Pub Date : 2021-09-08DOI: 10.1177/13657127211031040
J. Morrison, J. Bradshaw, G. Murphy
Communication plays a key role in a witness's ability to give evidence and participate in the court process. Adults with intellectual disabilities (ID) can be negatively impacted by communication difficulties such as: limitations in recall abilities; suggestibility to leading questions; difficult question styles used by advocates; and unfamiliar language used within the court setting. Most research carried out on communication challenges for adults with ID, when giving evidence, has involved participants in psychology-based experimental methodology. In this study 19 court reports assessing actual witnesses (complainants and defendants) with ID, written by Registered Intermediaries in Northern Ireland, were analysed. A wide range of communication difficulties were identified for the adult witnesses. Difficulties resulting from communication used by their communication partner (typically the advocate in a court setting) were also described. A rich model of the challenges for both partners, in giving evidence and in cross-examination, is presented, extending previous research. This study highlights the need for research within UK courts to assess: how witnesses with ID are being questioned; the effectiveness of changes made to the court process to enhance communication; the impact of the court process and environment on communication and alternative question styles for advocates to use.
{"title":"Reported communication challenges for adult witnesses with intellectual disabilities giving evidence in court","authors":"J. Morrison, J. Bradshaw, G. Murphy","doi":"10.1177/13657127211031040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211031040","url":null,"abstract":"Communication plays a key role in a witness's ability to give evidence and participate in the court process. Adults with intellectual disabilities (ID) can be negatively impacted by communication difficulties such as: limitations in recall abilities; suggestibility to leading questions; difficult question styles used by advocates; and unfamiliar language used within the court setting. Most research carried out on communication challenges for adults with ID, when giving evidence, has involved participants in psychology-based experimental methodology. In this study 19 court reports assessing actual witnesses (complainants and defendants) with ID, written by Registered Intermediaries in Northern Ireland, were analysed. A wide range of communication difficulties were identified for the adult witnesses. Difficulties resulting from communication used by their communication partner (typically the advocate in a court setting) were also described. A rich model of the challenges for both partners, in giving evidence and in cross-examination, is presented, extending previous research. This study highlights the need for research within UK courts to assess: how witnesses with ID are being questioned; the effectiveness of changes made to the court process to enhance communication; the impact of the court process and environment on communication and alternative question styles for advocates to use.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"243 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42097749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-03DOI: 10.1177/13657127211035831
Giada Fratantonio
Why can testimony alone be enough for findings of liability? Why statistical evidence alone can't? These questions underpin the ‘Proof Paradox’. Many epistemologists have attempted to explain this paradox from a purely epistemic perspective. I call it the ‘Epistemic Project’. In this paper, I take a step back from this recent trend. Stemming from considerations about the nature and role of standards of proof, I define three requirements that any successful account in line with the Epistemic Project should meet. I then consider three recent epistemic accounts on which the standard is met when the evidence rules out modal risk (Pritchard 2018), normic risk (Ebert et al., 2020), or relevant alternatives (Gardiner 2019 2020). I argue that none of these accounts meets all the requirements. Finally, I offer reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects of having a successful epistemic explanation of the paradox. I suggest the discussion on the proof paradox would benefit from undergoing a ‘value-turn’.
