Recent advocates of “field philosophy” make the case that philosophy “needs to get outside more often”; alongside disciplinary modes of practice we should cultivate philosophical work that is “practically engaged, stakeholder-centered, and timely” (Frodeman and Briggle 2016). As illustrated by The Guide to Field Philosophy (2020), this takes a great many different forms. I draw on three examples of field-engaged philosophy of science that address the legacies of settler-colonialism in a field science, archaeology, to illustrate the promise of field philosophy in relation to a framework for analyzing “broadly engaged philosophy of science” proposed by Plaisance and Elliott (2021).
{"title":"Philosophy of the Field, In the Field","authors":"A. Wylie","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.90","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.90","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent advocates of “field philosophy” make the case that philosophy “needs to get outside more often”; alongside disciplinary modes of practice we should cultivate philosophical work that is “practically engaged, stakeholder-centered, and timely” (Frodeman and Briggle 2016). As illustrated by The Guide to Field Philosophy (2020), this takes a great many different forms. I draw on three examples of field-engaged philosophy of science that address the legacies of settler-colonialism in a field science, archaeology, to illustrate the promise of field philosophy in relation to a framework for analyzing “broadly engaged philosophy of science” proposed by Plaisance and Elliott (2021).","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85487808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sexes are normally taken to be fundamental categories in biology – many sexually reproducing organisms fall under the categories of female/male. Much research aims at explaining differences between sexes. Sexual selection forms a central framework for explaining “typical” distributions of traits among sexes, and explicating circumstances leading to “reversal”. I claim sexual selection models needn’t make use of sexes, that sexes lack explanatory significance in such models. I offer a framework of reproductive dimorphism and argue it’s better than that of sexes, because it (i) is more compatible with explanations of sexual selection and (ii) allows for their greater applicability.
{"title":"What do Sexes Have to do with (Models of) Sexual Selection?","authors":"Aya Evron","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.86","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.86","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Sexes are normally taken to be fundamental categories in biology – many sexually reproducing organisms fall under the categories of female/male. Much research aims at explaining differences between sexes. Sexual selection forms a central framework for explaining “typical” distributions of traits among sexes, and explicating circumstances leading to “reversal”. I claim sexual selection models needn’t make use of sexes, that sexes lack explanatory significance in such models. I offer a framework of reproductive dimorphism and argue it’s better than that of sexes, because it (i) is more compatible with explanations of sexual selection and (ii) allows for their greater applicability.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"400 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84046927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Historians have shown that philosophical discussions about the implications of relativity significantly shaped the development of European philosophy of science in the 1920s. Yet little is known about American debates from this period. This paper maps the first responses to Einstein’s theory in three U.S. philosophy journals and situates these papers within the local intellectual landscape. We argue that these discussions (1) stimulated the development of a distinctly American branch of philosophy of science and (2) paved the way for the logical empiricists, who emigrated to the United States in the years before World War II.
{"title":"The Reception of Relativity in American Philosophy","authors":"Sander Verhaegh","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.85","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Historians have shown that philosophical discussions about the implications of relativity significantly shaped the development of European philosophy of science in the 1920s. Yet little is known about American debates from this period. This paper maps the first responses to Einstein’s theory in three U.S. philosophy journals and situates these papers within the local intellectual landscape. We argue that these discussions (1) stimulated the development of a distinctly American branch of philosophy of science and (2) paved the way for the logical empiricists, who emigrated to the United States in the years before World War II.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85637561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amid times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this article, we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of “fast science” should respond and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of higher-order evidence (HOE), and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19.
{"title":"Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence","authors":"Dan Friedman, Dunja Šešelja","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.83","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amid times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this article, we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of “fast science” should respond and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of higher-order evidence (HOE), and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"41 1","pages":"937 - 957"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87281343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I propose an account of the model-based structure of the present-day high energy physics experiments in which the relations among the theoretical, experimental and simulation models constitute a non-linear structure that is akin to a network of models (NoM). I argue that while the proposed NoM subsumes Suppes’ hierarchy of models (HoM) as the model-based characterization of the inference leading from the data to the validity or invalidity of the hypothesis tested in an experiment, it involves a model-based characterization of the inference leading from the collision of particles to the acquisition of data, which is missing in Suppes’ HoM.
