Husserl's phenomenology is widely considered an idealistic philosophy, this article aims to present the empirical side of Husserl's philosophy by analyzing a key epistemological concept, i.e., an object. The research of the first and last of Husserl's writings (which are devoted to the issue of constituting logic) will present a necessary part of the phenomenological conception of the object – its external aspect. This aspect is, on the one hand, based on the general phenomenological conception of knowledge, which prima facie contains the features of idealism, but, on the other hand, by examining the concepts below, the strength of the bond that connects this conception with the outside should be clarified.
{"title":"Vnější aspekty předmětu v Husserlově fenomenologii","authors":"Viktor Zavřel","doi":"10.5817/pf20-2-2190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/pf20-2-2190","url":null,"abstract":"Husserl's phenomenology is widely considered an idealistic philosophy, this article aims to present the empirical side of Husserl's philosophy by analyzing a key epistemological concept, i.e., an object. The research of the first and last of Husserl's writings (which are devoted to the issue of constituting logic) will present a necessary part of the phenomenological conception of the object – its external aspect. This aspect is, on the one hand, based on the general phenomenological conception of knowledge, which prima facie contains the features of idealism, but, on the other hand, by examining the concepts below, the strength of the bond that connects this conception with the outside should be clarified.","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71354451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses totalitarianism against the background of Hegel’s concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). It employs Hegel’s concept of experience from the Phenomenology of Spirit so that the reader could “experience” totalitarianism (in Hegel’s sense), and thereby apprehend a universal (sittlich) ethical life within the state as a true antidote against totalitarianism. “Hegel’s” state, understood here as an emergent middle that balances between its relation to itself (domestic policy) and to the other states (foreign policy) is contrasted with the totalitarian state that suspended its self-relation in the name of its relation to the outside, either in the form of a “total war” (Hitler) or the “total peace” (Stalin). Contrasting the totalitarian state with that of Hegel’s aims to reveal, in turn, the substantial defect of liberal thought. Despite the fact that “total war” and the “total peace” had taken place, liberal thought still stubbornly preoccupies itself with domestic issues, traditionally with the question of how to secure the “Maginot” line between the state and its citizens, at the expense of overcoming its own impoverished knowledge of the state as an instrument, since this utilitarian knowledge of the state combined with the fact that the state is also the sovereign individuality appearing on the scene of foreign relations turned out to be totalitarian. Totalitarianism and liberalism are thereby not understood simply as enemies but rather as a tragical couple. To reveal this mutually enforced interdependence, the paper illustrates it on different and more commonplace examples in order to clarify how liberal thought can overcome animosity against its totalitarian enemy, namely via “experiencing” totalitarianism as nothing but the hitherto unknown dark side of its own instrumental understanding of the state.
{"title":"Hegel: Why Liberal Thought Is Not Anti-Totalitarian Enough","authors":"Tomáš Korda","doi":"10.5817/pf20-1-2086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/pf20-1-2086","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses totalitarianism against the background of Hegel’s concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). It employs Hegel’s concept of experience from the Phenomenology of Spirit so that the reader could “experience” totalitarianism (in Hegel’s sense), and thereby apprehend a universal (sittlich) ethical life within the state as a true antidote against totalitarianism. “Hegel’s” state, understood here as an emergent middle that balances between its relation to itself (domestic policy) and to the other states (foreign policy) is contrasted with the totalitarian state that suspended its self-relation in the name of its relation to the outside, either in the form of a “total war” (Hitler) or the “total peace” (Stalin). Contrasting the totalitarian state with that of Hegel’s aims to reveal, in turn, the substantial defect of liberal thought. Despite the fact that “total war” and the “total peace” had taken place, liberal thought still stubbornly preoccupies itself with domestic issues, traditionally with the question of how to secure the “Maginot” line between the state and its citizens, at the expense of overcoming its own impoverished knowledge of the state as an instrument, since this utilitarian knowledge of the state combined with the fact that the state is also the sovereign individuality appearing on the scene of foreign relations turned out to be totalitarian. Totalitarianism and liberalism are thereby not understood simply as enemies but rather as a tragical couple. To reveal this mutually enforced interdependence, the paper illustrates it on different and more commonplace examples in order to clarify how liberal thought can overcome animosity against its totalitarian enemy, namely via “experiencing” totalitarianism as nothing but the hitherto unknown dark side of its own instrumental understanding of the state.","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45212576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For most people, a lie would be defined solely as a false statement. However, many philosophers argue that a statement does not need to be false to be considered a lie, what is important is that the speaker believes that the statement is false. In a prototype semantic analysis, there are three elements of a lie , namely factual falsity, belief, and intention (Coleman and Kay, 1981). As in the case of philosophers’ arguments, English, Spanish, Arabic and Hungarian speakers consider belief as the main element of a prototypical lie. By replicating Coleman and Kay’s study of Indonesian speakers, the present paper tries to answer the following research questions. (1) Does the Indonesian word bohong ‘lie’ consist of the Coleman & Kay’s prototype elements? (2) If it does, what is the order of the elements? (3) Do Indonesians interpret the situation in which a lie occurs similarly to speakers of other languages? And (4) how to interpret the results of this experiment from the philosophical perspective? The results reveal that not all elements suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981) are present in lying according to Indonesians and the factuality of the statement is more important to Indonesians than belief. Thus, Indonesians have a perception of a lie that is different from the definitions suggested by the philosophers.