为什么仅凭证词就足以认定责任?为什么仅凭统计证据不能?这些问题构成了“证明悖论”。许多认识论家试图从纯粹的认识论的角度来解释这一悖论。我称之为“认知计划”。在本文中，我将从这一近期趋势中退后一步。根据对证明标准的性质和作用的考虑，我定义了符合认知项目的任何成功的描述都应该满足的三个要求。然后，我考虑了三个最近的认知解释，当证据排除模态风险(Pritchard 2018)、常态风险(Ebert et al.， 2020)或相关替代方案(Gardiner 2019 2020)时，它们符合标准。我认为这些说法都不符合所有的要求。最后，我提出了一些理由，让我们对这一悖论成功的认识论解释前景感到悲观。我认为关于证明悖论的讨论将受益于经历一次“价值转向”。
{"title":"Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project","authors":"Giada Fratantonio","doi":"10.1177/13657127211035831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211035831","url":null,"abstract":"Why can testimony alone be enough for findings of liability? Why statistical evidence alone can't? These questions underpin the ‘Proof Paradox’. Many epistemologists have attempted to explain this paradox from a purely epistemic perspective. I call it the ‘Epistemic Project’. In this paper, I take a step back from this recent trend. Stemming from considerations about the nature and role of standards of proof, I define three requirements that any successful account in line with the Epistemic Project should meet. I then consider three recent epistemic accounts on which the standard is met when the evidence rules out modal risk (Pritchard 2018), normic risk (Ebert et al., 2020), or relevant alternatives (Gardiner 2019 2020). I argue that none of these accounts meets all the requirements. Finally, I offer reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects of having a successful epistemic explanation of the paradox. I suggest the discussion on the proof paradox would benefit from undergoing a ‘value-turn’.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"307 - 325"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211035831","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46065560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1177/13657127211011207
Martin Smith
The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak—there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. In this paper, I will recapitulate the familiar arguments for this thesis, before defending a more radical one: The 50%+ standard is also too strong—there are circumstances in which a court should find that a defendant is liable, even though the evidence presented makes it less than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. I will argue that the latter thesis follows naturally from the former once we accept that the parties in a civil trial are to be treated equally. I will conclude by sketching an alternative interpretation of the civil standard of proof
{"title":"Civil liability and the 50%+ standard of proof","authors":"Martin Smith","doi":"10.1177/13657127211011207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211011207","url":null,"abstract":"The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak—there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. In this paper, I will recapitulate the familiar arguments for this thesis, before defending a more radical one: The 50%+ standard is also too strong—there are circumstances in which a court should find that a defendant is liable, even though the evidence presented makes it less than 50% likely that the plaintiff’s claim is true. I will argue that the latter thesis follows naturally from the former once we accept that the parties in a civil trial are to be treated equally. I will conclude by sketching an alternative interpretation of the civil standard of proof","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"183 - 199"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211011207","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41538029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-05DOI: 10.1177/13657127211011236
Anna High
Prison informant or ‘jailhouse snitch’ evidence is a notoriously unreliable category of evidence. In light of reliability concerns, the New Zealand Supreme Court has adopted a progressive approach to the exclusion of prison informant evidence, centred on greater use of general exclusionary provisions as a threshold of reliability for the admission of suspect evidence. In so doing, the court has shifted the emphasis from deference to the jury as arbiter of ultimate reliability and towards more robust judicial gatekeeping as a safeguard against false testimony. This article critically analyses the New Zealand approach, including by way of comparison with Canada, Australia and England and Wales. The New Zealand approach is presented as a principled and important example of adapting fundamental evidentiary principles and provisions in line with emerging social science evidence. However, in light of the general concerns surrounding this class of evidence, ultimately further safeguards are still needed
{"title":"The exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand","authors":"Anna High","doi":"10.1177/13657127211011236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211011236","url":null,"abstract":"Prison informant or ‘jailhouse snitch’ evidence is a notoriously unreliable category of evidence. In light of reliability concerns, the New Zealand Supreme Court has adopted a progressive approach to the exclusion of prison informant evidence, centred on greater use of general exclusionary provisions as a threshold of reliability for the admission of suspect evidence. In so doing, the court has shifted the emphasis from deference to the jury as arbiter of ultimate reliability and towards more robust judicial gatekeeping as a safeguard against false testimony. This article critically analyses the New Zealand approach, including by way of comparison with Canada, Australia and England and Wales. The New Zealand approach is presented as a principled and important example of adapting fundamental evidentiary principles and provisions in line with emerging social science evidence. However, in light of the general concerns surrounding this class of evidence, ultimately further safeguards are still needed","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"217 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211011236","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49127465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-05DOI: 10.1177/13657127211011219
Andrés Páez
Rules 405(a) and 608(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allow the use of testimony about a witness’s reputation to support or undermine his or her credibility in trial. This paper analyses the evidential weight of such testimony from the point of view of social epistemology and the theory of social networks. Together they provide the necessary elements to analyse how reputation is understood in this case, and to assess the epistemic foundation of a reputational attribution. The result of the analysis will be that reputational testimony is extremely weak from an epistemological point of view, and that in many cases there are more reliable substitutes that achieve a similar purpose. The obvious fix, in my view, is to eliminate the use of reputation testimony to support or undermine the credibility, honesty, chastity or peacefulness of a witness
{"title":"An epistemological analysis of the use of reputation as evidence","authors":"Andrés Páez","doi":"10.1177/13657127211011219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211011219","url":null,"abstract":"Rules 405(a) and 608(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allow the use of testimony about a witness’s reputation to support or undermine his or her credibility in trial. This paper analyses the evidential weight of such testimony from the point of view of social epistemology and the theory of social networks. Together they provide the necessary elements to analyse how reputation is understood in this case, and to assess the epistemic foundation of a reputational attribution. The result of the analysis will be that reputational testimony is extremely weak from an epistemological point of view, and that in many cases there are more reliable substitutes that achieve a similar purpose. The obvious fix, in my view, is to eliminate the use of reputation testimony to support or undermine the credibility, honesty, chastity or peacefulness of a witness","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"200 - 216"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211011219","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43712644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1177/13657127211002288
Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou, C. McCartney
This case note deals with doctrinal and inferential issues around the use of DNA in the criminal process, in particular DNA alone, as a case to answer.
