{"title":"Review of Slobodan Perović From Data to Quanta – Niels Bohr’s Vision of Physics The University of Chicago Press (2021), 280 pp., $45 USD (cloth)","authors":"Michael E. Cuffaro","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.108","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82249736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal important methodological limitations of many experimental philosophy studies and suggest that philosophical training may not protect against hasty generalizations.
{"title":"Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis","authors":"U. Peters, Olivier Lemeire","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.109","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal important methodological limitations of many experimental philosophy studies and suggest that philosophical training may not protect against hasty generalizations.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82695093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The central role of such epistemic concepts as theory, explanation, model, or mechanism is rarely questioned in philosophy of science. Yet, what is their actual use in the practice of science? Here we deploy text-mining methods to investigate the usage of 61 epistemic notions in a corpus of full-text articles from the biological and biomedical sciences (N=73,771). The influence of disciplinary context is also examined by splitting the corpus into sub-disciplinary clusters. The results reveal the intricate semantic networks that these concepts actually form in the scientific discourse, not always following our intuitions, at least in some parts of science.
{"title":"Epistemic markers in the scientific discourse","authors":"C. Malaterre, Martin Léonard","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.97","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.97","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The central role of such epistemic concepts as theory, explanation, model, or mechanism is rarely questioned in philosophy of science. Yet, what is their actual use in the practice of science? Here we deploy text-mining methods to investigate the usage of 61 epistemic notions in a corpus of full-text articles from the biological and biomedical sciences (N=73,771). The influence of disciplinary context is also examined by splitting the corpus into sub-disciplinary clusters. The results reveal the intricate semantic networks that these concepts actually form in the scientific discourse, not always following our intuitions, at least in some parts of science.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91344880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Grant Ramsey and Michael Deem argue that appreciating the role that empathy plays in posttransgression guilt leads to a more promising account of the emotion’s evolutionary origins. But because their proposal fails to adequately distinguish guilt from shame, we cannot say which of the two emotions we are actually getting an evolutionary account of. Moreover, a closer look at the details suggests both that empathy may be more relevant for our understanding of shame’s evolutionary origins than guilt’s, and that guilt is unlikely to be an adaptation.
{"title":"An Evolutionary Account of Guilt?","authors":"Charlie Kurth","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.105","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Grant Ramsey and Michael Deem argue that appreciating the role that empathy plays in posttransgression guilt leads to a more promising account of the emotion’s evolutionary origins. But because their proposal fails to adequately distinguish guilt from shame, we cannot say which of the two emotions we are actually getting an evolutionary account of. Moreover, a closer look at the details suggests both that empathy may be more relevant for our understanding of shame’s evolutionary origins than guilt’s, and that guilt is unlikely to be an adaptation.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79509838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues against general claims for the epistemic superiority of experiment over observation. It does so by dissociating the benefits traditionally attributed to experiment from physical manipulation. In place of manipulation, we argue that other features of research methods do confer epistemic advantages in comparison to methods in which they are diminished. These features better track the epistemic successes and failures of scientific research, cross-cut the observation/experiment distinction, and nevertheless explain why manipulative experiments are successful when they are.
{"title":"Observations, Experiments, and Arguments for Epistemic Superiority in Scientific Methodology","authors":"N. M. Boyd, Dana Matthiessen","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.101","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues against general claims for the epistemic superiority of experiment over observation. It does so by dissociating the benefits traditionally attributed to experiment from physical manipulation. In place of manipulation, we argue that other features of research methods do confer epistemic advantages in comparison to methods in which they are diminished. These features better track the epistemic successes and failures of scientific research, cross-cut the observation/experiment distinction, and nevertheless explain why manipulative experiments are successful when they are.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75927511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note presents a short reply to Henderson’s critical discussion of Schurz’s approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise, namely an approximation condition, that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson’s approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient.
