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Research with captive wildlife in Animal Biosafety Level 2 (ABSL2) and 3 (ABSL3) facilities is becoming increasingly necessary as emerging and re-emerging diseases involving wildlife have increasing impacts on human, animal, and environmental health. Utilizing wildlife species in a research facility often requires outside the box thinking with specialized knowledge, practices, facilities, and equipment. The USGS National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC) houses an ABSL3 facility dedicated to understanding wildlife diseases and developing tools to mitigate their impacts on animal and human health. This review presents considerations for utilizing captive wildlife for infectious disease studies, including, husbandry, animal welfare, veterinary care, and biosafety. Examples are drawn from primary literature review and collective 40-year experience of the NWHC. Working with wildlife in ABSL2 and ABSL3 facilities differs from laboratory animals in that typical laboratory housing systems, husbandry practices, and biosafety practices are not designed for work with wildlife. This requires thoughtful adaptation of standard equipment and practices, invention of customized solutions and development of appropriate enrichment plans using the natural history of the species and the microbiological characteristics of introduced and native pathogens. Ultimately, this task requires critical risk assessment, understanding of the physical and psychological needs of diverse species, creativity, innovation, and flexibility. Finally, continual reassessment and improvement are imperative in this constantly changing specialty area of infectious disease and environmental hazard research.

With the recent upswing of infectious disease outbreaks (coronavirus, influenza, Ebola, etc), there is an ever-increasing need for biocontainment animal use protocols to better address the research of emerging diseases and to increase the health of both animals and humans. It is imperative that we as a research community ensure these protocols are conducted with the utmost scrutiny and regulatory compliance for the welfare of the animals as well as the health and safety concerns of the individual conducting these studies. Both the welfare of the animals and the health and safety of the research staff must be balanced with the integrity of the science being studied. Even prior to reviewing biocontainment protocols, the research stakeholders should have professional and collegial interactions across all levels of the proposed project. These stakeholders should include the attending veterinarian, the principal investigator, the sponsor, and any organic institutional health and safety assets (environmental health and safety, occupational health, biosafety personnel, medical personnel, facilities operations and maintenance, etc). At most institutions, these stakeholders are members of the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and may not possess the necessary tools to properly assess an Animal Biosafety Level 3 and 4 animal use protocol. It is the goal of this article to review some basic concepts of biocontainment, discuss critical communications and preapprovals, clinical observations, medical interventions and supportive care, scientific and study endpoints, euthanasia criteria, animal manipulations, documentation, training, emergency response and contingency plans, security, and decontamination and provide a scenario-based and informative thought-provoking process Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee members and veterinary staff may consider during Animal Biosafety Level 3 and 4 protocol review. These topics will enhance the ability of all stakeholders to balance the protection of the people with the integrity of the science and ultimately the welfare of the animal.

Waste disposal in Agricultural Animal High Containment Animal Biosafety Level 3Ag and Animal Biosafety Level 4Ag (ABSL-3Ag and ABSL-4Ag) research facilities necessitates significantly more attention to detail in operations than that required in lower-containment-level laboratories. The unique features and requirements of agricultural-related research involve additional equipment and systems to safely transfer decontaminated waste out of the facility. The waste stream coming from ABSL-3Ag and ABSL-4Ag facilities, or high containment agricultural research waste, consists of many forms and differs from most research facility waste in that it is produced from research with livestock or other species loose housed, with the animal room serving as primary containment. This is in contrast to small laboratory animals being housed in primary containment caging. Waste handling equipment in agricultural research facilities may include autoclaves, effluent decontamination systems, incinerators, high-temperature renderers, alkaline tissue digester systems, high-efficiency particulate air filtration of exhaust and supply air, gas decontamination systems, and laundry facilities. This article focuses primarily on the disposal of waste from ABSL-3Ag livestock facilities, including procedures and lessons learned over 10 years of facility operation.

The study of many arthropod-borne pathogens requires high biosafety considerations, including the use of specialized facilities and equipment for arthropod containment. Mosquito- and tick-borne viruses such as yellow fever, West Nile, and Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever viruses require facilities that are suitable for housing vertebrates. Multidisciplinary studies that incorporate the vector, vertebrate, and pathogens are essential for a complete understanding of the interactions between these transmission cycle components, especially if they aim to evaluate and model relative susceptibilities of different arthropods and vertebrates to infection and transmission between these. Under laboratory conditions, these studies can be relatively simple, for example, involving colonized arthropods, small animals, and attenuated viruses. Other studies are complex with large animals, high-biocontainment pathogens, and field-collected arthropods. These require a higher level of containment and special design considerations. Both of these types of experiments have their relative merits. A thorough understanding of the issues related to these types of studies and the benefits and drawbacks to using various challenge models will enable the researcher to develop realistic goals for various experiments. This review examines the varied issues that should be considered prior to starting these experiments and covers the basics from the procurement of various arthropods, rearing, high-containment facilities and operational issues specific to work with arthropods, types of infection experiments, and specific issues with arthropod and animal experiments in biosafety levels 3 and 4.

