At Philebus 23c4-26d10 Socrates makes a division into three kinds: Unbounded (apeiron), Bound (peras), and Mix (meikton). I review problems for the main interpretations of Unbounded and Mix and review kinds of scales defined in abstract measurement theory. Then I take 23c4-26d10 speech by speech, interpreting the Unbounded as a kind containing partial scales, Bound as the kind containing the relations and quantities needed to turn partial scales into appropriate ratio scales, and Mix as the kind containing ratio scales appropriate for the good things that come to be in the world.
{"title":"Philebus 23c-26d: Peras, Apeiron, and Meikton as Measure Theory","authors":"G. Rudebusch","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_4","url":null,"abstract":"At Philebus 23c4-26d10 Socrates makes a division into three kinds: Unbounded (apeiron), Bound (peras), and Mix (meikton). I review problems for the main interpretations of Unbounded and Mix and review kinds of scales defined in abstract measurement theory. Then I take 23c4-26d10 speech by speech, interpreting the Unbounded as a kind containing partial scales, Bound as the kind containing the relations and quantities needed to turn partial scales into appropriate ratio scales, and Mix as the kind containing ratio scales appropriate for the good things that come to be in the world.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47130183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.14195/2183-4105_22_11
Jonathan Lavilla de Lera, Javier Aguirre Santos
El presente artículo defiende que Platón bromea cuando su Sócrates afirma estar inspirado o bajo posesión divina en Fedro 238d y Crátilo 396d. Para ello, primero se sitúan en contexto ambos pasajes; a continuación, se muestra que a lo largo de todo el corpus Platón contrapone el conocimiento y el arte (τέχνη) al falso saber y a la inspiración (ἐνθουσιασμός); en tercer y cuarto lugar respectivamente, leemos los pasajes en cuestión en función de esta contraposición, para mostrar que hay que desconfiar de cuanto dice Sócrates cuando burlonamente afirma estar inspirado.
{"title":"La broma de Sócrates inspirado","authors":"Jonathan Lavilla de Lera, Javier Aguirre Santos","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_11","url":null,"abstract":"El presente artículo defiende que Platón bromea cuando su Sócrates afirma estar inspirado o bajo posesión divina en Fedro 238d y Crátilo 396d. Para ello, primero se sitúan en contexto ambos pasajes; a continuación, se muestra que a lo largo de todo el corpus Platón contrapone el conocimiento y el arte (τέχνη) al falso saber y a la inspiración (ἐνθουσιασμός); en tercer y cuarto lugar respectivamente, leemos los pasajes en cuestión en función de esta contraposición, para mostrar que hay que desconfiar de cuanto dice Sócrates cuando burlonamente afirma estar inspirado.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46927810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a recent publication, Nicholas Smith discussed some elements of the Republic’s divided line (Rep. 509d6-511e4) to demonstrate that they create an unresolved problem. I tackle Smith’s argumentation to show that elements of the divided line that are mentioned by him do not create problems in interpreting this passage. On the contrary, these features convey one of the most important doctrines behind this passage. This is the idea that the world of sensible things holds a dependence upon the world of Forms in the same way that shadows and reflections depend on the things that are shadowed and reflected. Following this line of reasoning, I propose an interpretation of the divided line in which both knowledge and opinion are set over the same kind of objects F. One has an opinion about F whenever apprehending F by means of its effects, and one has knowledge about F whenever apprehending F itself.
