chinese trade and investment in the region, Beijing is also extending its diplomatic influence into what has long been considered as India’s sphere of influence. With longstanding strategic distrust and unresolved territorial disputes, New Delhi is suspicious of Beijing’s intentions and concerned over the latter’s growing influence into a region it has long considered its sphere of influence. In this context, the BRI has the potential to intensify Sino–Indian rivalry, and the Modi government has indeed explored and launched initiatives to counter Chinese diplomatic activities. It remains a challenge whether and how Asia’s rising powers can reduce their trust deficits and explore areas of cooperation made possible by the BRI, working toward a cooperative, mutually beneficial future for Sino–Indian relations and the region as a whole.
{"title":"China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia and the Indian Response","authors":"Jingdong Yuan","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119400022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119400022","url":null,"abstract":"China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious project aiming to transform the economic landscape along its route in the areas of trade, investment, and energy supplies. It makes as its focal point the connectivity between China and Eurasia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. South Asia’s location presents China with significant strategic opportunities as Beijing seeks to expand its economic presence in the subcontinent by providing resources in infrastructural development, particularly the construction of seaports. With growing Chinese trade and investment in the region, Beijing is also extending its diplomatic influence into what has long been considered as India’s sphere of influence. With longstanding strategic distrust and unresolved territorial disputes, New Delhi is suspicious of Beijing’s intentions and concerned over the latter’s growing influence into a region it has long considered its sphere of influence. In this context, the BRI has the potential to intensify Sino–Indian rivalry, and the Modi government has indeed explored and launched initiatives to counter Chinese diplomatic activities. It remains a challenge whether and how Asia’s rising powers can reduce their trust deficits and explore areas of cooperation made possible by the BRI, working toward a cooperative, mutually beneficial future for Sino–Indian relations and the region as a whole.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87079533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-05DOI: 10.1142/S101325111950005X
Fung Chan, Biyang Sun
Widely known by the public, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong is selected not by universal suffrage but by a 1,200-member Election Committee (EC). While candidates Carrie Lam, John Tsang, and Kwok-hing Woo all ran in the Chief Executive Election of 2017, only Lam received the blessing of authorities in the Mainland. Though Tsang had led the polls throughout the entire campaign and was popular on several social media platforms, a majority of EC members still cast their vote for Lam as Chief Executive. This was the first time that EC members voted against popular opinion in the Chief Executive Election. This paper analyzes the limited power of social media under elections that are under the influence of Mainland China. It also examines the problem of legitimacy in such electoral settings and the way in which authorities in the Mainland have influenced electoral outcomes through defects in the institutional systems of Hong Kong. The 2017 Chief Executive Election affirmed the tightened control of Mainland authorities over the affairs of Hong Kong.
{"title":"Digital Representation in an Electoral Campaign Influenced by Mainland China: The 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive Election","authors":"Fung Chan, Biyang Sun","doi":"10.1142/S101325111950005X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S101325111950005X","url":null,"abstract":"Widely known by the public, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong is selected not by universal suffrage but by a 1,200-member Election Committee (EC). While candidates Carrie Lam, John Tsang, and Kwok-hing Woo all ran in the Chief Executive Election of 2017, only Lam received the blessing of authorities in the Mainland. Though Tsang had led the polls throughout the entire campaign and was popular on several social media platforms, a majority of EC members still cast their vote for Lam as Chief Executive. This was the first time that EC members voted against popular opinion in the Chief Executive Election. This paper analyzes the limited power of social media under elections that are under the influence of Mainland China. It also examines the problem of legitimacy in such electoral settings and the way in which authorities in the Mainland have influenced electoral outcomes through defects in the institutional systems of Hong Kong. The 2017 Chief Executive Election affirmed the tightened control of Mainland authorities over the affairs of Hong Kong.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"205 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80365149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-04DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119400010
Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy
The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) election victory in May 2014 under the leadership of Narendra Modi saw the first parliamentary majority achieved by a single party in three decades. Both Indian and foreign observers of India’s foreign policy knew a little of Modi and the BJP’s approach to India’s external engagements. Modi’s image as a nationalist and strong leader led to the speculation that he would substantially change the direction of India’s foreign policy. This may be most visible in India’s “Neighborhood-First” Initiative (NFI). This study focuses on Modi’s neighborhood policy. It gives an overview of how the Modi government is redefining India’s neighborhood policy and considers the new vision and approach that the Modi government is pursuing with India’s neighborhood. It is followed by an assessment of difficulties in putting the policy into practice. Finally, it discusses responses from China and summarizes key points in the concluding section.