对大多数人来说，谎言仅仅被定义为虚假陈述。然而，许多哲学家认为，一个陈述并不一定是假的才能被认为是谎言，重要的是说话者相信这个陈述是假的。在原型语义分析中，谎言有三个要素，即事实虚假、信念和意图(Coleman and Kay, 1981)。就像哲学家的论证一样，说英语、西班牙语、阿拉伯语和匈牙利语的人认为信仰是典型谎言的主要元素。通过复制Coleman和Kay对印尼语使用者的研究，本文试图回答以下研究问题。(1)印尼语bohong“lie”是否包含Coleman & Kay的原型元素?(2)如果是，元素的顺序是什么?(3)印尼人对谎言发生的解释是否与说其他语言的人相似?(4)如何从哲学的角度解释这个实验的结果?结果表明，并不是Coleman和Kay(1981)提出的所有因素都存在于印度尼西亚人的谎言中，对印度尼西亚人来说，陈述的真实性比信念更重要。因此，印尼人对谎言的理解不同于哲学家们对谎言的定义。
{"title":"Indonesians Do Not Believe in Lying: New Results of Replicating Coleman and Kay’s Study","authors":"Ahmad Adha","doi":"10.5817/pf20-1-2067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/pf20-1-2067","url":null,"abstract":"For most people, a lie would be defined solely as a false statement. However, many philosophers argue that a statement does not need to be false to be considered a lie, what is important is that the speaker believes that the statement is false. In a prototype semantic analysis, there are three elements of a lie , namely factual falsity, belief, and intention (Coleman and Kay, 1981). As in the case of philosophers’ arguments, English, Spanish, Arabic and Hungarian speakers consider belief as the main element of a prototypical lie. By replicating Coleman and Kay’s study of Indonesian speakers, the present paper tries to answer the following research questions. (1) Does the Indonesian word bohong ‘lie’ consist of the Coleman & Kay’s prototype elements? (2) If it does, what is the order of the elements? (3) Do Indonesians interpret the situation in which a lie occurs similarly to speakers of other languages? And (4) how to interpret the results of this experiment from the philosophical perspective? The results reveal that not all elements suggested by Coleman and Kay (1981) are present in lying according to Indonesians and the factuality of the statement is more important to Indonesians than belief. Thus, Indonesians have a perception of a lie that is different from the definitions suggested by the philosophers.","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41498029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The study deals with the matter of three of the most puzzling doctrines of Baruch Spinoza’s system, the so-called ‘final doctrines’, which are intuitive knowledge, intellectual love of God, and the eternity of the (human) mind. Contrary to many commentators, but also in concordance with many others, this account strives to affirm the utmost importance of these doctrines to Spinoza’s system as a whole, but mostly to his ethical theory. Focusing specifically on the cultivation of the human mind, the paper offers partial analyses of the central notions of these doctrines and their conceptual contexts. It is argued that the cultivation of the human mind, i.e., its determination to its perfect activity, should be considered as Spinoza’s ultimate ethical goal, and that the mind truly only advances to this goal by means of these cognitive, affective, and intellectual transformations of thinking.
