American Business Law Journal最新文献

Scholars, antitrust agencies, and policy makers have historically paid little attention to anticompetitive practices in labor markets. This was largely due a misconception that antitrust law is meant to govern conventional markets in which goods and services trade, rather than govern labor markets. Antitrust law may also offer a poor remedy to redress employers who enter no-poaching agreements or otherwise impair competition. The primary tension involves antitrust's purpose, which is to promote “consumer welfare.” To identify whether conduct eroded consumer welfare, courts tend to scrutinize whether prices increased. But here, lessening wages can enable firms to sell goods at cheaper prices, benefiting consumers. Another issue is that the typical restraint affects only a smattering of workers instead of lessening wages throughout the greater market. This article uses empirical analyses to show that antitrust should promote labor's welfare as it does consumer welfare, and it argues that enforcement must condemn labor cartels as per se illegal. The research demonstrates that labor cartels are more pernicious than restraints in product markets, as employers can lessen wages with less effort than in product markets. Antitrust should even proscribe no-poaching agreements formed for a legitimate purpose (e.g., to protect trade secrets) because employers could have achieved the same goals using less coercive means; the noncompete agreement, at least, provides labor with a semblance of notice and bargaining power without drawing antitrust scrutiny. The prohibition of labor cartels would thus promote competition and consumer welfare, especially in minimum wage labor markets.

In this article we examine the rate at which patent applications are granted as a function of the inventor's race and gender. Empirical analysis of more than 3.9 million U.S. applications finds minority and women applicants are significantly less likely to secure a patent relative to the balance of inventors. Further analysis indicates that a portion of this bias is introduced during prosecution at the Patent Office, independent of the quality of the application. Mechanisms underlying these disparities are explored. The article concludes with a discussion of our results and their interaction with patent law, innovation policy, and employment trends.

In 2014, New Jersey passed the Sports Wagering Act, permitting sports betting at state casino and racetrack venues, in direct conflict with the federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act. In 2017, South Dakota passed Senate Bill 106, requiring that certain e-commerce retailers collect and remit sales tax, in violation of federal law. The two U.S. Supreme Court decisions arising from challenges to these state statutes—South Dakota v. Wayfair and Murphy v. NCAA—exemplify U.S. Supreme Court “case baiting.” Case baiting is a tactic states implement to challenge federal directives by passing state legislation that directly conflicts with federal law to lure the Court into granting certiorari and ruling in their favor. This article argues that South Dakota's and New Jersey's triumphs pave the way for other jurisdictions to pursue similar strategies across multiple legal issues such as abortion restrictions and immigration law. In addition, this article suggests that case baiting invites further scholarly exploration of important policy considerations, including the use of this tactic as a novel approach to the application of law and strategy, whether case baiting promotes the Court's progression toward a more quasi-legislative role, and whether passing conflict legislation violates state legislators’ oaths of office.

The Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc. removed an important tool from competition regulators’ arsenals. Not only did the Court express skepticism about the existence of a price squeeze cause of action, but it also applied the economically mismatched predatory pricing test to price squeeze cases. Unfortunately, the lack of clarity on linkLine's reach also caused significant confusion in the lower courts. Examining these issues, this article clarifies the distinction between price squeeze and predatory pricing claims, and argues that the second step of the predatory pricing test, probability of recoupment, is inappropriate for price squeeze cases and should either be dropped from the test or replaced with a presumption of recoupment.

This is a dynamic time for insolvency law. Many jurisdictions have made or are considering reforms to their insolvency regimes. The United Kingdom has proposed a new standalone restructuring mechanism that incorporates many attributes of Chapter 11, including a cross-class cram down and the absolute priority rule. A distinctive feature of the UK proposal is the infusion of judicial discretion permitting courts to deviate from the absolute priority rule. This discretion is not permitted in the United States. This judicial discretion addresses a key problem with the application of the absolute priority rule in the United States—it may serve as an impediment to reorganization. This impediment is exacerbated by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., which impacts the effective use of Chapter 11 rescue tools. This article explores the absolute priority rule, the problems associated with it, and the effect of Jevic in the United States. Drawing on the UK reform proposal, I argue that the United States should implement reforms that infuse judicial discretion into the application of the absolute priority rule. Doing so will facilitate the underlying policy goal of rescuing the company in Chapter 11 and also promote a broader policy goal of rescuing the business.

