I discuss a contemporary solution to the Dynamic Problem of Old Evidence (POE), as proposed by Jan Sprenger (2015). Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the Dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does not resolve the problem. I consider several potential responses.
{"title":"Reply to Sprenger’s “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”","authors":"Fabian Pregel","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.92","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.92","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I discuss a contemporary solution to the Dynamic Problem of Old Evidence (POE), as proposed by Jan Sprenger (2015). Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the Dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does not resolve the problem. I consider several potential responses.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85996937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"PSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.95","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.95","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83406364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"PSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.96","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.96","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82382791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Preparing Dinosaurs: The Work Behind the Scenes, by Caitlin Wylie","authors":"Matilde Carrera, Aja Watkins","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.89","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72378099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent advocates of “field philosophy” make the case that philosophy “needs to get outside more often”; alongside disciplinary modes of practice we should cultivate philosophical work that is “practically engaged, stakeholder-centered, and timely” (Frodeman and Briggle 2016). As illustrated by The Guide to Field Philosophy (2020), this takes a great many different forms. I draw on three examples of field-engaged philosophy of science that address the legacies of settler-colonialism in a field science, archaeology, to illustrate the promise of field philosophy in relation to a framework for analyzing “broadly engaged philosophy of science” proposed by Plaisance and Elliott (2021).
{"title":"Philosophy of the Field, In the Field","authors":"A. Wylie","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.90","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.90","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent advocates of “field philosophy” make the case that philosophy “needs to get outside more often”; alongside disciplinary modes of practice we should cultivate philosophical work that is “practically engaged, stakeholder-centered, and timely” (Frodeman and Briggle 2016). As illustrated by The Guide to Field Philosophy (2020), this takes a great many different forms. I draw on three examples of field-engaged philosophy of science that address the legacies of settler-colonialism in a field science, archaeology, to illustrate the promise of field philosophy in relation to a framework for analyzing “broadly engaged philosophy of science” proposed by Plaisance and Elliott (2021).","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85487808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sexes are normally taken to be fundamental categories in biology – many sexually reproducing organisms fall under the categories of female/male. Much research aims at explaining differences between sexes. Sexual selection forms a central framework for explaining “typical” distributions of traits among sexes, and explicating circumstances leading to “reversal”. I claim sexual selection models needn’t make use of sexes, that sexes lack explanatory significance in such models. I offer a framework of reproductive dimorphism and argue it’s better than that of sexes, because it (i) is more compatible with explanations of sexual selection and (ii) allows for their greater applicability.
{"title":"What do Sexes Have to do with (Models of) Sexual Selection?","authors":"Aya Evron","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.86","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.86","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Sexes are normally taken to be fundamental categories in biology – many sexually reproducing organisms fall under the categories of female/male. Much research aims at explaining differences between sexes. Sexual selection forms a central framework for explaining “typical” distributions of traits among sexes, and explicating circumstances leading to “reversal”. I claim sexual selection models needn’t make use of sexes, that sexes lack explanatory significance in such models. I offer a framework of reproductive dimorphism and argue it’s better than that of sexes, because it (i) is more compatible with explanations of sexual selection and (ii) allows for their greater applicability.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84046927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Historians have shown that philosophical discussions about the implications of relativity significantly shaped the development of European philosophy of science in the 1920s. Yet little is known about American debates from this period. This paper maps the first responses to Einstein’s theory in three U.S. philosophy journals and situates these papers within the local intellectual landscape. We argue that these discussions (1) stimulated the development of a distinctly American branch of philosophy of science and (2) paved the way for the logical empiricists, who emigrated to the United States in the years before World War II.
{"title":"The Reception of Relativity in American Philosophy","authors":"Sander Verhaegh","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.85","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Historians have shown that philosophical discussions about the implications of relativity significantly shaped the development of European philosophy of science in the 1920s. Yet little is known about American debates from this period. This paper maps the first responses to Einstein’s theory in three U.S. philosophy journals and situates these papers within the local intellectual landscape. We argue that these discussions (1) stimulated the development of a distinctly American branch of philosophy of science and (2) paved the way for the logical empiricists, who emigrated to the United States in the years before World War II.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85637561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amid times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this article, we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of “fast science” should respond and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of higher-order evidence (HOE), and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19.
{"title":"Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence","authors":"Dan Friedman, Dunja Šešelja","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.83","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amid times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this article, we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of “fast science” should respond and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of higher-order evidence (HOE), and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87281343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I propose an account of the model-based structure of the present-day high energy physics experiments in which the relations among the theoretical, experimental and simulation models constitute a non-linear structure that is akin to a network of models (NoM). I argue that while the proposed NoM subsumes Suppes’ hierarchy of models (HoM) as the model-based characterization of the inference leading from the data to the validity or invalidity of the hypothesis tested in an experiment, it involves a model-based characterization of the inference leading from the collision of particles to the acquisition of data, which is missing in Suppes’ HoM.
{"title":"A Network Account of Models in High Energy Physics Experiments","authors":"Koray Karaca","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.73","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.73","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I propose an account of the model-based structure of the present-day high energy physics experiments in which the relations among the theoretical, experimental and simulation models constitute a non-linear structure that is akin to a network of models (NoM). I argue that while the proposed NoM subsumes Suppes’ hierarchy of models (HoM) as the model-based characterization of the inference leading from the data to the validity or invalidity of the hypothesis tested in an experiment, it involves a model-based characterization of the inference leading from the collision of particles to the acquisition of data, which is missing in Suppes’ HoM.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83207128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The War-time Worldview of Werner Heisenberg - Werner Heisenberg: Reality and Its Order, edited by Konrad Kleinnecht with introduction by H. Rechenberg and commentary by E.P. Fischer . Translated by M.B Rumscheidt , N. Lukens and I. Heisenberg . Springer, 2019.
{"title":"The War-time Worldview of Werner Heisenberg - Werner Heisenberg: Reality and Its Order, edited by Konrad Kleinnecht with introduction by H. Rechenberg and commentary by E.P. Fischer . Translated by M.B Rumscheidt , N. Lukens and I. Heisenberg . Springer, 2019.","authors":"Elise Crull","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.82","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.82","url":null,"abstract":"The War-time Worldview of Werner Heisenberg - Werner Heisenberg: Reality and Its Order, edited by Konrad Kleinnecht with introduction by H. Rechenberg and commentary by E.P. Fischer . Translated by M.B Rumscheidt , N. Lukens and I. Heisenberg . Springer, 2019.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135741837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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