{"title":"The Three Final Doctrines of Spinoza: Intuition, Amor Dei, the Eternity of the Mind","authors":"Michaela Petrufová Joppová","doi":"10.5817/pf20-1-2073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/pf20-1-2073","url":null,"abstract":"The study deals with the matter of three of the most puzzling doctrines of Baruch Spinoza’s system, the so-called ‘final doctrines’, which are intuitive knowledge, intellectual love of God, and the eternity of the (human) mind. Contrary to many commentators, but also in concordance with many others, this account strives to affirm the utmost importance of these doctrines to Spinoza’s system as a whole, but mostly to his ethical theory. Focusing specifically on the cultivation of the human mind, the paper offers partial analyses of the central notions of these doctrines and their conceptual contexts. It is argued that the cultivation of the human mind, i.e., its determination to its perfect activity, should be considered as Spinoza’s ultimate ethical goal, and that the mind truly only advances to this goal by means of these cognitive, affective, and intellectual transformations of thinking.","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71354402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stanislaw Leśniewski postuloval system logiky a zakladu matematiky, jenž se do znacne miry lisi od systemu, který navrhli Russell a Whitehead ve sve knize Principia Mathematica . Velmi odlisný je zejmena Leśniewskeho kalkul jmen a pojeti jmen, jež jsou jeho soucasti. Russellova teorie deskripci hrala v historii filozofie nesrovnatelně důležitějsi roli než Leśniewskeho teorie, proto se snažili někteři Leśniewskeho pokracovatele přibližit Leśniewskeho pojeti jmen Russellově teorii. Existuje hned několik takových navrhů, tento clanek se ale zaměřuje pouze na interpretaci, kterou navrhl Arthur N. Prior. Prior interpretoval Leśniewskeho pojeti jmen jako třidova jmena ( class names ). Tato interpretace je odmitana tak významnými badateli, jako je Peter Simons nebo Rafal Urbaniak. Podle Simonse neodpovidaji třidova jmena Leśniewskeho pojeti ontologie. Urbaniak o třidových jmenech napsal, že Prior představil svou interpretaci nejasně. Cilem tohoto clanku je ukazat, že pokud je na celý problem nahliženo z formalniho hlediska, může mit Priorovo pojeti opodstatněni.
{"title":"Leśniewského pojetí jmen jako třídových jmen","authors":"Zuzana Rybaříková","doi":"10.5817/pf19-2-1904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/pf19-2-1904","url":null,"abstract":"Stanislaw Leśniewski postuloval system logiky a zakladu matematiky, jenž se do znacne miry lisi od systemu, který navrhli Russell a Whitehead ve sve knize Principia Mathematica . Velmi odlisný je zejmena Leśniewskeho kalkul jmen a pojeti jmen, jež jsou jeho soucasti. Russellova teorie deskripci hrala v historii filozofie nesrovnatelně důležitějsi roli než Leśniewskeho teorie, proto se snažili někteři Leśniewskeho pokracovatele přibližit Leśniewskeho pojeti jmen Russellově teorii. Existuje hned několik takových navrhů, tento clanek se ale zaměřuje pouze na interpretaci, kterou navrhl Arthur N. Prior. Prior interpretoval Leśniewskeho pojeti jmen jako třidova jmena ( class names ). Tato interpretace je odmitana tak významnými badateli, jako je Peter Simons nebo Rafal Urbaniak. Podle Simonse neodpovidaji třidova jmena Leśniewskeho pojeti ontologie. Urbaniak o třidových jmenech napsal, že Prior představil svou interpretaci nejasně. Cilem tohoto clanku je ukazat, že pokud je na celý problem nahliženo z formalniho hlediska, může mit Priorovo pojeti opodstatněni.","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43625985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Etika sociálnych dôsledkov a evolučná ontológia v súčasnom eko-etickom diskurze","authors":"Martin Pazdera","doi":"10.5817/pf19-1-1847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/pf19-1-1847","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41665013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Předkladana stať aplikuje Hegelovo „vyvraceni“ spinozismu na Marxe. Nejprve osvětluje povahu Hegelova pojeti filosoficke kritiky, kterou Hegel stavi do kontrastu s pouhou polemikou – střetem jedne genialni mysli s druhou. Na tomto pozadi lepe vynika Hegelovo „vyvraceni“ spinozismu jako ukazky filosoficke kritiky, a nikoli pouhe polemiky. Filosoficka kritika si narokuje být imanentni. Kritizovanou filosofii nicim zvnějsku neobohacuje, ale přihliži, jak ona sama sebe překonava. Přikladem takoveho sebepřekonani je pochopeni substance zaroveň jako subjektu, ci jako ducha. Toto pochopeni vlastně děla to, že dava ontologický význam tomu, cemu Hegel řika „vnějsi mysleni“ a co na prvni pohled žadný ontologický význam nema, co se zda být pouhou ideologii, afekci ci vice ci meně adekvatni ideou. V teto „ontologizaci mysleni“ Hegel vidi to jedine skutecne vyvraceni spinozismu. Mým navrhem je přihližet teže „ontologizaci“ – řekněme „ontologizaci ideologie“ u Marxe. Toto sebepřekonani Marxovy filosofie spatřuji v Hegelově vyvozeni pojmu statu z pojmu obcanske spolecnosti. Hegelem vypracovaný logický ci pojmový přechod od obcanske spolecnosti ke statu odpovida re-konceptualizaci substance v ducha. Tato re-konceptualizace vyvraci nejen spinozismus, ale i marxismus.