{"title":"Cognition, Objects, and Proportions in the Divided Line","authors":"Renato Matoso","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_2","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent publication, Nicholas Smith discussed some elements of the Republic’s divided line (Rep. 509d6-511e4) to demonstrate that they create an unresolved problem. I tackle Smith’s argumentation to show that elements of the divided line that are mentioned by him do not create problems in interpreting this passage. On the contrary, these features convey one of the most important doctrines behind this passage. This is the idea that the world of sensible things holds a dependence upon the world of Forms in the same way that shadows and reflections depend on the things that are shadowed and reflected. Following this line of reasoning, I propose an interpretation of the divided line in which both knowledge and opinion are set over the same kind of objects F. One has an opinion about F whenever apprehending F by means of its effects, and one has knowledge about F whenever apprehending F itself.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41325262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I articulate three kinds of division that Plato and Aristotle acknowledge to be proper, valid methods of division, namely, diairesis (vertical division), parallel division, and chiasmus (cross-division). I attempt to explain the relationship among the three kinds of division, namely, how they transform from one to another. Starting with Plato’s division of constitution in the Statesman, I illuminate that from ostensible diairesis emerges a parallel division, and the parallel division causes a cross-division to occur. Thus, the sixfold division of constitution is not a diairesis (as it appears to be) but rather is a 3 x 2 cross-division. Inheriting the three kinds of division from Plato, Aristotle advances the form by providing a theoretical explanation to the transformation of the three kinds of division. In Topics Z6, Aristotle prescribes two conditions under which a parallel division can originate from or construct ostensible diairesis and how the parallel division further causes a cross-division to occur.
{"title":"On Diairesis, Parallel Division, and Chiasmus: Plato’s and Aristotle’s Methods of Division","authors":"Xin Liu","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_3","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I articulate three kinds of division that Plato and Aristotle acknowledge to be proper, valid methods of division, namely, diairesis (vertical division), parallel division, and chiasmus (cross-division). I attempt to explain the relationship among the three kinds of division, namely, how they transform from one to another. Starting with Plato’s division of constitution in the Statesman, I illuminate that from ostensible diairesis emerges a parallel division, and the parallel division causes a cross-division to occur. Thus, the sixfold division of constitution is not a diairesis (as it appears to be) but rather is a 3 x 2 cross-division. Inheriting the three kinds of division from Plato, Aristotle advances the form by providing a theoretical explanation to the transformation of the three kinds of division. In Topics Z6, Aristotle prescribes two conditions under which a parallel division can originate from or construct ostensible diairesis and how the parallel division further causes a cross-division to occur.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42478172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While each Form is what it is to be F, some Forms also instantiate F (or “self-instantiate”). Here I consider whether the explanation for a Form’s instantiating F should be the Form’s participating in itself. First, I motivate the need for an explanation of self-instantiation. Second, I consider the advantages and disadvantages of self-participation alongside an alternative explanation—that the Form’s being what it is to be F is a sufficient explanation of its instantiation of F. The result is not a conclusive case for self-participation, but only some initial considerations in favor of it.
{"title":"Self-Instantiation and Self-Participation","authors":"Michael J. Augustín","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_1","url":null,"abstract":"While each Form is what it is to be F, some Forms also instantiate F (or “self-instantiate”). Here I consider whether the explanation for a Form’s instantiating F should be the Form’s participating in itself. First, I motivate the need for an explanation of self-instantiation. Second, I consider the advantages and disadvantages of self-participation alongside an alternative explanation—that the Form’s being what it is to be F is a sufficient explanation of its instantiation of F. The result is not a conclusive case for self-participation, but only some initial considerations in favor of it.\u2028","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48635724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article primarily tackles implicit poetic references in the Parmenides, trying to show that Plato adverts the reader that he’s going to adopt a different style of writing in the second part of this dialogue. The choice of a new dialogical form is a turning point in the evolution of Plato’s writing, and this new form of Socratic dialogue (paradoxically “non-Socratic”) will be reused and refined in later writings such as the Sophist, in which a clear allusion to the Parmenides’ literary innovation can be traced.
