American Business Law Journal最新文献

Arbitration is changing the United States justice system. Critics argue that arbitration leads to claim suppression. Proponents argue that, compared with courts, arbitration is cheaper and less formal. These claims have not been empirically tested. In particular, whether and how arbitration impacts individuals’ decision to sue remains an open inquiry. This article for the first time shows, in a series of experiments, the impact of arbitration agreements on individuals' decisions to sue. This article calls it the “arbitration effect.” First, we test whether the arbitration effect exists; that is, if arbitration agreements negatively impact individuals' decision to sue. Second, we experimentally test individuals' decisions to opt out of arbitration agreements. Lastly, we assess whether any type of information can “cure” the arbitration effect. The results establish that individuals are less likely to sue in arbitration as opposed to court, hence the arbitration effect. Such an effect, however, does not exist at the contracting stage, meaning that individuals do not shun arbitration when given the option. Further, none of the fundamental attributes of arbitration, as touted by the U.S. Supreme Court, nor win-rates and class actions mitigate the arbitration effect. Equally, informational nudges do not reduce the effect, and individuals do not ascribe negative attributes to firms forcing mandatory arbitration. For decades, courts and lawmakers grappled with issues related to arbitration. The article provides much-needed data on arbitration. Findings cast serious doubts on the ongoing efforts—market-based, judicial, or regulatory—aiming to change the arbitration course.

Professional baseball players are often thought of as making multi-million-dollar salaries, but most professional baseball players have recently made under $15,000 a year. Minor league players toiled under an onerous system resulting from baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption and lobbying efforts that exempted them from minimum wage and overtime. These factors allowed teams to impose a uniform player contract (UPC) on players with numerous unconscionable provisions for years. However, a late-night Tweet in August of 2022 sent shockwaves through the sports and labor world, announcing that the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) was sending out authorization cards to represent minor league players. After years of fighting to maintain the authority to impose conditions on minor league players, through lobbying and litigation, Major League Baseball (MLB) turned over a new leaf and recognized the unionization of minor league players under the MLBPA less than three weeks later. In light of this long sought-after recognition, this article takes a novel approach. First, it provides historical context for baseball's unique ability to impose working conditions on minor leaguers without significant concern for legal ramifications. Second, it provides an overview of the doctrine of contractual unconscionability and analyzes the prior UPC as an unconscionable agreement. Finally, it details the historic unionization process and makes detailed recommendations to ameliorate the unconscionable conditions minor league players have faced when they negotiate with MLB owners to draft their initial collective bargaining agreement.

While the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) establishes a bright-line jurisdictional amount in controversy for removing cases from state to federal court, calculating that quantitative threshold in practice is a fraught and heavily litigated exercise. This article examines removals under CAFA to show the substantial lack of clarity in how state-law causes of action and damage claims interact to reach the jurisdictional threshold. It compiles cases illustrating the challenges surrounding removal litigation that flow from these uncertainties, particularly in how the structure of CAFA incentivizes defendants to chain together tail-event precedent to inflate theoretical amounts in controversy. It then applies a Coasean analysis to suggest these uncertainties impede efficient resolutions to litigation. Finally, it suggests a series of practical amendments to CAFA and its interpretive case law that would provide clarity, decrease forum-selection litigation, and enhance the efficacy of class litigation.

Following the 2008 Great Financial Crisis, financial policy makers have refocused their attention on bank resolution, prompting the creation of new resolution tools and regime reforms. As a result, the focus has mainly been on large, systemically important banks. Less attention has been paid to a broader range of financial institutions, namely small and medium deposit-taking institutions. That tendency limits the applicability of these tools, which are imperfectly adapted to the unique issues faced by these smaller institutions. This article will assess both the successful applications and the limitations of resolution tools to small and medium deposit-taking institution failures, focusing on three tools in particular: the bail-in, the bridge bank, and purchase and assumption. In doing so, the benefits and challenges of each of these tools will be examined through the lens of recent resolution examples in the United States, Canada, and the European Union. This article also argues for the availability of public funds to achieve a successful resolution, taking the view that moral hazard concerns are overstated and that rigid bans of public funds are counterproductive to the goals of resolution. Lastly, this article seeks to develop a broad understanding of the systemic importance that accounts for the essential role of small and medium deposit-taking institutions in their communities.

Anti-corruption laws aim to bolster public integrity by punishing attempts to illegitimately curry favor with government decision-makers. These laws, however, can generate integrity risks of their own. This article examines one such risk: that firms subject to scrutiny under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) may attempt to influence prosecutors by exploiting shared political leanings or related socio-cultural ties. Drawing on social psychology, we theorize that FCPA defendants retain defense attorneys who are aligned with government officials. This behavior is consistent with a strategy of marshaling in-group favoritism—i.e., the psychological tendency for individuals to view more favorably those that they perceive as members of the same group—to defendants' advantage. This strategy may be particularly auspicious in FCPA matters, in which prosecutors engage in subjective, trust-based assessments of defendants' self-investigatory efforts, typically with minimal judicial oversight. We test this theory by matching attorneys listed on court filings for all FCPA matters over eighteen years with a database of individuals' political views based on their patterns of political donations. This analysis reveals that defendants tend to hire more liberal attorneys to represent them on these filings when prosecutors lean left and during Democratic administrations, and more conservative attorneys when prosecutors lean right and during Republican presidencies. In light of these findings, we offer policy prescriptions aimed at increasing transparency and judicial oversight of FCPA matters to mitigate integrity risks.

