The original architects of the representational theory of measurement interpreted their formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representations are conventional. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the theory require careful scrutiny as one moves toward a more metaphysically robust interpretation by showing that there is a sense in which the very number system one uses to represent a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. This result undermines inferences which impute structure from the numerical representational structure to the quantity it is used to represent.
{"title":"The Conventionality of Real Valued Quantities","authors":"Marissa Bennett, Michael E. Miller","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.138","url":null,"abstract":"The original architects of the representational theory of measurement interpreted their formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representations are conventional. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the theory require careful scrutiny as one moves toward a more metaphysically robust interpretation by showing that there is a sense in which the very number system one uses to represent a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. This result undermines inferences which impute structure from the numerical representational structure to the quantity it is used to represent.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"21 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper addresses problems with a defensive turn in discussions of science and Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing. Philosophers and practitioners of science have focused recent discussions on coarse-grained questions of demarcation, epistemic parity and identity—asking questions such as “Is Indigenous knowledge science?” Using representative examples from Aotearoa New Zealand, we expose rampant ambiguities in these arguments, and show that this combative framing can overlook what is actually at stake. We provide a framework for analyzing these problems and suggest better ways forward.
{"title":"Against Defending Science: Asking Better Questions About Indigenous Knowledge and Science","authors":"Emily C Parke, Daniel Hikuroa","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.146","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper addresses problems with a defensive turn in discussions of science and Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing. Philosophers and practitioners of science have focused recent discussions on coarse-grained questions of demarcation, epistemic parity and identity—asking questions such as “Is Indigenous knowledge science?” Using representative examples from Aotearoa New Zealand, we expose rampant ambiguities in these arguments, and show that this combative framing can overlook what is actually at stake. We provide a framework for analyzing these problems and suggest better ways forward.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135405658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We consider the long-term evolution of science and show how a ‘contagion of disrespect’ – an increasing dismissal of research in subfields associated with marginalized groups – can arise due to the dynamics of collaboration and reputation (versus, e.g., preconceived notions of the field’s worth). This has implications both for how we understand the history of science and for how we attempt to promote diverse scientific inquiry.
{"title":"Social Dynamics and the Evolution of Disciplines","authors":"Kekoa Wong, Hannah Rubin","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.149","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider the long-term evolution of science and show how a ‘contagion of disrespect’ – an increasing dismissal of research in subfields associated with marginalized groups – can arise due to the dynamics of collaboration and reputation (versus, e.g., preconceived notions of the field’s worth). This has implications both for how we understand the history of science and for how we attempt to promote diverse scientific inquiry.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"46 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.
{"title":"Causal Explanation and Revealed Preferences","authors":"Kate Vredenburgh","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.112","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"37 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135412139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We consider some of the epistemic benefits of exploring “theory space” in the context of modifications of general relativity with intended applications in cosmology. We show how studying modifications of general relativity can help in assessing the robustness of empirical inferences, particularly in inaccessible regimes. We also discuss challenges to sharply distinguishing apparently distinct directions in theory space.
{"title":"Dark Energy or Modified Gravity?","authors":"Chris Smeenk, James Owen Weatherall","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.143","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider some of the epistemic benefits of exploring “theory space” in the context of modifications of general relativity with intended applications in cosmology. We show how studying modifications of general relativity can help in assessing the robustness of empirical inferences, particularly in inaccessible regimes. We also discuss challenges to sharply distinguishing apparently distinct directions in theory space.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"2004 47","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many philosophers sympathetic with Humeanism about laws have thought that the fundamental laws will include not only the traditional dynamical equations, but also two additional principles: the Past Hypothesis (PH) and the Statistical Postulate (SP). PH says that the universe began in a particular very-low-entropy macrostate M(0), and SP posits a uniform probability distribution over the microstates compatible with M(0). This view is arguably vindicated by the orthodox Humean Best System Account. However, I argue that recent developments of the BSA render the Past Hypothesis otiose. In particular, Pragmatic Humeanism does not support the idea that PH is a law.
{"title":"Does the Best System Need the Past Hypothesis?","authors":"Chris Dorst","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.152","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many philosophers sympathetic with Humeanism about laws have thought that the fundamental laws will include not only the traditional dynamical equations, but also two additional principles: the Past Hypothesis (PH) and the Statistical Postulate (SP). PH says that the universe began in a particular very-low-entropy macrostate M(0), and SP posits a uniform probability distribution over the microstates compatible with M(0). This view is arguably vindicated by the orthodox Humean Best System Account. However, I argue that recent developments of the BSA render the Past Hypothesis otiose. In particular, Pragmatic Humeanism does not support the idea that PH is a law.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"29 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The goal of this paper is to analyse the role of convention in interpreting physical theories—and, in particular, how the distinction between the conventional and the non-conventional interacts with judgments of equivalence. We will begin with a discussion of what, if anything, distinguishes those statements of a theory that might be dubbed “conventions”. This will lead us to consider the conventions that are not themselves part of a theory’s content, but are rather applied to the theory in interpreting it. Finally, we will consider the idea that what conventions to adopt might, itself, be regarded as a matter of convention.