{"title":"Modi’s Neighborhood Policy and China’s Response","authors":"Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119400010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119400010","url":null,"abstract":"The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) election victory in May 2014 under the leadership of Narendra Modi saw the first parliamentary majority achieved by a single party in three decades. Both Indian and foreign observers of India’s foreign policy knew a little of Modi and the BJP’s approach to India’s external engagements. Modi’s image as a nationalist and strong leader led to the speculation that he would substantially change the direction of India’s foreign policy. This may be most visible in India’s “Neighborhood-First” Initiative (NFI). This study focuses on Modi’s neighborhood policy. It gives an overview of how the Modi government is redefining India’s neighborhood policy and considers the new vision and approach that the Modi government is pursuing with India’s neighborhood. It is followed by an assessment of difficulties in putting the policy into practice. Finally, it discusses responses from China and summarizes key points in the concluding section.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78967527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-29DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500024
Hee Min, Seongyi Yun
Previous studies have shown that social media is effective in large-scale mobilization, facilitating leaderless and more flexible forms of resistance. However, some scholars argue that this type of mobilization suffers from a lack of organizational form and collective identity. This paper shows that social media-centered networks can in fact promote collective actions powerful enough to challenge a corrupt president. We also prove the role of emotions in collective actions. Using an empirical analysis of the 2016 Presidential Impeachment Protests surrounding “Choi Soon-sil Gate,” we first demonstrate the effects of social media activities on participation in collective actions. Next, we explore the effects of anger on social media activities and participation. In short, this study reveals a new angle on social media’s influence in mobilizing collective actions by analyzing the effect of emotions on participation. In this process, social media activities are escalated by emotional outbreaks, and participation then increases throughout a given collective action.
{"title":"Role of Social Media and Emotion in South Korea’s Presidential Impeachment Protests","authors":"Hee Min, Seongyi Yun","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119500024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119500024","url":null,"abstract":"Previous studies have shown that social media is effective in large-scale mobilization, facilitating leaderless and more flexible forms of resistance. However, some scholars argue that this type of mobilization suffers from a lack of organizational form and collective identity. This paper shows that social media-centered networks can in fact promote collective actions powerful enough to challenge a corrupt president. We also prove the role of emotions in collective actions. Using an empirical analysis of the 2016 Presidential Impeachment Protests surrounding “Choi Soon-sil Gate,” we first demonstrate the effects of social media activities on participation in collective actions. Next, we explore the effects of anger on social media activities and participation. In short, this study reveals a new angle on social media’s influence in mobilizing collective actions by analyzing the effect of emotions on participation. In this process, social media activities are escalated by emotional outbreaks, and participation then increases throughout a given collective action.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90788873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-29DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500048
Shinn-Shyr Wang, Hsin-Hsien Wang, Wei-Feng Tzeng
While China’s economic reforms have produced undeniably positive outcomes, a rapid increase in popular protests has become most striking in recent years. As protests grow steadily in both scale and frequency, the government continues to tout social stability as the chief concern of China today. These mounting tensions reflect a direct clash of horns between the maintenance of stability and the public’s desire to exercise their rights, frequently culminating in acts of repression by the Chinese state in order to quell the unrest. This raises an important question: how can the relationship between repression and popular protest in China be characterized? More specifically, which precise circumstances of popular protest elicit the employment of China’s repressive state capacity? Taking into account both theoretical perspectives and empirical analysis, this paper attempts to elucidate the issue by first collating a large body of data to clarify the precise characteristics of popular protest, then undertaking quantitative analysis to identify which factors trigger the mobilization of China’s machinery of repression. Furthermore, this study identifies that in recent years, the use of state repression has risen in parallel with an increasing emphasis on the principle of “maintaining social stability” in China.