本案例说明涉及在刑事程序中使用DNA的理论和推理问题，特别是DNA单独作为一个案例来回答。
{"title":"To the exclusion of all others? DNA profile and transfer mechanics—R v Jones (William Francis) [2020] EWCA Crim 1021 (03 Aug 2020)","authors":"Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou, C. McCartney","doi":"10.1177/13657127211002288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211002288","url":null,"abstract":"This case note deals with doctrinal and inferential issues around the use of DNA in the criminal process, in particular DNA alone, as a case to answer.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"135 - 140"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211002288","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45984407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1177/13657127211002284
S. Shaffer, N. S. Compo, J. Z. Klemfuss, Joanna Peplak, Julio Mejias
This study examined the experiences of law enforcement in investigating physical abuse, neglect and Abusive Head Trauma (AHT). Law enforcement (N = 388) in the United States were surveyed regarding case characteristics, investigative strategy, interrogative approaches, frequency/content of perpetrator admissions and interagency interaction across cases of physical abuse, neglect and AHT. Results revealed that exposure rates matched those of national statistics. AHT perpetrators reported to admit guilt less often than suspects of physical abuse and neglect. Participants reported that suspects explain physical abuse and AHT by referencing poor self-control as a common cause. Lack of financial resources was commonly reported as the explanation for neglect. Potentially coercive interviewing techniques were reported across abuse types but were more frequent in cases of AHT. AHT cases were reportedly hardest to prove/prosecute partially due to conflicting medical diagnoses. Potential implications for law enforcement investigative (interviewing) policies and future research are discussed.
{"title":"Law enforcement investigation of non-sexual child abuse: Physical abuse, neglect and Abusive Head Trauma","authors":"S. Shaffer, N. S. Compo, J. Z. Klemfuss, Joanna Peplak, Julio Mejias","doi":"10.1177/13657127211002284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211002284","url":null,"abstract":"This study examined the experiences of law enforcement in investigating physical abuse, neglect and Abusive Head Trauma (AHT). Law enforcement (N = 388) in the United States were surveyed regarding case characteristics, investigative strategy, interrogative approaches, frequency/content of perpetrator admissions and interagency interaction across cases of physical abuse, neglect and AHT. Results revealed that exposure rates matched those of national statistics. AHT perpetrators reported to admit guilt less often than suspects of physical abuse and neglect. Participants reported that suspects explain physical abuse and AHT by referencing poor self-control as a common cause. Lack of financial resources was commonly reported as the explanation for neglect. Potentially coercive interviewing techniques were reported across abuse types but were more frequent in cases of AHT. AHT cases were reportedly hardest to prove/prosecute partially due to conflicting medical diagnoses. Potential implications for law enforcement investigative (interviewing) policies and future research are discussed.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"75 - 92"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211002284","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49082929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1177/13657127211002287
J. Porter
The common law test of voluntariness has come to be associated with important policy rationales including the privilege against self-incrimination. However, when the test originated more than a century ago, it was a test concerned specifically with the truthfulness of confession evidence; which evidence was at that time adduced in the form of indirect oral testimony, that is, as hearsay. Given that, a century later, confession evidence is now mostly adduced in the form of an audiovisual recording that can be observed directly by the trial judge, rather than as indirect oral testimony, there may be capacity for a different emphasis regarding the question of admissibility. This article considers the law currently operating in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia to see whether or not, in the form of an audiovisual recording, the exercise of judicial discretion as to the question of the admissibility of confession evidence might be supported if the common law test of voluntariness was not a strict test of exclusion.