{"title":"Hegelovo „vyvrácení“ Spinozy aplikované na Marxe","authors":"Tomáš Korda","doi":"10.5817/PF19-1-1905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/PF19-1-1905","url":null,"abstract":"Předkladana stať aplikuje Hegelovo „vyvraceni“ spinozismu na Marxe. Nejprve osvětluje povahu Hegelova pojeti filosoficke kritiky, kterou Hegel stavi do kontrastu s pouhou polemikou – střetem jedne genialni mysli s druhou. Na tomto pozadi lepe vynika Hegelovo „vyvraceni“ spinozismu jako ukazky filosoficke kritiky, a nikoli pouhe polemiky. Filosoficka kritika si narokuje být imanentni. Kritizovanou filosofii nicim zvnějsku neobohacuje, ale přihliži, jak ona sama sebe překonava. Přikladem takoveho sebepřekonani je pochopeni substance zaroveň jako subjektu, ci jako ducha. Toto pochopeni vlastně děla to, že dava ontologický význam tomu, cemu Hegel řika „vnějsi mysleni“ a co na prvni pohled žadný ontologický význam nema, co se zda být pouhou ideologii, afekci ci vice ci meně adekvatni ideou. V teto „ontologizaci mysleni“ Hegel vidi to jedine skutecne vyvraceni spinozismu. Mým navrhem je přihližet teže „ontologizaci“ – řekněme „ontologizaci ideologie“ u Marxe. Toto sebepřekonani Marxovy filosofie spatřuji v Hegelově vyvozeni pojmu statu z pojmu obcanske spolecnosti. Hegelem vypracovaný logický ci pojmový přechod od obcanske spolecnosti ke statu odpovida re-konceptualizaci substance v ducha. Tato re-konceptualizace vyvraci nejen spinozismus, ale i marxismus.","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45273379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Text nabizi přehled disertacnich praci, ktere předložily ženy na filozoficke a přirodovědecke fakultě Masarykovy univerzity od jejiho založeni do roku 1939. Podrobněji se věnuje těm disertacnim pracim, ktere tematicky spadaly do tzv. filozofických věd. V dobovem chapani se jednalo o filozofii, psychologii, pedagogiku a sociologii. Hlavnim cilem je představit odborný zajem žen v danem mistě a casovem obdobi.
{"title":"Disertační práce žen na univerzitě v Brně do roku 1939","authors":"Z. Jastrzembská","doi":"10.5817/PF19-1-1925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5817/PF19-1-1925","url":null,"abstract":"Text nabizi přehled disertacnich praci, ktere předložily ženy na filozoficke a přirodovědecke fakultě Masarykovy univerzity od jejiho založeni do roku 1939. Podrobněji se věnuje těm disertacnim pracim, ktere tematicky spadaly do tzv. filozofických věd. V dobovem chapani se jednalo o filozofii, psychologii, pedagogiku a sociologii. Hlavnim cilem je představit odborný zajem žen v danem mistě a casovem obdobi.","PeriodicalId":53428,"journal":{"name":"Pro-Fil","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46598833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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