This paper argues against general claims for the epistemic superiority of experiment over observation. It does so by dissociating the benefits traditionally attributed to experiment from physical manipulation. In place of manipulation, we argue that other features of research methods do confer epistemic advantages in comparison to methods in which they are diminished. These features better track the epistemic successes and failures of scientific research, cross-cut the observation/experiment distinction, and nevertheless explain why manipulative experiments are successful when they are.
{"title":"Observations, Experiments, and Arguments for Epistemic Superiority in Scientific Methodology","authors":"N. M. Boyd, Dana Matthiessen","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.101","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper argues against general claims for the epistemic superiority of experiment over observation. It does so by dissociating the benefits traditionally attributed to experiment from physical manipulation. In place of manipulation, we argue that other features of research methods do confer epistemic advantages in comparison to methods in which they are diminished. These features better track the epistemic successes and failures of scientific research, cross-cut the observation/experiment distinction, and nevertheless explain why manipulative experiments are successful when they are.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75927511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note presents a short reply to Henderson’s critical discussion of Schurz’s approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise, namely an approximation condition, that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson’s approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient.
{"title":"Discussion Note: Henderson on Meta-induction and the Problem of Induction","authors":"Gerhard Schurz","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.102","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This note presents a short reply to Henderson’s critical discussion of Schurz’s approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise, namely an approximation condition, that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson’s approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90851213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Teleosemantic theories aim to naturalize mental representation through the use of functions, typically based on past selection processes. However, the historical dependence of these theories has faced severe criticism, leading some philosophers to develop ahistorical alternatives. This paper presents a new dilemma for all ahistorical teleosemantic theories, focusing in particular on the theories proposed by Timothy Schroeder and Bence Nanay. These theories require certain dispositions in the producers or consumers of mental representations. But the appeal to dispositions puts the proponents in an undesirable position: mental content is either overly dependent on current circumstances or ultimately dependent on historical factors.
{"title":"The Dilemma of Ahistorical Teleosemantics","authors":"F. Hundertmark","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.98","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.98","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Teleosemantic theories aim to naturalize mental representation through the use of functions, typically based on past selection processes. However, the historical dependence of these theories has faced severe criticism, leading some philosophers to develop ahistorical alternatives.\u0000 This paper presents a new dilemma for all ahistorical teleosemantic theories, focusing in particular on the theories proposed by Timothy Schroeder and Bence Nanay. These theories require certain dispositions in the producers or consumers of mental representations. But the appeal to dispositions puts the proponents in an undesirable position: mental content is either overly dependent on current circumstances or ultimately dependent on historical factors.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88479956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Basal cognition investigates cognition working upwards from non-neuronal organisms. Since it is committed to empirically testable hypotheses, a methodological challenge arises: how can experiments avoid using zoo-centric assumptions that ignore the ecological contexts that might elicit cognitively driven behaviour in non-neuronal organisms? To meet this challenge, I articulate the Principle of Dynamic Holism (PDH), a methodological principle for guiding research on non-neuronal cognition. PDH’s relation to holistic research programmes in human-focused cognitive science and psychology is described and then an argument from analogy based on holistic developmental biology is presented. Lastly, two experiments exemplifying the need for PDH are examined.
{"title":"The Principle of Dynamic Holism: guiding methodology for investigating cognition in non-neuronal organisms","authors":"Matthew Sims","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.104","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Basal cognition investigates cognition working upwards from non-neuronal organisms. Since it is committed to empirically testable hypotheses, a methodological challenge arises: how can experiments avoid using zoo-centric assumptions that ignore the ecological contexts that might elicit cognitively driven behaviour in non-neuronal organisms? To meet this challenge, I articulate the Principle of Dynamic Holism (PDH), a methodological principle for guiding research on non-neuronal cognition. PDH’s relation to holistic research programmes in human-focused cognitive science and psychology is described and then an argument from analogy based on holistic developmental biology is presented. Lastly, two experiments exemplifying the need for PDH are examined.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78671821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of John D. Norton , “The Material Theory of Induction” Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2021 ISBN 9781773852751 $59.99 paperback / $119.99 hardcover","authors":"T. Sterkenburg","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.88","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.88","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82394939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I discuss a contemporary solution to the Dynamic Problem of Old Evidence (POE), as proposed by Jan Sprenger (2015). Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the Dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does not resolve the problem. I consider several potential responses.
{"title":"Reply to Sprenger’s “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”","authors":"Fabian Pregel","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.92","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.92","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I discuss a contemporary solution to the Dynamic Problem of Old Evidence (POE), as proposed by Jan Sprenger (2015). Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the Dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does not resolve the problem. I consider several potential responses.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85996937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Piccinini’s usability constraint states that physical processes must have “physically constructible manifestation[s]” to be included in epistemically useful models of physical computation. But to determine what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of computations), we must already know what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of processes for constructing computing systems). We need additional assumptions about what qualifies as a building process. Piccinini implicitly assumes a classical computational understanding of executable processes, but this is an assumption imposed on physical theories and may artificially limit our picture of epistemically useful physical computation.
{"title":"On Epistemically Useful Physical Computation","authors":"Timothy Schmitz","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.91","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Piccinini’s usability constraint states that physical processes must have “physically constructible manifestation[s]” to be included in epistemically useful models of physical computation. But to determine what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of computations), we must already know what physical processes can be implemented in physical systems (as parts of processes for constructing computing systems). We need additional assumptions about what qualifies as a building process. Piccinini implicitly assumes a classical computational understanding of executable processes, but this is an assumption imposed on physical theories and may artificially limit our picture of epistemically useful physical computation.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 1","pages":"974 - 984"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79707225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"PSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.96","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.96","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"41 1","pages":"b1 - b2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82382791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Preparing Dinosaurs: The Work Behind the Scenes, by Caitlin Wylie","authors":"Matilde Carrera, Aja Watkins","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.89","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":" 1002","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72378099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：