{"title":"Admissibility of confession evidence: Principles of hearsay and the rule of voluntariness","authors":"J. Porter","doi":"10.1177/13657127211002287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211002287","url":null,"abstract":"The common law test of voluntariness has come to be associated with important policy rationales including the privilege against self-incrimination. However, when the test originated more than a century ago, it was a test concerned specifically with the truthfulness of confession evidence; which evidence was at that time adduced in the form of indirect oral testimony, that is, as hearsay. Given that, a century later, confession evidence is now mostly adduced in the form of an audiovisual recording that can be observed directly by the trial judge, rather than as indirect oral testimony, there may be capacity for a different emphasis regarding the question of admissibility. This article considers the law currently operating in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia to see whether or not, in the form of an audiovisual recording, the exercise of judicial discretion as to the question of the admissibility of confession evidence might be supported if the common law test of voluntariness was not a strict test of exclusion.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"93 - 114"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211002287","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49348593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1177/13657127211002285
Jack Allen
Criminal lawyers regard burdens of proof placed on the accused with deep suspicion. Recently, this suspicion has spurred an interest in how to reconcile these so-called ‘reverse burdens’ with the rule that it is for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial. Though views on this differ among commentators, all reach their conclusions by reference to the presumption of innocence (PoI). Unfortunately, such analysis frequently falls prey to a serious error. Namely, the existing literature fails to adequately distinguish the thin conception of the PoI (a trial rule) from a thick PoI (a general norm of the criminal law) or ignores the distinction entirely. In either case, failure to appreciate this distinction and attend to its consequences raises significant doubt that existing analyses of reverse burdens are sound. This article addresses this failure and offers a fresh approach to reconciling reverse burdens and the PoI.
{"title":"Rethinking the relationship between reverse burdens and the presumption of innocence","authors":"Jack Allen","doi":"10.1177/13657127211002285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211002285","url":null,"abstract":"Criminal lawyers regard burdens of proof placed on the accused with deep suspicion. Recently, this suspicion has spurred an interest in how to reconcile these so-called ‘reverse burdens’ with the rule that it is for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial. Though views on this differ among commentators, all reach their conclusions by reference to the presumption of innocence (PoI). Unfortunately, such analysis frequently falls prey to a serious error. Namely, the existing literature fails to adequately distinguish the thin conception of the PoI (a trial rule) from a thick PoI (a general norm of the criminal law) or ignores the distinction entirely. In either case, failure to appreciate this distinction and attend to its consequences raises significant doubt that existing analyses of reverse burdens are sound. This article addresses this failure and offers a fresh approach to reconciling reverse burdens and the PoI.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"115 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211002285","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43939923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1177/13657127211002290
H. Jellema
Like scientists, investigators and decision-makers in criminal cases both explain known evidence and use the resulting explanations to make novel predictions. Philosophers of science have made much of this distinction, arguing that hypotheses which lead to successful predictions are—all else being equal—epistemically superior to those that merely explain known data. Their ideas also offer important lessons for criminal evidence scholarship. This article distinguishes three values of prediction over explaining known facts in criminal cases. First, witnesses who predict are—all else being equal—more reliable than those who do not because they are less likely to be biased or lying. Second, investigators who only explain known facts run the risk of ‘fudging’ the scenarios that they formulate. Predictions can protect us against this danger. Third, carefully constructed predictions may help investigators to avoid confirmation bias. This article ends with a case study of the murder of Hae Min Lee.
{"title":"The values of prediction in criminal cases","authors":"H. Jellema","doi":"10.1177/13657127211002290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127211002290","url":null,"abstract":"Like scientists, investigators and decision-makers in criminal cases both explain known evidence and use the resulting explanations to make novel predictions. Philosophers of science have made much of this distinction, arguing that hypotheses which lead to successful predictions are—all else being equal—epistemically superior to those that merely explain known data. Their ideas also offer important lessons for criminal evidence scholarship. This article distinguishes three values of prediction over explaining known facts in criminal cases. First, witnesses who predict are—all else being equal—more reliable than those who do not because they are less likely to be biased or lying. Second, investigators who only explain known facts run the risk of ‘fudging’ the scenarios that they formulate. Predictions can protect us against this danger. Third, carefully constructed predictions may help investigators to avoid confirmation bias. This article ends with a case study of the murder of Hae Min Lee.","PeriodicalId":54168,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Evidence & Proof","volume":"25 1","pages":"163 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/13657127211002290","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46081299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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