{"title":"Platon sur le Parménide","authors":"M. Donato","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_7","url":null,"abstract":"This article primarily tackles implicit poetic references in the Parmenides, trying to show that Plato adverts the reader that he’s going to adopt a different style of writing in the second part of this dialogue. The choice of a new dialogical form is a turning point in the evolution of Plato’s writing, and this new form of Socratic dialogue (paradoxically “non-Socratic”) will be reused and refined in later writings such as the Sophist, in which a clear allusion to the Parmenides’ literary innovation can be traced.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41609463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that myth in Kallipolis is used to communicate philosophical truths, rather than distribute politically motivated falsehoods. It first considers the function of myth in the ideal artistic culture of Kallipolis (I), and the philosophical theology that informs it (II). On this basis, it is argued that the discussion of medicinal falsehoods at 382a-d is more focused on the truth-content of myth than usually assumed (III). The latter part of the paper (IV and V) explores the connection between this new understanding of myth in books 2-3 and the philosophical myths in the central books of the dialogue.
{"title":"Myth and Truth in Republic 2-3","authors":"Rasmus Sevelsted","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_9","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that myth in Kallipolis is used to communicate philosophical truths, rather than distribute politically motivated falsehoods. It first considers the function of myth in the ideal artistic culture of Kallipolis (I), and the philosophical theology that informs it (II). On this basis, it is argued that the discussion of medicinal falsehoods at 382a-d is more focused on the truth-content of myth than usually assumed (III). The latter part of the paper (IV and V) explores the connection between this new understanding of myth in books 2-3 and the philosophical myths in the central books of the dialogue.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45401267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.14195/2183-4105_22_12
Stephen Oppong Peprah
Scholars have made several attempts to understand the ‘compulsion problem’ in the Republic, namely, why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to descend into the cave to rule. These attempts, however, fail to properly incorporate two other main instances of compulsion in the dialogue into the discussion: first, the compulsion in Plato’s concept of philosophical rulership, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics; second, the instances of compulsion in the future philosopher-rulers’ education. My main aim in this paper is to re-examine the ‘compulsion problem’. I argue that the just law that compels the philosopher-rulers to rule corroborates Plato’s concept of education to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership, i.e. rulers who despise ruling.
{"title":"Re-examining the ‘Compulsion Problem’ in Plato’s Republic","authors":"Stephen Oppong Peprah","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_12","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have made several attempts to understand the ‘compulsion problem’ in the Republic, namely, why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to descend into the cave to rule. These attempts, however, fail to properly incorporate two other main instances of compulsion in the dialogue into the discussion: first, the compulsion in Plato’s concept of philosophical rulership, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics; second, the instances of compulsion in the future philosopher-rulers’ education. My main aim in this paper is to re-examine the ‘compulsion problem’. I argue that the just law that compels the philosopher-rulers to rule corroborates Plato’s concept of education to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership, i.e. rulers who despise ruling.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44528557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The fifth “deduction” in Plato’s Parmenides (160b5-163b6) concerns the consequences that follow for a (or the) one from the hypothesis that it is not. I argue that the subject of this hypothesis is, effectively, any Form, considered just insofar as it is one Form. The hypothesis, I further argue, does not concern any essential aspect of a Form, but rather posits its contingent non-instantation (“a one is not” = “a Form is not instantiated”). The motion this deduction attributes to its one is a special type of motion: motion into and out of instantiation.
{"title":"Rethinking Deduction Five of Plato’s Parmenides (160b5-163b6)","authors":"Thomas M. Tuozzo","doi":"10.14195/2183-4105_22_5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_5","url":null,"abstract":"The fifth “deduction” in Plato’s Parmenides (160b5-163b6) concerns the consequences that follow for a (or the) one from the hypothesis that it is not. I argue that the subject of this hypothesis is, effectively, any Form, considered just insofar as it is one Form. The hypothesis, I further argue, does not concern any essential aspect of a Form, but rather posits its contingent non-instantation (“a one is not” = “a Form is not instantiated”). The motion this deduction attributes to its one is a special type of motion: motion into and out of instantiation.","PeriodicalId":53756,"journal":{"name":"Plato Journal","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41362239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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