{"title":"Status in Ancient and Medieval Law: Introduction","authors":"Timothy Lubin","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"105 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Indentured servitude was an exploitative form of coerced labor in England’s American colonies, but indentured servants were expected to join settler society after completing their terms of indenture, and they possessed clearly defined legal rights and protections in both English and colonial laws, even during their period of servitude. The masters and mistresses of indentured servants sometimes engaged in physical abuse and contractual fraud, but servants could sue their masters or mistresses in court without owing fees, a status termed in forma pauperis. Courts facilitated servant lawsuits and heeded procedural fairness, bringing in compensated witnesses, searching archival records, and even providing pro bono lawyers. It appears that most servants won their cases against their masters and mistresses, obtaining their freedom, their withheld freedom dues, or reimbursement for overlong terms of servitude. Indentured servants’ lawyers affirmed that their clients were rights-bearing members of society, persuasively utilizing terms such as ‘justice’ and ‘equity’ to represent their cases. The access of servants to legal recourse, the courts’ commitment to ensure due process and legal representation, and the frequent victories of servants over their masters demonstrated that indentured servants were regarded as valued members of colonial society in the Chesapeake, and in other colonial regions. Unlike enslaved people, who possessed neither legal rights nor access to the courts, white indentured servants possessed inherent, though limited, rights of freeborn subjects, even if from disenfranchised groups, such as women, children, or those of Irish origin. The legal and social distinctions between servitude and slavery began arising half a century before Bacon’s Rebellion in the 1670s, which is conventionally assumed to be a watershed event in the division between indentured servitude and slavery. The affirmation of the rights of indentured servants developed in parallel with the growth of slavery, and contributed to developing ideals of white citizenship.
{"title":"<i>In forma pauperis:</i> Indentured Servitude, the Right to Counsel, and White Citizenship in the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake","authors":"Anna Suranyi","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Indentured servitude was an exploitative form of coerced labor in England’s American colonies, but indentured servants were expected to join settler society after completing their terms of indenture, and they possessed clearly defined legal rights and protections in both English and colonial laws, even during their period of servitude. The masters and mistresses of indentured servants sometimes engaged in physical abuse and contractual fraud, but servants could sue their masters or mistresses in court without owing fees, a status termed in forma pauperis. Courts facilitated servant lawsuits and heeded procedural fairness, bringing in compensated witnesses, searching archival records, and even providing pro bono lawyers. It appears that most servants won their cases against their masters and mistresses, obtaining their freedom, their withheld freedom dues, or reimbursement for overlong terms of servitude. Indentured servants’ lawyers affirmed that their clients were rights-bearing members of society, persuasively utilizing terms such as ‘justice’ and ‘equity’ to represent their cases. The access of servants to legal recourse, the courts’ commitment to ensure due process and legal representation, and the frequent victories of servants over their masters demonstrated that indentured servants were regarded as valued members of colonial society in the Chesapeake, and in other colonial regions. Unlike enslaved people, who possessed neither legal rights nor access to the courts, white indentured servants possessed inherent, though limited, rights of freeborn subjects, even if from disenfranchised groups, such as women, children, or those of Irish origin. The legal and social distinctions between servitude and slavery began arising half a century before Bacon’s Rebellion in the 1670s, which is conventionally assumed to be a watershed event in the division between indentured servitude and slavery. The affirmation of the rights of indentured servants developed in parallel with the growth of slavery, and contributed to developing ideals of white citizenship.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"25 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135219928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Save the Constitution, the United States’s most famous legal export may well be the case method. This article pieces together the story of how CC Langdell’s brainchild was brought to the rest of the common law world in treading the momentous events and geopolitics of the last century and a half, and reflects on the lessons from this global experiment for the present and future of the case method. After initially attracting little attention overseas, the rise of the case method encountered its watershed in the post-war period. From then on, the method’s further expansion branched into two narratives: one in the Western world and the other in the former British African, Asian, and Caribbean colonies. The overseas experiments with the case method yielded some durable successes and cast a light on its singular ability to adapt to widely different environments. But mostly the picture is one of mixed results, especially outside the Western world, owing to a failure to devise an educational program adapted to the varying local circumstances. As with law itself, the teaching of law is inextricably tied to local idiosyncrasies and world politics, thus making the future of the case method as difficult to predict as it would have been for Langdell and his contemporaries. Today’s different national and international contexts from that of 1945 represent an opportunity to reassess the merits of the case method in our more mature legal and educational environments, freed from colonial and neocolonial agendas.