{"title":"The Nature of Popular Protest and the Employment of Repressive State Capacity in China","authors":"Shinn-Shyr Wang, Hsin-Hsien Wang, Wei-Feng Tzeng","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119500048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119500048","url":null,"abstract":"While China’s economic reforms have produced undeniably positive outcomes, a rapid increase in popular protests has become most striking in recent years. As protests grow steadily in both scale and frequency, the government continues to tout social stability as the chief concern of China today. These mounting tensions reflect a direct clash of horns between the maintenance of stability and the public’s desire to exercise their rights, frequently culminating in acts of repression by the Chinese state in order to quell the unrest. This raises an important question: how can the relationship between repression and popular protest in China be characterized? More specifically, which precise circumstances of popular protest elicit the employment of China’s repressive state capacity? Taking into account both theoretical perspectives and empirical analysis, this paper attempts to elucidate the issue by first collating a large body of data to clarify the precise characteristics of popular protest, then undertaking quantitative analysis to identify which factors trigger the mobilization of China’s machinery of repression. Furthermore, this study identifies that in recent years, the use of state repression has risen in parallel with an increasing emphasis on the principle of “maintaining social stability” in China.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90268251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-29DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500012
Ji-Whan Yun
After undergoing a series of mass demonstrations during the past three decades, including the 2016–2017 candlelight protests that led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, many commentators in South Korea are confident that their country has become a land for what Karl Marx called “free men.” Korean citizens are portrayed as being ready to participate in voluntary political associations and collective actions and to pursue their interests in the public sphere. However, the data are showing the opposite to be true: citizen participation in public-sphere activities has substantially decreased since the mid-2000s, while the government has managed to improve or at least maintain its political responsiveness during the same period. Explaining the unnoticed background to this imbalance, this essay sheds light on the myth of the benefactor state in Korean democracy, arguing that this has emerged because neoliberalism has not only placed an increasing number of people in precarious positions but also neutralized them politically. The Korean government has capitalized on this situation to mythicize itself as a benefactor state that possesses an incomparable administrative capacity to take care of precarious people. By investigating the period of Park’s presidency (2013–2017) and the current rule of President Moon Jae-in (2017–), this essay shows how the myth of the benefactor state has emerged and created a unique cycle of Korean democracy.
{"title":"Democracy in Myth: The Politics of Precariatization in South Korea","authors":"Ji-Whan Yun","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119500012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119500012","url":null,"abstract":"After undergoing a series of mass demonstrations during the past three decades, including the 2016–2017 candlelight protests that led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, many commentators in South Korea are confident that their country has become a land for what Karl Marx called “free men.” Korean citizens are portrayed as being ready to participate in voluntary political associations and collective actions and to pursue their interests in the public sphere. However, the data are showing the opposite to be true: citizen participation in public-sphere activities has substantially decreased since the mid-2000s, while the government has managed to improve or at least maintain its political responsiveness during the same period. Explaining the unnoticed background to this imbalance, this essay sheds light on the myth of the benefactor state in Korean democracy, arguing that this has emerged because neoliberalism has not only placed an increasing number of people in precarious positions but also neutralized them politically. The Korean government has capitalized on this situation to mythicize itself as a benefactor state that possesses an incomparable administrative capacity to take care of precarious people. By investigating the period of Park’s presidency (2013–2017) and the current rule of President Moon Jae-in (2017–), this essay shows how the myth of the benefactor state has emerged and created a unique cycle of Korean democracy.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85305687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-29DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500036
Eunjung Choi, Jongseok Woo
In the past few decades, post-democratization politics in South Korea have witnessed an upsurge in authoritarian nostalgia, called the “Park Jung-hee syndrome.” This paper examines the origins of public nostalgia for the authoritarian dictator by putting two theoretical arguments, i.e., the socialization thesis and the system output thesis, to an empirical test. This paper utilizes the 2010 Korea Democracy Barometer from the Korea Barometer and the 2010 and the 2015 Korean National Identity Survey from the East Asia Institute. The empirical analysis of the South Korean case strongly supports the political socialization argument, suggesting that citizens’ yearning for Park Jung-hee is not merely an outcome of the negative evaluations of the democratic governments’ performances. Rather, their authoritarian nostalgia is in large part an outcome of their political socialization during the Park dictatorship. The analysis implies that, although a resurgence of the Park Jung-hee syndrome in post-democratization South Korea is not expected to derail the country’s route to democratic deepening, it may continue to be a main source of political division in partisan and electoral politics in the future.
