Psychology is a discipline that has a high number of failed replications, which has been characterised as a ‘crisis’ on the assumption that failed replications are indicative of untrustworthy research. This paper uses Chang’s concept of epistemic iteration to show how a research programme can advance epistemic goals despite many failed replications. It illustrates this through analysing an on-going large-scale replication attempt of Southgate’s 2007 work exploring infants’ understanding of false beliefs. It concludes that epistemic iteration offers a way of understanding the value of replications — both failed and successful — that contradicts the narrative centred around distrust.
{"title":"Growth From Uncertainty","authors":"J. Lavelle","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.157","url":null,"abstract":"Psychology is a discipline that has a high number of failed replications, which has been characterised as a ‘crisis’ on the assumption that failed replications are indicative of untrustworthy research. This paper uses Chang’s concept of epistemic iteration to show how a research programme can advance epistemic goals despite many failed replications. It illustrates this through analysing an on-going large-scale replication attempt of Southgate’s 2007 work exploring infants’ understanding of false beliefs. It concludes that epistemic iteration offers a way of understanding the value of replications — both failed and successful — that contradicts the narrative centred around distrust.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139270925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we will focus on a neglected aspect of scientific theory choice, i.e., how the selection of theories affects epistemic values. Building on Kuhn, we will provide a general characterization of the feedback-loop dynamic between theories and values in theory choice as analogous to the relationship between organisms and the environment in niche construction. We will argue that understanding theory choice as niche construction can explain how certain values acquire more weight and a specific application over time and how resistance to scientific change can, therefore, arise. We will illustrate our picture by looking at the Mendelian-Biometrician controversy.
{"title":"Theory Choice As Niche Construction: The Feedback Loop Between Scientific Theories and Epistemic Values","authors":"Matteo De Benedetto, Michele Luchetti","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.160","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we will focus on a neglected aspect of scientific theory choice, i.e., how the selection of theories affects epistemic values. Building on Kuhn, we will provide a general characterization of the feedback-loop dynamic between theories and values in theory choice as analogous to the relationship between organisms and the environment in niche construction. We will argue that understanding theory choice as niche construction can explain how certain values acquire more weight and a specific application over time and how resistance to scientific change can, therefore, arise. We will illustrate our picture by looking at the Mendelian-Biometrician controversy.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139275440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The problem of quantity is the problem of identifying what about the physical world explains why it can be so well represented with mathematical entities. I introduce quantitative primitivism, the dominant position in the literature, which only offers a partial solution to the problem of quantity. I argue that a reductive account of quantitativeness provides a full solution to the problem, and describe two reductive accounts in the literature. Sections 3 and 4 discusses some of the unique metaphysical consequences of reductive accounts of quantity, including a novel dissolution to the longstanding absolutist/comparativist debate.
{"title":"Against Quantitative Primitivism","authors":"Zee R. Perry","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.140","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The problem of quantity is the problem of identifying what about the physical world explains why it can be so well represented with mathematical entities. I introduce quantitative primitivism, the dominant position in the literature, which only offers a partial solution to the problem of quantity. I argue that a reductive account of quantitativeness provides a full solution to the problem, and describe two reductive accounts in the literature. Sections 3 and 4 discusses some of the unique metaphysical consequences of reductive accounts of quantity, including a novel dissolution to the longstanding absolutist/comparativist debate.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135813881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Teleparallel gravity, an empirically equivalent counterpart to General Relativity, represents the influence of gravity using torsional forces. It raises questions about theory interpretation and underdetermination. To better understand the torsional forces of Teleparallel gravity, we consider a context in which forces are better understood: classical spacetimes. We propose a method of incorporating torsion into the classical spacetime context that yields a classical theory of gravity with a closed temporal metric and spacetime torsion. We then prove a result analogous to the Trautman degeometrization theorem, that every model of Newton-Cartan theory gives rise, non-uniquely, to a model of this theory.
{"title":"Torsion in the Classical Spacetime Context","authors":"Helen Meskhidze, James Owen Weatherall","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.136","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Teleparallel gravity, an empirically equivalent counterpart to General Relativity, represents the influence of gravity using torsional forces. It raises questions about theory interpretation and underdetermination. To better understand the torsional forces of Teleparallel gravity, we consider a context in which forces are better understood: classical spacetimes. We propose a method of incorporating torsion into the classical spacetime context that yields a classical theory of gravity with a closed temporal metric and spacetime torsion. We then prove a result analogous to the Trautman degeometrization theorem, that every model of Newton-Cartan theory gives rise, non-uniquely, to a model of this theory.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136261736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The original architects of the representational theory of measurement interpreted their formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representations are conventional. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the theory require careful scrutiny as one moves toward a more metaphysically robust interpretation by showing that there is a sense in which the very number system one uses to represent a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. This result undermines inferences which impute structure from the numerical representational structure to the quantity it is used to represent.