{"title":"A Network Account of Models in High Energy Physics Experiments","authors":"Koray Karaca","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.73","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.73","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I propose an account of the model-based structure of the present-day high energy physics experiments in which the relations among the theoretical, experimental and simulation models constitute a non-linear structure that is akin to a network of models (NoM). I argue that while the proposed NoM subsumes Suppes’ hierarchy of models (HoM) as the model-based characterization of the inference leading from the data to the validity or invalidity of the hypothesis tested in an experiment, it involves a model-based characterization of the inference leading from the collision of particles to the acquisition of data, which is missing in Suppes’ HoM.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"72 1","pages":"777 - 796"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83207128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The War-time Worldview of Werner Heisenberg - Werner Heisenberg: Reality and Its Order, edited by Konrad Kleinnecht with introduction by H. Rechenberg and commentary by E.P. Fischer . Translated by M.B Rumscheidt , N. Lukens and I. Heisenberg . Springer, 2019.
{"title":"The War-time Worldview of Werner Heisenberg - Werner Heisenberg: Reality and Its Order, edited by Konrad Kleinnecht with introduction by H. Rechenberg and commentary by E.P. Fischer . Translated by M.B Rumscheidt , N. Lukens and I. Heisenberg . Springer, 2019.","authors":"Elise Crull","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.82","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.82","url":null,"abstract":"The War-time Worldview of Werner Heisenberg - Werner Heisenberg: Reality and Its Order, edited by Konrad Kleinnecht with introduction by H. Rechenberg and commentary by E.P. Fischer . Translated by M.B Rumscheidt , N. Lukens and I. Heisenberg . Springer, 2019.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135741837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Stavros Ioannidis and Stathis Psillos’s Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics? - Book reviewed: Ioannidis, Stavros, and Stathis Psillos. Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics? Cambridge University Press, 2022. doi:10.1017/9781009019668.","authors":"Mark Povich","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.84","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.84","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80469059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emanuele Ratti and Thomas A. Stapleford (eds.): Science, Technology, and Virtues: Contemporary Perspectives, Oxford University Press.","authors":"Rune Nyrup","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.76","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.76","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78916580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Howson (2000) contends that the No-Miracles argument fails as an argument in support of scientific realism because it commits the base-rate fallacy. Psillos (2009) has defended the argument by appealing to cases that involve conditional probabilities but where base-rate information can properly be ignored. I show that Psillos’s defense of the No-Miracles argument is inadequate and that the prospects for a purely probabilistic formulation of the argument are dim. I end by considering whether interpreting the argument as an inference to the best explanation might better serve the scientific realist, concluding that such an approach would limit the realist’s ability to effectively counter the Pessimistic Induction.
{"title":"On No-Miracles and the Base-Rate Fallacy","authors":"Keith Dyck","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.80","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.80","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Howson (2000) contends that the No-Miracles argument fails as an argument in support of scientific realism because it commits the base-rate fallacy. Psillos (2009) has defended the argument by appealing to cases that involve conditional probabilities but where base-rate information can properly be ignored. I show that Psillos’s defense of the No-Miracles argument is inadequate and that the prospects for a purely probabilistic formulation of the argument are dim. I end by considering whether interpreting the argument as an inference to the best explanation might better serve the scientific realist, concluding that such an approach would limit the realist’s ability to effectively counter the Pessimistic Induction.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 1","pages":"761 - 776"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88510769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kevin J. S. Zollman, Julian García, Toby Handfield
We model the impact of different incentives on journal behavior in undertaking peer review. Under one scheme, the journal aims to publish the highest quality papers; under the second, the journal aims to maintain a high rejection rate. Under both schemes, journals prefer to set very high standards for acceptance despite allowing significant error in peer review. Under the second scheme, however, in order to encourage more submissions from mediocre papers, the journal is incentivized to make its editorial process less accurate. This leads to both worse peer review and to lower quality articles being published.
{"title":"Academic journals, incentives, and the quality of peer review: a model","authors":"Kevin J. S. Zollman, Julian García, Toby Handfield","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.81","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.81","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We model the impact of different incentives on journal behavior in undertaking peer review. Under one scheme, the journal aims to publish the highest quality papers; under the second, the journal aims to maintain a high rejection rate. Under both schemes, journals prefer to set very high standards for acceptance despite allowing significant error in peer review. Under the second scheme, however, in order to encourage more submissions from mediocre papers, the journal is incentivized to make its editorial process less accurate. This leads to both worse peer review and to lower quality articles being published.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84728124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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