Around 1250, a shift began to occur in texts written on the common law. Where earlier texts on the practices of the king’s courts had mostly been written in Latin, a number of the new texts written after 1250 were written in French. The shift to French initially occurred mostly in the context of texts on counting and pleading, the oral parts of court procedure, which were conducted in French, and one author of the 1280s even suggested that by his time a norm had developed that texts on counting and pleading should be written in French. This article examines the evidence for such a norm and the reasons for the shift to French in the later thirteenth century. It uses texts on counting and pleading to examine how both French and Latin were used in the education of pleaders and concludes that, although a norm probably did exist that the oral parts of procedure should be taught in French, Latin was still being used for a number of different purposes in the education of pleaders.
{"title":"Those Things Which Are Written in Romance: Language and Law Teaching in Thirteenth-Century England","authors":"Thomas McSweeney","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njac020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njac020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Around 1250, a shift began to occur in texts written on the common law. Where earlier texts on the practices of the king’s courts had mostly been written in Latin, a number of the new texts written after 1250 were written in French. The shift to French initially occurred mostly in the context of texts on counting and pleading, the oral parts of court procedure, which were conducted in French, and one author of the 1280s even suggested that by his time a norm had developed that texts on counting and pleading should be written in French. This article examines the evidence for such a norm and the reasons for the shift to French in the later thirteenth century. It uses texts on counting and pleading to examine how both French and Latin were used in the education of pleaders and concludes that, although a norm probably did exist that the oral parts of procedure should be taught in French, Latin was still being used for a number of different purposes in the education of pleaders.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84541109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Wagner Act established a right to collective action as the keystone of industrial democracy. In doing so, it also articulated a radical conception of the self: that individuals form genuine desires and attain full self-actualization through collective action. This conception ran counter to the traditional liberal idea of selfhood, which took possessive individualism as the fundament of democratic governance. This paper places the Wagner Act and its reception in the context of changing conceptions of the self in American political thought from 1920 to 1950. The Wagner Act derived its conception of democratic activity from a pragmatist and progressivist theory of the “social self.” But its reception took place amidst a very different intellectual context. By midcentury, a liberal hostility to “mass society” and its deleterious effects on individual choice had repudiated the older pragmatist collectivism. In other words, the Act’s core provision—the notion of collective action as central to the formation of workers’ individual desires—was born of a dying moment in American thought. The immediate hostility that the new labor law regime faced in Congress and the courts was a consequence, in part, of that disjuncture.
{"title":"The Tragic Pragmatism of the Wagner Act","authors":"Daniel Judt","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njac019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njac019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Wagner Act established a right to collective action as the keystone of industrial democracy. In doing so, it also articulated a radical conception of the self: that individuals form genuine desires and attain full self-actualization through collective action. This conception ran counter to the traditional liberal idea of selfhood, which took possessive individualism as the fundament of democratic governance. This paper places the Wagner Act and its reception in the context of changing conceptions of the self in American political thought from 1920 to 1950. The Wagner Act derived its conception of democratic activity from a pragmatist and progressivist theory of the “social self.” But its reception took place amidst a very different intellectual context. By midcentury, a liberal hostility to “mass society” and its deleterious effects on individual choice had repudiated the older pragmatist collectivism. In other words, the Act’s core provision—the notion of collective action as central to the formation of workers’ individual desires—was born of a dying moment in American thought. The immediate hostility that the new labor law regime faced in Congress and the courts was a consequence, in part, of that disjuncture.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86548405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"William Phelan, Great Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Rethinking the Landmark Decisions of the Foundational Period","authors":"Jaka Kukavica","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njac015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njac015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"232 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80608642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Russell Sandberg, Subversive Legal History: A Manifesto for the Future of Legal Education","authors":"W. Eves","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njac014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njac014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88840191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inge Van Hulle, Britain and International Law in West Africa","authors":"Joyman Lee","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njac012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njac012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73144489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro was a seventeenth-century Polish statesman whose works on Polish legal theory and history are generally underappreciated. Whenever he is mentioned, it is generally as a defender of the institution liberum veto, which is nearly universally blamed for the decline and eventually collapse of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. This article is part of a contemporary attempt to reignite academic interest in Fredro by bring his work to the attention of comparative constitutional scholars and legal historians, as well as to rehabilitate his reputation. More concretely, it examines the Gestorum, his first major work and a historical treatise, in order to recreate Fredro’s theories of constitutional interpretation in contemporary theoretical parlance: his theory of casus qui facit leges as a constitutional moment, interpretatio/ratio legislatoris vs verbis legis as legislators’ intentionalism vs textualism, and his interpretation vs explication as interpretation vs construction. These latter two sets of distinctions are particularly relevant to ongoing debates about originalistic approaches within comparative constitutional theory and legal history.
{"title":"The Art of Interpretation or the Art of Construction? The Case of Gestorum—A Constitutional Treatise by Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro","authors":"Marek Tracz-Tryniecki,J Patrick Higgins","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njac001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Andrzej Maksymilian Fredro was a seventeenth-century Polish statesman whose works on Polish legal theory and history are generally underappreciated. Whenever he is mentioned, it is generally as a defender of the institution liberum veto, which is nearly universally blamed for the decline and eventually collapse of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. This article is part of a contemporary attempt to reignite academic interest in Fredro by bring his work to the attention of comparative constitutional scholars and legal historians, as well as to rehabilitate his reputation. More concretely, it examines the Gestorum, his first major work and a historical treatise, in order to recreate Fredro’s theories of constitutional interpretation in contemporary theoretical parlance: his theory of casus qui facit leges as a constitutional moment, interpretatio/ratio legislatoris vs verbis legis as legislators’ intentionalism vs textualism, and his interpretation vs explication as interpretation vs construction. These latter two sets of distinctions are particularly relevant to ongoing debates about originalistic approaches within comparative constitutional theory and legal history.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"338 1","pages":"1-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138516944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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