Because federal law does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, LGBTQ Americans were thrilled to learn that a preliminary draft of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) included a provision (the Provision) requiring each nation to enact LGBTQ-inclusive nondiscrimination laws. That excitement promptly turned to despair, however, after the Trump administration insisted on the addition of a footnote (the Footnote) designed to exempt the United States from the Provision. To date, the Footnote has been derided by scholars and trade experts alike as a transparent attempt to evade the Provision's LGBTQ-inclusive mandate. Yet, by focusing only on what the USMCA does not do, these analyses overlook what the agreement does do, even if unintended, to benefit LGBTQ Americans. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the USMCA's implications for federal antidiscrimination law and demonstrates that—regardless of how the Supreme Court rules in a trio of LGBTQ employment cases—the Footnote actually stands to help, not hinder, the cause of LGBTQ equality.

It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union (EU) and the United States, namely, article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law concerning interfirm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime's approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under the EU competition regime. Using economic theories of harm concerning information exchange to understand the imposition of liability in relation to “stand-alone” instances of information exchange, we argue that such liability must be grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. We characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex post counterpart in antitrust law. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust regime, we argue that the implementation of such a rule pursuant to EU competition law leads to higher error costs without a significant reduction in regulatory costs. As a majority of jurisdictions have competition law regimes that resemble EU competition law more closely than U.S. antitrust law, our thesis has important implications for competition regimes around the world.

This article uses the context of daily fantasy sports (DFS) to analyze how companies use strategic categorization in regulatory arbitrage. Recent actions by two leaders in the DFS industry, DraftKings and FanDuel, provide an ideal context to study this issue. DraftKings and FanDuel categorized themselves differently to different audiences at different times in a manner that evaded categorization as an illegal gambling activity, only to then dominate the sports betting market after the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. NCAA. We examine how this type of strategic categorization, which we call “fluid categorization,” raises important questions for regulators and others concerned with regulatory arbitrage. We also explore how fluid categorization provides lessons for other businesses. While this article has broad implications for the sports gambling marketplace, it also contributes to meaningful discourse for the broader business community, as its findings are relevant to industries beyond DFS that offer gray market products and seek to fight categorical labels until there is a reclassification event.

For most of its modern history, antitrust law distinguished between normal competition and monopolization by looking for merit, legitimate business justifications, or efficiencies in the challenged business conduct. These proxies were seen as appropriate because they served antitrust law's welfare objectives well. However, the universal adoption of these proxies has overshadowed significant shortcomings, chief among them being that firms do not think in terms of legitimate business justifications or efficiencies, but rather in terms of long-term sustainability and appropriation of value. As a result, antitrust law becomes detached from the very subjects it purports to regulate. Against the backdrop of the recent resurgence of enforcement activity, particularly involving tech giants, this article attempts a conceptualization of monopolization that does not revolve around merit in any form or function. Instead it introduces the proxy of commonness of business practices to determine their legality. This helps highlight the importance of considering “how things are done” in the relevant market, and helps reground antitrust law in business realities, which can enhance the heuristic mechanism of distinguishing between normal and anticompetitive practices. To prove this point the article develops an error test framework, through which it compares current tests with the proposed test in terms of their error footprint and concludes that the integration of the commonness parameter delivers better results. Ultimately, the inquiry undertaken herein is not only about constructing a conception of normal competition different from the only standard we currently have, that is, variants of merit, but also about shifting the conversation from how to fine-tune existing standards to how to capture a more complete conception of competition.