Few Indian reservations have any semblance of a private sector. Consequently, poverty and unemployment are major problems in much of Indian country. While there are many reasons why private enterprise is scarce in Indian country, one of the foremost reasons is businesses do not trust tribal courts. Businesses' distrust of tribal courts is not unique as outsiders often fear bias in foreign tribunals. Similarly, businesses are often concerned about a court's capacity to adjudicate complex disputes. Federal diversity jurisdiction was developed to allay fear of bias, and many states have developed business courts to address questions about court capacity. Tribes can overcome these issues by creating an intertribal business court (IBC). Tribes will be free to sculpt the IBC as they see fit. However, the IBC's intertribal nature will help reduce fears of bias, and an IBC's focus on business disputes will answer doubts about court capacity. An IBC will also make tribal law more accessible, further increasing confidence in this new tribunal. As businesses gain greater confidence in tribal legal institutions through the IBC, they will be more likely to operate in Indian country. Accordingly, the IBC could help to transform tribal economies.

This article analyzes trends in litigation brought against corporate actors regarding human rights information. Such information includes, but is not limited to, statements on packaging claiming that products are “ethically sourced” and investor-facing disclosures representing that an issuer's operations are environmentally friendly. It proceeds by outlining the sources of human rights-related disclosures as they arise under both legal and voluntary regimes. The article then addresses the case law. Recent years have seen an increase in lawsuits involving human rights information, or lack thereof, imparted by companies. Consumer protection or consumer fraud cases are being filed, alleging that companies have either provided false and misleading information or omitted information about corporate human rights impacts and mitigation efforts. Investors are filing similar claims. The article examines the trend and considers the role of this litigation both in holding companies to their word and in providing corporate accountability for the underlying human rights abuses that false or misleading human rights information may mask. It ultimately argues that, although success at trial in such cases remains elusive, litigation is a useful and potentially growing tool for holding companies to their word regarding human rights claims. It contextualizes this litigation, arguing that other means by which companies can be held to their word should be strengthened, including public enforcement and—potentially—new disclosure and due diligence laws.

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the foundation of all international space regulation. It establishes space as the province of all humankind and promotes its peaceful use and exploration for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. In 2020, the FCC released its “Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age” guidelines for commercial satellite applicants. While these guidelines appear to substantively address the risks posed by orbital debris to Earth and space industries, they fail to do so in two key areas: (1) by not adopting specific requirements for applicants to share data needed to effectively establish space situational awareness (SSA); and (2) by not requiring applicants to prepare an Environmental Assessment on low Earth orbits (LEO). This article exposes fatal flaws in how the FCC regulates satellite operator access to LEO by examining how the regulation of satellite constellations enables the creation of orbital debris and occupation of orbital shells in a manner that may compromise Earth's satellite-based information infrastructure and violate the OST, and it recommends legislative language that will ensure FCC regulations are in compliance with the OST and are sufficient for establishing SSA. Given the Supreme Court's 2022 ruling in West Virginia v. EPA, adopting such language constitutes a clear congressional authorization to protect Earth's orbital environment and helps operationalize the OST's proclamation that spacefaring activities be for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.

Climate change is the existential issue of our age. Its challenges are massive, its science is ever-developing and most now agree that its demands are immediate. How society deals with the immensity and immediacy of the challenge in the face of incomplete, immature, and sometimes inconclusive data is a question playing out now in our capital markets. Bending to demand from green investors and environmental activists, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed new rules on March 21, 2022, “to enhance and standardize climate-related disclosures” to better inform investors' decision-making. How should reporting companies, already obligated to report on material risks to their businesses, “enhance and standardize” climate-related disclosure when the data are ambiguous or in conflict? This article proposes one possible and currently available solution: use satellite-based data. By requiring the use of available satellite data, regulators can protect investors from being misled by cherry-picked emissions data. We begin with a case for standardization and a brief history of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting and metrics, both in the United States and internationally, as well as SEC efforts regarding climate change disclosures. We then explore the precedent for satellite use and space-based technology in monitoring and regulatory compliance and argue that satellite and space data can be instrumental to help investors make more informed investment decisions based on reporting companies' true environmental impact.

Financial markets are increasingly developing innovative, ESG-related derivatives and relying upon these instruments to hedge ESG-related risks. The global derivatives markets are among the largest, most consequential financial markets in the world. Derivatives are financial contracts that derive their value from an underlying reference entity which can be almost anything, including interest rates, credit, equities, foreign exchange, the weather, or the price of carbon. They provide for hedging, investment (speculation), and arbitrage, and trade on regulated exchanges and in over-the-counter markets. Derivatives can also facilitate access to the tremendous amounts of capital necessary for the transition to a cleaner energy future and to the objective of net zero emissions by 2050 of governments around the world. Through an exploration of recent innovations and developments in the exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivative markets, this article explores the role of the derivatives ecosystem—the instruments themselves, trading exchanges, and clearinghouses—in promoting ESG objectives.