New solutions are necessary for the singular global health security threat formed by endemic, epidemic, and emerging/re-emerging zoonoses, coupled with epizootic and enzootic transboundary animal diseases (TADs). This One Health issue is related to the daily interactions between wildlife, domesticated and indigenous livestock, and humans primarily associated with global trade, transboundary co-movement of humans and diverse livestock/livestock products, and agriculture production intensification and penetration into previously uninhabited areas. The World Health Organization defines Risk Group 3 (RG-3) and RG-4 pathogens as mainly viruses but also bacteria that serve as the foundation for approximately 60% of emerging infectious diseases that are zoonoses. The World Organisation for Animal Health defines trade-notifiable TADs, and subsets of these are zoonotic. Livestock vaccination policies mainly focus on TADs that are promulgated by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and government agriculture agencies. The development, licensure, and product manufacturing of next-generation molecular-based RG-3 and RG-4 veterinary vaccines largely ignored by the global animal health biopharmaceutical sector can have an important positive impact on food security and One Health. There have been sharp increases in the global demand for livestock meat and milk products, especially in low- and middle-income countries in Africa and Asia. This relatively recent market driver-coupled with scientific advances in human EID and zoonotic disease vaccine platform technologies and increases in the number of high (US biosafety level 3 agriculture) and maximum (US animal biosafety level 4) biocontainment facilities with supporting workforce capabilities-offers new investment opportunities to the animal health biopharmaceutical sector. Moreover, a growing number of One Health public-private partnerships have moved the net present value calculus in favor of the financial feasibility of RG-3 and RG-4 veterinary vaccine product development and licensure. This article highlights the challenges and opportunities in the use of high and maximum biocontainment facilities in developing and licensing RG-3 and RG-4 veterinary vaccines that are safe and effective against epizootic and enzootic TADs and zoonotic diseases.

Research animals models infected with Biosafety Level-3 (BSL-3) agents need to be housed in specialized biocontainment caging. Most of these specialized cages have input and exhaust that is high efficiency particulate air filtered and sealed to prevent escape of the BSL-3 agent. An alternative to the use of the above BSL-3 biocontainment caging is the use of a flexible film or modified semi-rigid plastic film isolator that has its own high efficiency particulate air-filtered input and exhaust and is sealed with respect to the animal room environment, thus preventing BSL-3 agent escape. Standard caging can be housed within such an isolator. Computational fluid dynamics was used to evaluate the integrity of modified semi-rigid isolators for containment of aerosolized BSL-3 agents. Three isolators were located inside an animal BSL-3 room to provide an extra tier of protection and to permit different infectious studies within the same room while reducing or eliminating the risk of cross-contamination. The isolators were sized to house caging for rabbits and smaller non-human primates such as marmosets, African greens, and macaques. Multiple case studies of failure scenarios were investigated, including isolator breaches through the plastic membrane seam separation and rips, and exhaust fan failure. Breaching the level of containment provided by the isolators required the improbable simultaneous event of a plastic membrane rip in addition to the rare malfunction of the back-up exhaust fans. Each isolator was equipped with 2 blower motors connected in parallel to a common exhaust plenum and a battery backup. Even with this rare double (simultaneous) event, the animal BSL-3 room air exhaust system was able to contain the few droplets released in the simulated computational fluid dynamics breach. The modified semi-rigid isolators with negative airflow proved safe and effective for aerosol studies using BSL-3 agents, even in the unlikely event of a breach in containment.

Institutions that conduct high-containment agricultural research involving domestic livestock represent a specialized category of programs that are accredited by AAALAC International. The accreditation process includes a comprehensive assessment of the overall program of animal care and use. However, the complex design of these facilities and the unique care required for animals in this type of environment often mean that additional attention will be directed at areas regarded as higher risk when the programs are evaluated. Specific issues that may stimulate additional discussion and interest include animal housing practices, environmental conditions inside the facility, maintenance of procedure and support areas, methods for obtaining and safely transporting healthy research animals, strategies to minimize animal pain and distress, unusual protocol review challenges, and institutional policies relevant to personnel training and safety. These issues are further discussed to inform institutions of potential concerns that should be reviewed and assessed during internal preparations for accreditation visits by AAALAC site visit teams.