{"title":"The Origins of the Park Jung-hee Syndrome in South Korea","authors":"Eunjung Choi, Jongseok Woo","doi":"10.1142/S1013251119500036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119500036","url":null,"abstract":"In the past few decades, post-democratization politics in South Korea have witnessed an upsurge in authoritarian nostalgia, called the “Park Jung-hee syndrome.” This paper examines the origins of public nostalgia for the authoritarian dictator by putting two theoretical arguments, i.e., the socialization thesis and the system output thesis, to an empirical test. This paper utilizes the 2010 Korea Democracy Barometer from the Korea Barometer and the 2010 and the 2015 Korean National Identity Survey from the East Asia Institute. The empirical analysis of the South Korean case strongly supports the political socialization argument, suggesting that citizens’ yearning for Park Jung-hee is not merely an outcome of the negative evaluations of the democratic governments’ performances. Rather, their authoritarian nostalgia is in large part an outcome of their political socialization during the Park dictatorship. The analysis implies that, although a resurgence of the Park Jung-hee syndrome in post-democratization South Korea is not expected to derail the country’s route to democratic deepening, it may continue to be a main source of political division in partisan and electoral politics in the future.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78799893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S101325111840009X
Reinhard Biedermann
China’s raw materials diplomacy and unregulated purchasing of minerals in Africa and Latin America, as well as its domestic raw materials export quota, have for years been eyed with suspicion by state and private actors. Industrialized countries want to uphold and extend free market access to raw materials, but also strengthen their political accountability and sustainability. However, critics argue that in contrast, China, the world’s largest metals and minerals trading power, has taken the opposite course, ignoring social and environmental standards, reinforcing authoritarian governments, and erecting trade barriers. China is faced with several interrelated challenges in its resource diplomacy and governance. This article claims that an identifiable, chronological connection and pattern has existed between China’s aid and investment diplomacy for resources since the late 1990s, free trade agreements since the 2000s, Beijing’s resource nationalism since the 2010s, and the reform process of national and privately organized transnational governance toward sustainability in the present day. Is China socializing with emerging transnational standards on mining and resource extraction in the developing world, and if so, why? This article argues that China’s raw materials governance, including corporate governance, has entered a phase of reform to pacify the external environment and to implement the Belt and Road Initiative. In theoretical terms, China’s raw materials governance will continue to emphasize neoliberal and neo-mercantilist goals, cushioned by globalist features.
{"title":"China’s Raw Materials Diplomacy and Governance Cycle: Toward Sustainable Mining and Resource Extraction?","authors":"Reinhard Biedermann","doi":"10.1142/S101325111840009X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S101325111840009X","url":null,"abstract":"China’s raw materials diplomacy and unregulated purchasing of minerals in Africa and Latin America, as well as its domestic raw materials export quota, have for years been eyed with suspicion by state and private actors. Industrialized countries want to uphold and extend free market access to raw materials, but also strengthen their political accountability and sustainability. However, critics argue that in contrast, China, the world’s largest metals and minerals trading power, has taken the opposite course, ignoring social and environmental standards, reinforcing authoritarian governments, and erecting trade barriers. China is faced with several interrelated challenges in its resource diplomacy and governance. This article claims that an identifiable, chronological connection and pattern has existed between China’s aid and investment diplomacy for resources since the late 1990s, free trade agreements since the 2000s, Beijing’s resource nationalism since the 2010s, and the reform process of national and privately organized transnational governance toward sustainability in the present day. Is China socializing with emerging transnational standards on mining and resource extraction in the developing world, and if so, why? This article argues that China’s raw materials governance, including corporate governance, has entered a phase of reform to pacify the external environment and to implement the Belt and Road Initiative. In theoretical terms, China’s raw materials governance will continue to emphasize neoliberal and neo-mercantilist goals, cushioned by globalist features.","PeriodicalId":53213,"journal":{"name":"ISSUES & STUDIES","volume":"116 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78494422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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