{"title":"International Legacies of a Century and a Half of the Case Method","authors":"Han-Ru Zhou","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Save the Constitution, the United States’s most famous legal export may well be the case method. This article pieces together the story of how CC Langdell’s brainchild was brought to the rest of the common law world in treading the momentous events and geopolitics of the last century and a half, and reflects on the lessons from this global experiment for the present and future of the case method. After initially attracting little attention overseas, the rise of the case method encountered its watershed in the post-war period. From then on, the method’s further expansion branched into two narratives: one in the Western world and the other in the former British African, Asian, and Caribbean colonies. The overseas experiments with the case method yielded some durable successes and cast a light on its singular ability to adapt to widely different environments. But mostly the picture is one of mixed results, especially outside the Western world, owing to a failure to devise an educational program adapted to the varying local circumstances. As with law itself, the teaching of law is inextricably tied to local idiosyncrasies and world politics, thus making the future of the case method as difficult to predict as it would have been for Langdell and his contemporaries. Today’s different national and international contexts from that of 1945 represent an opportunity to reassess the merits of the case method in our more mature legal and educational environments, freed from colonial and neocolonial agendas.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135618423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The normative universe of the premodern Islamic legal tradition revolves around duties. These duties are determined by an individual’s status both as an autonomous entity and as part of the collective. The duties one owes and those that one is owed, are primarily constructed around belief. Belief, and its absence, function as the primary vehicles for affirming or denying an individual’s place within the moral community. In the jurists discourse on warfare, during the fifth ah/eleventh ce and sixth ah/twelfth ce centuries, we find an illustrative example of how belief dictates the duties that must be performed. Who is obligated to fight, who must be fought, and what obligations are owed in death all depend, though not exclusively, on the belief status of the relevant actors. In the process jurists constructed status hierarchies based on belief and, as in the case of martyrs, negotiated a delicate balance between preserving the sacredness of belief status and accounting for the pragmatic requirements of the battlefield.
{"title":"Belief as Status: Premodern Islamic Law, Duties, and the Martyr Conundrum","authors":"Adnan A Zulfiqar","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The normative universe of the premodern Islamic legal tradition revolves around duties. These duties are determined by an individual’s status both as an autonomous entity and as part of the collective. The duties one owes and those that one is owed, are primarily constructed around belief. Belief, and its absence, function as the primary vehicles for affirming or denying an individual’s place within the moral community. In the jurists discourse on warfare, during the fifth ah/eleventh ce and sixth ah/twelfth ce centuries, we find an illustrative example of how belief dictates the duties that must be performed. Who is obligated to fight, who must be fought, and what obligations are owed in death all depend, though not exclusively, on the belief status of the relevant actors. In the process jurists constructed status hierarchies based on belief and, as in the case of martyrs, negotiated a delicate balance between preserving the sacredness of belief status and accounting for the pragmatic requirements of the battlefield.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Ancient Greek city-states, or poleis, had a bewildering number of terms for people who lived in them. In Athens, freedmen seem to be assimilated juridically to the status of metics (resident aliens), although socially there were ways of both denigrating freedmen and obscuring the distinction between metic and freed. Elsewhere we can see that under some circumstances distinctions between metic and freed were made, but not in ways that point to strong juridical differences. By looking at the development of both statuses historically, I propose that the juridical assimilation occurred in Athens because metic status was created first, in an historical context in which distinctions between citizens and foreigners was crucial: an imperial power with a strong economy was attracting many foreigners to the mother city. This line drawn between citizens and foreigners was expressed through the law in both the fifth and fourth centuries bce. But the social perception of metics changed in the fourth century, for historical reasons deriving from the assimilation of metics and freed into one category. Other areas of the Greek world with both metics and freedmen may have assimilated the two statuses initially, but over time split them apart.
