Pub Date : 2019-01-08DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/11109
G. Maddalena
The idea of ‘gesture’ is present in the philosophical world in various forms. All of them might find an important theoretical grounding in pragmatist philosophy, if we combine pragmatism with some French philosophies of mathematics and read it as a way out of the Kantian philosophy of representation. The paper uses the insights of Jean Cavailles (1903-1944) to set out the problem of the weakness of the epistemic Kantian defense of mathematical and logical thought. Cavailles rejected the possible amendments to Kant’s explanation provided by both Husserl and Bolzano and their heirs. He used the word ‘gesture’ in order to explain the activity of mathematicians who have to act synthetically, following rules, with some physical representation, and being aware of the possibility of failure. Cavailles conceived the use of gesture as an alternative to the Heidegerian idea of event defended by Albert Lautman. The paper then follows the idea of gesture in the French philosophy of mathematics of Gilles Châtelet and Giuseppe Longo. Finally, the paper illustrates how Peirce’s study of Existential Graphs and the main insights of pragmatism complete Cavailles’s idea by giving to gestures a phenomenological and semiotic structure. The pragmatist philosophy of gesture is thus a new way of overthrowing Kant’s philosophy of representation without surrendering to irrationalism.
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Pub Date : 2019-01-08DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/11111
G. Borrelli
In this paper, I will try to establish a parallel between Charles S. Peirce’s (1839-1914) and Ernst Bloch’s (1885-1977) theory of categories. Both the authors hypothesise a phenomenological foundation for their theory of categories: categories are elements of Experience (according to Peirce) and products of Praxis (according to Bloch). Nevertheless, Bloch’s phenomenology is characterised by a peculiar aspect: according to Bloch, the gestural dimension plays a fundamental role in the Knowledge Process, positing the category of ‘Possibility’. In line with Maddalena’s analyses on the relation between ‘Complete Gesture’ and ‘Work’, I will try to illustrate that the parallel between Bloch and Peirce can be extended, by including the semiotic dimension of gesture.
在本文中，我将尝试在Charles S. Peirce(1839-1914)和Ernst Bloch(1885-1977)的范畴理论之间建立一种平行关系。两位作者都为他们的范畴理论假设了现象学基础:范畴是经验的要素(根据皮尔斯的说法)和实践的产物(根据布洛赫的说法)。然而，布洛赫的现象学有一个特殊的方面:根据布洛赫的观点，手势维度在知识过程中起着基本的作用，设定了“可能性”的范畴。根据madalena对“完整手势”和“工作”之间关系的分析，我将试图说明布洛赫和皮尔斯之间的平行可以通过包括手势的符号学维度来扩展。
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Pub Date : 2019-01-08DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/11114
M. Bella
This article aims to show the validity of an actualization of William James’s pragmatist epistemology of psychology for the construction of personal identity. Following Giovanni Maddalena’s theoretical hypothesis of “gesture” as a complete synthetic tool for the acquisition of knowledge, an in-depth analysis of the continuous and dynamic conception of personal identity proposed by James may be helpful today to better develop the emotional-somatic dimension of synthetic reasoning. As far as the epistemology of the Self is concerned, significant continuities and discontinuities are drawn from James’s naturalized integrated conception of personal identity in the light of this new Peirce’s inspired interpretation. This attempt is part of a wider project in which recovering the character of psychological and ontological processual continuity in James’s epistemology makes a considerable contribution to the development of a comprehensive understanding of mental models, one that avoids to tighten up these models as it happens in most of the contemporary epistemologies of the self.