{"title":"The Conventionality of Real Valued Quantities","authors":"Marissa Bennett, Michael E. Miller","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.138","url":null,"abstract":"The original architects of the representational theory of measurement interpreted their formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representations are conventional. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the theory require careful scrutiny as one moves toward a more metaphysically robust interpretation by showing that there is a sense in which the very number system one uses to represent a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. This result undermines inferences which impute structure from the numerical representational structure to the quantity it is used to represent.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper addresses problems with a defensive turn in discussions of science and Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing. Philosophers and practitioners of science have focused recent discussions on coarse-grained questions of demarcation, epistemic parity and identity—asking questions such as “Is Indigenous knowledge science?” Using representative examples from Aotearoa New Zealand, we expose rampant ambiguities in these arguments, and show that this combative framing can overlook what is actually at stake. We provide a framework for analyzing these problems and suggest better ways forward.
{"title":"Against Defending Science: Asking Better Questions About Indigenous Knowledge and Science","authors":"Emily C Parke, Daniel Hikuroa","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.146","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper addresses problems with a defensive turn in discussions of science and Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing. Philosophers and practitioners of science have focused recent discussions on coarse-grained questions of demarcation, epistemic parity and identity—asking questions such as “Is Indigenous knowledge science?” Using representative examples from Aotearoa New Zealand, we expose rampant ambiguities in these arguments, and show that this combative framing can overlook what is actually at stake. We provide a framework for analyzing these problems and suggest better ways forward.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135405658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We consider the long-term evolution of science and show how a ‘contagion of disrespect’ – an increasing dismissal of research in subfields associated with marginalized groups – can arise due to the dynamics of collaboration and reputation (versus, e.g., preconceived notions of the field’s worth). This has implications both for how we understand the history of science and for how we attempt to promote diverse scientific inquiry.
{"title":"Social Dynamics and the Evolution of Disciplines","authors":"Kekoa Wong, Hannah Rubin","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.149","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider the long-term evolution of science and show how a ‘contagion of disrespect’ – an increasing dismissal of research in subfields associated with marginalized groups – can arise due to the dynamics of collaboration and reputation (versus, e.g., preconceived notions of the field’s worth). This has implications both for how we understand the history of science and for how we attempt to promote diverse scientific inquiry.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.
{"title":"Causal Explanation and Revealed Preferences","authors":"Kate Vredenburgh","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.112","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135412139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We consider some of the epistemic benefits of exploring “theory space” in the context of modifications of general relativity with intended applications in cosmology. We show how studying modifications of general relativity can help in assessing the robustness of empirical inferences, particularly in inaccessible regimes. We also discuss challenges to sharply distinguishing apparently distinct directions in theory space.
{"title":"Dark Energy or Modified Gravity?","authors":"Chris Smeenk, James Owen Weatherall","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.143","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider some of the epistemic benefits of exploring “theory space” in the context of modifications of general relativity with intended applications in cosmology. We show how studying modifications of general relativity can help in assessing the robustness of empirical inferences, particularly in inaccessible regimes. We also discuss challenges to sharply distinguishing apparently distinct directions in theory space.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many philosophers sympathetic with Humeanism about laws have thought that the fundamental laws will include not only the traditional dynamical equations, but also two additional principles: the Past Hypothesis (PH) and the Statistical Postulate (SP). PH says that the universe began in a particular very-low-entropy macrostate M(0), and SP posits a uniform probability distribution over the microstates compatible with M(0). This view is arguably vindicated by the orthodox Humean Best System Account. However, I argue that recent developments of the BSA render the Past Hypothesis otiose. In particular, Pragmatic Humeanism does not support the idea that PH is a law.
{"title":"Does the Best System Need the Past Hypothesis?","authors":"Chris Dorst","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.152","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many philosophers sympathetic with Humeanism about laws have thought that the fundamental laws will include not only the traditional dynamical equations, but also two additional principles: the Past Hypothesis (PH) and the Statistical Postulate (SP). PH says that the universe began in a particular very-low-entropy macrostate M(0), and SP posits a uniform probability distribution over the microstates compatible with M(0). This view is arguably vindicated by the orthodox Humean Best System Account. However, I argue that recent developments of the BSA render the Past Hypothesis otiose. In particular, Pragmatic Humeanism does not support the idea that PH is a law.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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