{"title":"Metics and Freedmen: Conflicts of Social and Juridical Status in the Classical and Hellenistic Greek World","authors":"Elizabeth A Meyer","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ancient Greek city-states, or poleis, had a bewildering number of terms for people who lived in them. In Athens, freedmen seem to be assimilated juridically to the status of metics (resident aliens), although socially there were ways of both denigrating freedmen and obscuring the distinction between metic and freed. Elsewhere we can see that under some circumstances distinctions between metic and freed were made, but not in ways that point to strong juridical differences. By looking at the development of both statuses historically, I propose that the juridical assimilation occurred in Athens because metic status was created first, in an historical context in which distinctions between citizens and foreigners was crucial: an imperial power with a strong economy was attracting many foreigners to the mother city. This line drawn between citizens and foreigners was expressed through the law in both the fifth and fourth centuries bce. But the social perception of metics changed in the fourth century, for historical reasons deriving from the assimilation of metics and freed into one category. Other areas of the Greek world with both metics and freedmen may have assimilated the two statuses initially, but over time split them apart.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136062650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article hunts for the medieval understanding of juridical persona in the courtrooms of communal Italy (c.1250–1450). While corporate personae have been the long-favored subject of inquiry for both medieval and modern scholars, the ontological predecessor of the corporate persona, the juridical persona, remains undertheorized. The gap is surprising given that (i) the concept is central to other formative legal notions of standing, status, and identity and (ii) medieval legal practice’s erstwhile penchant was to gloss and re-gloss every word of its central texts. By considering cases of gestural blasphemy brought before both civic and ecclesiastical courts, this article discovers the multiple and context-specific meanings for persona at law. These shifting definitions hover around a theological impossibility: a material quality to divine persons that could render them subject to injury and defendable in court. I contend that the legal utility of the term persona rested in its ability to bridge conceptual gaps like that created in the prosecution of blasphemy. Persona was left definitionally both one and many for good legal reason.
{"title":"The Matter of Personae in Medieval Italy","authors":"Melissa Vise","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article hunts for the medieval understanding of juridical persona in the courtrooms of communal Italy (c.1250–1450). While corporate personae have been the long-favored subject of inquiry for both medieval and modern scholars, the ontological predecessor of the corporate persona, the juridical persona, remains undertheorized. The gap is surprising given that (i) the concept is central to other formative legal notions of standing, status, and identity and (ii) medieval legal practice’s erstwhile penchant was to gloss and re-gloss every word of its central texts. By considering cases of gestural blasphemy brought before both civic and ecclesiastical courts, this article discovers the multiple and context-specific meanings for persona at law. These shifting definitions hover around a theological impossibility: a material quality to divine persons that could render them subject to injury and defendable in court. I contend that the legal utility of the term persona rested in its ability to bridge conceptual gaps like that created in the prosecution of blasphemy. Persona was left definitionally both one and many for good legal reason.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"242 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136062395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Giving to worthy recipients has been meritorious public piety in India at least since the Mauryan empire. Most consequential were grants in perpetuity of land or capital as a ‘religious foundation’ for monks or Brahmins, conferred by means of a charter (śāsana). Grants to Brahmins typically created or supported an agrahāra, a residential enclave with attached farmland and villages, on terms analogous to those of grants to Buddhist or Jaina mendicants or monasteries. In these records (attested since the beginning of the Common Era), rulers cede their claims to certain normal obligations of subjects, such as tax revenue, compulsory labor, and billeting or provisions for officers of the state, and they often give the beneficiaries authority over internal legal administration. This article examines the implications of the fiscal and juridical autonomy conferred in such grants in providing state recognition and institutional support of Brahmins’ sacred status as a religious profession and a privileged caste.
{"title":"Religious Endowments in Ancient India and the Institutionalization of Brahmin Caste Status","authors":"Timothy Lubin","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Giving to worthy recipients has been meritorious public piety in India at least since the Mauryan empire. Most consequential were grants in perpetuity of land or capital as a ‘religious foundation’ for monks or Brahmins, conferred by means of a charter (śāsana). Grants to Brahmins typically created or supported an agrahāra, a residential enclave with attached farmland and villages, on terms analogous to those of grants to Buddhist or Jaina mendicants or monasteries. In these records (attested since the beginning of the Common Era), rulers cede their claims to certain normal obligations of subjects, such as tax revenue, compulsory labor, and billeting or provisions for officers of the state, and they often give the beneficiaries authority over internal legal administration. This article examines the implications of the fiscal and juridical autonomy conferred in such grants in providing state recognition and institutional support of Brahmins’ sacred status as a religious profession and a privileged caste.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136293905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract One phase in the long history of Roman citizenship ended in 212 ce, when the emperor Caracalla granted citizenship to all free-born residents of the empire. This moment subsequently came to be understood as inevitable, as though the juridical unification of the world had been the project of empire all along—and virtually all subsequent European empires have been implicated in the legacy of that tradition. But the history of Roman citizenship is neither unitary nor continuous. This article interrogates processes of juridification in the relationship between citizenship and empire. Some of these concern the Roman citizen body itself, which on one reading was gradually transformed from a collective of self-ruling agents to a community of economic actors. Others concern the effects on alien political and religious communities of the appearance of Roman tribunals as courts of the second instance. The legacies of Roman citizenship in modern forms of subjectivity should be understood against this complex history.