{"title":"‘Gesto’ e identità personale. Per una epistemologia del sé in chiave pragmatista","authors":"M. Bella","doi":"10.13130/2240-9599/11114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13130/2240-9599/11114","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to show the validity of an actualization of William James’s pragmatist epistemology of psychology for the construction of personal identity. Following Giovanni Maddalena’s theoretical hypothesis of “gesture” as a complete synthetic tool for the acquisition of knowledge, an in-depth analysis of the continuous and dynamic conception of personal identity proposed by James may be helpful today to better develop the emotional-somatic dimension of synthetic reasoning. As far as the epistemology of the Self is concerned, significant continuities and discontinuities are drawn from James’s naturalized integrated conception of personal identity in the light of this new Peirce’s inspired interpretation. This attempt is part of a wider project in which recovering the character of psychological and ontological processual continuity in James’s epistemology makes a considerable contribution to the development of a comprehensive understanding of mental models, one that avoids to tighten up these models as it happens in most of the contemporary epistemologies of the self.","PeriodicalId":53793,"journal":{"name":"Lebenswelt-Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48865346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-08DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/11116
Lisa Giombini
What kind of art is performance art? In what sense – if any – can it be defined? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions by drawing on the category of ‘performative gesture’. One crucial manifestation of the character of performance art is the way it challenges our traditional ideas about what art is. A pivotal point is that performance art does not hold up to the traditional notion of artistic creativity as either a process of ‘production’ or ‘reproduction’. It is rather committed to putting the focus of artistic creativity on a special kind of gestures, differing from both the gestures of traditional art and from the gestures of theater. Performative gestures do not ‘bring anything into being’; analogously, they do not ‘mimic’ nor ‘represent’. Instead, they suggest the worrying idea that everything and anything can be considered art: not only every object, but even every ordinary act in everyday life. In this sense, performance art attempts at blurring the boundaries between art and life.
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Pub Date : 2019-01-08DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/11115
Matteo Santarelli
This article aims to apply the classification of incomplete gestures introduced by Maddalena (2015) as a tool for understanding and classifying different attachment patterns (West 2001; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, Wall 1978; Talia, Miller-Bottome, Daniel 2017). In the first section the classification of incomplete gestures proposed by Maddalena will be reconstructed. In the second part the relationship between communication and attachment will be introduced through a brief critical survey of the psychological literature dedicated to this subject. In the third part I aim to show how the specific communication of the insecure avoidant pattern is characterized by two specific types of incomplete gestures: schematization and projection. Specifically, the avoidant seems to adopt communicative strategies that allow to minimize, deactivate or at least limit the conjunction between the two phenomenological qualities of firstness and secondness (Peirce). In the conclusions, I will briefly analyse some theoretical repercussions of the approach adopted, especially with regard to the relationship between incompleteness and completeness.
本文旨在应用madalena(2015)引入的不完整手势分类作为理解和分类不同依恋模式的工具(West 2001;安斯沃思，布莱哈尔，沃特斯，沃尔1978;Talia, miller - bottom, Daniel 2017)。在第一部分中，我们将重构madalena提出的不完全手势的分类。在第二部分中，沟通和依恋之间的关系将通过对心理学文献的简要批判性调查来介绍。在第三部分中，我旨在展示不安全回避模式的具体交流如何以两种特定类型的不完整手势为特征:图式化和投射。具体地说，回避者似乎采用的交际策略允许最小化、停用或至少限制第一和第二这两种现象学性质之间的联系(皮尔斯)。在结论中，我将简要分析所采用的方法的一些理论影响，特别是关于不完备性和完备性之间的关系。
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Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/10373
Claudia Lombardo
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Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/10366
A. Barale
The paper focuses on the quite famous but also still quite mysterious idea of “immaterial similarity” (or more literally “nonsensous similarity”) by Walter Benjamin. Benjamin argues that the production of an immaterial similarity is in some way an act of magic. But it is also at the same time an overcoming of magic itself. And the reason is that the “immaterial similarity” can open the way to a “materialistic perspective”. How can that be? In order to answer, we’ll consider Benjamin’s idea of “matter”. In Benjamin’s early writings matter (Materie) appears, as we shall see, as something magic. But there is another idea, which is quite near to matter but is not exactly the same: the idea of “stuff” (Stoff). The stuff is the “material” things are made of. If we search for a definition of it, we can find that it is “the mute, soft and flocky element that – like the snow in the snow globes – clouds over inside the core of things”. We are going to examine this problematic definition. We’ll discover that way that the idea of stuff marks, in comparison to matter, a possibility. A possibility that has to be seized, before it “flits past.