{"title":"Equivalence and Convention","authors":"Neil Dewar","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.148","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of this paper is to analyse the role of convention in interpreting physical theories—and, in particular, how the distinction between the conventional and the non-conventional interacts with judgments of equivalence. We will begin with a discussion of what, if anything, distinguishes those statements of a theory that might be dubbed “conventions”. This will lead us to consider the conventions that are not themselves part of a theory’s content, but are rather applied to the theory in interpreting it. Finally, we will consider the idea that what conventions to adopt might, itself, be regarded as a matter of convention.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135368682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Epistemic stances are collections of attitudes, values, aims, and policies relevant to assessing evidence, eventuating in belief or agnosticism regarding the output of scientific investigations. If in some cases conflicting stances promoting scientific realism and antirealism, respectively, are rationally permissible, this would seem to undermine the possibility of resolving certain debates between realists and antirealists. In this paper I reply to two concerns about this conception of stances, to the effect that: (1) a stance underlying realism is, in fact, rationally obligatory for realists, given certain natural assumptions; and (2) this sort of permissivism would validate pseudoscience and science denialism.
{"title":"Resolving Debates about Scientific Realism: The Challenge from Stances","authors":"Anjan Chakravartty","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.141","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Epistemic stances are collections of attitudes, values, aims, and policies relevant to assessing evidence, eventuating in belief or agnosticism regarding the output of scientific investigations. If in some cases conflicting stances promoting scientific realism and antirealism, respectively, are rationally permissible, this would seem to undermine the possibility of resolving certain debates between realists and antirealists. In this paper I reply to two concerns about this conception of stances, to the effect that: (1) a stance underlying realism is, in fact, rationally obligatory for realists, given certain natural assumptions; and (2) this sort of permissivism would validate pseudoscience and science denialism.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The modern Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics describes an emergent multiverse. The goal of this paper is to provide a perspicuous characterisation of how the multiverse emerges making use of a recent account of (weak) ontological emergence. This will be cashed out with a case study that identifies decoherence as the mechanism for emergence. The greater metaphysical clarity enables the rebuttal of critiques due to Baker (2007) and Dawid and Thébault (2015) that cast the emergent multiverse ontology as incoherent; responses are also offered to challenges to the Everettian approach from Maudlin (2010) and Monton (2013).
现代埃弗雷特对量子力学的解释描述了一个新兴的多元宇宙。本文的目的是利用最近对(弱)本体论涌现的描述，为多元宇宙如何出现提供一个清晰的特征。这将通过一个案例研究来证明，该案例研究将退相干识别为涌现的机制。更大的形而上学清晰度可以反驳Baker(2007)和david and th bault(2015)提出的批评，这些批评将新兴的多元宇宙本体视为不连贯的;作者还对莫德林(2010)和蒙顿(2013)对埃弗里特方法提出的挑战作出了回应。
{"title":"Incoherent? No, Just Decoherent: How Quantum Many Worlds Emerge","authors":"Alexander Franklin","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.155","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The modern Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics describes an emergent multiverse. The goal of this paper is to provide a perspicuous characterisation of how the multiverse emerges making use of a recent account of (weak) ontological emergence. This will be cashed out with a case study that identifies decoherence as the mechanism for emergence. The greater metaphysical clarity enables the rebuttal of critiques due to Baker (2007) and Dawid and Thébault (2015) that cast the emergent multiverse ontology as incoherent; responses are also offered to challenges to the Everettian approach from Maudlin (2010) and Monton (2013).","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"71 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The founder of conservation biology, Michael Soulé, set out a vision for conservation biology that was explicitly value-laden, analogous to cancer-biology. In so doing, he drew on the writings of Aldo Leopold, known among philosophers primarily for his land ethic. Employing and extending the work of Anderson (2004) and Clough (2020), I argue that the Leopoldian views that Soulé was drawing on were the product of the coevolution of descriptive and evaluative beliefs over the course of Leopold’s life, grounded in his experiences, resulting in tested and reliable – albeit defeasible – values underlying conservation biology.
{"title":"The coevolution of descriptive and evaluative beliefs in Aldo Leopold’s thinking","authors":"Roberta L Millstein","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.133","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The founder of conservation biology, Michael Soulé, set out a vision for conservation biology that was explicitly value-laden, analogous to cancer-biology. In so doing, he drew on the writings of Aldo Leopold, known among philosophers primarily for his land ethic. Employing and extending the work of Anderson (2004) and Clough (2020), I argue that the Leopoldian views that Soulé was drawing on were the product of the coevolution of descriptive and evaluative beliefs over the course of Leopold’s life, grounded in his experiences, resulting in tested and reliable – albeit defeasible – values underlying conservation biology.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"76 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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