{"title":"Empire, Status, and the Law","authors":"Clifford Ando","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One phase in the long history of Roman citizenship ended in 212 ce, when the emperor Caracalla granted citizenship to all free-born residents of the empire. This moment subsequently came to be understood as inevitable, as though the juridical unification of the world had been the project of empire all along—and virtually all subsequent European empires have been implicated in the legacy of that tradition. But the history of Roman citizenship is neither unitary nor continuous. This article interrogates processes of juridification in the relationship between citizenship and empire. Some of these concern the Roman citizen body itself, which on one reading was gradually transformed from a collective of self-ruling agents to a community of economic actors. Others concern the effects on alien political and religious communities of the appearance of Roman tribunals as courts of the second instance. The legacies of Roman citizenship in modern forms of subjectivity should be understood against this complex history.","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134944382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Eric L Muller, Lawyer, Jailer, Ally, Foe: Complicity and Conscience in America’s World War II Concentration Camps Get access Eric L Muller, Lawyer, Jailer, Ally, Foe: Complicity and Conscience in America’s World War II Concentration Camps ( University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2023), pp 304, US$30.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-1469673974 Gabriel J Chin Gabriel J Chin Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law, 400 Mrak Hall Dr., Davis, CA, USA gjchin@ucdavis.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, njad017, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad017 Published: 05 October 2023
期刊文章埃里克·L·穆勒，律师，狱卒，盟友，敌人:美国二战集中营中的共谋和良心获取埃里克·L·穆勒，律师，狱卒，盟友，敌人:美国二战集中营中的共谋和良心(北卡罗来纳大学出版社，教堂山2023)，304页，30.00美元(精装)。Gabriel J Chin Gabriel J Chin Edward L. Barrett Jr.加州大学戴维斯分校法学院主席兼马丁·路德·金法学教授，400 Mrak Hall博士，Davis, CA, USA gjchin@ucdavis.edu查找作者的其他著作:Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, njad017, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad017出版日期:2023年10月5日
{"title":"Eric L Muller, <i>Lawyer, Jailer, Ally, Foe: Complicity and Conscience in America’s World War II Concentration Camps</i>","authors":"Gabriel J Chin","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad017","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Eric L Muller, Lawyer, Jailer, Ally, Foe: Complicity and Conscience in America’s World War II Concentration Camps Get access Eric L Muller, Lawyer, Jailer, Ally, Foe: Complicity and Conscience in America’s World War II Concentration Camps ( University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2023), pp 304, US$30.00 (hardcover). ISBN 978-1469673974 Gabriel J Chin Gabriel J Chin Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law, 400 Mrak Hall Dr., Davis, CA, USA gjchin@ucdavis.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, njad017, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad017 Published: 05 October 2023","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135482870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Russell Sandberg, A Historical Introduction to English Law: Genesis of the Common Law Get access Russell Sandberg, A Historical Introduction to English Law: Genesis of the Common Law ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. xiii+280. £90 (hardcover). ISBN 9781107090583 William Eves William Eves School of Law, History of Law and Governance Centre, University of Nottingham, UK will.eves@nottingham.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, njad016, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad016 Published: 21 September 2023
{"title":"Russell Sandberg, <i>A Historical Introduction to English Law: Genesis of the Common Law</i>","authors":"William Eves","doi":"10.1093/ajlh/njad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad016","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Russell Sandberg, A Historical Introduction to English Law: Genesis of the Common Law Get access Russell Sandberg, A Historical Introduction to English Law: Genesis of the Common Law ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. xiii+280. £90 (hardcover). ISBN 9781107090583 William Eves William Eves School of Law, History of Law and Governance Centre, University of Nottingham, UK will.eves@nottingham.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, njad016, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njad016 Published: 21 September 2023","PeriodicalId":54164,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136235836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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