{"title":"Discussion Note: Henderson on Meta-induction and the Problem of Induction","authors":"Gerhard Schurz","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.102","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This note presents a short reply to Henderson’s critical discussion of Schurz’s approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise, namely an approximation condition, that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson’s approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90851213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Teleosemantic theories aim to naturalize mental representation through the use of functions, typically based on past selection processes. However, the historical dependence of these theories has faced severe criticism, leading some philosophers to develop ahistorical alternatives. This paper presents a new dilemma for all ahistorical teleosemantic theories, focusing in particular on the theories proposed by Timothy Schroeder and Bence Nanay. These theories require certain dispositions in the producers or consumers of mental representations. But the appeal to dispositions puts the proponents in an undesirable position: mental content is either overly dependent on current circumstances or ultimately dependent on historical factors.
{"title":"The Dilemma of Ahistorical Teleosemantics","authors":"F. Hundertmark","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.98","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.98","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Teleosemantic theories aim to naturalize mental representation through the use of functions, typically based on past selection processes. However, the historical dependence of these theories has faced severe criticism, leading some philosophers to develop ahistorical alternatives.\u0000 This paper presents a new dilemma for all ahistorical teleosemantic theories, focusing in particular on the theories proposed by Timothy Schroeder and Bence Nanay. These theories require certain dispositions in the producers or consumers of mental representations. But the appeal to dispositions puts the proponents in an undesirable position: mental content is either overly dependent on current circumstances or ultimately dependent on historical factors.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88479956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Basal cognition investigates cognition working upwards from non-neuronal organisms. Since it is committed to empirically testable hypotheses, a methodological challenge arises: how can experiments avoid using zoo-centric assumptions that ignore the ecological contexts that might elicit cognitively driven behaviour in non-neuronal organisms? To meet this challenge, I articulate the Principle of Dynamic Holism (PDH), a methodological principle for guiding research on non-neuronal cognition. PDH’s relation to holistic research programmes in human-focused cognitive science and psychology is described and then an argument from analogy based on holistic developmental biology is presented. Lastly, two experiments exemplifying the need for PDH are examined.
{"title":"The Principle of Dynamic Holism: guiding methodology for investigating cognition in non-neuronal organisms","authors":"Matthew Sims","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.104","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Basal cognition investigates cognition working upwards from non-neuronal organisms. Since it is committed to empirically testable hypotheses, a methodological challenge arises: how can experiments avoid using zoo-centric assumptions that ignore the ecological contexts that might elicit cognitively driven behaviour in non-neuronal organisms? To meet this challenge, I articulate the Principle of Dynamic Holism (PDH), a methodological principle for guiding research on non-neuronal cognition. PDH’s relation to holistic research programmes in human-focused cognitive science and psychology is described and then an argument from analogy based on holistic developmental biology is presented. Lastly, two experiments exemplifying the need for PDH are examined.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78671821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of John D. Norton , “The Material Theory of Induction” Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2021 ISBN 9781773852751 $59.99 paperback / $119.99 hardcover","authors":"T. Sterkenburg","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.88","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.88","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82394939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Piccinini’s usability constraint states that physical processes must have “physically constructible manifestation[s]” to be included in epistemically useful models of physical computation. But to determine what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of computations), we must already know what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of processes for constructing computing systems). We need additional assumptions about what qualifies as a building process. Piccinini implicitly assumes a classical computational understanding of executable processes, but this is an assumption imposed on physical theories and may artificially limit our picture of epistemically useful physical computation.
{"title":"On Epistemically Useful Physical Computation","authors":"Timothy Schmitz","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.91","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Piccinini’s usability constraint states that physical processes must have “physically constructible manifestation[s]” to be included in epistemically useful models of physical computation. But to determine what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of computations), we must already know what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of processes for constructing computing systems). We need additional assumptions about what qualifies as a building process. Piccinini implicitly assumes a classical computational understanding of executable processes, but this is an assumption imposed on physical theories and may artificially limit our picture of epistemically useful physical computation.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79707225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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