{"title":"Stuff that matters. Mimesis and (the end of) magic in Walter Benjamin","authors":"A. Barale","doi":"10.13130/2240-9599/10366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13130/2240-9599/10366","url":null,"abstract":"The paper focuses on the quite famous but also still quite mysterious idea of “immaterial similarity” (or more literally “nonsensous similarity”) by Walter Benjamin. Benjamin argues that the production of an immaterial similarity is in some way an act of magic. But it is also at the same time an overcoming of magic itself. And the reason is that the “immaterial similarity” can open the way to a “materialistic perspective”. How can that be? In order to answer, we’ll consider Benjamin’s idea of “matter”. In Benjamin’s early writings matter (Materie) appears, as we shall see, as something magic. But there is another idea, which is quite near to matter but is not exactly the same: the idea of “stuff” (Stoff). The stuff is the “material” things are made of. If we search for a definition of it, we can find that it is “the mute, soft and flocky element that – like the snow in the snow globes – clouds over inside the core of things”. We are going to examine this problematic definition. We’ll discover that way that the idea of stuff marks, in comparison to matter, a possibility. A possibility that has to be seized, before it “flits past.","PeriodicalId":53793,"journal":{"name":"Lebenswelt-Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42898658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/10363
G. Raimo
In this article, I argue that fregean approach to semantics, like that of modelling semantics, doesn’t have the conceptual tools to define the notions of truth and reference. The reason is that these programs ignore what Wittgenstein taught us, namely the link between meaning and use. More specifically, I intend to show how a theory of descriptive language can only be constructed by clarifying the connection between the notions of linguistic game, meaning and description. But how can this connection be clarified? Wittgenstein, in the second phase of his thought, had never been interested in a theory of this type (ie the construction of a theory of descriptive use), and all his reflections on use and meaning had the sole purpose of “curing” from that essentialist attitude (the claim to capture the "essence" of the terms) that had characterized the Tractatus , and which still today characterizes almost the whole analytic philosophy. This means that it is not in Wittgenstein's thought that we can find such a theory, but in Moritz Schlick’s works, who attempted to build a theory of linguistic meaning based on the connection between the notions of image, use and verification.
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Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/10372
Lia Turtas
{"title":"J. Harbord, Ex-centric cinema. Giorgio Agamben and film archaeology","authors":"Lia Turtas","doi":"10.13130/2240-9599/10372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13130/2240-9599/10372","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53793,"journal":{"name":"Lebenswelt-Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43423762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.13130/2240-9599/10367
Fabrizia Bandi
Alain (Emile Chartier), 1920: Systeme des beaux-arts , Paris, Gallimard, 1920. Burdea, G.C., Coiffet P., 1993: Virtual Reality Technology , Hoboken, New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2003. Dufrenne M., 1953: Phenomenology of aesthetic experience, by E. Casey, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973. Dufrenne M., 1963: Le poetique , Paris, P.U.F., 1963. Dufrenne M., 1966: Jalons , Nijhoff, La Haye, 1963. Dufrenne M., 1967: Esthetique et Philosophie , vol. I, Paris, Klincksieck, 1967. Dufrenne M., 1976a: Esthetique et Philosophi e, vol. II, Paris, Klincksieck, 1967. Dufrenne M., 1981a: L'inventaire des a priori: recherche de l'originaire , Paris, Bourgois, 1981. Dufrenne M., 1981b: Esthetique et Philosophie , vol. III, Klincksieck, Paris. 1981. Dufrenne M., 1987: L'oeil et l'oreille , Montreal, L'HEXAGONE, 1987. Franzini E., 1982: Natura e Poesia, Su un inventario degli a priori di Mikel Dufrenne , in Fenomenologia e scienze dell'uomo , Padova, CLESP editrice, pp. 67-90. Sartre J.P., 1940: The psychology of imagination , New York, Philosophical library, 1948.
Alain (Emile Chartier)， 1920:美术系统，巴黎，Gallimard, 1920。Burdea, g.c.， Coiffet P.， 1993:虚拟现实技术，新泽西州霍博肯，John Wiley & Sons Inc.， 2003。1953年，E. Casey，西北大学出版社，埃文斯顿，1973年。Dufrenne M.， 1963: Le poetique, Paris, p.u.f.， 1963。Dufrenne M.， 1966: Jalons, Nijhoff, La Haye, 1963。1967年:Esthetique et Philosophie, vol. I, Paris, Klincksieck, 1967年。Dufrenne M.， 1976: Esthetique et Philosophi e，第二卷，巴黎，Klincksieck, 1967年。《先验清单》，巴黎，波哥大，1981年。Dufrenne M. 1981: Esthetique et Philosophie，第三卷，Klincksieck，巴黎，1981年。Dufrenne M.， 1987: oeil et oreille，蒙特利尔，l' hexagone, 1987。Franzini E.， 1982:《自然与诗歌》，Mikel Dufrenne，《现象学与人类科学》，帕多瓦，CLESP出版社，第67-90页。《想象心理学》，纽约，哲学图书馆，1948年。
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