Pub Date : 2019-04-15DOI: 10.1177/1365712719838635
P. Roberts
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Pub Date : 2019-04-01DOI: 10.1177/1365712718813783
H. Lai
This response to Allen and Pardo focuses mainly on questioning the comparative nature of juridical proof under their relative plausibility theory.
对Allen和Pardo的回应主要集中在质疑他们的相对合理性理论下的司法证明的比较性质。
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Pub Date : 2019-03-06DOI: 10.1177/1365712719830704
Alexander Shytov, P. Duff
Chinese criminal procedural law has recently been undergoing rapid transformation. While the search for ‘truth’, embodied in a confession by the accused, has traditionally dominated the criminal process, efforts are now being made to secure more procedural fairness. This is exemplified by the introduction of rules to render inadmissible at trial confessions extorted from suspects by ill treatment. Unsurprisingly, it has proved difficult to shift the mindsets of the players in the criminal justice process. The new rules have not been fully implemented in many respects and there is still confusion over the criteria to be used by the courts in making decisions about inadmissibility. Further, it has proved difficult to enable defence lawyers to play a more active role in defending their clients and to render it normal for witnesses to testify at trial. This handicaps the drive to secure a better balance between the search for truth and procedural fairness in the Chinese criminal trial.
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Pub Date : 2019-03-06DOI: 10.1177/1365712719831716
J. D. Mujuzi
In the 1976 case of Liswaniso v The People, the Zambian Supreme Court held that illegally obtained evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant. Since then, unsuccessful attempts have been made to convince the Supreme Court and the High Court to reconsider this position, especially when the evidence in question has been obtained in violation of a right in the Bill of Rights. Recent decisions from the Supreme Court show that the court is unlikely to change its position on this issue. In this article, the author suggests ways in which the Supreme Court could relax, without necessarily overruling, its rule in the Liswaniso when dealing with evidence obtained through violating human rights.
{"title":"The admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations in Zambia: Revisiting Liswaniso v The People (1976) Zambia Law Reports 277","authors":"J. D. Mujuzi","doi":"10.1177/1365712719831716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712719831716","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1976 case of Liswaniso v The People, the Zambian Supreme Court held that illegally obtained evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant. Since then, unsuccessful attempts have been made to convince the Supreme Court and the High Court to reconsider this position, especially when the evidence in question has been obtained in violation of a right in the Bill of Rights. Recent decisions from the Supreme Court show that the court is unlikely to change its position on this issue. In this article, the author suggests ways in which the Supreme Court could relax, without necessarily overruling, its rule in the Liswaniso when dealing with evidence obtained through violating human rights.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"23 1","pages":"316 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1365712719831716","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43017677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-25DOI: 10.1177/1365712718815349
M. Wittlin
In this response to Allen and Pardo’s Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, I argue that while relative plausibility presents certain advantages over probabilism, it also fails to avoid several problems that the authors attribute to probabilism. I note that relative plausibility can be understood as probabilism under certain constraints that characterise a typical trial. I then argue that two of Allen and Pardo’s central problems with probabilism—the absence of an objective means for measuring the strength of evidence and the conjunction problem—apply to both probabilism and relative plausibility, although neither problem poses a serious threat to accuracy. I conclude that each theory, despite these problems, is useful for certain purposes—relative plausibility better models how advocates present cases and how jurors process information; probabilism serves as a valuable tool for modelling relevance and prejudice.
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Pub Date : 2019-02-06DOI: 10.1177/1365712718824123
Guy Ben-David
In general, a conviction may be based on a single piece of evidence or a single testimony if the court is convinced that it proves the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions special cases were established by statute and case law in which a single piece of evidence cannot suffice to prove a defendant’s guilt and additional evidence is required to support the main evidence. This rule, known as the Corroborative Rule (hereinafter ‘the rule’ or ‘CR’) constitutes a barrier against conviction on the basis of individual evidence, without the judge or jury cautioning themselves against reliance on a single piece of evidence in order to convict the accused. In general, the requirement for additional evidence exists in cases where there is a single piece of incriminating evidence, but there is concern regarding its reliability. In order to reduce the risk of a mistake that will lead to a false conviction (conviction of an innocent defendant), the law requires additional evidence as a condition for conviction. The first purpose of this article is to provide a comparative-descriptive perspective on the CR as practised in Anglo-American and Israeli law. While in continental law a defendant’s conviction is not subject to any requirement for a specific quantity of evidence, in Anglo-American law there is a clear trend to reduce the application of a requirement for additional evidence. Yet in Israeli law, an opposite trend is evident, expressed in increased application of the Corroborative Rule in order to convict the accused. The second purpose of the article is to undertake a critical examination of the theoretical infrastructure underpinning the CR. According to this infrastructure, the justification for the CR is epistemic and relates, as a rule, to testimony whose reliability is, a priori, dubious. Thus the CR is linked to one of the purposes of some of the rules of criminal proceedings, which is to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants. However, at the same time, the CR restricts judicial discretion and harms the prosecutor’s and the court’s ability to ensure conviction of guilty defendants, even in cases where there is a single piece of evidence, which the court trusts. The first section provides a comparison of the use of the CR in English, Canadian, Scottish, American and Israeli law. The second section is devoted to the description of the theoretical infrastructure of the CR, while the third section contains a critical discussion on both the theoretical infrastructure described in the second section and also the requirement for evidential supplements, in general. To conclude the article, I provide a summary of its contents.
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Pub Date : 2019-01-22DOI: 10.1177/1365712718816749
R. Hastie
Allen and Pardo's Relative Plausibility Model provides a mostly valid descriptive model for the reasoning of fact-finders like American jurors. My major reservations on the project concern the incompleteness of the authors’ review of empirical, behavioral research relevant to their proposal. The merits of the project as a normative model are less satisfying and, again, the review of relevant sources seems incomplete.
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Pub Date : 2019-01-17DOI: 10.1177/1365712718816760
R. Allen, Michael S. Pardo
This rejoinder replies to the twenty published commentaries on our article, “Relative Plausibility and Its Critics.” Our response has four objectives: 1) presenting further details regarding relative plausibility and the scope of our project in order to address some of our critics’ claims of ambiguity; 2) examining some important methodological considerations; 3) clarifying the significance of the conjunction problem and its role in the “probability debates”; and 4) noting avenues for future research.
{"title":"Clarifying relative plausibility: A rejoinder","authors":"R. Allen, Michael S. Pardo","doi":"10.1177/1365712718816760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712718816760","url":null,"abstract":"This rejoinder replies to the twenty published commentaries on our article, “Relative Plausibility and Its Critics.” Our response has four objectives: 1) presenting further details regarding relative plausibility and the scope of our project in order to address some of our critics’ claims of ambiguity; 2) examining some important methodological considerations; 3) clarifying the significance of the conjunction problem and its role in the “probability debates”; and 4) noting avenues for future research.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"23 1","pages":"205 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1365712718816760","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44437098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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